Securitisation in the Arab region: A new form of kinship relations?

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Abstract: This article examines the repercussions of the process of securitisation in the Arab region, focusing on its impact on the ‘everyday’. It demonstrates how this process negatively impacted on human rights and infringed on freedoms, failing to serve national security and human security. The logic the article follows is based on an assumption that securitisation is organically connected to neoliberal transformations, which tend to deform the role of the state in protecting its citizens, and the autonomy of individuals by obliging them with new duties, and conditioning their lives upon a sophisticated regulatory system under various pretexts, not the least of which is security. This conditioning poses a threat to the nature of the everyday, which is the ultimate goal of all political organisations, and is perceived to need protection, as the everyday is the scene where the principles of equality of humans and their dignity are realised.

Key words: securitisation; Arab region; ‘everyday’; national security; human security

1 Introduction

One of the most intriguing observations that can be made in the era of securitisation is the hybrid and controversial elements of its manifestations: the extreme legalisation of the everyday life with a declining role of the legislator; the removal of barriers for the movement of goods and restrictions on the movement of their producers, consumers,
and the finances involved in the process of their circulation; a total embracing of market freedom together with the monopolisation of the market; a call to protect privacy with an unprecedented infringement on the private sphere; and an extremely violent approach to combating violence.

The securitisation doctrine emerged and flourished in a (new) world order that is characterised by the development of (a) a worldwide spread of neoliberal politics and policies; (b) globalisation; (c) a relative unipolarity; and (d) a regionalism reflected in a new approach to peace-keeping by the United Nations (UN) (De Coning 2016: 7) or, as Buzan puts it, by ascribing ‘a political quality to a cultural zone’ along the worrying idea of a clash of civilisations (Gonzalez-Pelaez & Buzan 2009: 32). While these trends are closely interconnected and should be treated as a package, each on its own represents a particular aspect of the securitisation framework and its practices (Balzacq 2011).

Manifestly, securitisation is a complex process and its interpretation is an ongoing debate. In our effort to shed light on securitisation, we examine the legal and socio-political changes in the concept and practice of security at various levels (national, regional and international) since the end of the Cold War. The article attempts to demonstrate that the securitisation process (as it evolved during the past two to three decades) involves the process of hijacking the public sphere, and limiting the private sphere, thus de-forming and re-forming the everyday. An elaboration of this process and its repercussions on democracy and human rights in the Arab region will be made by examining relevant aspects in the areas of (a) international relations (including international law and regional regulatory frameworks); (b) national legislation (in Morocco and Palestine); and (c) the impact of securitisation on the everyday (understood as the normal, most direct, unmediated relations between community members).

While securitisation techniques vary, the article focuses on anti-terrorism legislation and policies, while anti-money laundering legislation is also considered. Bearing in mind how the securitisation discourse can give way to national and international legal measures, we discuss these measures and their frameworks in international and national law. Once implemented, these securitisation techniques (measures) become realities in people's daily lives, which we also examine as the everyday is essential to evaluate the eventual overall impact of securitisation. The question of securitisation will eventually bring us back to its meaning and implications for human rights and democracy, especially in situations where the restriction of rights becomes a preventive and collective security measure, and when ideological threats and conflicts of interest are identified as security threats.

2 Security, securitisation and the Arab world

The world order that replaced that of the Cold War era had serious impacts on the group of countries that belong to the global south, to which the Arab world belongs. These countries were affected by the new order in the sense that they could no longer negotiate their position of weakness by acting on or reacting to the bipolar divide between the super
powers and their close allies. As a co-product of the neoliberalism along with the concentration of wealth, economic polarisation and corporate domination, securitisation in the Arab region comes in juxtaposition with dependency, colonial and neo-colonial conditionality, and the prevalence of authoritarianism (Anon 2017: 30-33; Sayigh 2016).

This juxtaposition is at the origin of the turmoil that the region went into starting late in 2010. Deep social, political and economic divisions, the intensification of ‘identitarianism’ (Badiou 2012: 81-95), popular despair, and the lack of economic growth shaped the conditions of struggling for survival. These factors, together with the existence of real threats to life, gave way to the securitisation doctrine with little public negotiation, and little accountability on the part of the political leadership, leading to the creation of international coalitions on security and interventions of foreign forces of various types which frequently align with corporate interests. This serves as the specific (although not unique) context of securitisation in the Arab region.

It is the relatively recent significant changes in the approach to security which help to explain in part the emergence of securitisation. It is argued that security is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Buzan 1991: 7). Its conceptualisation and practice have mutated over time and have been adapted to each historical moment depending on the circumstances of war and political tensions among members of the international community, usually defined by the most powerful states. A traditional understanding of security is the protection of the territory from foreign military intervention, centred around the concept of sovereignty (Kelsen 1957: 1, quoted in Nasu 2011: 16). Thus, originally, the scope of the concept was intrinsically related to national security and the historical post-war moment which brought the necessity to establish parameters for the protection of the sovereign state and its citizens.

The first steps towards a common concept of international security were taken by the extinct League of Nations (1919), which identified acts of war that could undermine the peace among state members (Nasu 2011: 16). Based on this ground, the 1945 Charter establishing the Security Council within the UN has also broadened the scope of security to an international level, where maintaining peace and security has to be achieved through a multilateral involvement of the member states. In this manner, national security has been redefined as the building block of international security, and a set of international standards for national securities was developed, in essence making national security a prerequisite for international security, unlike the assumptions of the classical security doctrine (Ramcharan 2008: 37-41, 190-191).  

The latest crucial changes to security making (and the emergence of securitisation), not coincidentally, went hand in hand with the development of neoliberal politics and the rise of the unipolar world order. Not surprisingly, securitisation and its neoliberal context severely impacted on the global south, including the Arab world. One distinct

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1 While there is no room here to provide the basis and evidence for this discussion, the authors of this article believe that the change is connected to the demise of entrusting the security of a country to its political system (sovereignty) and the emergence of a perceived centralised regulatory system in a unipolar world order.
aspect of the everyday consequences of securitisation is the segregation it created in addition to that of the neoliberal order. While neoliberalism allows for economic differences that are gradually reflected in the livelihoods of people, the impact of securitisation is more sudden, declared and unavoidable. Not only can it immediately affect people's private and public behaviour, but it also divides the population when it identifies (and thereby marginalises and excludes) suspects as potential threats to security by using a whole range of profiling techniques (whether based on appearance, or from the examination of verbal and written communication content, or statistically using big data). Furthermore, unlike economic neoliberalism, securitisation leaves room for neither sympathy nor empathy with the ‘suspects’, or for social responsibility in that matter. On the contrary, it encourages a uniform discourse of unilateral condemnation and creates heroism on the basis of societal divisions of the good and the bad, leading to the unprecedented mainstreaming of public opinion on certain aspects of life that do not tolerate diversity or plurality. This process eventually leads to a socially-embedded segregation under the placard of identity, where society is only unified by the need to be protected by the powerful security apparatus, and eventually willing to sacrifice freedoms, privacy, and distinctiveness for survival.

Securitisation is a complex process, closely linked to the practice of security. Since securitisation engages in a ‘speech act’ (McDonald 2008), it is imperative to question the construction of the discourse around security and terrorism, especially as they are entwined ‘essentially contested concepts’ (Buzan 1991: 7). The assumption is that this discourse structure (as well as its background) will prove to be problematic for safeguarding human rights and maintaining democratic systems.

The transformation of security into an undisputed good, the realisation of which requires conformity sets the stage for a rational (and emotional) ground in which securitisation takes root, and this process might best be understood through the perspective of a specific issue in international security.

3 Securitisation and terrorism

The ‘speech act’ (McDonald 2008), in which securitisation continuously engages and depends on, requires us to pay attention to the construction of the discourse behind security measures. The assumption is that this discursive structure (as well as its background) will prove itself crucial in explaining how violations of human rights and democratic practices are made possible and, at the same time, precisely highlighting those same tools that can be used to safeguard rights.

In the past decades, the phenomenon of securitisation has placed terrorism as one of the forefront issues threatening international security. One of the ways in which it reached this position is through a set of international legal instruments that were developed by the UN, starting in the late 1950s. However, terrorism belongs to the category of ‘essentially contested concepts’: a legally vague term that transforms over time, location and political international relations. The well-known freedom fighter/terrorist dichotomy reveals the high degree of subjectivity, intellectual and political negotiation involved in the characterisation of
terrorism (McWhinney 1990: 81). National independence movements or organisations formerly considered terrorists and later recognised as legitimate and legal leading national parties (the National Liberation Front (FLN), the African National Congress, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and so forth) bear witness to the subjectivity and the shifting connotation of the term. Furthermore, terrorist (and non-terrorist) labels vary across national interpretations. For example, the United States and Canada list the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) as terrorist groups, whereas in Palestine they both are official political parties that participate in elections, and the PFLP sits in the parliament. In the same vein, the Jewish Defence League (JDL) is tolerated in France, illegal in Israel, and considered ‘extremist’ in the US (Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice 2001).

Since 1963, international law has developed 19 counter-terrorism conventions2 under the guidance of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (United Nations (undated)). The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee was created in 2001. By 2011, ‘some two-thirds of UN member states have either ratified or acceded to at least 10 of the 19 instruments, and there is no longer any country that has neither signed nor become a party to at least one of them’ (Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee 2011).

Some of the most ratified instruments include the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (185/193); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (185/193); and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (188/193), all issued between 1963 and 1971.

Since the end of World War II, the public market for commercial and civil use of airplanes and air transportation services had been expanding on a massive scale (Vleck 2013: 199-238). When in the early 1960s the phenomenon of aircraft hijacking gained more and more symbolic publicity, states began to see the need for international legal sanctions to deter such political activism and guarantee the safety of international business (McWhinney 1990: 78-79). Airplanes had become goods to be protected, and air transportation services movements to be controlled.

With the intensification of the capitalist economy, and the growth of multi- and trans-national corporations, a state-corporation interdependence emerged as the state delegated more and more functions to corporations, and a new central function of the state was to protect these corporations, although this protection may have extended beyond state territories. As some scholars point out, capitalist interests are intrinsically at the heart of security strategies where ‘human security has been co-opted to legitimise military intervention in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and has underpinned the “responsibility to protect” and counter-terrorism strategies that subordinate and securitise the interests of the “other” to the imperatives of core capitalism’ (Cooper et al 2008: 393).

2 Naturally, these do not capture the phenomenon of state terrorism. See para 160 of UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004.
Counter-terrorism, through the prism of UN treaties, prioritises securing the state and the global economy before protecting civilian lives. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979) defines the offender in terms of who the offence is exercising pressure on: ‘any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons ...’ (United Nations General Assembly 1979: 207). Terrorism is determined by the intention to exercise pressure rather than by the act itself: ‘any action ... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act’ (UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004: 49).

The process allowing states to list individuals, groups and entities as terrorists creates a situation where these individuals and groups are criminalised for their identities and affiliations, regardless of their actions. For example, the US Code Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, Part II, Sec 1182 states that ‘[a]n alien who is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation is considered, for purposes of this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity’. This process of criminalisation with no relation to a concrete act also became part of UN practice. Proposing an entity to the UN terrorist list is the prerogative of states. They can do so, asking not to be named as the designated state. Civilians then become referent objects to secure but also potential targets to be neutralised, since states mostly identify perpetrators of terrorism as coming from civilian population, whether theirs or from other states.

With the terrorist label comes concrete action, not only against individuals and the targeted groups, but also against their suspected supporters which, at times, can even include their relatives. Notwithstanding the open space for interpretation, anti-terrorism clauses have become a common requirement for international funding to humanitarian aid (Mackintosh & Duplat 2013: 11). When the Palestinian political faction Hamas won the parliamentary majority in January 2006, the United States suspended its aid programme to Palestine, while other states, including some European countries, advocated a policy of no contact with Hamas. This complicated the work of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially in Gaza, as they had to go through states such as Norway or Switzerland to reach the local authorities, and led NGOs to practise self-censoring which translated into avoidance of any event or action that could have jeopardised their allocation of funding for suspicion of terrorist association. Preventive reactions ranged from not attending community meetings where ministerial officials may be present, to refusing two kindergartens in school feeding programmes because of the kindergarten community’s potential ties with Hamas (Mackintosh & Duplat 2013: 99).

To win people’s support for their policies, state agents engage in a public process of validation seeking. A good part of this (other than declaring it an acceptable norm of international practice) is realised through the ‘speech act’ of securitisation. This complex act is described as ‘a discursive process by means of which an actor (1) claims that a referent
Among the active participants in the process is the media in all its forms. Its reaction reinforces the threatening quality of certain issues or challenges it, especially with the language it chooses to use. For example, when an Israeli newspaper headlines read ‘Thirteen year-old terrorist charged with attempted murder’, it is presenting terrorism as a priority security issue as well as a rampant threat pervading all levels of a society in which children become criminals. Doing so, it produces fear, offers justifications for strict security measures and even suggests support for more and stricter policies (Hasson 2015).

Another striking example of the media’s power to frame an issue and influence its political outcome is the false number of civilian deaths reported internationally at the beginning of the Libyan revolution in February 2011. Initially announced by the Saudi television news channel Al-Arabiyya and then taken on by many national media outlets, the state repression of protesters in Tripoli did not cause the death of 10,000 people as it was claimed, but fewer than 250 across the region. While a life is a life and the military repression of civilian protest is a crime under international law, one of the official reasons that prompted the UN Security Council to send troops to Libya was the (then reasonable) fear of deadlier massacres to come, especially as other exaggerations of deaths continued to be issued (Chaix 2016). Although it is not clear whether all or any of the media involved were aware of the falsehood of their information, or were unprofessionally neglecting a rigorous checking of their sources, or simply driven by the prospect of lucrative sensationalism, it does show the role that the media can play in international political decisions that have life and death consequences.

Supported by ‘speech’ and promoted through various means such as the media, the securitisation process encourages the criminalisation and exclusion on the basis of identity, creating conditions under which security reasons are no longer required to justify the restriction of human rights. A breach of human rights starts to look like a preventive illegal (but legitimate) measure that takes the form of collective punishment in violation of the principle of presumption of innocence. In Palestine, students from the Gaza strip, when striving to attend a West Bank or foreign university, find many administrative and physical obstacles to reach their studies: ‘Since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, sweeping bans on travel to the West Bank have been imposed on university students from Gaza, and all requests to travel for study purposes have since been rejected, even in the absence of security concerns’ (UNOCHA 2016: 11).
Another version of identity-based suspicion is the US immigration ban ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, which had a ‘retroactive’ impact on life projects that people undertook assuming some sort of normalcy. To mention just a few, an Iranian student who had started his PhD programme at the University of Santa Barbara, California, in 2015, was in Iran when he found out about the promoted immigration ban (Golshiri 2017) and another student, in his fourth year of anthropology studies at Yale University, who also found himself abroad when the executive order was announced (Redden 2017). Such retroactive infringements on rights do not have any legal basis. The power of exclusionary policies even extends to ‘self-exclusion’, as is suggested by the stories of nationals who are not directly affected by the US ban, but are anxious about its potential implications. A student from Mali at Portland State University summarises it well: The ‘anti-immigration’ message has been received and, as a foreigner and a Muslim, he does not feel at ease (Alpert 2017). Not surprisingly, as several universities in the United States reported, the number of foreign undergraduate students applying to colleges for Fall 2017 is decreasing (Alpert 2017).

The entire rationale of security is overturned when securitisation becomes a state of mind no longer requiring the investigation of security concerns. A higher threshold of this overturning is achieved when ideological threats become security threats, eventually resulting in the refusal of access to a territory in a state of war for humanitarian workers, human rights professionals and academics for presumed security reasons. One of the authors of this article shares her own experience on the matter: A French citizen following an MA programme in Italy, she came to Palestine for her thesis research. In March 2017, she left in haste for her grandmother’s funeral in France (the circumstance further denotes the empathy rarely present in spaces like border control) and, when returning to Tel Aviv four days later, she spent eight hours in waiting or interrogation rooms. She was unceremoniously informed that she was to be ‘deported’ and spent the night in a detention centre near the airport. The reasons listed for her denial of entry were ‘public security or public safety or public order considerations’. She was later told that it was one of the most common reasons. However, she had initially been taken aside for questioning as she gave the name of her institution, namely, the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC). The Israeli officer’s instant reaction to the name of the institution was to ask whether there were ‘violations of human rights here in Israel’, before advising her to ‘go to Syria where the situation was much worse’.

4 International human rights law

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly asserts security as a human right in three different contexts: personal, social and a lack of livelihood (articles 3, 22 and 25 respectively). Implicitly, the right to security may also be deduced or assumed from a variety of other rights (such the right to life). We assume that each of the three mentioned contexts presents different types of rights that are best protected when integrated, but can in certain situations of conflict be addressed separately. This section examines the question of whether securitisation fosters the different contexts in which security figures as a right; whether it can integrate and unify these rights; and whether it can maintain a defendable
balance between them. One of our presumptions is that the doctrinal transition from security to securitisation not only worked against the integration and fostering of these rights, but created the conditions for legitimising their infringement.

As the examples above demonstrate, the securitisation speech act identifies a particular issue, such as a terrorist attack, and manages a sustainable campaign to create acceptance of the proposed measures among the people, presenting the measures in such a way that they become the guarantee to people’s safety and justify the invasion of the private sphere for the common good. Individuals then concede to giving up some freedoms in order to receive security from the state. Within the securitisation framework, restrictions are implemented invoking legitimate concepts without defining their contents, allowing the arbitrary restriction of rights.

The international legal framework on security has been sharpened after the World Trade Centre terrorist attacks in September 2001, and changed much of the conception and dynamics of security worldwide. The Security Council, based on article 24(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution 1373 (UN Security Council 2001) declaring terrorism to be contrary to the principles of the Charter and establishing an international legal framework for the fight against terrorism. Even though the resolution was taken as an action under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and involved a series of actions and prohibitions against persons and entities involved, directly or indirectly, in supporting terrorist acts, it does not define the ‘terrorist act’, leaving room for states to have a ‘margin of appreciation’ when invoking ‘national security’ and counter-terrorism, enabling them to potentially limit the rights of their citizens and other inhabitants (Saul 2006: 48-51). In this context, states, chiefly the US and some members of the European Union (EU), initiated measures concerning the protection of their territories and their citizens, at least prima facie, invading the public sphere and, at least partially, the private sphere of the citizens (Balzacq 2011: 125). Measures taken by the UN to counter terrorism involved the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) (United Nations undated).

As Buzan and Hansen suggest, the speech surrounding terrorism works to present a terrorist not as a legitimate enemy but rather as an evil, barbaric and irrational being (Buzan & Hansen 2012: 244). Therefore, any conduct deployed by the states, including the use of force in foreign territories, has the appearance of being justified by the pursuance of a legitimate aim. This helped the US to justify its use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. The conduct of the US included not only military intervention in foreign countries, but also internal measures, some of which were immediately taken in 2001, such as the Executive Order 13224 by the Bush administration, and the US Congress USA Patriot Act of 26 October 2001. These acts encompass a series of policies establishing security measures on the borders, in the army, in the immigration service, and the inclusion of criminal laws against terrorism.

Securitisation justifies the enactment of policies that infringe on fundamental rights with the guarantee of safety under the presence of a threat (whether or not it is real). The speech together with its public
acceptance can create the façade of legitimacy regarding the measures undertaken by the state. Nevertheless, the acceptance that brings about ‘pseudo legitimacy’ cannot justify the limitation of rights contrary to the standards of protection issued by the corpus juris of international human rights law, because the measures must be balanced with the protection of rights under a defined legal framework, neither depending on vague political decisions nor on public acceptance. The concept of human rights establishes, a priori, limitations on state power for the safety of human beings. International human rights law\(^3\) has also set the limitations for the restrictions of human rights and the impact of such restrictions.

Alexy proposes an analytical framework that examines the limitations of rights using a ‘proportionality test’. It includes three principles, namely, adequacy, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense (Alexy 2014: 54 ff). If we apply this test to the wall built on the Turkish-Syrian border, it becomes hard to justify the security considerations behind the wall construction. In August 2016, the Turkish authorities started to build a wall alongside their common border with Syria. The first segment was built in the province of Kobani, Northern Syria, and is supposed to extend more than 511 kilometres. According to the Turkish government, the intent was to boost the security at the borders in order to avoid the perpetual trespassing of terrorists. However, the Kurdish population located in the region repeatedly protested against the decision, indicating that the structure aimed to separate the Kurdish population currently settled there (Sputnik International 2016).

According to human rights groups, the measure is affecting the mobility of the population trying to escape from the Syrian armed conflict to seek protection. The Turkish government seems to be ‘determined to stop people, including refugees, coming through,’ according to Andrew Gardner, Amnesty International’s Turkey researcher (Winter 2017). This clearly has serious implications for the Syrian population as their freedom of movement is directly related to their right to life, and the wall represents a threat to their integrity. While arguments exist for the adequacy of the measure (Erkuş 2017), and for its necessity (the Turkish authorities should be able to secure their borders), such a decision should be the last possible resource, as a harmful and more invasive one for the rights of the Syrian/Kurdish population. It is in the proportionality (in the narrow sense) consideration where the building of the wall fails the test. The wall construction represents a disproportionate threat to human rights. The freedom of movement and the threat to the life and physical and psychological integrity affect the Syrian and Kurdish populations in a disproportionate way in relation to the aim of ‘national security’ that is supposed to be achieved.

The farce lies in how the securitisation speech encourages people to think that there is a real threat from receiving migrants assuming that these migrants might be terrorists, or presenting them as potential would-be terrorists or potential aggressors, and not refugees or victims of a

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\(^3\) See, for example, art 30 of the Organization of American States, 1969: ‘The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have been established.’
conflict, thus using fear and the appeal of security to encourage people to make irrational conclusions.

At the level of international law, especially after the World Trade Centre attacks, securitisation profited from a range of regulations that provided states with an obligation of fighting against terrorism, while lacking clarity of definition and scope. These regulations *de facto* provided states with a wide margin of discretion when considering individuals and groups of people (and states, in many cases) as terrorists or terrorist supporters/exporters/facilitators, thus providing the appearance of legitimacy (and legality) to acts that otherwise would not have been legal or legitimate from the point of view of international law.

5 National legislative and policy reforms

Instigated by the developments in international law and pressure from the international community, in particular from its more powerful actors, as well as by the need to act against terrorism to maintain internal security, many states engaged in legislative and policy reforms to adapt to the new world conditions and developments in the emerging security/securitisation paradigm.

We will explore the reforms at the legislative and policy levels using the examples of Morocco and Palestine by examining (a) the counter-terrorism legislation in Morocco and its impact on society and on human rights; and (b) the emergence of neoliberal policies in Palestine involving security sector reform, anti-money-laundering legislation, and the introduction of vetting policies in a colonial context. 4

With the spread of terrorism in the past decades (Sofer 2011), the question of security has become a priority on the international, regional and national levels. 5 However, this coincided with the prevalence of ‘open border’ policies and the expansion of the phenomenon of globalisation. The parallel increase in terrorism, on the one hand, and the expansion of globalisation, on the other, was alerting. It is argued that globalisation has encouraged religious fundamentalism (Stibli 2010: 2), which has become internationalised. In this environment the securitisation doctrine found fertile ground to flourish. This tendency was all the more evident at the national level.

6 Moroccan example

While threatened by terrorism, Morocco recorded the lowest number of terrorist attacks in the region of the Maghreb and Sahel since the September 2001 attacks. 6 This comparative difference might suggest a Moroccan ‘immunity’ to terrorism, possibly through a relatively successful anti-terrorism strategy. Since the Casablanca attacks in 2003, the

4 The colonial context of Palestine, where legislative reforms mostly are made on external demand in the absence of sovereignty, serves as an exemplary model as it reflects a case of maximal adoption to the demands of the international community.
5 See, for example, Council of Europe, 2015.
6 Morocco recorded a total of nine attacks, whereas Algeria recorded 1 285, and Mauritania 27 (Alexander 2014).
monarchy took measures on four different levels: the legal; the social; the religious; and the military.

6.1 Legal reforms

After some violent attacks in Casablanca in 2003, an anti-terrorism law, Law 03-03, was promulgated. Eight years later, the country was shaken by another major terrorist attack in the touristic city of Marrakech. This event triggered a reconsideration of the counter-terrorism strategy by the authorities, leading to the promulgation of Law 86-14, which complemented the previous one. The purpose of these two major statutes was to fight terrorism and maintain security by attempting to prevent future attacks. Many controversial questions arise in relation to these changes: Were these statutes effective? Did they really guarantee more security? What was their impact on human rights? How were they received by Moroccan society?

Law 03-03, the first of two major laws constituting the legal framework of the anti-terrorism legislation, was voted as a reaction to the events in Casablanca of 16 May 16 2003. The Law had three main purposes (Saadoun 2015):

- It criminalised acts considered terrorist offences and defined the penalties.
- It centralised the jurisdiction related to terrorist acts. The Rabat Court of Appeal is now the only competent court with jurisdiction over all Moroccan territory.
- It designated court trials related to terrorism regardless of the location of the crime or where the accused lives or was arrested.

‘The Law addressed the handling of fiscal information and sought to stop the flow of money intended to fund terrorism. This introduced the possibility of freezing suspicious bank accounts, and prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes related to funding terrorism’ (Saadoun 2015).

Although this Law arguably helped to prevent further attacks in Morocco (Kalpakian 2011) and to unify the jurisprudence related to terrorism, it suffered similar handicaps to what was discussed in relation to international law, namely, that its terms are very general and poorly defined. The term ‘terrorism’ itself is not clearly defined. Moreover, expressions such as ‘a serious breach of public order’ are very vague. In addition, there is a lack of precision in describing the means of perpetration: intimidation, terror and violence. These three words definitely are not unique to terrorist acts and can be reunited in other cases, leading to the danger of (mis)qualifying some acts as ‘terrorist’ when they are not.

Another alarming issue are the measures and the severity of penalties related to terrorist activities. Concerning measures, the Law, for example, raised the time limit of police custody to 96 hours, twice renewable, and suspects are only allowed to contact a lawyer after six days, which raises the possibility of subjecting suspects to torture. Houses may be searched or surveyed outside of normal times with the permission of the public prosecutor or the investigating judge. Freezing suspicious accounts and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes related to funding terrorism became possible. All these extraordinary measures form a threat to the private sphere of citizens as they give the authorities a wide margin of
intervention, which can lead to suspecting innocent people and violating their private life in the name of ‘public order’ or ‘social security’.

On 6 January 2015, the draft Law 86-14 was approved by the majority of the House of Deputies. Its main goal was to amend certain provisions of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Issam Saliba, this law criminalised the act of joining terrorist groups, expanded the scope of terrorist acts, and extended the jurisdiction of the national courts to prosecute terrorist crimes whether committed within or outside the Moroccan national territory (Saliba 2015).

Similar to Law 03-03, the new law was also criticised because of its severe punitive aspect that can extend as far as life imprisonment or even execution. Moreover, its very wide application might contradict the principle of ‘no penalty without law’. For example, this law even applies to situations where the actions are not intended to harm the people or the state of Morocco or its interests.

6.2 Socio-economic reforms

In addition to the legal reforms, the state engaged in modifications on the socio-economic front on the assumption that such modifications are useful for the success of counter-terrorism goals. Some argued that the Casablanca attack in May 2016 was in reaction to the social inequality in this particular city since ‘the eight suicide bombers involved in the attack were youth living in squalid conditions in Casablanca slums’ (Paciello et al. 2016: 5). Finding a solution for the conditions of extreme poverty in the Moroccan society became a pressing issue. In 2005 the King launched the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), a project aimed at ‘assist[ing] the government in improving inclusiveness, accountability and transparency of decision-making and implementation processes at the local level in order to enhance the use of social and economic infrastructure and services by poor and vulnerable groups’. According to the World Bank, this project has four components: to alleviate poverty in rural areas; to alleviate social exclusion in urban areas; to alleviate extreme vulnerability; and to mainstream INDH governance mechanisms and strengthen institutional capacity (World Bank 2014). These initiatives are perceived to have helped in starting to improve the socio-economic situation (Bennis 2015). Moreover, these measures were complemented by investing in infrastructure (such as initiating a housing project) which also helped to address poverty. A recent example of social changes for security purposes is the ban in February 2017 of the ‘production, sale and import of the burka’ (BBC 2017). This measure was decided by the King because of ‘security concerns’. In the context of securitisation, this ban is regarded as infringing on citizens’ personal choices and limiting their private spheres ‘for security purposes’.

6.3 Religious reforms

Recent religious reforms in Morocco have targeted mosques, the media and education. Previously, most mosques were operated independently (not under the control of the state). Since 2003, every mosque, whether built by the state or not, falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs which has the prerogative to appoint imams and other clerks. The intervention was an expression of the apprehension of the state towards extremism perceived to be initiated inside these mosques. In a
similar framework, the King decided in 2004 to launch the Mohammad VI television channel and the Mohammad VI radio station. This particular step was a way of promoting a ‘homogenous Islam’ to the Moroccan nation and to encourage values such as tolerance and moderation. In June 2014, a religious programme was created in order to teach imams across the country about the ‘values of Islam’. The reform in the religious sector involved the inclusion of women in religious establishments and the introduction of female religious workers. Finally, in 2016, on the initiative of the Crown, a reform of Islamic education textbooks took place with the aim of combating terrorism through teaching a ‘more moderate’ Islam. A commission was created ‘to review the Islamic education textbooks to ensure they adhere to the precepts of Islam and the Maliki Sunni rite, which advocates moderation, tolerance and coexistence with other religions and cultures’ (Igrouane 2017).

It is worth noting here that much focus is placed on the ideological roots of terrorism (allowing for a connection between terrorism and Islam) without much attention to the question of the existence of terrorist acts that have no relation to Islam (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011: 5-9), or to the causes of radicalisation amongst Muslim populations that do not lie in the realm of ideology (Johnston 2014; Amrani 2009: 314-315, 318-320). The systematic work on promoting jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s is also absent from the discussion (Tarabay 2013; Blum 2004).

6.4 Security reforms

Several reform steps were undertaken at the military and security levels. This was a central element of the process of securitisation. It is argued that one of the strengths of the Moroccan system lies in the preventive security measures. Morocco tightened its control over its borders with Algeria, and reinforced its military presence on its southern border with the Sahara desert. In parallel with this border control, the new security of Hadar was installed: Royal armed forces, royal gendarmerie, police and auxiliary forces were deployed all over the territory, either by simple physical presence or by the establishment of checkpoints (Bennis 2015).

A key element of the Moroccan security mechanism is the unofficial network of informants or undercover agents called Muqaddim who obtain detailed information about ‘suspicious’ activities in every neighbourhood, reporting directly to the monarchy through a specific hierarchy. The Muqaddim usually is locally appointed as a village or neighbourhood leader, and a Shikh is the local head of a group of villages. These two positions report to an appointed head of district, the Qa’id, who is a state servant. In this way, the state can be updated in different parts of the country through this chain of agents.

Morocco has been able to maintain a relatively low level of terrorist acts in comparison to its neighbours. Arguably, this is due, in part, to the strategy adopted since 2003. However, the analysis of the Moroccan strategy calls into question certain aspects such as the very fast tempo and global scale of the reaction to the events of Casablanca in 2003. As stated previously, Law 03-03 was voted during the same year of the attacks and

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7 It is important to recall that the insurgence from Algeria to Morocco is historically related to the dispute over the Western Sahara, and the war against the Polisario Front.
subsequent reforms that took place covered all aspects of life. All the measures taken resemble long-term strategies geared towards the prevention of terrorist attacks. In addition to the focus on prevention, a common examination of the various aspects and procedures unearth the deployment of the monarchy's monopoly over all aspects of life, which might signify that there is more repression than prevention.

Through the implementation of its securitisation strategy, the monarchy created a web linking and monitoring various aspects of life: religion; education; social assistance; security; movement; and so forth. The constant presence of security forces in the public sphere (malls, airports, streets, neighbourhoods) allows the monarchy to be fully present on the territory and to control most areas of society. Propaganda is another key element in the implementation of the strategy. The media, such as radio, television and advertisement, is used to advance the monarchy, in general, and the King, in particular. The public sphere is utilised (and hijacked) for the implementation of the securitisation strategy.

The private sphere has also been altered by the Moroccan approach. Various aspects of people’s lives have become very limited. One example is the hierarchical system in the neighbourhoods: The Muqaddim or the Shikh observe the movements of individuals in specific neighbourhoods and report any ‘suspicious’ behaviour. Another example is the impact of the new legislations since they give the state the right to search houses, freeze bank accounts, and listen to private conversations.

In addition to these infringements, human rights protection suffered at the individual level. Persons suspected of being linked to terrorist activities can now be detained for extended periods, which is likely to result in torture and mistreatment. The likelihood of arbitrary arrest has grown, and sentencing has become harsher. This occurred in the case of the Temara secret detention centre, where torture was brutally practised (Arabic Network for Human Rights Information 2005).

On the other hand, the package contains policies and procedures oriented at fostering and enforcing some rights (such as the better inclusion of women as a consequence of the religious and social reforms). The choice of rights to be fostered remains limited and based on ideological assumptions. Other elements of the ‘larger’ package involve tolerance and attention to poverty after the Marrakech Declaration in 2016 (Anon 2016). In addition, the state has worked through its policies on helping the poor and ensuring housing: ‘All this poses the question whether the palace may be moving towards a less inclusive “developmental dictatorship” model that justifies a lack of political and civil rights as the price for progress in modernisation and the prospect of a rising standard of living’ (Werenfels & Saliba 2017).

Understanding social acceptance of securitisation strategies might prove difficult because of the controversies they imply. Interviewing people on the streets8 shows multiple perceptions of security. Some people feel that security is aimed at defending the monarchy; others feel insecure (by

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8 An interview has been conducted in the streets of Rabat. Interviewed citizens were asked about their opinion concerning the security strategy of the state and whether they were in favour of this strategy. Moreover, they were asked if they were feeling ‘secure’ with the measures taken by the state. Respondents were chosen randomly.
securitisation techniques) but have learned to accept it and to live with it. However, one constant element seems to be present, namely, the existence of (framed) liberty. Although Moroccan society is facing many issues, people feel that they are allowed to behave in ‘total’ liberty as long as it is does not involve violence, terrorism or the monarchy’s interests. Three striking examples constantly emerged during the interviews: the easy access to hashish; corruption; and the modernisation of the social sphere (including religion). Security forces tend to turn a blind eye to certain illegal behaviour (like smoking hashish) and to accept bribes when an infraction is committed, as long as it has no link to terrorism, violence or the monarchy. Moreover, people seemed to appreciate the modernisation in their society during the interviews. The protests that took place starting late in May 2017 demonstrate the fragility of the situation and the short-term impact of the reforms. Consider this episode from a news report in the Middle East Monitor (2017):

Zefzafi was detained ‘along with other individuals’ and transferred to Casablanca for ‘undermining the security of the state’ and other ‘criminal’ acts, the prosecutor confirmed ... Prosecutors said the arrest was ordered after Zefzafi ‘obstructed, in the company of a group of individuals, freedom of worship’ at the mosque in Al-Hoceima ... The protest leader appeared in footage ... where he was seen berating mosque leaders for being mouthpieces of the government and questioning whether mosques were places of worship or centres of propaganda for the government.

As far as Morocco is concerned, one may interpret the strategy adopted by the monarchy as a double-edged sword, perhaps with the two edges not of equal impact. The strategy involves a certain (contested) promotion of some women’s rights and the penetration of the private sphere; some enhanced security and highly centralised control; some (contested) modernisation and socio-religious liberalisation and the mainstreaming and corporatisation of the daily life and the market; the monopolisation of the religious sphere; and so forth. In short, one is faced by a typical hegemonic intervention: The monarchy tries to respond to people’s needs in a limited manner that does not compromise its own (including its clients’) priorities and interests, hoping to ‘stabilise’ the public. This approach resulted in limited change. The speech differs from the reality. The 2011 constitutional amendment and its implementation demonstrated the paradox between the human rights norms in the Constitution and their implementation in the social, political and cultural contexts (Lachhab 2013). The strategy of securitisation in Morocco was modelled to protect the society as a means of protecting the monarchy. The major goal of the strategy was to create an ‘immune system’ around the monarchy and to securitise the society.

7 Palestinian example

Since the emergence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, a steady growth has been witnessed of variable legal mechanisms designed for the sake of ‘internal security and public order’. The role of law is focused on legitimising obedience, monitoring and social control, in order to manage the Palestinian population and ultimately to protect the security of the colonising system, which is a prerequisite for the existence of the PA. Palestinian laws have been facilitating security measures that respond to
the needs of the coloniser, and promote a culture of soft surveillance in the everyday, violating the civil, political and cultural rights of Palestinians.

The construction of securitisation in Palestine after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1993 involved shifts in discourse and changes in the political rhetoric. It played a role in reshaping ‘perceptions’, shifting the threat from the ‘other’ to the ‘self’. The new constructs were institutionalised (a process that bears the local signature of former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad) through encouraging the emergence of a new economic elite described as the ‘new audiences’ (McDonald 2008), which played a role in maintaining the rhetoric of fear and threat.

The drafting of security-related legislation promoted a culture of direct and indirect surveillance, in order to alter behaviour and manage the population, securitising and censoring social acts and relations, eventually leading to the violation of cultural, civil and political rights.

The very notion of ‘national security’ in Palestine was introduced after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. In article VIII this interim agreement handed the task of ‘internal security’ to the newly-established PA, stating that ‘to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order’ (Anon 1993). For Palestinians, this task represented a way of initiating a state-building project, while for the Israeli government, it meant the creation of an internal unit that undertakes a co-ordination task to protect Israeli security. Subsequent agreements stipulated the responsibility of the PA to pursue terrorists. The shift from ‘armed struggle’, ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘revolutionaries’ to terms such as ‘internal security’, ‘public order’, ‘riots’ and ‘terrorists’ constituted a reshaping of Palestinian aspirations through colonial and neo-colonial transplants. What added insult to injury was the vague and shifting meaning of ‘terrorism’ which started to be used to describe acts of resistance (including armed resistance), historically seen as legitimate and legal from the point of view of international law. The ultimate project of liberation was replaced by the state-building project. Anything that jeopardised this new project became a ‘threat’. The construction of threats can extend, as Sjostedt argues, to ‘individual perceptions’ (Sjostedt 2008). As a result, one’s image and identity are colonially constructed. One of the links between colonialism and surveillance is the Fanonian implication of the colonised adopting the same surveillance and control techniques of the coloniser (Zureik 2011).

An effective and successful securitisation is ‘audience-based’ (Balzacq 2005). Audiences are defined as the ‘addressee of the speech act’, differing from the ‘referent object [which is] the entity to be protected’ (Cote 2016). The audience not only is a recipient, but a security actor, since they play a role in shaping (perceived) threats and security matters.

Today, daily actions that are not shaped by direct confrontations with the officers of the colonial power resemble it, not only through the

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implants that the PA adopted, but by the ‘new audiences’. For example, on 3 May 2017, a meeting was organised in Ramallah on a public square named after Nelson Mandela. The meeting was in support of the hunger strike declared since 17 April 2017 by more than 1,500 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons to protest the conditions of their incarceration. Support for the striking prisoners is a common denominator amongst Palestinians and, hence, thousands of supporters gathered peacefully on the square (which is far from any point of potential friction). The protesters were surrounded by the agents of two private security companies who attended voluntarily. The square was also full of the unsolicited ‘support’ of the major telecom company, which asked its personnel to join the event. When asked about the reason for the presence of the ‘security force’, answers ranged between logistics, providing drinking water, and helping people around. However, it turned out that one of the two companies provided security for the telecom company. Eventually, any movement in cities might very well be perceived as a threat (Fawaz et al 2012: 186).

The politics of securitisation in Palestine focus on creating a fear of uncertainty. Although it is a difficult task to present fear in a colonised space, the investment in fear, and re-introducing it in the everyday, was shaped in such a way as to transpose fearing ‘the other’ into fearing oneself, making it possible for fear to penetrate the sphere of social relations and the everyday of Palestinians.

In the Palestinian case, Fayyad’s project, which focused on reforming the security sector, building institutions and the free market (Tartir 2015), produced new political and economic elites who, naturally, have a vested interest in the status quo. These groups have been co-opted with bank loans and tempted into enjoying a ‘secure’ lifestyle. As a result, they synchronise their attitudes with the political narrative of the PA on ‘internal security and public order’. New audiences are a product of the new policies of securitisation, and any discussion around what constitutes security ‘becomes a privilege of selected elites’ (Sarikakis 2006). The new audience becomes an active agent in responding to these political narratives as part of the securitisation measures. They subscribe to the PA’s rhetoric by advocating public order, increasing investments, and creating NGOs and media platforms that are silent about PA conduct.

While the criminalisation of certain conduct may not prevent actions of terror, the very idea of criminalisation creates a certain threat. As Ramsay argues, penal codes have political significance, in which they emphasise the idea of the sovereign state (Ramsay 2012). In Palestine the legislative process is presented as evidence of the notion of the existence of state structures, and a reminder that there is control. Thus, penal codes are a central part of securitisation measures to the extent that these codes explicitly or implicitly define the concept of security through criminalising acts against ‘public order’.10

In addition to the vagueness of the ‘public order’ concept, the Palestinian security apparatus in charge of preserving it operates under legislation that does not provide clarity on the distribution of tasks and mandates among security apparatuses. The law suffers from dualism

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10 See the Jordanian Penal Code of 1960 Section 13/2 (applicable in the West Bank).
(Dayya et al 2007), which facilitates violations of civil liberties and rights, and a lack of accountability. The possible ‘abuse’ of the concept of ‘public order’, together with the lack of clarity on which conduct poses a threat to it, add to the difficulties in regulating the protection of rights in the everyday life of Palestinians. For example, in the only functioning Palestine cinema hall, a warning sign is displayed before a film is showed, indicating that there is camera surveillance in order to detect any conduct that may jeopardise ‘public order’. In this context, people understand that socially-unaccepted behaviour is a threat to the ‘public order’.

Preserving public order not only has a cultural but also a political incentive. The public sphere in Palestine is a battleground between the complex competing agendas of state building and national liberation. The recent events of March 2017 portray this relationship. On 6 March 2017, the forces of the Israeli Occupation entered Ramallah and executed the Palestinian activist Basel Al-Araj, who had been convicted before the Palestinian courts on a charge of ‘acquisition of unlicensed weapons’. The coincidence of his trial session after his death and the alleged co-ordination between Israeli and Palestinian security organs led to public protest. The Palestinian security forces declared this protest illegal, and responded by using force that was incompatible with the peaceful nature of the protest (Dweik et al 2017). The clash between the security forces and the protestors not only resembled a clash between the above-mentioned competing agendas, but also a battle over the public sphere. It highlighted the lack of co-ordination between the two security agencies Al- Amen Alweqa’i and Al-Mukhabarat, and exposed gaps in regulations (Dayya et al 2007). The immediate and extensive use of force by Palestinian security forces denotes (a) that these actions can jeopardise the ‘manufacturing’ of the artificial public sphere; and (b) that securitisation is more important than civil liberties. The PA’s behaviour towards public protests demonstrates a deliberate restriction of citizens’ access to policy making (Sarikakis 2006).

Olesker (2013) argues that ‘laws contribute to the formation of the concept of ‘national security’ in such a way to legitimize illiberal practices’. In general, anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism laws have been limiting the private sphere. For example, certain rights to privacy and financial information are undermined for the sake of a ‘general cause’. The complex tension between anti-money-laundering laws and privacy rights could be considered a battle between individual liberty and social order (Pasley 2002).

The Palestinian anti-money-laundering and financing of terrorism law of 2015 is no different. While article 23 states that the information of individuals should be preserved, the law gives tremendous powers to banks by authorising them to undertake identity checks, follow transactions, and exchange and reveal individual information. This means that the ‘individual’s lifestyle, personal interests and political beliefs … to which groups and associations the individual belongs are not protected’ (Pasley 2002). Furthermore, the law exempts financial institutions, their directors, administrators and employees who reveal information on the ground of good intentions from any criminal, civil, or administrative procedures against them, in obvious violation of article 32 of the Palestinian Basic Law, which states:
Each aggression committed against any personal freedom, against private life of human being, or against any of rights or freedom, which have been guaranteed by the law or by this basic law, shall be considered as a crime. Criminal and civil case resultant from such infringement shall not be subject to any status of limitation. The National Authority shall guarantee fair indemnity for those who suffered from such damages.

Not only is the state collecting private information but, in essence, it is subcontracting this task to the private sector. Private information is frequently requested for the purchase of vital services, including water, electricity and telecommunication.

Muharemi (2015) defines security vetting as ‘an evaluation method that considers whether a person is an acceptable risk to the state and its public order’. As in other places, the security vetting procedures in Palestine are of political and partisan nature. These have been inherited from previous orders, but were developed under the current President, Mahmoud Abbas, to control the employment in areas such as the educational system, the judiciary and other sectors of the public service, on the basis of ‘security conditions’.

Vetting in Palestine has no clear legal reference but responds, for example, to the political division between Fateh and Hamas. After the Hamas victory in the legislative elections, former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh issued Resolution 8/5/10 to cancel the refusal of employment for ‘security’ reasons, based on conditions established by the Civil Service Law No 4 of 1998. The government of Salam Fayyad re-established this refusal policy by a decision (18 of 2007) of the Cabinet. The decision contradicts the Palestinian Civil Service Law which determines the requirements for employment (article 24). Nothing in the law indicates that ‘security clearance’ is a prerequisite for employment. In 2010, more than 1,500 employees were fired for ‘security reasons’ (indicating links to Hamas) (Saadeh 2013).

The interference by security apparatuses (Al-aman el weqai and Almukhabarat) in the civil employment procedure is common knowledge in spite of the fact that laws regulating their work do not allow them to ‘interfere in government appointments’. Such acts not only indicate discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, but also demonstrate the failure to maintain the rule of law.

In 2012, the High Court of Justice responded positively to a petition presented by the Palestinian Ombudsman requiring the cancellation of the security clearance condition, and a re-allocation of teachers who had been fired on security grounds. However, the procedure remains in place, shedding doubt over the ability of judicial institutions to observe and correct the conduct of the executive.

In the case of Palestine, one more aspect of securitisation is discernible, namely, the colonial dimension of the external aspects of ‘internal’ security. The Palestinian political system is conditioned by external factors, in addition to Israeli occupation. The agreements between Israel and the PLO, and those between Israel and the PA, directly and indirectly selectively handed the mission of preserving internal security and public order in certain areas to the Palestinian security apparatus. This mission focuses on preserving Israeli security from Palestinian threats and attacks rather than on the security of Palestinian citizens. The Palestinian public
'feel[s] no tangible effects of the co-operation for its own security' (Lisiecka 2017), and 'whilst in 2011 one-third of the PA's budget was spent on security, the main beneficiary of such large national expenditure is Israel' (Purkiss & Nafi 2015: 5). The security co-ordination between the occupied and the occupying entities is 'a core issue upon which Israeli-Palestinian peace depends', in which Palestinians would preserve it as a way to persuade the international community of their commitment to peace and, thus, of their readiness to build an independent state.

Israeli security and securitisation measures relating to the Palestinian population are hard to differentiate. Israel have grossly violated, and still violates, the human rights of Palestinians. The syndrome is older than the emergence of securitisation reform. Israeli security and securitisation practices became part of this discussion on Palestine as these measures constitute a core part of the lives of Palestinians. The extent to which these measures impact Palestinians is vast and comparable to typical colonial conditions prevailing in colonies.

In summary, one may conclude that four layers of securitisation measures exist in Palestine: (a) the measures typical of colonial conditions practised by Israel over Palestinians; (b) a Palestinianised version of the Israeli measures, which serve as a local extension of what Israel perceives as a 'security threat'; (c) measures aimed at social control and framing or altering the behaviour of the ordinary Palestinian citizen to ensure obedience and submission, and to establish a 'control society' (Parons 2011), at the cost of violating rights such as the right of political participation, the right to freedom of expression and the right to protest; and (d) measures focusing on the exclusion of 'ineligible' political parties and factions (such as Hamas and other organisations that are listed as terrorist groups outside Palestine).

Securitisation measures in the West Bank are strengthened by legal instruments; ranging from presidential decrees to cabinet decisions, in which not only the drafting of these laws intended to exclude political participation, but were able to promote a culture of surveillance and control where rights and freedoms are being violated.

It is unfortunate that there is no short story in the case of Palestine. The situation in Gaza, which is not controlled by the PA, but by Hamas, also has a complex security/securitisation architecture which differs from the one in the West Bank. This requires a separate discussion.

8 The everyday

One major difference between the security and securitisation doctrines lies in their association with the everyday and how and to what extent they impact on it. The everyday, understood as the unmediated (un-brokered) life where people live their lives regardless of their education, profession and status (a good example is the way people drive), is the final direct and indirect target (landing spot) of all disciplines, events and practices.

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11 That seems to be a reason behind the fact that Israeli companies play a leading role in securitisation technology. See for example (Palmer, 2011).
Hence, the everyday is the crucial scene to evaluate the eventual overall impact of securitisation.

Security, as a sector oriented towards maintaining the sovereignty of the state, is a professional subdivision of society and the state, with its own structures, rules and regulations, work ethos, clothing, manners and traditions. These apply to it exclusively, and the rest of society is expected to appreciate, respect and facilitate its functions while realising and recognising the military/civil dichotomy as part of respecting the professionalism of those who are in charge of security. The impact of the operations and functions of this societal subdivision on the everyday is brokered by the state, and is seen as a product that comes from outside civil society, and from outside the private spheres. Only in the exceptional times of war would it become possible to flout the delineations of private/public duties and functions.

On the contrary, as demonstrated above, securitisation, while being the responsibility of more sophisticated, larger, separate and professional subdivisions of society, functions in a manner that is embedded in the everyday, and requires the involvement of all citizens (and non-citizens) in the realisation of its goals. Individuals, families, groups, institutions and businesses have security duties that are supervised by security organs either directly, or by delegation, through the private sector, or through adding security tasks to almost all other sectors of the public service including, but not limited to, education through the securitisation of school curricula, health, transportation, through introducing biometrics or DNA tests, and security-related measures to car rentals or flights, and the financial sector with security measures related to bank operations involving bank account eligibility and fiscal transactions.

The dismissal of the broker function of the state in the relationship between security and the everyday, ideally, is good news if it is related to overcoming hierarchies and power relations. Unfortunately, the discussion above suggests that this is not the case. On the contrary, the securitisation-driven conditions resemble a combination of an everlasting situation of urgency akin to war, and a super-porous shield protecting the private sphere, which is penetrated by a powerful security apparatus that shields itself from accountability. Not only does this immanent overarching securitisation penetrate the private sphere, but it also hijacks the public sphere since this becomes the melting pot of the public and the private that can no longer be delineated.

A stark example of the overarching securitisation considerations on the everyday is an order (No 1169-b) by the governor of Beirut, Justice Ziad Chbib, issued on 26 April 2017, prohibiting the practice of street vendors and cancelling their work licences. The order was issued upon the recommendation of the Lebanese minister of interior. In essence, this order changes the image, tradition and daily habits of Beirut inhabitants and visitors. When in a televised interview the governor was asked about the reasons for this order, he stated that they are multiple, the most important of which are security considerations (since this group is at risk of being used [lured or fooled] for terrorist acts) (Chbib 2017). One street vendor indicated that the order was the result of a dispute between the governor and the police chief (Anon 2017). The perception of this vendor is supported by a study of Beirut's security, which states that 'Beirut is subjected to overlapping, sometimes conflicting security systems that
neither report to the same authorities nor concur on their identification of what constitutes a threat’ (Fawaz et al 2012: 188).

The impact of the transformation of security into securitisation on the everyday is the ultimate impact of the process. The everyday is where people negotiate securitisation, accept or reject it, and assume or are assigned various roles. Ultimately, it involves the process of transposing the free civil beneficiaries of security into slave agents of securitisation. This process uses the people who should benefit from the security measures and their resources in order to motivate their support for those who create the security threats after they have amalgamated them with those who are responsible to provide the protection. Instead, the protection is provided to neoliberal investments (Fawaz et al 2012: 177).

Various transformations (mutations) accompany securitisation, including globalisation, dichotomisation and polarisation. These transformations relate to the state, to the nation, to security, to the community, and they all lead to transformations and deformations in the everyday. The techniques used to facilitate this transposition vary, and require a separate discussion, but they include such pseudo presentations as the promotion of ignorance through replacing knowledge production with knowledge consumption, mainstreaming, extreme legalisation through the ‘proceduralisation’ of all aspects of life, reducing the question of legitimacy to the question of legality, replacing the law with the procedure, and reducing the popular will into the will of its protectors/representatives, thereby reincarnating feudal dependency relations in the form of fabricated identities and tribes where the like should stick with the like. Security is a catalyst of social and political divisions ... like capital, security has become one more form in which existing social hierarchies are consolidated and/or challenged and new ones imposed. An individual's political position and/or sympathy for a particular political group, her gender, age, class, religion or nationality converge to construct the same security deployment in unequal frames, with one being threatening and the other protective (Fawaz et al 2012: 191).

These techniques are capable of cultivating popular acceptance of anti-popular measures (to the degree that fascist trends are redefined as populist), and reframing reality where friends and enemies are mixed up. It becomes 'legitimate' to curtail rights in the face of a perceived threat of an enemy, in order to guarantee the status quo perceived as preferable survival. This is how one accepts the hijacking of public space by security personnel together with corporate advertisement that amounts to shaping public taste through imposing corporate identity on public space (frequently presented as a donation or a gesture of social responsibility).

While coming forth in response to emerging security needs, the securitisation framework is not shaped to fulfil these needs, but rather to protect a main instigator of the threats that emerged. Whether terrorism or other types of violence affecting public safety and security are a direct

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12 This can involve tagging, the obligatory ownership of cellular phones and bank accounts as a precondition to acquiring vital services or being employed. It can also involve limitations on participation or even its denial due to certain digital limitations in certain procedures.
result of poverty, alienation, despair, or are instigated by dichotomies of the good and evil, or the radicalisation of ideological differences, or the expression of identity crises, or a reaction to the globalised polarisation of wealth, or the globalised dominance of ‘westernisation’, or the re-emergence of national aspirations, or tribal belonging, the techniques utilised in securitisation and the components of the neoliberal securitisation package do not attend in any significant manner to the resolution of any of these possible causes or similar ones. On the contrary, securitisation techniques create the conditions for the penetration of these phenomena into the everyday in a manner in which social symptoms become psychological syndromes. Such negative aspects of current globalisation as the radicalisation of wealth polarisation are protected and promoted by the securitisation techniques, and the marginalisation of non-mainstream cultures and views is fostered by these techniques, to the extent that the everyday is invaded by the coalition of the preeminent state control and the corporate world rendering the everyday a utensil of the governance system rather than its ultimate goal.

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Securitisation in the Arab region: A new form of kinship relations?

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