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The Cultural Shock faced by Syrian Refugees in Germany

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Abstract

In a world full of violence and conflicts, worldwide figures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees show that there are 68.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, 25.4 million of which are refugees. Germany is one of the largest recipients of Syrian refugees since the Syrian crisis. The influx of refugees into Germany has led to the rise of populist political parties and a backlash against refugees within host communities. This study examines the effect of cultural shock on refugees, and attempts to find a correlation between culture shock and violent trends in behavior by refugees. A sample of 10 male participants between the ages of 18-35, Syrian of origin in the cities of Hamburg and Berlin were randomly selected to answer a semi-formal questionnaire in order to determine the extent to which there is a correlation between the two variables of culture shock and violent behavior, the independent variable being that the participants were subjected to displacement and have resided in Germany between 2015-2017.

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Chapter 1: General Introduction – The Cultural Shock faced by Syrian Refugees in Germany

1.1 Problem Diagnosis

In a world full of violence and conflicts, worldwide figures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees show that there are 68.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, 25.4 million of which are refugees; half of which are under the age of 18¹. More than half of the world's refugees come from South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria, and the top hosting countries are Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Lebanon, Iran, and Germany². In a speech delivered by Dimitri Avramopoulous in 2015, European Commissioner for migration and Home Affairs and Citizenship, he describes the refugee situation as “the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War,” and Europe as “struggling to deal with the high influxes of people seeking refuge within [the] borders.”³ In recent years, migration flow to the European external borders have dramatically increased mainly targeting Germany, Sweden, France, Greece, Spain and Italy.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that the “global refugee population from Syria has continued to be the largest, reaching 6.5 million and was still growing, having increased by 180,300 in the first half of 2018 alone ⁴. The high rates of violence and uninhabitable condition have left many seeking asylum. In maintaining clarity, it is important to define the term asylum:

“Form of international protection given by a state on its territory. It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his/her country of citizenship and/or residence, in

¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report “Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017”, June 2018

² Ibid

³ Dimitri Avramopoulous, Speech “A European Response to Migration: showing solidarity and sharing responsibility”, 16 August 2015 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5498_fr.htm

⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report “Mid-year Trends- Refugee Statistics”, June 2018.

particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion⁵”.

As per Eurostat, the statistical data office of the European Union, over 1.26 million asylum requests were registered in 2015⁶ amounting to the highest level ever recorded. In placing focus on Germany, the UNHCR reports that the number of refugees steadily increased ranking it the fourth refugee host country within the EU zone in 2018, up from the first in 2015 with a refugee population of 1 million, an increase of “51,300 in the first half of 2018⁷”.

The environment in Europe over the past few years with regards to terrorism and the influx of refugees begs the ‘what came first the chicken or the egg’ question. Over the last few years, several countries across Europe such as France, Belgium, Germany and the UK have been shaken by terrorist attacks and as a result sparking security concerns linked to migration flows. In this context, migration has been framed as a transnational security threat that poses a risk at the European level as it is believed that some terrorists use migratory course to enter Europe. This claim has been raised and manifested as the terroristic activity inspired by Islamic extremist groups have been on the rise in Europe. This issue has been projected mostly after a suicidal bomber; affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant militant group, used a fake Syrian passport to reach France through Greece and the Balkans⁸. Following this incident, several anti-migrants right wing movements dramatically dominated the political theatre. Prominent figures such as Marine Le Pen, leader of French right wing National Front was the first to extend populist demands calling for the “immediate halt of all intakes of migrants in France.” In regards to Germany, PEGIDA, which stands for the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West, joined the stance. Siegfried Dabritz, leader of the organization expressed his opinion on the Paris attacks as “the result of an

⁵ “Asylum Statistics.” Asylum Statistics - Statistics Explained, Eurostat, 2019, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Main_countries_of_destination:_Germany,2C_France_and_Greece.

⁶ Eurostat, “Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015”, 4 March 2016 <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/>

⁷ “Asylum Statistics.” Asylum Statistics - Statistics Explained, Eurostat, 2019, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Main_countries_of_destination:_Germany,2C_France_and_Greece.

⁸ Marcus Walker and Noemie Bissrbe, “Paris stadium attacker got to Europe using fake Syrian Passport”, Wall Street Journal, 16 November 2015 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-stadium-attacker-entered-europe-via-greece-1447698583> (consulted on 1 May 2017)

immigration policy that invited people from completely foreign cultures with completely different values into countries and regions, whose culture many of these immigrants despise⁹.”

Not only the fear of terrorism, but also of crime by foreigners dominated: It has been claimed by AFD, which stands for the rise of Alternative for Germany – a far right–wing Populist Party – that there is a “link between the influx of migrants and a rise in crime¹⁰”. Images show that ‘murders have increased ‘by 14.6% and rapes by 8% between 2014 and 2016¹¹’. This claim has been supported by the German interior ministry which reported that in 2018 “447 figures refer to killings or attempted killings by all asylum seekers and refugees, most of whom are in Germany legally¹²”, indicating that there is a trend in rising crime correlated to the influx of refugees in Germany.

Regardless of the social impacts refugees have locally and regionally in Europe, the impact of the Syrian civil war has been devastating on numerous levels. Various refugees lost their loved ones, witnessed violence, had their houses destroyed, experienced detention, or suffered war-related injuries. Under these circumstances, and in purpose of seeking safety, refugees find themselves forcibly pushed into new environments holding totally different beliefs, values and norms. As a result, number of refugees develop trauma throughout three different levels: pre–fleeing, while fleeing, and upon arrival to the country of resettlement that might swamp their capacity to cope in new environments. A report issued by the PubMed Central claims that refugees who have fled from war zones are at significant increased risk for post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and other trauma-related disorders, which might lead to dysfunctional behaviors that impair their ability to cope with social and/or family life.¹³ Adding up to this, as originating from rural areas, some refugees come with limited linguistic, educational and financial resources, and as such might find a challenge to easily integrate into industrialized Western communities such as Germany.

⁹ BBC NEWS, “Reality Check: Are migrants driving crime in Germany?”, BCC NEWS, 13 September 2018, 16 November 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419466> .

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ PubMed Central, Report “Psychosocial problems in traumatized refugee families: overview of risks and some recommendations for support services” 11 January 2018
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5765601/#CR6>

Consequently, some refugees might experience a set of negative emotions with symptoms of: confusion, anxiety, fear and depression. that might not only hinder their integration process, but also fuel them to commit acts of violence due to their inability to manage their personal challenges resulting from the cultural shock they experience once resettled. The literature surveys various studies which lead to a homogeneous conclusion; violent internal conflicts ultimately lead to psychosocial traumas on individuals. These trends can be traced back to the early 1990s, with studies conducted by Newman, Dudley and Steel, Humpage and Martson¹⁴ of asylum seekers in Australia reported the psychological damage of refugees which included over 15,000 children and adults in 1992.¹⁵ The Global Child Protection Group has conducted studies in 2014 which states that around 98% of Syrian children showed “deterioration in their psychological well-being”¹⁶. According to studies conducted on trauma’s experienced from migration, Jabbar and Zaza outline that these fears are due to “fear of direct violence in home communities, displacement and lack of a sense of belonging, lack of access to education, and lack of recreation and play”.¹⁷

The process of forced migration is a prolonged process that occurs in several phases, with each phase uniquely affecting the psychological well-being of a refugee. Fazel and Stein use a three-phased model that tracks the refugee migration experience and was previously adapted to refugees in the United Kingdom.¹⁸ The three phases are divided into the pre-flight, flight, and resettlement phase. The pre-flight phase looks at the duration of time that is spent by refugees in their home country before forcefully fleeing to another country, the flight phase observes the period of time in which the refugee is displaced and the duration in which they travel in order to reach their safety zone, and resettlement observes the period which the refugee arrives to their destination. Each phase according to this model inflicts the refugee with certain stressors, which later manifest into specific traumas, depending to what the refugee was exposed to. The resettlement phase exposes

¹⁴ Lacroix, Marie and Al-Qdah Talal, “Iraqi refugees in Jordan: lessons for practice with refugees internationally”, in *European Journal of Social Works*, Routeledge, 08 June 2011, Vol.15, No.2, pp.223-239.

¹⁵ Newman, Louise K. et. al, “Asylum, Detention, and Mental Health in Australia”, in *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Oxford University Press, 2008, Vol. 27, No.3, pp. 110-127, Available at <http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/3/110.abstract?sid=db006c51-a298-4f57-916a-3b1c34fb053a>.

¹⁶ Abdel Jabbar, Sinaria and Zaza, Haidar Ibrahim, “Impact of conflict in Syria on Syrian children at the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan”, in *Early Child Development and Care*, Routeledge, 02 June 2014, Vol. 184, Nos. 9-10, p. 1507-1530, Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03004430.2014.916074>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Fazel, M., and Stein, A., “The mental health of refugee children”, in *Archives of Diseases in Childhood*, 25 July, 2002, Vol. 87, Iss. 5, pp. 366-370, Available at doi:10.1136/adc.87.5.366.

refugees to “culture shock” or what Fazel and Stein refer to as “secondary trauma”. This shock or trauma is highly related to the harshness of getting asylum protection in the receiving country. The latter highly depends on policies that are issued by that state and the refugee has to endure the stress of being let in, and secondly have to undergo the process of integration into an alien society. The refugee is expected to adopt to the cultural norms of that state, which ultimately presents a new set of stressors that are detrimental to the psychological well-being of the refugee. “Cultural shock” entails surviving in a country that has dissimilar values, norms, traditions and language than the country of origin the refugee belongs to¹⁹.

Research shows that for some people traumatic experiences are directly related to future perpetration of violence as painful events affect multiple areas of functioning, including emotion, cognition, social interaction, and behavior²⁰. People with histories of trauma- particularly males - are at heightened risk for developing a personality disorder, and engaging in antisocial conduct, including violent acts²¹. Consequently, unmanageable tension and anxiety would make a person highly irritable and unable to tolerate frustration of any kind which thereby leads to reduced control over impulsive and aggressive behavior²². The Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture claims that refugees may experience signs of anxiety, guilt and shame over their experiences which could lead to aggression²³. It suggests that the psychological effects of experiencing the normalization of violence may be a contributing factor for violence including family violence²⁴.

On the other hand, the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) announced that crimes committed by refugees stood at the same level as those committed by native Germans.²⁵ A study in 2016 into German attitudes about asylum seekers shows that 49.6 percent of those surveyed indicated negative attitudes towards asylum seekers.²⁶ It has been recorded that attacks

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Daniel J Neller and John Matthew Fabian, Research “Trauma and its contribution to aggressive behavior”, Winter 2006-07 <https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/09627250608553387.pdf>

²¹ Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture, Manual “Rebuilding Shattered Lives”, June 1998 https://www.foundationhouse.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Rebuilding_Shattered_Lives_Complete.pdf

²² *Ibid*

²³ The Australian, “Refugee Trauma Linked to Domestic Violence”, 2 July 2015 <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/immigration/refugee-trauma-linked-to-domestic-violence/news-story/f18fda946060328eb94ff3b47933c4f7>

²⁴ *Ibid*

²⁵ DW, Report “Refugees have not increased crime rate in Germany”, 13 November 2015 <https://www.dw.com/en/report-refugees-have-not-increased-crime-rate-in-germany/a-18848890>.

²⁶ The Local, Report “German attitudes towards asylum seekers increasingly hostile”, 25 April 2019 <https://www.thelocal.de/20190425/german-attitudes-towards-asylum-seekers-increasingly-hostile-report>

against asylum seekers and people of ‘foreign’ appearance have been frequent throughout much of the former German communist east.²⁷ The researchers, looking at ‘hate crime’ incidents from 2013 to 2015, found that new asylum seeker arrivals were ten times more likely to be attacked in former East Germany than they were in the former West.²⁸ Lange argue that the increase in hate crime is linked to xenophobic attitudes which have already existed in the eastern regions, and are now become more entrenched.²⁹ In assessing those facts, one might argue that violent crimes resulting from the mismanagement of refugee integration and culture shock inevitably lead to a destabilized and unsafe living environment. Therefore, the latter being a major factor in the rise of populism in Germany.

1.2 Relevance of the work and research goals:

The subject of the integration of inhabitants with migration’s background was permanently a special research field for the German scholars since 1950’s. But a new gap in the research field has been opened after 2015 with a mass migration phenomenon. Although Germany was one of the most receptive countries towards refugees in comparison to other European countries, the refugees’ crises has become a heated debate within the host society as it has disturbed the social balance and has played an important role in fueling the rise of populism³⁰. Some few perpetrators with migration backgrounds had committed crimes and murders; even if such incidents were relatively few in numbers, right wing parties clearly benefited from those stories and fed their ambitions by fueling frustration and insecurity towards refugees.

In March 2016, the transformation in the electoral taste was recorded when local elections took place in three German states (*Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt*). While Angela Merkel’s Party experienced painful downfall, polls indicate that the right wing, Alternative for Germany Party, achieved gains in all three states³¹. Alternative for Germany Party

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ See: <https://qz.com/1050086/populist-anger-in-germany-isnt-about-smashing-the-elite-its-purely-about-immigrants/>

³¹ BBC, “Angela Merkel's CDU suffers German state election setbacks”, 13 March 2016
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35796831>

did not only pushed some voters of mainstream parties to switch but also mobilized previous non-voters³². This anti-Merkel vote, reflect opposition to her controversial [Willkommenspolitik](#) towards refugees³³. This indicates that the ongoing refugees crises has the power to alter the dynamics of the German political scene. The subject of migration in Germany will shake up the political scene for many years to come and might cause significant modifications in electoral preferences. The lack of cohesion between refugees and local nationals has led to a rise in crime rates. Hence, this master thesis is of political and scientific relevance as it would explore the extent to which there is a direct correlation between culture shock of refugees resulting from lack of assimilation within Germany and the rise of populism within political parties relating to this specific context. This research will also propose recommendations that aid in refugee assimilation in order to foster German social cohesion and can possibly impact populist political agenda targeting refugees.

1.3 Central guiding questions, hypothesis

1.3.1. Research Questions

This thesis will confront several main questions:

- How do cultural, historical, and social differences of Syrians from Germans can lead to personal challenges that might hinder the integration in industrialized societies such as Germany?
- Does the lack of integration lead to the rise of populism?

1.3.2 Hypotheses

The main hypothesis that will be explored in this thesis will be based on Fazel and Stein's Three-Phased Model of Forced Migration³⁴. Fazel and Stein's theoretical model will be used as a basis of assessing the trauma inflicted upon refugees in the 'resettlement' phase; predominantly culture

³² The Guardian, "What the stunning success of AfD means for Germany and Europe", 24 September 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/24/germany-elections-afd-europe-immigration-merkel-radical-right>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid. Fazel and Stein.

shock. The model stipulates direct psychological trauma correlated with resettlement without proper integration, which can lead to aggressive and violent behavior. The latter hypothesis will be used to assess the correlation between violent behavior resulting from trauma and the rise of populism in Germany.




Figure 1: The Three -Phased Model of Forced Migration³⁵

The second model that will be used to track the adaptation and acculturation of refugees will be the two-dimensional model of Berry on acculturation³⁶, which renders four different outcomes that refugees might experience after culture shock, depending on where they fall on the high-low scale referred to in Table 2 of Chapter 3.³⁷ The combination of the latter two models, alongside the questionnaire given to the sample of respondents will determine the following:

- Whether there is a correlation between culture shock and violent acts
- Whether there is a correlation between trauma and culture shock
- The correlation between trauma, culture shock, and integration

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Wimmer, Heinz and Levent Kiylioglu. "the Relationship between Immigration, Acculturation and Psychological Well-being the Case of Turkish Youth in Austria." *Nesne-Psikoloji Dergisi*3, no. 5 (2015): 1-19.

³⁷ Ibid.

1.3.3 Timeline

This thesis will specifically address the rise of migration of Syrian refugees into Germany between the years of 2015 and 2019 in relation to the rise of documented populism in Germany between 2015 to 2017³⁸.

1.3.4 Limitations

This research will particularly focus on exploring the assumed cultural shock and its effect on social cohesion and populism faced by Syrian refugees who resettled to Germany after 2015. The sample is limited to participants in two main cities: Hamburg and Berlin. Under the umbrella of exploring trauma after forced migration, it is important to underline the concerns and challenges related to the reception in Germany, legal status of refugees, legal/illegal entrance, or asylum seeking procedures. Migration is a broad topic and as such not all aspects related to this matter will be explored in this research work. Furthermore, issues related to the EU's migration policy and legislative documents of different EU agencies are topics beyond the scope of this research and will not be analyzed. In addition, this research work will only target Syrian refugees, and not refugees or migrants from other countries such as Yemen, Libya or Afghanistan. Finally, due to the fact that I don't speak German, access to information or sources provided in German is another limitation for my work.

1.4. Method of inquiry and structure of the work.....

1.4.1 Methodology

The method applied to answer the questions of this research is based on a qualitative research. The research will firstly assess political trends from secondary sources to track the evolution of populist political parties from 2015-2017. The qualitative research will be conducted on a sample of 10 Syrian refugee men between the ages of 18-35, five of which live in Hamburg and five of which live in Berlin. The interviews will be semi-structured in order to leave room for open-ended

³⁸ See: <https://qz.com/1050086/populist-anger-in-germany-isnt-about-smashing-the-elite-its-purely-about-immigrants/>.

responses from the refugees. Furthermore, at the end of the research period, participation in conferences related to migration and Populism might take place in an attempt to gather more information. Finally, under certain circumstances, as a former employee at UNHCR, I will draw from my personal experience in interviewing Syrian Refugees in Lebanon to support my arguments.

1.4.2 Structure

Following this introductory chapter, the thesis will include four main chapters. The first chapter will firstly outline the history of migration in Germany, and give a vital background related to the historical and social background of Syrian refugees in the context of religion and ethnicity. Both communities will be compared particularly in terms of beliefs and norms. Then, the second chapter will address a basic comprehension of the plight faced by refugees and the trauma experienced throughout three levels: pre-fleeing, while fleeing and upon arrival to the country of resettlement. The phenomena of cultural shock and its general consequences will be addressed. Then, the third chapter will explain the process of cultural shock, its causes, effects and will look into the cultural shock impact on refugee's integration will also be addressed. Finally, the thesis will end in the fourth chapter by examining the reaction of voters in Germany to the refugee situation and the results from interviews will be reported and a summary and some recommendations which would help foster social cohesion within the German territory will be discussed.

1.5 Definitions and Theory:

In a research work like the following, it is necessary to identify the definitions of certain key terms which will be often used throughout the study.

1.5.1 Refugee

The term refugee in this paper will refer to the United Nations Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees definition to the latter which states that “Any person who by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, membership in a particular social group or political opinion (a) is outside his country of origin or nationality and is

unable or unwilling by reason of such fear, to return to or avail himself of the protection of that country, or (b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of his former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to return to that country³⁹". The term refugee will describe any Syrian person who arrived to Germany after 2015, and will include both, the ones who were granted with the status, and the ones who were not. Therefore, the term "refugee" refer to a person who sought protection in Germany in an attempt to acquire a permanent residence due to the threat or persecution he/she might face if they return back to Syria.

1.5.2 Host Society

The term host society will be used in this paper to refer to the German community, organizations as well as the lifestyle endorsed by most of the Germans.

1.5.3 Cultural Shock

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines cultural shock as a sense of confusion and uncertainty sometimes with feelings of anxiety that may affect people exposed to an alien culture or environment without adequate preparation⁴⁰. In this paper, cultural shock would refer to the stress that refugees experience when they enter the German society that may cause worry, fear, anxiety or depression.

1.5.4 Populism

It is challenging to define the term "populism" as this term has been used to refer to political parties, leaders, movements, and ideologies across historical and geographical circumstances. Therefore, it is important to advance populism from a theoretical point of view, and analyze whether the term is accurate to use within the German argument based on empirical findings that will be introduced throughout the research work.

³⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mandate "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees", 1951 <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>

⁴⁰ Merriam Webster Dictionary, Dictionary, 1932 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture%20shock>

- A.** As a cultural and social plan of action, ‘integration’ of the Syrian refugees in Germany will be the main theoretical framework of this research. According to Marascuilo and Dagenais, integration is the “realization of equal opportunity by deliberate cooperation and without regard to racial or rather social barriers⁴¹”. On the other hand, other scholars evaluated integration in terms of economic participation. According to Banki, integration refers to the "ability of a refugee to participate with relative freedom in the economic and communal life of the host region⁴²". Other scholars addressed the idea of social integration such as Blau who believes that the degree of social integration of certain individuals would be dependent on how do they interact with the members of dominant groups, and how would they respond to conflicts that might occur due to the competition with the host society, that might; as a result, hinder the integration process⁴³. In this paper, the degree of difference among the refugees and the host society in terms of language, ethnicity, religion, beliefs and norms will be described. The Three-Phased Forced Migration Model of Fazel and Stein will be the central theory and framework that will construct the foundation of this thesis. The Three-Phased Model, alongside primary data from qualitative interviews can draw a direct correlation between trauma experienced from resettlement and violent behavior.
- B.** Numerous scholars have proposed that Germany's Nazi history has made Germans less sensible to xenophobia than other countries within Europe. However, just a year after announcing opening the borders for refugees and accepting in more than one million asylum seeker by Angela Merkel, the Christian Democratic Union - *her party*- dropped to the third place in 2016 elections. On the contrary, the anti-migrant Alternative for Germany party assembled around 21 percent of the votes⁴⁴. As a result to the rise of AfD’s admiration, Merkel began advocating strict anti-Islamist measures, such as banning

⁴¹ Leonard Marascuilo and Henry Dagenais , “The meaning of the word "integration" to seniors in a multi-racial high school” in *The Journal of Negro Education*, 1974, p.179-189

⁴² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Working Paper “Refugee integration in the intermediate term: A study of Nepal, Pakistan, and Kenya”, 2004

⁴³ Peter Blau, “A Theory of Social Integration” in the *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1960, p. 546-556 <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/222785>

⁴⁴ The Telegraph, “Germany’s far-right AfD hands defeat to Angela Merkel’s party in key regional vote”, 4 September 2016 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/09/04/germanys-far-right-afd-unseats-angela-merkels-party-in-key-regio/>

Muslim women from donning the full veil in public⁴⁵. Consequently, the Germans response put this theory into doubt. The topic of the refugees crises has been a major issue in Germany, and has been placed on several governmental and elections campaigns. As such, it will be important to define populism since it will guide the researcher to reflect on the matters of fact. Jan-Werner Müller refers to populism as the exclusion form of identity politics based on a well-built definition of “the people” which does not include minority groups, foreigners and immigrants⁴⁶. Consequently, I will use this theory to analyze the fact of the rise of populism in Germany.

⁴⁵ The New York Times, “Angela Merkel Calls for Ban on Full-Face Veils in Germany”, 6 December 2016 <https://www.newyorktimes.com/2016/12/06/world/europe/merkel-calls-for-ban-on-full-face-veils-in-germany.html>

⁴⁶ The World Bank, “What is this thing called ‘populism’: Jan- Werner Müller hoes the weeds” 12 January 2016 <http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/what-thing-called-populism-jan-werner-m-ller-hoes-weeds>

Chapter 2- Recent migration trends in Germany

2.1 A brief history of migration in Germany

Germany has always been considered a country with a migration background. During the past few years, the number of people migrating into Germany has risen tremendously. In 2005, 15.3 million people had a migration background, which was around 19% of the total population, 19.5 % of the population were migrants in 2011, and this percentage continued to increase in 2013 to reach 20.5% roughly.⁴⁷ People with a migration background were defined by the Statistical Federal Office as those “who moved to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949”.⁴⁸ Despite the increase in the migration rate into Germany, several factors forced hundreds of people to leave the country over the centuries due to religious conflicts, incessant wars, and political grievances, which caused an enormous loss in the land’s relative population. It was estimated that around six million emigrants left the German lands between 1820 and 1920.⁴⁹ However, as Germany witnessed economic success during the industrial era in 1890, the number of people immigrating to Germany exceeded that who left. Foreign laborers were lucky to find employment in the booming cores of steel industries and steel. People were always in motion even during 1945, especially with the forced mobility of various groups of people which affected the structure of the German population. This resulted in confessional and socio-cultural differences, which caused diverse disputes in the country. Although immigration figures persisted to be modest during the 1980s, the numbers quickly grew again through the early 1990s.⁵⁰

The year of 2005 witnessed a new immigration law that came into effect, in which Germany announced itself as a country of immigration that defines “integration” as a legal duty. That period of time observed a legal requirement to learn German language courses. As Germany gave itself the integrative character, the figures of migrating people became more evident; 23% of the applicants came from Syria in 2014, and this percentage increased to 24.6% in 2015⁵¹. Because a

⁴⁷ Ostrand, N. (2015). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, 3(3), 255-279.
doi:10.14240/jmhs.v3i3.51

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Khoury, S. J. (2018). Factors that impact the sociocultural adjustment and well-being of Syrian refugees in Stuttgart – Germany. *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling*, 47(1), 65-80.
doi:10.1080/03069885.2018.1520196.

⁵¹ Ostrand, N. (2015). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

considerable number of asylum seekers was from countries outside of Europe, among all immigrants, the share of citizens from the European Union was only around 40%, while Syria surpassed Romania and Poland by being the main country of origin of immigrants into Germany. However, in comparison to Turkey and Lebanon, Germany offers asylum to very few people, especially that German communities and cities are seldom prepared for the emergence of refugees and are not very adapted to the cultural and social differences with immigrants⁵².

2.2 Social and historical background of Syrian Refugees

As this thesis discusses the status of Syrian refugees in Germany, it is important to shed light on the Syrian crisis that started in 2011. The Syrian conflict that occurred between Bashar al-Assad's government and other forces has caused displacement within Syria and across the region. The Syrian refugee crisis is considered, to date, as the most severe refugee crisis since World War II. Around 7.6 million people were internally displaced by the end of 2014, and an estimate of 3.7 million Syrians have left the country since the initiation of the conflict.⁵³ While massive numbers of Syrian refugees were hosted by Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, Syrians are progressively looking forward to attaining protection outside the regional countries as well. It is considerable to state that the majority of Syrian refugees who are currently leaving Syria and heading towards countries in Europe after enduring a 4-year severe civil war are Sunni Muslims of middle class. According to statistics, 40% of arriving Syrians have attained either higher education or upper level secondary education. Several people of those departing Syria at present used to have jobs and homes in their country of residence.⁵⁴

Consequently, hundreds of Syrians, even those whose status continued to be relatively safe during the war, look forward to a better access to education and standard of living for their children and themselves. With hundreds of thousands of Syrians fleeing to Europe, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, has come under exceptional scrutiny. Germany have welcomed Syrians while most European countries have adopted a doubtful attitude towards the refugees. One might question why is Germany choosing a welcoming attitude at a time when the rest of Europe still seems to be dragging its feet in tackling the Syrian crisis?

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

2.3 Behind the differences of both communities

Being the most dominant economy in the EU, Germany has both the organizational and financial capacity to take action in the problems related to Syrian refugees. With Germany being the principal sponsor of the EU project, Germany's economic power has assigned it as a successful country in assuming multiple political, economic, and social responsibilities in Europe.⁵⁵

Furthermore, as the German population continues to age, the country's developing economy continues to be in need of an active workforce. It happens that most of the Syrians fleeing into Germany have proved the ability to walk hundreds of kilometers to their diverse destinations in Europe and are fairly, well-educated, young generations.⁵⁶ Germany considers that the involvement of young Syrians who are reasonably educated, with functional English language, will definitely contribute to the recharging of the diminishing German workforce. Not only does the Syrian impulse boost the labor market, but also is regarded as a factor of demographic coup, since healthy, educated, and motivated Syrians join the ageing society, which provides a much-needed youthful uplift. For instance, most of the newly arriving Syrians in Munich are in their 20s and 30s and portray significant range of aspirations and qualifications, despite language barriers.⁵⁷

During the wake of the Syrian civil war, the term "welcome culture" displayed a characteristic of Germany's official response to the numerous refugees arriving to the country in 2015.⁵⁸ Such a response not only calls for welcoming refugees, but also accepts them and encourages the civil society to support the integration of refugees. However, several observers agree that the political and societal perspectives of Germany on welcoming refugees has shifted during 2017 when the general elections occurred. Talks about "refugee crisis" and local "refugee ceiling" were hot topics that are now established in media, politics, and everyday language. It is undeniable that the dramatic rise in migrants to Germany challenges the country's capacity to incorporate refugees. The fact that the country has started originating procedures to take in refugees only in 2015, despite that the German economy is well-fit, does not necessarily mean that

⁵⁵ Liebe, U., Meyerhoff, J., Kroesen, M., Chorus, C., & Glenk, K. (2018). From welcome culture to welcome limits? Uncovering preference changes over time for sheltering refugees in Germany. *Plos One*, 13(8). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0199923

⁵⁶ Project, B. (2019, April 24). Difficulties Faced by Syrian Refugees in Germany. Retrieved from <https://borgenproject.org/syrian-refugees-in-germany/>

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Liebe, U., Meyerhoff, J., Kroesen, M., Chorus, C., & Glenk, K. (2018).

the country can maintain the welcoming attitude. For instance, Germany spent around €16 billion on migrants in 2015.⁵⁹ Despite that German policy makers make efforts to maintain the balance between the political will of the ruling parties and citizens' demands, there still exists significant figures of German citizens who support anti-immigrant movements. This gap between the will of German citizens and the politicians displays a considerable difference between the social and political reactions in the country that is worthwhile observing. For instance, numbers of violent incidents directed towards refugees has increased lately because a portion of German citizens believe that the massive influx of refugees into their country may induce problems for their religious and cultural identities.⁶⁰

The responses to the Syrian refugee crisis have been composed by Germany through the different demographic changes and economic situations, and mainly through socio-political systems and historical backgrounds which are both related to the ideals and norms of the states and the citizens. This is why the success of the political responses is not merely defined by how well the economic resources are provided; the issue is also related to the culture, norms, and identities of these two societies.⁶¹ Syrian refugees in Germany are forced to adapt with the new norms and rules, and are expected to at least accept them for themselves, as they will become part of their identity, even after going back to their country. Such a newly developed lifestyle would also affect their future interests. In return, Syrian refugees have become one of the most significant agents in influencing the lives of the citizens and politics in Europe, and in Germany in particular. Although Syrians benefit a lot from what they receive in Germany, the stressors associated with the displacement into a country whose culture and language vastly differs from their own have their significant impact on the wellbeing and adjustment of the refugees.⁶² Studies have shown that the acquisition of the host language was one of the major predictors of refugees' sociocultural adjustment.⁶³ Although the German language is a bit uneasy to learn, language barriers are not

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Khoury, S. J. (2018). Factors that impact the sociocultural adjustment and well-being of Syrian refugees in Stuttgart – Germany.

⁶² Project, B. (2019, April 24). Difficulties Faced by Syrian Refugees in Germany. Retrieved from <https://borgenproject.org/syrian-refugees-in-germany/>

⁶³ Liebe, U., Meyerhoff, J., Kroesen, M., Chorus, C., & Glenk, K. (2018). From welcome culture to welcome limits? Uncovering preference changes over time for sheltering refugees in Germany.

unique to Germany, and they do cause a well-defined challenge.⁶⁴ The German government has successfully taken several steps to decrease the language barrier issue, but the problem still exists since the German education system and the certification training system is a bit complex and requires a level of German language proficiency. Although Germany offers language schooling, the challenge remains of a longer-term character that is to make sure that the language policies are effective and consequently offer a directional path for people to get integrated into the economy as well.

⁶⁴ Khoury, S. J. (2018). Factors that impact the sociocultural adjustment and well-being of Syrian refugees in Stuttgart – Germany.

Chapter 3- Cultural Shock and Trauma of Refugees

3.1. Assessing the plight and trauma experienced by refugees

Assessments regarding the psychological paradigm in humanitarian organizations and international law was not seen in literature until post-1990s, which sought the emergence of various inter-state conflicts that caused violence and displacement. Therefore, the psychological paradigm was introduced in the 20th century as a medium that assesses international conflict and the effects of such conflict. Research regarding psychology relating to war zones can be traced back to the early 1900s with the First World War. During World War I, violence and atrocities were committed in large scales, whereby both soldiers and civilians were exposed to what was known as ‘shell shock’⁶⁵.

Research shows that the harsh conditions and the nature of weapons used at the time reported to cause psychological damage to soldiers, such as delusions and hallucinations⁶⁶. British psychologist, Dr. Charles Myers in his research of psychological trauma of militant combatants in World War I founded that such symptoms were results of “repressed trauma”.⁶⁷ With the evolution of warfare, conflicts, and military equipment used, future wars fought on large scale such as World War II and the introduction of inter-state conflict⁶⁸ led to displacement, forced migration and eventually resulted in the psychological damage of both soldiers and civilians.⁶⁹ Evolutions in the psychological field and assessment of trauma eventually evolved to formally recognize these traumas to fall under the umbrella of posttraumatic stress disorder, which was officially recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 which states that this trauma results from “natural or man-made disasters, war, torture, or repression”.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Vautravers, Alexandre J. and Hagey, Sara, “The Recognition and Institutionalization of Trauma”, in Psychological Impact of Humanitarian Crises: 14th Humanitarian Conference, Webster University of Geneva, Geneva, 17 Jan. 2011, pp. 18-38.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Edgar, Johnes Dr., “Shell shocked”, in *Monition on Psychology*, American Psychological Association, June 2012, Vol. 43, No. 6, p. 18, available at <http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/06/shell-shocked.aspx>.

⁶⁸ Referencing civil wars in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Yugoslavia and Bosnia.

⁶⁹ Lind, William S., et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct. 1989, <http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html>.

⁷⁰ Anderman, Lisa Francesca, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Cultural Aspects of Trauma”, in *Canadian Psychological Association*, Aug. 2002, Available at <http://www1.cpa-apc.org/Publications/Archives/Bulletin/2002/august/andermannEn.asp>.

According to research conducted by Saber Azam discussed in his findings *The Psychology of Refugees*⁷¹, there are various factors that directly cause trauma to refugees. As highlighted in Chapter 1, there are various phases in the migration according to Fazel and Stein's three-phase model⁷² which a refugee experiences in forced displacement. Azam's research on refugee trauma is similar to Fazel and Stein's, which emphasis placed that trauma is experienced in both the pre and post migratory phases.

Before the flight mode⁷³, refugees begin to develop trauma as they experience loss and violence as they are persecuted due to ethnic, political or religious factors. According to Azam,⁷⁴ these factors initiate the trauma experienced, and the trauma is highly dependent on the country of asylum refugees resettle in. These host communities are meant to provide a safe haven for refugees, however not all host communities are equipped with the infrastructure to provide services such as housing, jobs and counseling for the influx of refugees. The latter results in further destabilization and anxiety in the mindset of the refugee, which has left their home and family behind. In the post-migration phase, Azam draws on other factors that hamper the psychological well-being of refugees, that are "cultural and linguistic in nature"⁷⁵. Refugees settling into host communities encounter various hardships such as being displaced from home and family and recovering from war-related violence. However, assimilation into a new host community which entails different cultural norms, traditions and ways of communication inevitably leads the refugee to result in the phenomena of culture shock.⁷⁶

3.2 Defining cultural shock

According to Ioana Cupsa, cultural shock⁷⁷ "involves a powerful, transformative process that takes place at both the individual and societal levels as important cultural forces are clashing"⁷⁸. This process can be traced back and was coined by anthropologist Kalervo Oberg in 1954 in Rio de

⁷¹ Azam, Saber, "The Psychology of Refugees", *Psychological Impact of Humanitarian Crises: 14th Humanitarian Conference*, Webster University of Geneva, Geneva, 17 Jan. 2011, pp. 132-136.

⁷² Fazel, M., and Stein, A., "The mental health of refugee children", in *Archives of Diseases in Childhood*, 25 July, 2002, Vol. 87, Iss. 5, pp. 366-370, Available at doi:10.1136/adc.87.5.366.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Azam, Saber, "The Psychology of Refugees", pp. 132-136.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Cupsa, Ioana. "Culture Shock and Identity." *Transactional Analysis Journal* 48, no. 2 (2018): 181-191.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Janeiro, and stated it was “an occupational disease of people who have been suddenly transplanted abroad. Like most ailments, it has its own etiology, symptoms, and cure”.⁷⁹ Cultural shock is caused by the sentiment of anxiety that an individual experiences after the loss of all “familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse”⁸⁰ one is accustomed to, such as the mediocre social cues that are used in day to day life. The shock that is experienced is directly related to the impact occurring when encountering a different culture, and when this impact leads to emotional and “cognitive disturbance” when the individuals tries to process the new information presented in the new reality and unfamiliar he is inhibited in. Various recent studies on intercultural contact refer that the term “culture shock” should be looked at ways of how individuals cope to this situation and stress in cultural contact ⁸¹.

The phenomenon of cultural shock in the 21st century cannot be avoided. According to the UNHCR in the *Global trends forced displacement in 2016*⁸², around 65.5 million people are displaced around the world, with one person fleeing from a persecuted space every three seconds. Individuals are thrown into host communities forcibly with having no prior knowledge of this community or its culture. Furthermore, individuals forcibly fleeing for safe haven into alien communities are not mentally equipped for such a harsh transition nor do they know how to interact with this host community. According to Antonio Guterres in 2017 at the World Economic Forum in 2017 in Switzerland,⁸³ he states that it is necessary “to invest in the social cohesion of those societies⁸⁴[...] for people to be able to first of all see their identities valued, but also for people to feel that they belong to the larger community”⁸⁵.

⁷⁹ Oberg K. Culture shock: adjustment to new cultural environments. *Practical Anthropol* 1960; 7:177–182.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² See: <http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/> [Google Scholar]

⁸³ See: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/01/secretary-generals-remarks-at-the-world-economic-forum/>

⁸⁴ Refers to multi-ethnic societies. See <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/01/secretary-generals-remarks-at-the-world-economic-forum/>

⁸⁵ Ibid, par. 14.

3.3 Phases of cultural shock

The literature surveys that there are around four or five stages of cultural shock that have been recognized⁸⁶. Moreover, it has overall been identified that the process of cultural adjustment takes around a year, with its phases and ultimately consequences⁸⁷. Oberg identifies four phases of cultural shock, known as incubation, crisis, recovery and full recovery⁸⁸. Adler on the hand identifies five stages, such as “contact, disintegration, reintegration, autonomy and independence”.⁸⁹ A plethora of authors have surveyed that the stages of the process of culture can be best depicted in U-shaped curve⁹⁰. The latter hypothesis was first developed by Lysgaard⁹¹ in 1955 and later developed by Zapf⁹² in 1993.

Figure 1: U-Curve pattern of adjustment of new culture by Zapf and Lysgaard⁹³




Figure 1 The U-curve pattern of adjustment to a new culture (Modified from Zapf¹³ after Lysgaard¹⁴).

The U-curve above illustrates the overall well-being of individuals when first arriving into the foreign land, with three stages of arrival, settling in, and after the end of the first year. As can be

⁸⁶ Stewart, L. and P. A. Leggat. "Culture Shock and Travelers." *Journal of Travel Medicine* 5, no. 2 (1998): 84-88.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Oberg K. Culture shock: adjustment to new cultural environments. *Practical Anthropol* 1960; 7:177-182.

⁸⁹ Stewart, L. and P. A. Leggat. "Culture Shock and Travelers." P. 85.

⁹⁰ Lysgaard S. Adjustment in a foreign society: Norwegian FuUbrigt grantees visiting the United States. *Int SOC Sc Bull* 1955; 74-51.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Zapf MK. Remote practice and culture shock: social workers moving to isolated northern regions. *Social Work* 1993; 38(6) :694-704.

⁹³ Ibid.

seen from Figure 1, the psychological well-being of the individual is first high, as the individual is excited from experiencing the new culture's surroundings, food, language, and religions. In the second stage of settling in however, the psychological well-being of the individual drops dramatically, as the individual experiences a sense of frustration from not being able to interact with the new culture. After what is estimated to be a period of a year, the individual's psychological well-being is supposed to be elevated as the individual begins to accept the new culture and is able to interact in a meaningful way with others. However, there are cases in which the individual is not able to move on from the 'settling in' stage, in which two things may occur; either the individual returns to one's home country or if unable to do so, "increased isolation may lead to psychiatric illness and suicide".⁹⁴

According to Pedersen⁹⁵, there are five stages of cultural shock: the honeymoon, disintegration, reintegration, autonomy, and interdependence stages. The honeymoon stage creates a sense of excitement, joy and curiosity for refugees and this usually happens between the transition of from death to life situations. In the second stage, "disintegration", the refugee experiences sensations of confusion, disorientation and disconnection from the surroundings of one self. The individual goes on to blame the self for the shortcomings or barriers faced, such as language or communication. This stage can begin with the sentiment of being home-sick or experiences misunderstandings with neighbors or co-workers. The amount of new information the individual has to learn and process is overwhelming and can create a scenario of isolation and withdrawal from interacting with others. Peterson claims that "disintegration" can lead to the beginning of strained relationships with others. In the third stage, "reintegration", there is a strong rejection against the host community from the individual. In this stage, the refugee polarizes everything 'good' to be from their home culture, and everything 'bad' to be from the host community's culture. There are a lot of negative sentiments experienced such as feeling alienated, different and misunderstood from the host community. This stage is very critical, as the individual can move onto the next stage or regress to the one behind. The individual also faces large confusion as to how to return to their sense of identity or creating a new one that can fit into this new host community. This stage is very

⁹⁴ Stewart, L. and P. A. Leggat. "Culture Shock and Travelers." P. 85.

⁹⁵ Pedersen, P. (1995). *The five stages of culture shock: Critical incidents around the world*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

important for the development of a new personal identity. In the fourth stage, autonomy⁹⁶, the individual develops a more sense of independence by being able to balance their life between work, family, and activities in relation to the new culture. The differences between the individual and the host community's culture are seen as "nonthreatening". In this stage, the individual develops independence, awareness of the self and is less dependent. According to Pederson, there is "little of the illusion of the first stage nor the pain of the second stage nor the anger of the third stage but rather a synthesis in a more complex role but also a competent role for the student in the host culture"⁹⁷. Moreover, in this stage there is a more sense of acceptance of the self and by others in the host community. In the last and fifth stage, "interdependence", the individual is able to balance the creation of two selves, the self of their own culture and the new self of the new culture where there is room for new perspectives to be formed. In this stage, the refugee feels at home in the host community culture and has easily integrated their identity into the new one, forming a "multicultural or bicultural identity"⁹⁸. Pederson asserts that in this stage, the refugee attains characteristics of being able to cope in new surroundings and very flexible.

3.4 Cultural Reintegration and Trauma

In relation to cultural integration and reintegration, Dahinden⁹⁹ establishes that there are differences between structural and cultural reintegration. Within structural reintegration, individuals have to integrate within the educational, social and work life of the specific community. On the other hand, cultural reintegration refers to cultural values and norms, which is more difficult to occur. Moreover, if individuals cannot identify with the culture at hand, then it highly affects their willingness to stay or repatriate to their country of origin. Dahinden states that for sustainability to occur, these three aspects have to be addressed thoroughly.¹⁰⁰ Empirical studies conducted by Black, Koser & Munk¹⁰¹ on refugees and voluntary return to home of origin

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 201.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 243.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Dahinden J: Asylkonferenz 2005: "Rückkehr ins Herkunftsland"- wo funktioniert das Konzept (nicht)?.

[<http://www.stadt->

[zuerich.ch/internet/str/home/mandant_manifest/home/asylkonferenz_2005.ParagraphContainerList.ParagraphContainer0.ParagraphList.0009.File.pdf/Referate_Dahinden.pdf](http://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/internet/str/home/mandant_manifest/home/asylkonferenz_2005.ParagraphContainerList.ParagraphContainer0.ParagraphList.0009.File.pdf/Referate_Dahinden.pdf).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Black R, Koser K, Munk K: Understanding voluntary return. Home Office Online Reports. 2004, London: Home Office.

indicate that 53% of participants have psychiatric disorders before returning to their home country, and this percentage increased to 88% after their return.¹⁰² Data showed that there was a direct correlation with the living situation refugees experienced in Germany and their willingness to return home and mental health. However, two-thirds of participants' decisions to return to their home country was not voluntary as they faced deportation.¹⁰³ The literature also stipulates that psychosocial trauma within refugees will consistently immerge, regardless of whether refugees are housed in refugee camps or are in non-camp settings. According to Nasser¹⁰⁴ in a study on Syrian refugees at the Zaatari Camp in Jordan, the environment affects the stressors refugee experience. Inevitably, residing in a non-camp setting has less psychological stressors on a refugee. However, non-camp settings also come with a set of challenges that hamper their psychological well-being. Nasser stipulates that there are seven main challenges that refugees are faced with that can trigger mental disorders:

1. "feelings of loss and longing for their homes (in Syria);
2. perceptions of being discriminated against by host populations;
3. cases of bullying and intimidation;
4. anger;
5. nightmares;
6. victims of child abuse, or witnessing child abuse;
7. constant worry and nervousness."¹⁰⁵

Data collected illustrate that Mental Health and Psychosocial Support¹⁰⁶ personnel can also affect the effectiveness of psychological counseling refugees receive upon arrival to host country or refugee camp.¹⁰⁷ There are three main challenges that can make MPHSS less effective, such as:

1. language barriers between the professionals and patients;
2. cultural stigmatization of psychological disorders. This causes patients to lack any will to participate in counseling or take treatment seriously;

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Nasser, Sabine (2018). The Psychosocial Effects on Traumas of Syrian Women and Children Refugees. In: *Family, Separation, and Migration: An Evolution-Involution of the Global Refugee Crisis*. Volume 28. Peter Lang Publications. P. 239-252.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. P. 248.

¹⁰⁶ Also known as MPHSS

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. P. 249.

3. the terminology used to explain treatment to patients, which is misunderstood by patients.¹⁰⁸

Nasser further stipulates that culture is one of the main barriers that keeps refugees from resettling and assimilating into the new culture. The cultural paradigm thus has to be taken into consideration when examining the refugee issue in relation to the ‘settling in’ phase, that most refugees often cannot immerse from. By placing the refugee in a homogeneous category when arriving into the host country, governmental and non-governmental organizations must incorporate the cultural framework into resettlement programs in order for refugees to surpass the phase of culture shock in order to successfully assimilate into the new culture, and lessen the risk of facing damaging psychiatric issues.¹⁰⁹

According to Fazel and Stein,¹¹⁰ there are certain psychological stressors that refugees experience during the pre-flight, flight, and resettlement phase. The following table provides a brief summary of the stressors that refugees may experience during each phase that can further contribute to the psychological impairment of these individuals.

Table 1: Migration Periods and Psychological Stressors¹¹¹

Migration Period	Stressors
Pre-flight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exposure to combat in conflict zone • Violence • Torture • Loss of family members
Flight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separation between parent and child • Long period of habitation in refugee camps, detention centres, or homelessness
Resettlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-integration with new society • Awaiting asylum, possible deportation • Separation from family • Language barriers • Shift in traditional family dynamics

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. P. 249.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. P. 251.

¹¹⁰ Fazel, M., and Stein, A., “The mental health of refugee children”, in *Archives of Diseases in Childhood*, 25 July, 2002, Vol. 87, Iss. 5, pp. 366-370, Available at doi:10.1136/adc.87.5.366.

¹¹¹ Fazel, M., and Stein, A., “The mental health of refugee children”, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 366-370.

Table 2: Two-dimensional acculturation model of Berry¹¹²

Cultural Adaptation (relationship sought among groups)

		Cultural Adaptation (relationship sought among groups)	
		Low	High
Maintenance of heritage culture	High	Separation	Integration
	Low	Marginalization	Assimilation

The two-dimensional acculturation model of Berry

According to Berry's acculturation model, there are two dimensions of integration, one is based on maintaining cultural identity and the other is based on maintaining and having consistent relationships with other groups.¹¹³ The two-dimensionality of this model leads to a fourfold classification of acculturation, with four different reaction types as seen in Table 2. These reaction types mentioned are the different possibilities of reactions individuals might have to a foreign culture after resettlement. Individuals that originally have a very strong cultural identity but are ready to form bonds with individuals from the host community fall under 'integration'. This individual is able to take characteristics of their own culture and merge them with the ones of the new host community.¹¹⁴ This individual has a higher chance of being alleviated from the 'U-Curve'¹¹⁵ as they will subsequently adopt a multicultural identity. On the other hand, an individual with a strong cultural identity that is not willing to intermingle with the host society will fall under 'separation'. This individual has an ethnocentric view of their culture and rejects the host

¹¹² Wimmer, Heinz and Levent Kiylioglu. "the Relationship between Immigration, Acculturation and Psychological Well-being the Case of Turkish Youth in Austria." *Nesne-Psikoloji Dergisi* 3, no. 5 (2015): 1-19.

¹¹³ Sonja Manz (Author), 2003, Culture Shock - Causes, Consequences and Solutions: The International Experience, Munich, GRIN Verlag, <https://www.grin.com/document/108360>.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Zapf MK. Remote practice and culture shock: social workers moving to isolated northern regions. *Social Work* 1993; 38(6) :694-704.

community. Moreover, individuals with a weak cultural identity will be attracted to the new host culture and will fall under 'assimilation'. The rejection of their culture however, causes a problem for re-integration. Lastly, having a weak cultural identity and bad relations with the host community falls under the 'marginalized' category. These individuals have an identity conflict, as they feel both cultures clash and swing from one culture to another, unsure of how to integrate traits of both together.¹¹⁶

According to Marx,¹¹⁷ the stressors such as anxiety that individuals experience in the adaptation process of resettlement are not negative. Marx stipulates that the extent to which individuals adjust to the new culture is not necessarily correlated to the negative effects of culture shock, but has more to do with the extent to which individuals can cope with these circumstances. The existence of culture shock as a phenomenon is thus inevitable, and is an indicating factor that one has to explore the foreign culture in order to adapt and should be seen as a "positive sign on the road to international adaptation".¹¹⁸ Moreover, according to Furnham and Bochner¹¹⁹, the degrees of culture shock vary from one individual to another, and can be identified within three main categories:

1. Cultural differences: the result of culture shock in this case is due to the differences between the individual's culture and the host community's culture. As there are various differences and similarities between cultures, there are certain cultures that may share similar factors and some on the other hand that have various differences.
2. Individual differences: this looks into the different types of personalities and an individual's ability to handle the new host community's environment. This looks at specific variables such as: sex, socio-economic class, education and age.

¹¹⁶ Sonja Manz (Author), 2003, Culture Shock - Causes, Consequences and Solutions: The International Experience, Munich, GRIN Verlag, <https://www.grin.com/document/108360>.

¹¹⁷ Marx, Elisabeth: "Breaking through culture shock: what you need to succeed in international business"; London, 1999, p. 13

¹¹⁸ Ibid. P. 13

¹¹⁹ Furnham, Adrian/ Bochner, Stephen: "Social difficulty in a foreign culture: an empirical analysis of culture shock" in Bochner, Stephen: "Cultures in contact", Oxford, 1982, p. 161-198, p. 171

3. Sojourn experience: this looks into the types of change in location the individual has the quality of treatment these people get from the host society. The type of treatment received thus impacts the adaptation process.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Ibid. p. 171.

Chapter 4- Voting trends in Germany after 2015 versus Culture Shock

4.1 Theoretical perspectives on voting trends

The literature surveys two main perspectives on citizen's reactions to political party position on a specific issue. According to Zaller¹²¹ and Berinsky¹²², the 'cue-taking' phenomenon stipulates that citizens look up to elites that they trust when they create a certain view-point about an issue. The first school of thought states that elite opinion leadership takes place when political parties "send persuasive messages"¹²³ which then subsequently citizens readjust their views to. These elite cues play predominant role in shaping the attitudes of voters as the relationship built between citizens and elites is based on highly established trust.¹²⁴ On the other hand, the second perspective states that there is a casual relationship between citizens and their policy preference. The higher correlation between the citizen's perspective and the political actors' position on a certain issue, the more chance there is for there to be bias in opinion towards the position itself.¹²⁵ Moreover, researchers have founded a middle ground to these two opposing perspectives, by conducting an issue-based evaluation in order to determine whether political actors are the reason whether citizens find an issue important or whether cue-taking takes prevalence.¹²⁶

4.2 Refugee effect on voters in Germany

According to the study conducted by Mader and Harald¹²⁷ on voting responses in Germany in relation to the refugee crisis, the expectation was that citizens assessed political parties on their attitudes of immigration, rather than leaning towards party cues on immigration. At an individual level, Germans have pre-disposed opinions on immigration prior to the crisis.¹²⁸ The literature generally stipulates that a large majority of citizens in the West have prior conceptions and beliefs

¹²¹ Zaller, John R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹²² Berinsky, Adam J. (2009). In *Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

¹²³ Mader, Matthias and Harald Schoen. "The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters' Responses in Germany." *West European Politics* 42, no. 1 (2019): 67-90. P. 70.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* P. 70

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* P. 71.

towards certain issues that are imbedded into their belief systems.¹²⁹ Previous research and findings have demonstrated that these ‘attitudes’ towards issues are “stable, accessible, and closely related to deep-seated identities”.¹³⁰ As such, it is determined that attitudes towards immigration are not easily altered by elite rhetoric of political actors.¹³¹ It is moreover established that the refugee crisis has been able to transform the competition between political parties within Germany and have allowed for the evolution for a new policy dimension to emerge.¹³² The right-winged Alternative for Germany¹³³ has had the most radicalized in its policies towards cultural demarcation after the 2013 elections, after the substitution of founder Bernd Lucke with Frauke Petry. In relation to the ‘cue-taking’ theorem, it can be stipulated that citizens that already had predisposed impressions on immigration issues, such as being highly critical of the latter, would have more positive attitudes towards AfD on the issue and more critical of CDU’s¹³⁴ policies, which were more embracing towards refugee immigration post Syrian refugee crisis. The literature further surveys and concludes that political parties were forced to take sides on the refugee issue as the issue of immigration is a central one in European identity.¹³⁵ The latter relates to the fact that electoral competition is usually triggered by issue-related events, such as natural disasters, wars, terrorist attacks, economic crises and can affect voters’ attitudes depending on their predisposed opinions on the related issue at hand. Following this line of reasoning, “parties have the potential to lead voters by taking issue positions”.¹³⁶ In the context of the specific issue at hand; immigration, voters will shift their attitudes towards their values, identities, and emotions, rendering it difficult for political parties to influence voters decisions.¹³⁷

¹²⁹ Esses, Victoria M., Geoffrey Haddock, and Mark P. Zanna (1993). ‘Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinants of Intergroup Attitudes’, in Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton (eds.), *Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception*. San Diego: Academic, 137–66. Also see, Sides, John, and Jack Citrin (2007). ‘European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 37, 477–504. Also see, Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior (2004). ‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities’, *American Political Science Review*, 98, 35–49. Also see, Wagner, Ulrich, Julia C. Becker, Oliver Christ, Thomas F. Pettigrew, and Peter Schmidt (2013). ‘A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation’, *European Sociological Review*, 28, 319–32.

¹³⁰ Mader, Matthias and Harald Schoen. "The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters' Responses in Germany." *West European Politics* 42, no. 1 (2019): 67-90. P. 71.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* P. 71.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Known as *Alternative for Deutschland* (AfD).

¹³⁴ Known as the Christian Democratic Union of Germany.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* P. 69.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

4.3 Assessing voter attitudes towards political parties in Germany

According to the empirical study conducted by Mader and Harald,¹³⁸ data shows that public opinion about the refugee and immigration increased in 2015 onwards. The results further show that citizens have “updated their perceptions of party position in accordance to party behavior”.¹³⁹ Moreover, the shift in party allegiance by citizens was not due to their shift in attitudes about the immigration issue. Results show that the CDU deviated from its traditionalist view, that most citizens identified with, to become more open towards immigration policies. Results show a shift in the public perception of the CDU between the summer of 2015 and early 2016. Furthermore, there was a simultaneous shift in the perception of the AfD, which at the time was highly criticizing the government’s refugee and immigration policy.¹⁴⁰ The data clearly illustrates that the shift occurring was not due to cue-taking, but rather a shift of perception of political parties.¹⁴¹ The latter reaffirms that in Germany specifically, ‘real attitudes’ or ‘real demands’ as per Zaller’s theorem were confirmed, and were portrayed in the elections in 2017 federal election. Therefore, “voters responded to the flow of events by changing parties in line with their attitudes towards immigration”¹⁴² that were already pre-existing.

4.4 Concluding Remarks on Voting Trends

Although the study is limited in terms of providing a more detailed analysis of the shift of voters from CDU to AfD, the study clearly demonstrates that citizens’ perception of immigration policy in Germany is independent of external events. The rise of populist parties in Germany such as the AfD is not due to the refugee crisis itself, but due to the misperception that citizens had of CDU and the way the CDU would have approached the refugee influx at hand. Citizens voted for CDU as they were perceived to be a ‘traditionalist’ party, which represented their views and identity. However, the CDU is the changing variable, as it shifted its attitude towards immigration policy,

¹³⁸ Mader, Matthias and Harald Schoen. "The European Refugee Crisis, Party Competition, and Voters' Responses in Germany." *West European Politics* 42, no. 1 (2019): 67-90. P.76

¹³⁹ Ibid. P. 76

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. P. 76

¹⁴¹ Ibid. P. 77

¹⁴² Ibid. P. 77

causing voters to opt for a political party that represented their views. Therefore, in addressing the rise of conservative and preservationist political parties, it can be determined that there exists a correlation between the refugee crisis and the rise of parties like the AfD.

4.5 Findings

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the following questionnaire was delivered to 10 participants in the cities of Berlin and Hamburg. The sample of participants were between the ages of 18-35, all male. Five participants are located in Hamburg and five are located in Berlin. The questionnaire was delivered in Arabic, with the original questionnaire attached in Appendix 2. For the purpose of this thesis, the questionnaire was translated into English as can be seen in Appendix 1.¹⁴³

The responses were between open-ended and simple ‘yes or no’, as no details were needed for the purpose of this study. The questionnaire itself was a compilation of the two models that this study was based on: Fazel and Stein’s model of migration and trauma and Berry’s model of acculturation. Fazel and Stein’s model allowed the questionnaire to have some psychosocial questions, such as looking into anxiety, fear, stress, which are symptoms of ‘pre-flight’, ‘flight’, and ‘resettlement’. This allows for a correlation to be made between trauma and culture shock. Furthermore, Berry’s model of acculturation allowed the questionnaire to have cultural identity and social questions, regarding the sentiments of the individual on assimilation, experiences at work or in public, and desire of return. This allows a correlation to be made between: culture shock and integration and culture shock and marginalization which might have side effects of psychological issues or violent tendencies towards the host society.

Table 3: Overall data findings from questionnaire from sample participants

Sample	10 participants
Median Age	24 years

¹⁴³ All translations of questionnaires and responses from Arabic to English were conducted by the author of this document.

Occupation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unemployed: 60% • Employed: 40% • 2 participants: grocery store clerk • 1 participant: delivery clerk • 1 participant: handy-man/freelance
City of Residence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Berlin: 50%, • Hamburg: 50%
Marital Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20% Married • 80% Single
Children	<p>2 participants:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participant 1: 1 child • Participant 2: 0 children
Family left behind in Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 70% • No: 30%
Time in Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0-3 months: 10% • 3-6 months: 10% • 6-12 months: 40% • 12-18 months: 10% • 18-24 months: 20% • 24-30 months: 10%
Cities relocated within Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60% relocated cities • 2 participants: Berlin • 1 participant: Hamburg • 1 participant: Chemnitz • 1 participant: Cottbus • 1 participant: Pirmasens

Received aid from a INGO or NGO to find an occupation (Y/N)¹⁴⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 70% • No: 30%
Received psychological services upon arrival (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 20% • No: 80%
Received language learning assistance upon arrival (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 90% • No: 10%
Verbal abuse or harassment in the workplace (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 20% • No: 80%
Verbal abuse or harassment in private time(Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 80% • No: 20%
Physical abuse or harassment in the workplace (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 0% • No: 100%
Physical abuse or harassment private time (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 10% • No: 90%
Feelings of distress, anxiety or homesickness since arrival (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 90% • No: 10%
Improvement of symptoms since arrival (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 50% • No: 50%
Return to country of origin (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 30% • No: 70%

¹⁴⁴Responses are in the form of 'yes or no', strictly for data collection


Thoughts of acting in a violent manner towards local population (Y/N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes: 30% • No: 70%
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4.6 Summary of Findings

The findings of the questionnaire have a variety of results that lead to a myriad of conclusions and patterns. Although the demographic of the sample chosen is small and that limits the ability of the study to be overly conclusive, as the sample is minimal compared to the amount of refugees in Syria, it still however portrays a reflection of how culture shock is handled by some individuals and how it affects others. According to the U-Curve, it takes around a year for an individual to get over culture shock and assimilate into the host community’s culture. However, there are certain variables that prevent individuals from integrating or assimilating, leading them to be marginalized even after a year of living within the host community.

The following table shows the results of respondents and the duration of time they have resided in Germany.

Table 4: Time living in Germany



The table shows that overall, a majority of respondents have resided in Germany for more than a year. Only 20% of respondents have resided between 0-6 months, indicating that a limited amount of respondents are still in the ‘honeymoon’ phase of culture shock. Around 50% of respondents have lived in Germany for 6-12 months, indicating that these participants are in the most critical

stages of cultural shock. The remaining 30% of participants have crossed the year mark, and according to the model of acculturation by Berry should have either integrated or are now marginalized. The data shows that 60% have relocated between various cities as seen in Table 3, indicating that this move could be due to sentiments of rejection or inability to assimilate in the first city they move to. Displacement after resettlement is also critical, as sentiments of ‘flight’ might be mimicked again and can lead to psychological issues. This is evident as 90% of the respondents experienced sentiments of anxiety, stress, and homesickness. Although these sentiments were experienced, only 30% show a desire to return home if they had an option to. This can be linked both to participants being assimilated and to the fact that they also have no option of return. A majority of participants are unemployed (60%), indicating the difficulty of their assimilation into the host community and their inability to join the workforce due to certain factors such as not completing their language courses or not being given a job due to discrimination. Although a majority of participants received assistance on arrival, a majority of them remain unemployed and face verbal harassment in their private time. Verbal and physical abuse is non-existent in the workplace as this is an illegal offense. Only 30% of participants have thoughts of acting in a violent manner towards the host community, and the questionnaire responses have shown that these sentiments were expressed by individuals that were unemployed and did not receive language assistance upon arrival.

The purpose of the thesis is to assess the data in relation to the following questions, in order to create a correlation between culture shock and violent behavior of refugees. The following central correlations will be examined:

- Whether there is a correlation between culture shock and violent acts
- Whether there is a correlation between trauma and culture shock
- The correlation between trauma, culture shock, and integration.

4.7 Correlation of Findings with Fazel and Stein and Berry’s model of acculturation

The Fazel and Stein model assess the trauma’s experienced by individuals during three stages: pre-flight, flight, and resettlement. These three stages expose individuals to certain stressors that trigger psychosocial issues and can lead to psychological trauma. The questionnaire illustrates that there is a correlation between trauma and culture shock. It is evident that there is a significant


amount of trauma experienced within the participants of the study. The trauma is a variable that can be dependent on the three stages and displacement occurring within Germany after resettlement, and therefore can be contributed to various factors. Therefore, there exists a correlation between trauma and culture shock, as most respondents still experience these stressors and are still relocating between cities, unemployed, and are subjected to a form of harassment.

According to Berry's model of acculturation, cultural identity plays an important role in whether individuals are able to integrate into the host society. A majority of respondents did not show a desire to return home if they had the choice. This can indicate that a majority has either assimilated or integrated fully into the culture. The respondents that have resided in Germany for more than 12 months do not wish to return, in comparison to those to wish to return have been in Germany between 6-12 months. The period of 6-12 months according to the U-Curve is the lowest point on the adaptation scale of culture shock, therefore these results mirror the curve and indicate that this is the point when individuals experience alienation. The median age and marital status might also skew these results, as the median age is 24 and the majority of respondents are single (80%). Being single and having no responsibility can have both positive and negative effects. Being single can allow an individual to have less stress of having a family or providing for them. On the other hand, being alone can cause complete alienation and longing to return home. The questionnaire does not show a pattern between these results. However, as the majority of respondents are male, single, and have no children, it is easier for them to persevere under any condition in order to have a new start and thus will make more effort into integration. The data shows that a majority of respondents are unemployed, regardless of having received services. The data also shows that 90% still experience forms of distress or anxiety. This can lead to the conclusion that although forms of assistance were given, these individuals have not yet fully assimilated or integrated into the Germany society. Only 30% of respondents wish to express forms of violence against the host society, indicating that these outliers have not integrated nor assimilated, and thus fall under the category of marginalized. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a correlation between trauma, culture shock and integration, but no correlation between culture shock and violent acts.

Table 5: Trauma and refugees

Do you have any feelings of distress, anxiety, homesickness since your arrival?

Answered: 10 Skipped: 0



4.8 Correlation of findings with populism

As previously discussed in the beginning of Chapter 4, there is no correlation between the refugee crisis and voters' behavior. Citizens in Germany had always had the same sentiments towards immigration and refugee policy, and the latter caused the shift between voting for CDU to AfD. Therefore, the rise of populism is a variable that was bound to occur. The cultural identity of Germans and rejection of citizens is also shown in the results of the findings, as a majority of participants experienced forms of verbal harassment, mostly in their private time. This indicates that numerous environments in Germany are inhospitable towards refugees. Moreover, the findings show that there is no correlation between culture shock and populism, however there is a correlation between the *effects* of culture shock and variables such as trauma, and lack of assimilation and integration. Moreover, the study has founded that lack of assimilation and integration occur from both parties: refugees and the host society, as refugees still cannot adapt due to factors such as trauma, language barriers and harassment, the host society, proved by the rise of populism, rejects the presence of refugees thus inhibiting them from escaping the bottom of the U-Curve and being unable to neither assimilate nor integrate.

4.9 Correlation and Solutions

4.9.1 Correlation

It is evident that there is a correlation between the *effects* of culture shock and variables such as trauma, and lack of assimilation and integration. It is furthermore established that there lies no integration between culture shock and the rise of populism, however there is a correlation between culture shock and the rise of violence, as both sides of cultures are experiencing a clash and rejection between one another. The limitations of this study does focus on a small sample of men in two specific cities, which limits the results to be adapted to the entire refugee population in Germany. Further limitations in the study exist in the responses of the informal questionnaire, as the nature of responses cannot be verified via any institution. Therefore, the interviewee must take into consideration that a minor percentage of responses may be skewed. Nevertheless, these findings indicate that psychological trauma and unemployment are still major barriers that are experienced by refugees.

4.9.2 Solutions

The following solutions can be presented as to enhance the variables of culture shock on refugees in order to aid in assimilation and integration.

1. Insuring that refugees find a job after completing language programs.
2. Finding part-time jobs for refugees that do not require advanced language skills as they conduct language program. This will allow them to practice their skills.
3. Insuring that all refugees continue to go to counseling, even after the period of one year of residency.
4. Constructing a safe space for refugees where they can discuss problems they encounter on a daily basis, such as verbal or physical harassment.
5. Providing counsel for harassed refugees.
6. Providing safe and unbiased channels of reporting acts of harassment that occur.
7. Creating a safe space for mediation between refugees and members of host community.

Although the following solutions are minimal, they can pave the way for assimilation and integration to occur. As long as cultural and social barriers still exist, such as language barriers and the inability of refugees to find jobs, it is impossible for assimilation and integration to occur, leaving the refugee unable to leave the U-Curve. Moreover, being part of a society requires the ability to communicate and to perform a routine task for pay; a job. Being alienated by not being able to speak nor 'belong' in part of the workforce is a continuous form of stressor for the refugee and will result in a clash between the two cultures. Furthermore, as the host society is unaccepting of the refugee, the refugee has to cross these boundaries in order to be no longer perceived as a pariah.

4.9.3 Closing Remarks

The study performed indicates that there exists, to a certain extent, a correlation between the effects of culture shock and certain variables such as trauma and lack of assimilation and integration into German society by Syrian refugees. There exists a gap in literature which examines whether patterns of culture shock have led to animosity between the refugee population and host society due to differences in cultural identity, or whether more efforts should be placed into altering programs of assimilation into the host society.

Appendix A: Translated Questionnaire (English)

1. State your age
2. State your current profession
3. Are you single or married?
4. Do you have any children? If yes, how many?
5. Do you have any family left behind in Syria?
6. How long ago did you resettle in Germany?
7. Did you stay in the same location? If not, state the locations that you relocated from since your arrival.
8. Were you aided by a governmental or non-governmental organization to find an occupation?
9. Were there any psychological services provided to you since your arrival?
10. Were there any services provided to help you in learning the local language (German?)
11. Have you ever faced any verbal or physical violence from the local population at the work place or in your private time?
12. Do you have any feelings of distress, anxiety, homesickness since your arrival?
13. If yes, have your symptoms improved or worsened?
14. Do you think about returning to your homeland if you had an opportunity?
15. Do you ever have thoughts of acting in a violent manner towards the local population?

Appendix B: Original Questionnaire in Arabic

استطلاع رأي:

1. كم عمرك؟
2. ما هو عملك الحالي؟
3. هل أنت أعزب/عزباء أو متأهل/متأهلة؟
4. هل لديك أطفال؟ كم عددهم؟
5. هل بقي أي من أفراد عائلتك في سوريا؟
6. منذ متى استقرت في ألمانيا؟
7. هل بقيت في نفس المكان؟ إن تنقلت، حدد المواقع التي انتقلت منها منذ وصولك.
8. هل ساعدتك المؤسسات الحكومية والغير حكومية للعثور على عمل؟
9. هل تم تقديم أي علاج نفسي لك منذ وصولك؟
10. هل تم تقديم أي خدمات تعليم اللغة المحلية (الألمانية)؟
11. هل سبق أن واجهت أي عنف لفظي أو جسدي من السكان المحليين في مكان العمل أو في وقت فراغك؟
12. هل أنت تعاني من المحنة، القلق، والحنين إلى الوطن منذ وصولك؟
13. إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، هل تحسنت الأعراض أو ساءت؟
14. هل تفكر بالعودة إلى وطنك إن تثلثت لك الفرصة؟
15. هل سبق لك أن فكرت في التصرف بطريقة عنيفة تجاه السكان المحليين؟

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