Socio-economic development and resource redistribution as tools for conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building in fragile societies: A comparative analysis of Burundi and Rwanda

Nicholas Wasonga Orago*

Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a myriad of conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Many of these conflicts have lasted for long periods, leading to massive violations of human rights and creating general human suffering. The transitional justice processes that have been employed to resolve these intractable conflicts have mainly concentrated on political deal making and support to political-legal structures. Scant emphasis has been placed on the resolution of structural causes and factors contributing to these conflicts, such as poverty, inequality and socio-economic marginalisation. The failure to put in place post-conflict socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies in the context of peace building and conflict resolution processes has led to fragile post-conflict societies vulnerable to the recurrence of conflict. Using Rwanda and Burundi as case studies, this article argues that post-conflict transitional justice processes must implement effective socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies as a critical component of a comprehensive strategy aimed at dealing with all the root causes and factors contributing to intractable conflicts. This will ensure just, stable and peaceful post-conflict societies.

Key words: intractable conflicts; transitional justice; human needs theory; socio-economic development; resource redistribution

1 Introduction

In the post-Cold War era, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced constant sectarian conflicts leading to massive violations of the fundamental rights of the African people. These conflicts have subsisted for a considerable time, leading to intractable human rights and human security situations. Examples abound from Somalia, Sudan, Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad and Mozambique. When the root causes and factors contributing to these conflicts are not comprehensively,
substantively and effectively addressed during post-conflict peace building and reconciliation processes, it results in very fragile states that easily fall back into conflict. This endless cycle of conflict and violence creates an ongoing cycle of death, destruction and destitution. Rwanda and Burundi, the countries studied, feature prominently among those countries that have consistently, and with increasing propensity, experienced protracted sectarian violence throughout the decades after their independence (Uvin 2010: 161).

The article undertakes a comparative analysis of post-conflict peace-building and reconciliation strategies in these two countries (Rwanda and Burundi) as they share important historical, geographical, compositional, social, political and economic commonalities, to the extent that they have been referred to as ‘false twins’ (Ndikumana 2005: 415; Curtis 2015: 1366; Uvin 2010: 161). These countries have the same ethnic cleavages (85 per cent Hutus, 14 per cent Tutsis and 1 per cent Twa); have a similar colonial past, both having been colonies of Belgium; are resource-poor high-population countries dependent on agriculture; and have similarly experienced continuous violent sectarian conflicts during the past 20 years (Curtis 2015:1368-1369; Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 5; Wolpe 2004: 93). Comparing the two countries, the point of departure is the way in which they have chosen to deal with their violent past post-2000. Rwanda has chosen to adopt and implement a policy of comprehensive socio-economic and human development as well as resource redistribution. On the other hand, Burundi has failed to implement such comprehensive measures aimed at dealing with the poverty, inequality and other socio-economic causes of sectarian conflict (Curtis 2015: 1367). These differing choices made by the two countries regarding socio-economic and resource redistribution have resulted in starkly contrasting socio-economic and human development indicators, as evidenced in the table below:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General indicators</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>12 818 724</td>
<td>11 314 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size (km squared)</td>
<td>26 340</td>
<td>27 834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population density (per km squared)</td>
<td>490.5</td>
<td>405.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human development index rank 2015</td>
<td>163 out of 188</td>
<td>184 out of 188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of inequality (UNDP inequality adjusted HDI 2015)</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty headcount ratio per cent</td>
<td>44.9 (rural poverty, 48.7)</td>
<td>66.9 (rural poverty, 68.9)</td>
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The article argues that this point of departure – the implementation of comprehensive socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies – has constituted the primary difference in relation to the socio-economic transformation of Rwandan society compared to its Burundian counterpart. Consequently, it is argued that the Rwandan society has thus become more tolerant and reconciliatory as compared to Burundi, with positive dividends as far as peace building and post-conflict reconstruction of the Rwandan society are concerned. This may be seen in the differing responses by the two societies to a similar political challenge in 2015, namely, the non-democratic decisions by their two Presidents to renew their terms of office through constitutional amendments. While the Burundian society reacted to this challenge with the outburst of the latest bout of sectarian violence that has claimed the lives of many civilians, the Rwandan society in comparison was more tolerant, allowing a national referendum to determine the question of the constitutional amendment to review the term limits of the President. This illustrates that conflict resolution and peace-building efforts should be focused not only on political settlements and criminal accountability, but must also effectively respond to poverty, inequality, socio-economic exclusion and the marginalisation of different sectors of society. This is so because, in most instances, these challenges are the root causes of or the factors exacerbating violent sectarian conflicts. A failure to take these critical socio-economic determinants of conflict into account will detract from the peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation efforts, with the consequence that the cycle of violence will continue in the future, developing into intractable conflict situations. This will have adverse consequences for internal and regional stability, human security and the realisation of human rights.

2 Overview of the post-independence intractable conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda

2.1 Overview of the intractable conflict in Burundi

Since independence, Burundi has been mired in a vicious cycle of violent conflicts exacerbating ethnic and regional divisions as well as deepening the already-entrenched poverty, inequality and socio-economic exclusion (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 1). In 1965 a civil war started in Burundi, three

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<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total life expectancy (years)</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth 2015</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-7.20 (contraction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP 2015 in US$ billion</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita 2015 (US$)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>6.6 per cent</td>
<td>7.1 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perception index 2015</td>
<td>44 out of 167</td>
<td>150 out of 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of doing business ranking</td>
<td>62 out of 189</td>
<td>152 out of 189</td>
</tr>
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years after independence from Belgium, when Hutu officers, led by Gervais Nyangoma, attempted a coup to overthrow the monarchy. This attempted coup resulted in a state-led purge of the Hutu majority by the Tutsi minority from the public sector, and the subsequent socio-economic exclusion of the Hutus (Ndikumana 2005: 420-421; Bundervoet et al 2009: 538). The purge and socio-economic exclusion of the Hutus set the basis for the intractable sectarian conflict in Burundi that has from time to time flared up. These sectarian conflicts have been triggered mainly by power struggles in the country for the control of the state and its resources; the state being the major source of upward socio-economic mobility (Ndikumana 2005: 413-414). In 1972, Burundi experienced inter-ethnic violence after another failed coup attempt led by Hutu politicians. This resulted in the killing of around 200,000 Hutu civilians by the Burundian armed forces and the displacement of another 300,000 Hutus, a tragedy that has been classified as a genocide (Bhavnani & Backer 1999: 4-5). According to Ndikumana (2005: 422), this massacre of the Hutu population was intended to be a ‘final solution’ to the Hutu problem.

In 1976 Burundi experienced a third coup with President Michel Micombero being ousted by Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Bagaza ruled the country from that time until 1987, when he was similarly ousted in a coup by Major Pierre Buyoya (Bundervoet et al 2009: 538). Though authoritarian in his leadership, Bagaza implemented comprehensive socio-economic policies to enhance economic growth and human development, and his reign was characterised by unprecedented socio-economic development. The consequence of Bagaza’s efforts was that no violent sectarian conflicts occurred in the period 1976-1987 (see Curtis 2015: 1369 who draws similarities between the Bagaza regime and the current Kagame regime in Rwanda in relation to socio-economic development efforts). However, following Bagaza’s ouster in 1987, Burundi was again plunged into a cycle of sectarian violence, with 1988 witnessing political unrest led by the Hutus. This new cycle of violence resulted in the killing of over 20,000 Hutu civilians by Burundian armed forces and the displacement of over 50,000 people (Bhavnani & Backer 1999: 4-5). This massacre was condemned internationally, with the international community pressuring the ruling Burundi elite to democratise and open up the country’s political space. This international pressure for democratisation led to the first free elections in Burundi that brought a Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, to power in 1993 (Bundervoet et al 2009: 539; Ndikumana 2005: 422).

However, the transition did not last as Ndadaye was killed in a failed coup attempt (see Ndikumana 2005: 423 who states that Ndadaye was killed because he threatened the socio-economic and rent-seeking opportunities of the Tutsi elite). The killing of Ndadaye started the most severe wave of sectarian violence in Burundi between 1993 and 1999 that led to the large-scale massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by peasant Hutus. The violence led to the death of approximately 300,000 Burundian civilians, the second Burundian genocide (Bundervoet et al 2009: 539-542; Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 501). The conflict also led to the

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2 Ndikumana terms the Burundian conflict as distributional rather than sectarian, and that its resolution requires socio-economic empowerment of the masses rather than political deal making.
displacement from their homes of over 50 per cent of Burundians, severely interfering with socio-economic and other livelihood activities, such as farming and livestock keeping. This adversely impacted on the coping capacity and socio-economic welfare of the civilian population, further deepening poverty, inequality and the socio-economic marginalisation of the majority of the Burundian population (Bundervoet et al 2009: 542-543).

Efforts were made by the international community to bring the violence to an end, with the first efforts being undertaken by the United Nations (UN) in the period between 1994 and 1996. This UN-led effort did not bear any fruits due to the unwillingness of the international powers to take diplomatic lead or provide peacekeeping forces (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 2). A regional peace process was then commenced in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1996 to 1999, facilitated by the former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, and subsequently finalised with the facilitation of the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela. The negotiations, boycotted by two of the parties to the conflict – the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the FNL-Paliphetu – culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements in the year 2000 by 19 of the parties to the conflict (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 2). The signing of the Peace Agreement brought to an end the extended period of conflict in most of the provinces of Burundi, allowing for the formation of a transitional power-sharing government to govern for a period of 36 months pending the organisation of democratic elections.3 Subsequent to the Arusha Accord and the formation of the transitional government, negotiations were continued between the transition government and the rebel groups that had not signed the Arusha Accord. These negotiations led to cease-fire agreements with all but one rebel group, FNL-Paliphetu, with the agreeable rebel groups, including the CNDD-FDD, joining the transitional government, a development that halted conflict in all but one province in Burundi (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 2).

Democratic elections were held in 2005 and were won by the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza. The CNDD-FDD was not a party to the negotiated settlement in Arusha. This, however, was the main reason why the CNDD-FDD was popularly elected, as many Burundians viewed the Arusha Peace Process as an elitist process that had enriched politicians at the expense of the local people, and had failed to take into account the survival needs of the population (Curtis 2015: 1372). Despite the win, the CNDD-FDD remained fractured politically and was not able to create an effective administrative structure to implement comprehensive socio-economic, human development and resource redistribution policies. As a result of this failure by CNDD, Burundi continued facing socio-economic challenges such as poverty, inequality, socio-economic exclusion and marginalisation as well as corruption (Uvin 2010: 165; Nkurunziza & Ngaruko 2005: 1). These factors have militated against peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation that would have resulted in the creation of an

3 The transitional government functioned well, with the then President, Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, governing for 18 months and then allowing the Vice-President, Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu, to govern for the remaining 18 months, assisted by a new Vice-President, Alphonse Kadege, a Tutsi.
environment of positive peace conducive to socio-economic development, as discussed in section four below.

2.2 An overview of the intractable conflict in Rwanda

Rwanda has also experienced sectarian violence after independence, starting with the 1959 Hutu revolution that led to the overthrow of the Rwandan Tutsi-led monarchy and the establishment of the majority Hutu-led post-independent government with Gregoire Kayibanda as the President (Curtis 2015: 1366). The revolution led to periodic massacres of Tutsis by the Hutu-led government, with massacres occurring in 1959, 1963 and 1967 (Cooke 2011: 6). These successive bouts of massacres of the Tutsi population left over 20 000 Tutsis dead and exiled over 300 000 in refugee camps in Uganda, Burundi and the DRC (Cooke 2011: 6). The exiled Tutsis who had settled in refugee camps in Uganda formed the Rwandan Refugee Welfare Association which metamorphosed into the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1979 and finally to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987 (Curtis 2015: 1369-1370).

President Kayibanda utilised his position to benefit his community and allies, with major political positions being held by people from his central prefecture of Gitarayama. Similarly, he channelled socio-economic benefits to his province of birth (the Northern Province) to the detriment of other provinces (Justino & Verwimp 2008: 8). This created resentment among the Hutu population from other provinces, leading to the emergence of new north-south regional fault lines amongst the Hutus (Cooke 2011: 6). The resentment of the north-south Hutu divide led to a coup d’etat in 1973, bringing President Juvenal Habyarimana into power. The new President established an authoritarian one-party system, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MNRD), which entrenched the ethnic division between the Hutus and the Tutsis through a system of ethnic identity cards (Justino & Verwimp 2008: 8-9). The ethnicisation of government and the refusal by the Habyarimana government to allow the return of Rwandan refugees fomented rebellion against the government led by the RPF from 1990 to 1994. Efforts were made by the international community to broker peace between the warring factions under the auspices of the Arusha Peace Process, with a Peace Accord being signed by the parties in August 1993. However, the Accord collapsed as soon as it was signed due to the feeling among the major players in the Rwandan conflict that the balance of power struck was not reflective of the proper balance of power held by its signatories (McDoom 2011: 9-10). The result created hardliners within the ruling MNRD party, which resorted to ethnic mobilisation using the ideology of ‘Hutu power’ which excited ethnic Hutu passion against Tutsis (Cooke 2011: 8). When President Habyarimana was assassinated in the plane crash of 6 April 1994, the Hutu hardliners captured power. They used this opportunity to operationalise their ‘Hutu power’ ideology that culminated in the 1994 genocide in which between 500 000 and 1 000 000 Tutsis (about 75 per cent of the Tutsi population) were killed and around 105 000 displaced (Bhavnani & Backer 1999: 4-5; McDoom 2011: 25). The genocide was perpetrated in an environment of international disengagement, with the UN and foreign governments such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States doing little to prevent it, a fact that led to a military solution to the Rwandan civil war (McDoom 2011: 23-24).
The genocide ended in July 1994 with the successful overthrow of the Hutu government by the Tutsi-led RPF. The RPF proceeded to form a government of national unity in accordance with the Arusha Accord, allowing other opposition parties to take up their role both in government and in parliament (Curtis 2015: 1371; Cooke 2011: 8-9). This was undertaken through a Protocol of Agreement signed on 24 November 1994 with seven opposition parties that were part of the Arusha peace negotiations (McDoom 2011: 10-12; Cooke 2011: 9). The Protocol extended the period of transition from 22 months to nine years, giving the new government the opportunity to establish stability and plan for long-term socio-economic development, although this came at the expense of political participation in a democratic process (McDoom 2011: 10). The new government also adopted a policy of national unity and reconciliation, abolishing ethnic identities and advocating the adoption of a uniform identity of all people as Rwandans. The objective of this reconciliation strategy of abolishing ethnic divisions was the elimination of ethnic cleavages that were the main vehicles of mobilisation for violent conflicts, including the genocide (McDoom 2011: 12). The uncritical abolition of ethnic identities without a sustained national dialogue on these identities, however, has been criticised, with commentators arguing that this strategy would prevent ultimate reconciliation in Rwanda (see Power 2013: 1-9). It is acknowledged here that these are genuine concerns that must be addressed if Rwanda is to effectively transition from a fragile post-conflict society to a truly stable democratic society.

However, the conflict did not end in 1994 as the defeated government soldiers and the militia group, Interahamwe, fled to the border between Rwanda and the DRC and staged a counter-insurgency against the new Rwandan government. This resulted in continued conflict that lasted until 1999 (Justino & Verwimp 2008: 9). The counter-insurgency led to the massacre of Hutu soldiers and civilians in refugee camps in the DRC in the period 1995 to 1996 by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (formerly RPF). This massacre drew strong reactions from Hutu leaders within the Rwandan government itself, leading to the resignation from government of these Hutu leaders (McDoom 2011: 12). The counter-insurgency ended in 2000 when the majority of the counter-insurgents either moved deeper into the DRC or returned to Rwanda, leading to a process of demobilisation and demilitarisation (McDoom 2011: 27). With the insurgency effectively over, the transition period ended in 2003 with a constitutional referendum being held which led to the adoption of a new Constitution. Subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution, Rwanda held its local, legislative and presidential elections, which were overwhelmingly won by the RPF, with President Kagame garnering 95.1 per cent of the votes (McDoom 2011: 21). The new government proceeded to put in place comprehensive socio-economic, human development and resource redistribution policies aimed at jump-starting the economy and improving the living conditions of the Rwandan people. The stated government vision in adopting this comprehensive framework was that socio-economic empowerment would

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4 Under the Protocol, the presidency was to be held by Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu member of the RPF. The vice-presidency was to be held by Paul Kagame, a Tutsi and the military commander of RPF, and the position of Prime Minister was to be held by Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu opposition leader, marking the first time power had been shared between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.
create a more stable, united, peaceful and prosperous country. These efforts have borne some peace dividends, as discussed in section four below.

3 Socio-economic development as a tool for peace building and conflict resolution in intractable conflicts

According to the human needs theory propounded by Burton, unsatisfied human needs are the root causes of intractable conflicts, which in most instances are economic or resource-based (Danielsen 2005: 3-5). Burton asserts that in order to effectively deal with intractable conflicts at any level, there is a need for a comprehensive and holistic framework that captures the complexity of the conflict itself and responds to all the unmet needs of the populace (Burton 1997: 130). This is because, if not adequately addressed, the unmet needs would threaten the security of socio-economically excluded groups, thereby creating a vicious cycle of dehumanisation based on fear and want. The dire socio-economic situation is then exploited by different political actors to achieve divergent political agendas, resulting in intractable conflict situations. A good example of the utilisation of unmet human needs to stir violence is the pre-genocide Rwandan situation, when the Habyarimana regime used ethnic discourse based on past socio-economic divisions and disparities between the Hutus and the Tutsis to manipulate the majority Hutu and justify a war against the Tutsi-led RPF, which led to the genocide in 1994. The unmet socio-economic needs of the Hutus as a result of decades-long grievances over land and resource redistribution, coupled with the egregious structural violence of the Rwandan society, thus provided an enabling framework for the subsequent genocide (Miller 2008: 283-284; Uvin 2010: 165 & 175-176). In order to ensure conflict prevention, post-conflict reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable peace in such a society, it is paramount that the underlying human needs, especially the socio-economic and developmental needs of the populace, are adequately and effectively addressed. A failure to address these needs always leads to subsequent violent intractable conflicts that have further devastating consequences to lives and livelihoods.

How, then, does a society in a post-conflict situation meet the important human needs of its people, especially those related to poverty, inequality, socio-economic exclusion and marginalisation, and ensure the creation of a just, stable and equitable society? Suggestions have been made that the best way to create such a society that meets the human needs of its people is through the incorporation of socio-economic development and resource redistribution as important components of conflict resolution and post-conflict justice aimed at achieving social justice and sustainable peace (Mani 2008: 254-255). The UN Charter, a charter inspired by armed conflict and human suffering caused by it, critically interlinks international peace and security with the respect for fundamental human rights and development (article 1). Four fundamental pillars of post-conflict peace-building and conflict prevention emerge from the Charter: ‘Security (support to peace negotiations; deployment of peacekeeping troops; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; security sector reform); development (measures to support economic growth and social service delivery); governance (elections, decentralisation and civil society
support); and justice (transitional justice, distributive justice and reconciliation programmes) (Uvin 2010: 162).

Development is thus an important tool in conflict prevention and the creation of stable and just societies that are required for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, traditional transitional justice processes – aimed at conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and post-conflict justice and reconciliation – has for a long time ignored the development paradigm in its response to sectarian violence and civil wars. Thus, traditional transitional justice has consistently failed to deal effectively with structural and systemic inequalities and exclusions that make societies prone to conflict (Miller 2008: 266-267 & 272-280; Sharp 2012: 782). Some of the reasons fashioned for this oversight are as follows: First, having been heavily influenced by human rights, transitional justice has replicated human rights’ long-standing bias against socio-economic rights (Miller 2008: 275-276; Sharp 2012: 796-800; Arbour 2007: 5-8). Second is the influence of international criminal law on transitional justice, which focuses on the perpetrators of human rights violations and emphasises individual criminal responsibility, and not on the survivors/victims of violence and the structural causes of violence (Miller 2008: 269-270; Arbour 2007: 4-5 & 15). The third reason is the close connection between traditional transitional justice and the ‘liberal peace thesis’. This liberal peace thesis asserts that political and economic liberalisation (transition to a Western-style liberal market democracy) promotes sustainable and positive peace. The adoption of this thesis by traditional transitional justice practitioners has led to a focus on political-legal-institutional reform in conflict resolution processes rather than social justice and socio-economic transformation (Sharp 2012: 782 & 796; Arbour 2007: 3-4; Waldorf 2012: 3-4). As a result of these influences, traditional transitional justice has prioritised interventions geared towards the fulfilment of civil and political rights to the detriment of economic, social and cultural rights; those aimed at achieving individual justice for perpetrators than creating a conducive environment that responds to critical survival needs of victims and their general communities; and those aimed at democratisation rather than those aimed at socio-economic transformation.

The narrow conception of traditional transitional justice that ignores developmental issues has been heavily criticised as a truncated conception of the human person, which fails to recognise that the fulfilment of socio-economic human needs is as important as the recognition of the human person as an important right-holding member of the political community (Cobian & Raetegui 2009: 143). Sharp argues that this narrow conception of transitional justice is untenable as it provides a one-dimensional and distorted narrative of conflict based on the notion that socio-economic development and conflict can be neatly separated, while in reality conflict results from a messy and complicated mix of political, social, economic and cultural factors. Sharp asserts that in order for transitional justice to comprehensively deal with the root causes of conflict, it must propose policies that effectively deal with social justice concerns such as poverty, inequality, structural violence and distributive justice (Sharp 2012: 783).

Miller argues that transitional justice plays an important role in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation as it pre-determines issues related to the past that must be resolved. In this context, therefore, by
leaving out important issues of socio-economic development, resource redistribution or inequality of power and wealth, it tells the society that issues of development and conflict are separated, and that inequality itself should not be addressed in the transition process (Miller 2008: 268-270). Miller asserts that the divorce of development and social justice from transitional justice encourages the myth that the sources of intractable conflicts are political and ethnic rather than economic and resource-based (Miller 2008: 268 & 280-284; Sharp 2012: 794). Miller recommends that to deal effectively with intractable conflicts, achieve social justice and build stable post-conflict societies, transitional justice mechanisms must be responsive to three fundamental issues: the socio-economic roots and consequences of conflict; post-conflict economic liberalisation that fails to redistribute socio-economic resources; and the developmental policies and plans of the successor government for the future (Miller 2008: 267). She warns that the failure of transitional justice to comprehensively deal with these issues may actively contribute to the outbreak of renewed violence in the future (Miller 2008: 288).

The need for transitional justice to look beyond political settlements that serve the interests of the political elite to socio-economic development aimed at remedying underlying socio-economic inequalities that foment conflict was affirmed in 2006 by the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, who stated as follows:

Transitional justice must have the ambition of assisting the transformation of oppressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will procure an equitable future. It must reach to, but also beyond the crises and abuses committed during the conflict, which led to the transition, into the human rights violations that pre-existed the conflict and caused, or contributed to it. When making that search, it is likely that one would expose a great number of violations of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights and discriminatory practices (Arbour 2007: 3).

She further warned that transitional justice mechanisms that ignore the issue of socio-economic development could not in the long run bring sustainable peace (Arbour 2007: 8-9).

The need for transitional justice mechanisms to put in place socio-economic measures that respond to the actual socio-economic needs and priorities of the survivors of civil war has been affirmed by attitudinal surveys among survivors. This survey shows that survivors prioritise reparative and distributive justice – interventions that meet their basic and urgent socio-economic needs such as food, health, education, housing, clothing, employment and income generation – as compared to retributive justice (see Waldorf 2012: 5). Vinck and Pham, who undertook an attitudinal survey in the DRC, affirm this by stating that ‘as long as basic survival needs are not met and safety is not guaranteed, social reconstruction programmes, including transitional justice mechanisms, will not be perceived as a priority and will lack the level of support needed for their success’ (Vinck & Pham 2008: 404).

As a result of these criticisms, and the renewed requirement that transitional justice mechanisms act as tools for conflict prevention, it has been found that it is necessary for transitional justice to deal expressly and adequately with issues of social justice (Miller 2008: 288-289). Transitional justice has thus reformed to advocate the adoption of holistic and complementary approaches in post-conflict peace building,
reconciliation and reconstruction (Arbour 2007: 2). In this context of reforms, socio-economic development has become an important component of the holistic approaches to peace-building and conflict resolution as it focuses on the needs of the survivors of violence, with the aim of responding to past socio-economic deprivation and exclusion as well as enhancing their capacity to meet their socio-economic needs of the future, thus creating more stable societies.

Who, then, has the major responsibility of putting in place this broad-based and longer-term socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies in the post-conflict setting? It is asserted here that the biggest player in the transitional justice arena, with the responsibility for the realisation of sustainable peace in post-conflict situations, is the successor government itself. For the new government to succeed in maintaining sustainable peace and a stable post-conflict society, it has to adopt and implement effective long-term and broad-based socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies aimed at responding to the structural injustices and socio-economic deprivations that are almost always the root causes or the contributing factors of societal instability and conflict. These policies must be designed, implemented and funded adequately so as to respond to the subsisting needs and priorities of the citizenry affected by civil war. The importance of implementing comprehensive socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies aimed at improving the standards of living of the population in creating stable, more tolerant societies can be seen in the case of Rwanda, which implemented such policies, as compared to Burundi, which failed to implement such comprehensive policies, as detailed in the section below.

4 Socio-economic development efforts in Rwanda post-1994 and in Burundi post-2000 sectarian conflicts

4.1 Rwanda

The requirement that the state adopts a framework for the realisation of human rights, especially socio-economic rights, is entrenched in the Rwandan Constitution itself. Paragraph 9 of the Preamble affirms Rwanda’s adherence to human rights as enshrined in several human rights instruments, including the UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). All the above-mentioned international human rights instruments entrench economic, social and cultural rights, with the obligation on states to put in place legislative, policy, programmatic, remedial and other measures to enhance the progressive realisation of these rights. The Rwandan government, thus, has the obligation both under international and national law to put in place effective measures for socio-economic development and resource redistribution to enhance the realisation of socio-economic rights and reduce poverty, inequality and destitution. This is further acknowledged by the Constitution itself in paragraph 11 of the Preamble that affirms the determination of Rwanda to develop human resources, fight ignorance, promote technological advancement and advance the social welfare of the
people of Rwanda. The ‘fundamental principles’ in article 9 of the Constitution further affirm Rwanda’s commitment to establish a state committed to promoting social welfare and establishing appropriate mechanisms for ensuring social justice. The Constitution in the Bill of Rights further affirms the right to equality and equal treatment of the law, the right to free choice of employment and equal pay for equal work, the right to education and the right to health and important socio-economic rights (articles 11, 16 and 37-41). What, then, has been the response by the Rwandan government to these constitutional and international human rights obligations regarding socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies, and what impact has this response had on the reduction of poverty, inequality and the other contributing factors to societal fragility and violence? This question is explored from a historical perspective in this section.

Rwanda experienced a strong economic growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, mainly because of the international coffee boom, with average Rwandans experiencing an increased income in this period (Ansoms 2005: 496). However, this progressive economic growth stagnated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading to a major economic crisis. The economic crisis was precipitated mainly by the collapse of world coffee prices, but aggravated by declining governance and poor socio-economic policies that fomented political instability and internal insecurity (Cooke 2011: 7). The economic and governance crisis was further exacerbated by drought and food shortages as well as a demand for austerity by donors and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes. These factors led to the reduction by 40 per cent in the national budget in 1989, with social spending being the heaviest casualty (Cooke 2011: 7). During this period, Rwanda’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita contracted at the rate of 1.28 per cent per annum and inequality increased rapidly. The country transited from a low-inequality country with a Gini Coefficient of 0.289 to a high-inequality country with a Gini Coefficient of 0.451 (Ansoms 2005: 502).

The economic and governance crises culminated in the four-year Rwandan civil war that led to the 1994 genocide. The popular participation in the genocide was not driven solely by ethno-political ideologies, but also by the possibility of increasing access to basic socio-economic goods that were owned by the victims, such as land and other types of property (Ansoms 2005: 503; Justino & Verwimp 2008: 29). The Rwandan civil war thus gives credence to the theory that absolute or relative socio-economic deprivation creates a conflict-prone society that can easily be triggered into actual conflict by an unscrupulous political class. One of the best methods of conflict prevention in such societies, therefore, is enhanced socio-economic development and wealth redistribution aimed at increasing the economic opportunities of the poor and satisfying their basic human needs.

Subsequent to the 1994 genocide and in the context of post-conflict recovery, Rwanda put in place ambitious developmental policies to hasten economic growth and to reduce poverty and inequality through the redistribution of resources (McDoom 2011: 2 & 13; Cooke 2011: 1-2). These developmental efforts were to a substantial extent aided by substantial foreign aid inflows, which were 55 per cent more as compared to the normal sub-Saharan aid standards (Ansoms 2005: 499; Booth &
Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 5). The reasoning behind the adoption of these pro-poor socio-economic development policies was the theory that economic development and wealth redistribution is the cornerstone of social stability, and thus important tools for peace-building and post-conflict social transformation (McDoom 2011: 3 & 13).

In 2000, the government adopted the Vision 2020 policy document as the framework for Rwanda's development. The Vision 2020 policy was aimed at modernising and diversifying the Rwandan economy, generating off-farm employment and transforming Rwanda from a low-income agriculture-based economy to a middle-income knowledge-based economy by 2020 (Rwanda Vision 2020: 2-3). The policy identified six critical priority areas for development to enhance the socio-economic transformation of the Rwandan society: good governance and the strengthening of the state; human resource development to create a knowledge-based economy; private sector-led development; infrastructure development; productive, high-value and market-oriented agriculture; and regional and international integration (Rwanda Vision 2020: 13-21).

The Vision 2020 project was to be realised in periods captured by the different poverty reduction strategies, starting with the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper adopted in 2002 to cover the period 2002 to 2006. Its focus areas were rural development and agricultural transformation; human development; economic infrastructure; governance; private sector development; and institutional capacity building (PRSP 2002-2005: 6-7). In the period 2001 to 2006, overall poverty-prioritised spending increased from 25 to 50 per cent, leading to substantive economic growth, although the growth was below the Vision 2020 projection of 6 per cent (actual growth of 5 per cent) (Ansoms 2007: 372 & 376). The result of the relative economic growth was the reduction of poverty by 2.2 per cent as well as the reduction of extreme poverty by 4.2 per cent (EDPRS 2013-2018: 2). This meant that more than half of the population continued living below the poverty line and a third of the population was still afflicted by extreme poverty (Ansoms 2007: 373). Inequality, similarly, increased in that period from a Gini Coefficient of 0.47 to 0.51 (EDPRS 2013-2018: 2; Ansoms 2007: 376-377). At the end of the period, the Institute for Development Studies undertook an evaluation of the implementation of the PRSP, noting that even though a great effort was put in place by the government to meet its targets, there was still a need to integrate its priorities with actual poverty reduction, the enhancement of equity and the provision of broad-based socio-economic growth for all (IDS 2006).

Following on the first PRSP, and based on the Vision 2020 policy goals, Rwanda in 2007 adopted the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS I) that covered the period 2008 to 2012. It had three flagship areas. The first was sustainable growth for jobs and exports, which was aimed at reducing the cost of doing business, increasing the capacity to innovate as well as widening and strengthening the financial sector. The second flagship area was the Vision 2020 Umurenge, a highly-decentralised integrated rural development programme aimed at accelerating poverty reduction by promoting pro-poor components of the national growth agenda with a focus on socio-economic transformation of the rural areas. The third flagship area was good governance, which was aimed at anchoring pro-poor growth through fighting corruption and
building comparative regional advantage in ‘soft infrastructure’, which included well-defined property rights, efficient public administration as well as transparency and accountability in fiscal and regulatory matters (EDPRS 2008-2012: xi & 1). In the context of the three flagship areas, the EDPRSI further called for continued expenditure on social sectors such as health, education, water and sanitation, while also targeting agriculture, transport, information and communication technologies (ICT), energy, housing and urban development.

According to the Rwandan government, the EDPRS I period achieved a perfect developmental ‘hat trick’ with economic growth at an average of 8 per cent, poverty reduction at 12 per cent and the reduction in income inequality across all sectors of society, with the services sector growing at 10 per cent per annum to become the main contributor to the GDP by 53 per cent (EDPRS 2013-2018: ix & 3-4). The strong socio-economic growth was underpinned by the following factors: prudent and stable macro-economic and market-oriented policies; sustained business confidence; an improved regulatory framework; transparency in government-private sector interactions; a strong anti-corruption stance; high levels of consumption and public investment; and increased support by international development partners (EDPRS 2013-2018: 5). The EDPRS I successes were integrating inclusiveness and sustainability; undertaking home-grown initiatives such as umuganda (community work), gacaca, abunzi (mediators) and imihigo (performance contracts between central government and regional provinces) which have strengthened delivery of services; adopting community-based solutions which have empowered communities to be the drivers of their own development; and the use of ICT which has improved service delivery (EDPRS 2013-2018: ix). The EDPRS I period saw a poverty reduction from 56.7 per cent in 2005 to 44.9 per cent in 2011 with rural poverty decreasing from 61.9 per cent to 48.7 per cent (EDPRS 2013-2018: 6). Rural development saw improvements in agricultural production with agricultural output increasing from 21.5 to 26.9 per cent, while non-farm jobs also increased by 50-60 per cent (EDPRS 2013-2018: 6). Inequality generally decreased from a Gini Coefficient of 0.52 per cent in 2005 to 0.49 per cent in 2011, although gender inequality in relation to access to resources persisted and remains a challenge in addressing rural poverty (EDPRS 2013-2018: 6).

At the end of the first EDPRS I, Rwanda in 2012 adopted the second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS II) covering the period 2013 to 2018. This strategy is based on the redeveloped targets of Vision 2020 which were revised in 2012 with the following objectives: achieving an average growth rate of 11.5 per cent per annum to increase the GDP per capita to $1,240; eliminating extreme poverty and reducing the poverty headcount ratio to 20 per cent; creating 1.8 million new off-farm jobs and increasing the urban population by 35 per cent; reducing external dependency by increasing the export growth to 28 per cent per annum; and incorporating the private sector as the dominant engine of growth (EDPRS 2013-2018: 2). Based on the experience of EDPRS I, EDPRS II recognises the finite nature of Rwandan development in relation to challenges such as high poverty and inequality; high pressure on land due to increased population growth; youth unemployment; the slow growth of the private sector; the lack of a suitable infrastructure; as well as challenges in the horizontal and vertical co-ordination of developmental activities at different levels of governance.
Four thematic priority areas of focus are identified for development in the EDPRS II period in order to deal with the aforementioned challenges, which are economic transformation which targets an accelerated 11.5 per cent average economic growth and the restructuring of the economy towards industry and service delivery; rural development with the objective of reducing rural poverty from 44.9 per cent to below 30 per cent by 2018 through increased agricultural productivity and increased social protection programmes; productivity and youth employment through the creation of 200,000 new jobs annually; and accountable governance through the improvement of service delivery, enhancing citizen participation and ownership of developmental programmes and ensuring efficiency and sustainability (EDPRS 2013-2018: xi-xiii).

Rwandan socio-economic growth policies and political governance have been termed as ‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 7). This is because they channel available rent-seeking opportunities centrally so as to genuinely grow the economy of the country, enhance redistribution and meet the basic socio-economic needs of the people with the objective of achieving political stability (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 7). In adopting this developmental strategy, the government denied itself the easy opportunity of entrenching clientelism by providing private goods to the political elite to maintain political support, and instead opting to build political support and goodwill through demonstrating an ability to provide more and better public goods to the citizenry in general (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 7). The strategy involves limiting avenues of corruption and influence peddling among the political elite, with the result that socio-economic and developmental policy-making processes are strictly geared towards enhancing the nation’s economic growth and income distribution; and not the creation of rent-seeking opportunities for the political elite as is the case in other post-conflict societies, with Burundi as a prime example (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 8-9). This strategy was regarded as the best and most feasible route to overcoming Rwanda’s past ethnic divisions and inequalities, as articulated in Rwanda’s Vision 2020. The Vision is based on the reasoning that if economic and social progress occurs fast enough, the new generation of Rwandans will embrace their common identity as Rwandans and forget the divisions of the past (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2011: 8-9).

These socio-economic growth and development policies have started to bear fruits for Rwanda in terms of positive economic recovery, with Rwanda being the tenth fastest growing economy in the world in the decade since 2000. This is evidenced by statistical data which reveals Rwanda’s GDP per capita growing at an annual rate of 6 per cent in the period 1995 to 2004, and at 7.4 per cent since 2004, becoming 50 per cent greater than the GDP in the 1990s before the conflict (Cooke 2011: 4; Verpoorten 2014: 1). However, data indicates that poverty is still rampant in Rwanda, although efforts by government to address the challenge have borne some fruits. In 1994 after the genocide, the poverty headcount ratio was at 70 per cent (Verpoorten 2014: 1). In 2002, two years after the end of the counter-insurgency, 60.3 per cent of the Rwandan population was poor, with rural poverty being at 65.7 per cent, urban poverty at 19.4 per cent and the poverty rate in the capital Kigali being at 12.3 per cent (Justino & Verwimp 2008: 16). In relation to extreme poverty, 41.6 per cent of the population was experiencing extreme poverty, with 45.8 per
cent in rural areas, 10 per cent in urban areas and 4.5 per cent in Kigali (Rwanda UNDAF Evaluation Report 2013: 6). There have been further improvements in poverty and inequality reduction, with data indicating that in the period 2010 to 2011, the general poverty headcount ratio reduced to 45 per cent and rural poverty reduced to 49 per cent, while the Gini Coefficient for inequality decreased from 0.52 per cent in 2005 to 0.49 per cent in 2011 (Verpoorten 2014: 1; Rwanda UNDAF Evaluation Report 2013: 6).

In relation to education, with the constitutionalisation of free primary education, the primary school net attendance ratio increased from 72 per cent in 2000 to 87.5 per cent in 2010, while the secondary net attendance ratio also improved from 5.0 per cent in 2000 to 14.4 per cent in 2010 (EDPRS 2013-2018: 7; Verpoorten 2014: 6). Health indicators have also improved in the post-conflict period with the number of new-born deliveries in hospitals tripling from 26 per cent in 2000 to 78 per cent in 2010, showing a decrease in the maternal mortality rate from 1 071 per 100 000 live births in 2000 to 476 per 100 000 live births in 2010 (EDPRS 2013-2018: 7; Verpoorten 2014: 3). The infant mortality rate, which had increased from 85 per 1 000 live births in 1992 to 109 per 1 000 live births, decreased considerably to 50 per 1 000 live births in 2010 (EDPRS 2013-2018: 7; Verpoorten 2014: 5). Similarly, the under-five mortality rate, which had increased in the war period from 151 in 1992 to 196 in 2000, decreased to 76 in 2010 (Verpoorten 2014: 5-6). Child vaccination coverage, which had declined in the conflict period from 86.3 per cent in 1992 to 76.0 per cent in 2000, similarly improved to 90.1 per cent in 2010 (Verpoorten 2014: 6). The number of people using mosquito nets increased from 6.6 per cent in 2000 to 82.7 per cent in 2010, an important health indicator taking into account the prevalence of malaria in the Great Lakes region (Verpoorten 2014: 6). Further, the number of people accessing clean drinking water and sanitation increased from 71 per cent to 75 per cent between 2005 and 2011, with electrification cover expanding from 3 per cent to 13 per cent in the same period (EDPRS 2013-2018: 7).

Even though still classified in the low human development category at position 163 out of 188 countries,\(^5\) Rwanda has over the years shown consistent improvements in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) components, as represented by the table below (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Rwanda 2015: 2-3):

\(^5\) In 2016, Rwanda was ranked in position 159 out of 188 ranked countries with an HDI value of 0.498, an improvement from position 163 the previous year. This is above the average 0.497 HDI value for low HDI countries, but below the average 0.523 for sub-Saharan countries. Rwanda’s 2016 HDI value was an increase of 103 per cent from their HDI value of 0.244 in 1990. Its GNI per capita also increased by 90.9 per cent between 1990 and 2013; see UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Rwanda 2016: 2-4.
The graphic representation above bears evidence of the improvement in the human development indicators from very low bases between 1990 and 1995 as a result of the civil war and the genocide to the current improved status due to the socio-economic and developmental policies that have been implemented by the Rwandan government.

Because of a paucity of disaggregated data on the effect of these socio-economic development policies on different sections of society, opinions conflict as to whether there has been a sufficient redistribution of resources as well as the benefits of the increased economic growth. Some commentators are of the opinion that the effect of the progressive economic growth has not cascaded into the rural areas in relation to poverty reduction and the improvement of the social welfare of ordinary people. Cooke, with reference to the UNDP National Development Report for Rwanda 2007, asserts that Rwanda's economic growth is failing to benefit poor citizens, noting that the population growth will soon outstrip the economic gains (Cooke 2011: 4). She states the Report's warning that if the rising inequality remains unchecked, Rwanda will exhaust its ability to reduce poverty rates through economic growth alone. A study of the UNDP HDI for 2015, as discounted for inequality, affirms that inequality remains an issue in Rwanda, with Rwanda's HDI of 0.483 falling to 0.330, a loss of 31.6 per cent when adjusted for inequality (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Rwanda 2015: 4). However, this is lower than that in comparative countries such as Togo and Guinea, which suffer losses of 33.4 per cent and 36.5 per cent respectively, and the loss is also lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, which is at 33.3 per cent, and the average for low HDI countries, which is at 32.0 per cent (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Rwanda 2015: 4). The comparative lower level of inequality in Rwanda is further affirmed by the Gender Inequality Index, which is at 0.400, ranking Rwanda at position 80 out of the 155 countries evaluated (UNDP
The low inequality in comparative perspective indicates that the resource redistribution policies of the Rwandan government have borne some fruits, even though more needs to be done to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are fairly distributed between all the sectors of society (Ansoms 2005: 503). The challenges of differentiation in relation to poverty reduction in the provinces, gender inequality in relation to access to resources and inequality in Rwanda in comparative perspective are acknowledged by the Rwandan government, and the government has put in place measures within EDPRS II to ensure a more equitable redistribution of resources to ensure that the benefits of socio-economic growth and development are shared by all Rwandans (EDPRS 2013-2018: 8-10).

The strong socio-economic development and redistribution policies as well as the strong leadership provided by the RPF government under the leadership of President Kagame have entrenched social stability in Rwanda and put the country onto a path of reconciliation, social cohesion and social transformation. This has been a positive contribution to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, which has borne major peace dividends for the Rwandan people. However, as has been argued by some, basing social cohesion and conflict prevention solely on economic growth and strong leadership is not sustainable as economies fluctuate and leaders change (McDoom 2011: 33-38; Cooke 2011: 1-3 & 15-16; HRW 2012). Therefore, there is a need for political liberalisation to ensure that the Rwandan society is able to transition democratically should the RPF lose its electoral majority. Some of the civil and political reforms that have been suggested to increase the democratic space in Rwanda include the review of laws on genocide ideology and sectarianism so as to ensure that they are not used to muzzle legitimate dissent and political speech; the review of media laws to allow more space for independent media institutions; and the liberalisation of the political space to allow political parties as well as civil society organisations to register and operate freely, subject to legitimate regulation to weed out irresponsible rhetoric and actions (McDoom 2011: 33-34). McDoom and Cooke separately warn that the Rwandan society remains fragile and that, in the absence of the transformation of the political culture and the transition to a more democratic and accountable system of governance, the remarkable socio-economic growth and development of the Rwandan society undertaken by the RPF government may be undone by an unconstitutional change of regime (McDoom 2011: 38; Cooke 2011: 14-15).

4.2 Burundi

The requirement that the state adopts a framework for the realisation of human rights, especially socio-economic rights, is entrenched in the Burundian Constitution itself. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble, read with article 19 of the Constitution, affirms Burundi’s commitment to a respect for human rights, as enshrined in several human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration, the ICESCR, the African Charter, the CEDAW and the CRC, instruments that entrench economic and social

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6 It indicates that in Rwanda, 55.7 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women; 8.0 per cent of adults have reached at least secondary level of education as compared to 8.8 per cent of men; and that female participation in the labour market is at 86.4 per cent as compared to 85.3 per cent for men.
rights. This commitment is further affirmed by paragraph 5 of the Preamble which details Burundi’s consciousness ‘of the imperative need to promote the economic and social development of our country’. Further, in paragraph 10 of the Preamble the need is noted to put in place measures to enhance economic development and the realisation of equality and social justice in the country; acknowledging that these were profound causes of the ethnic and political violence, genocide, exclusion, insecurity and political stability that had plunged the country into civil war.

In the Bill of Rights, the Constitution entrenches the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law; the right to an adequate means of survival in a dignified manner; the entitlement to obtain the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights and the free development of the human person; the right to education; the right to work and favourable conditions of work; the right of access to healthcare; and the obligation on the state to develop the country (articles 22, 27 and 52-58). These provisions thus place a constitutional injunction on the state to adopt a necessary socio-economic and developmental policy and to implement the same to enhance the socio-economic situation of the Burundian people. What, then, has been the socio-economic development and resource redistribution policy response of the Burundian government to these constitutional and international law obligations; and what impact has that response had on the reduction of poverty, inequality and the other contributing factors to societal fragility and violence? In this section the article explores this question from a historical perspective.

Burundi is a landlocked, low-opportunity country with a high population density mainly reliant on agriculture. Its population mainly lives in the rural areas, with the urbanisation rate at only around 11.8 per cent. Before independence from Belgian rule, the Burundian economy was integrated with that of Rwanda and the Congo (now DRC), with support to the economy coming from the natural resource endowments in the DRC (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 3-4). The colonial economic union collapsed after independence in 1962 with Rwanda and DRC forming their own industries, with an adverse impact on the Burundian economy (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 4). Due to this severe economic situation, the state became the major source of resources (wealth and upward socio-economic mobility), leading to a fierce struggle for the control of the state and rents that could be controlled by those in power for their own self-enrichment and the benefit of their allies (Uvin 2010: 175-176; Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 8-9; Ndikumana 2005: 415-418).

The dire socio-economic situation has led to continuous conflicts and coups, with the different ethnic identities (ethnicities, regionalism and clanism) being channelled by the political elites for the purpose of capture and retention of state power. The essence of the control of state power was the control of the minimal available resources in the country, which was then used by the political elite for the economic and social wellbeing of themselves, their families and allies (Uvin 2010: 169-170; Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 11). In this context of intractable conflicts, in which many regimes did not last more than two years in power, the governing elite adopted short-termism in relation to socio-economic developmental planning and resource redistribution policies, with short-term political goals superseding long-term socio-economic planning (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 6 & 26-27). This short-term war-oriented political
mentality and the predatory nature of the state have subsisted throughout governance in Burundi. Consequently, even after the Arusha Accord in 2000 and the subsequent elections in 2005 that brought to power a democratically-elected CNDD-FDD government, not much in terms of long-term socio-economic planning and developmental policies was implemented by the new political elite. This failure in long-term socio-economic planning has had adverse consequences for economic growth, human development, resource redistribution and the general social welfare of the population of Burundi.

There was a short respite to the Burundian economy in 1976 to 1986, when the regime of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took power and undertook a massive programme of investment aimed at kick-starting economic growth and development, raising the share of public investments from 5.6 to 42.8 per cent (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 11). This period saw increased attempts at the modernisation of Burundi with large-scale infrastructural projects, such as the building of roads, dams and schools, being undertaken, which saw Burundi experiencing an economic growth rate above the African average (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 11). These efforts were largely bolstered by the coffee boom of the 1970s as well as increased foreign aid from Burundi’s development partners (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 7). This period of socio-economic development bore peace dividends, as no overt conflict was witnessed. However, it was a missed opportunity as the Bagaza regime failed to put in place effective peace-building, socio-economic inclusion and conflict-prevention structures to bring about positive peace and peaceful co-existence between the different ethnic groups in Burundi.

The socio-economic development gains that might have been consolidated within the Bagaza regime, however, were effectively wiped out in the period between 1988 and 2000 which was characterised by war and an unprecedented economic crisis (Nkurunzinza & Ngaruko 2005: 6). The continuous conflicts and undemocratic captures of power led to international and regional economic embargoes against Burundi as well as the withholding of foreign aid by international donors (with aid decreasing from $318 million in 1993 to $83 million in 1997). This further exacerbated the dire economic situation, with Burundi recording the highest levels of poverty and inequality (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 503). Burundi’s economy, which had grown at an average rate of 4 per cent per annum prior to 1993, recorded negative growth rates in the subsequent decade with the country’s per capita GDP reducing by more than a half between 1993 and 2001 (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 8). The country also suffered a 20 per cent devaluation of its currency and inflation shot up by almost 40 per cent by 1998, leading to the doubling of household poverty with 68 per cent of the population living below the poverty line (Brachet & Wolpe 2005: 8). These dire socio-economic conditions not only made Burundi’s ethnic and regional cleavages more acute, but they also severely limited any socio-economic aspirations of both Hutus and underprivileged Tutsis, leading to general despondency and despair within the population, a precarious situation receptive to ethnic-based mobilisation for violence (Brachet & Wolpe 2005 8-9). By the time the CNDD-FDD government came to power in 2005, the economy was in tatters and the livelihoods of the Burundian people had been severely compromised, a situation that needed comprehensive socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies to repair. The
important question to ask here is what the new government did in terms of the adoption and substantive implementation of socio-economic development and redistribution policies post-2005, and what impact that has had on growth, human development and the realisation of the socio-economic rights of the Burundian people. This question is important as fiscal, developmental and re-distributional policies are important tools for peace consolidation that can direct available resources towards the less-privileged segments of society so as to reduce poverty, inequality and other types of socio-economic marginalisation that are the fault lines for conflict.

In 2004 Burundi adopted an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a primarily donor-driven process, which provided for an ambitious three-year (2004-2006) programme funded by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility of the International Monetary Fund. The Interim PRSP was followed by the Programme Quinquennal de Gouvernement 2005-2010 and the first complete Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2006-2009 (PRSP I), aimed at stimulating the economy, social sectors and development (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 506). Despite the adoption of these measures, the economy grew at only 3 per cent, way below the projected 6.7 per cent, with the economy remaining heavily reliant on agriculture which accounted for 35 per cent of the GDP, provided over 90 per cent of jobs and accounted for over 80 per cent of exports (Burundi PRSP II 2012: 20). PRSP I was followed by the Programme Quinquennal de Gouvernement 2010-2015; the Vision Burundi 2025, which was adopted in 2010 to guide long-term political and socio-economic transformation;7 and the Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011-2015 (PRSP II).

The PRSP II retained focus on the four areas of PRSP I, but was more oriented towards economic growth and development (Burundi PRSP II 2012: 20). It acknowledged that socio-economic growth in the PRSP I period was too slow and insufficient for poverty reduction. It noted the challenges in that period as follows: high demographic growth; inefficient agricultural production; weak execution of public expenditure; underinvestment in the private sector; a persistent electricity deficit; and a lack of capacity to manage development. In order to respond to these challenges, the PRSP II adopted four strategic pillars to guide its achievement of Vision 2025: strengthening of the rule of law; the consolidation of good governance and the promotion of gender equality; the transformation of Burundi’s economy to generate sustainable job-creating growth; the improvement of access to and quality of basic services and the strengthening of social safety nets; and the promotion of development through sustainable environmental and space management (Burundi PRSP II 2012: xii-xvii). The objective was to increase the economic growth rate to 8.2 per cent by 2015, with the rural areas growing at the rate of 8.2 per cent in 2015 ((Burundi PRSP II 2012: xviii). However, as at the end of 2014 this had not been achieved: The economy had only grown by 4.7 per cent from 4.5 per cent in 2013 (African Economic Outlook – Burundi 2015: para 1).

7 The goal of the Vision is to enhance sustainable development in Burundi, increase economic growth and reduce poverty by half, that is, from 67 per cent to 33 per cent by 2025. Its three primary objectives are good governance and the rule of law; the development of a strong competitive economy; and improved living conditions for all Burundians.
With the development of these strategies came increased foreign aid inflows into Burundi, as donor countries were more certain of political stability in the country and also had a clear framework to focus on in terms of development support. Aid increased from $420 million in 2005; $480 million in 2006; $489 million in 2007; $511 million in 2008; peaking in 2009 when Burundi received aid worth $562 million (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 507-508). However, according to Desrosiers and Muringa, aid had followed the traditional donor country biases, with more aid being channelled towards the rule of law, transitional justice and security sectors, while aid to social, economic and production sectors that would have bolstered economies of scale and generated pro-poor growth was minimal (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 504). This sectoral disparity in aid inflows is affirmed by the UN Internal Peace Building Support Office (PBSO), which details peace-building priorities for funding to include good governance; the security sector; justice, human rights and the fight against impunity; land and reintegr ation – with economic development coming second last in a category named ‘other areas’ (PBSO 2007: 6).

The increase in aid inflow also resulted from the selection of Burundi as an initial country of focus by the new UN Peace-Building Commission (PBC) in 2006, with the aim of ensuring that Burundi moved from conflict to development. This led to the development of a Strategic Framework for Peace Building in Burundi (CSCP) in 2007 to guide the peace-building efforts as well as the disbursement of an initial $35 million from PBC to undertake quick impact projects as peace dividends (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 506). Furthermore, Burundi started to benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2005 by receiving interim debt relief assistance, a process that matured in 2009 with Burundi benefitting from full debt relief as well as qualifying for the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Assistance (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 507). The high aid masks Burundi’s poor use of internal resources, with internal resources forming only 12.4 per cent of the GDP in 2014 as compared to 13.1 per cent in 2013 and 14.2 per cent in 2011 (African Economic Outlook – Burundi 2015: para 1). This is due primarily to corruption which has seen funds diverted from public use to private coffers, a fact that has led to the international community cutting aid support from 5 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 2 per cent of GDP in 2014 (African Economic Outlook – Burundi 2015: para 1).

The tragedy is that despite the impressive policy documents put in place and the international support that was available to Burundi in the post-conflict setting between 2005 and 2015, there was never the requisite political will or governmental capacity to actually implement these policies. Consequently, the intended socio-economic transformation of the Burundian society never materialised (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 502). Although other issues contributed to this inability, the primary issue has been poor governance. This was manifested in wanton corruption, which has been the key mechanism for the siphoning of public funds meant for socio-economic development into private coffers to feed patron-client networks that have persevered in Burundi due to the predatory nature of the state and the war-induced short-term political culture prevailing among the political and social elite (Nkurunzinza 2009: 1 & 12). Evidence indicates that the elite in or close to power have rapidly enriched themselves. The frenzy of corruption has upset the requisite balance between available resources and the actual implementation of
developmental programmes, leaving the state with little resources to achieve any meaningful socio-economic transformation of the society (Nkurunzinza 2009: 13-14; Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 525-526). The government itself has acknowledged this challenge, stating that there was insufficient funding for economic infrastructure (10.3 per cent) and other areas with growth potential (8.8 per cent), which was partly responsible for the sluggish economic growth (AfDB 2011: 4).

As a consequence of this failure, poverty, inequality and socio-economic exclusion have grown deeper and more entrenched in the general population. Data from the UNDP HDI indicates that 81.8 per cent of Burundians are multi-dimensionally poor, with an additional 12 per cent living near multi-dimensional poverty (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2015: 6). The multi-dimensional poverty data from the UNDP HDI are supported by multi-dimensional poverty data from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) in its 2015 Country Briefing of Burundi, which is tabulated as follows (OPHI 2015: 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-dimensional poverty index</th>
<th>% of poor people</th>
<th>Average intensity across the poor</th>
<th>% of people vulnerable to poverty</th>
<th>% of people in severe poverty</th>
<th>% of people in destitution</th>
<th>Inequality among the poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>80.8 per cent</td>
<td>56.2 per cent</td>
<td>14.1 per cent</td>
<td>50.5 per cent</td>
<td>39.2 per cent</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to these challenges, Burundi has been classified under the HDI system as a low human development country at position 184 out of the 188 countries evaluated by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2015 with an HDI value of 0.400. This HDI valuation of Burundi falls below the average for low HDI countries at 0.505 and also below the average for sub-Saharan countries, which is at 0.518 (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2015: 2). Human development, in relation to the different components of the HDI, in Burundi over the years may be elaborated by the following graph (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2015: 3):

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8 In 2016, UNDP HDI still ranked Burundi at 184 out of 188 countries, with an HDI value of 0.404. This remains below the average HDI value of 0.497 for low human development countries and average HDI value of 0.523 for sub-Saharan African countries; see UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2016: 2-4.
The HDI also indicates that Burundi is a highly-unequal country, with its HDI value falling to 0.269 representing a 32.6 per cent loss due to inequality (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2015: 4).9 Inequality in Burundi is further affirmed by the Gender Inequality Index (GII) which positions the country at position 109 out of the 155 ranked countries with a GII value of 0.492, with only 5.3 per cent of women having reached at least a secondary level of education as compared to men at 8.3 per cent (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2015: 5).10 As far as education is concerned, the introduction of free primary education led to increased enrolments, but completion rates have remained poor, only increasing from 37 to 47.7 per cent between 2005 and 2010, a progress which the government itself noted as unremarkable (Burundi PRSP II 2012: 23). Due to a lack of infrastructural development in schools, there is overcrowding with an average of 82 students per classroom. The overcrowding, coupled with other quality learning challenges in the Burundian education system, has resulted in high levels of class repetition, with data indicating 35 per cent repetition levels in primary schools, 28 per cent in communal secondary schools and 18 per cent in public secondary schools. The poor quality of learning and habitual repetition have led to poor transitioning to higher levels of education, especially to secondary schools, with only 33 per cent of primary school pupils transitioning to secondary schools (Burundi PRSP II 2012: 23).

The differing human development paths of Rwanda and Burundi resulting from the different choices on socio-economic development and

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9 In 2016, inequality continued in Burundi, with the HDI value of 0.404 falling to 0.276, a decrease of 31.5 per cent when discounted for inequality, see UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2016: 4-5.

10 In 2016, Burundi improved by one position from 109 to 108 out of 159 ranked countries with a gender equality index value of 0.474, with 7.1 per cent of women accessing at least secondary level of education as compared to 9.6 per cent for men. Female participation in the labour market has increased to 84.6 per cent as compared to 82.7 per cent for men; see UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Burundi 2016: 5-6.
Resource redistribution policies are reflected in the graph below (UNDP HDI Briefing Notes, Rwanda 2016: 4).

This clearly shows that the policies of the Rwandan government have borne human development fruits for the people of Rwanda in comparative perspective to Burundi, which has struggled to achieve improved socio-economic transformation as reflected in the poor human development indicators as shown in the graph above.

The failure of socio-economic transformation of the Burundian society has led to greater frustrations and suspicion, creating new fault lines of social disintegration. These frustrations have been voiced through popular uprisings led by citizen movements against deteriorating socio-economic conditions and a rising cost of living due to the high prices of basic necessities (la vie chère), which have resulted in popular demonstrations and strikes (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 523-524). These movements, and the resultant increasingly authoritarian and violent reaction towards them on the part of the government, has led to a greater strain on state-society relationships, leading to greater social instability; a major recipe for the recurrence of cycles of violent conflict (Desrosiers & Muringa 2012: 526). It is in this strained socio-economic context that a new cycle of violent conflicts erupted in Burundi in 2015 when the incumbent sought to change the Constitution and extend his term of office, as discussed in section 5 below.

5 Viability of socio-economic development in resolving intractable conflicts

The wave of democratisation in Africa after the Cold War saw many African states entrench presidential term limits in their constitutions as a
bulwark against personal or authoritarian rule, with the objective of transitioning into pluralistic modes of democratic governance (Dulani 2015: 1-2). Unfortunately, in relation to the violation of constitutional term limits, the year 2015 brought a challenge to Africa, with at least five incumbent heads of state bidding to renew their terms of office through constitutional amendments, a list which included President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

In Burundi, Nkurunziza’s efforts started in 2014 when his government engineered a motion attempting to amend the presidential term limit entrenched in article 96 of the 2005 Constitution which provided that ‘[t]he President of the Republic is elected by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years renewable one time’. The proposed constitutional amendment was narrowly defeated in parliament (Arief 2015: 2). The government then adopted a different strategy, arguing that in 2005, the President had not been elected by universal direct suffrage as required by the Constitution, but indirectly by parliament, and had thus not served two terms, having only been directly elected in 2010 (Arief 2015: 2-3; Dulani 2015: 10). Therefore, they argued that the President was entitled to another term and was free to vie in 2015, an interpretation that was opposed by the opposition parties and civil society. The opposition approached the Supreme Court to challenge the President’s attempt at a third term, but the Court on 5 May 2015 upheld the government’s interpretation of the Constitution, allowing Nkurunziza to vie for another term (Arief 2015: 2-3). The determination by the Court that President Nkurunziza could legitimately seek a third term sparked heavy domestic protests. The protests were led by the Halte au troisième mandat (Stop the third mandate) movement, a movement composed of all sectors of society opposed to the third mandate. However, the protesters were met with ruthless repressive force from the state and its agents, especially the 50,000-strong CNDD-FDD youth wing, the Imbonerakure, leading to a massive displacement of over 216,000 Burundians by November 2015 (WFP 2015).

Although the contested third term was the trigger of the violence, analysts argue that the root cause of the massive protests was the collective frustration of the Burundian populace at the entire socio-economic and socio-political system built on impunity, structural violence and nepotism (Impunity Watch 2015: 2); Acker 2015: 7-8). The authoritarian reaction to the protest led to an attempted coup on 13 May 2015 by Major General Godefroid Niyombare. The fallout from the attempted coup sparked the massive killing of innocent people (109 deaths on 11 December 2015 alone); the assassination of political and military leaders; as well as the arrest and detention of several politicians and military leaders on accusation that they were the leaders of the coup attempt (Bentley et al 2016: 2-3). Undeterred by national and international pressure, President Nkurunziza organised an election in July 2015, which the opposition effectively boycotted, with the effect that he won his desired third term in office.

Peace brokerage efforts started before and after the July 2015 elections in Kampala, Uganda, led by the East African Community (EAC) under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (Global Counsel 2015: 2). An African Union (AU) Fact-Finding Mission also visited Burundi and decried the high levels of torture, killings, harassment and intimidation of
opposition parties and civil society organisations, among other serious human rights violations by the Nkurunzinza regime (ACHPR 2015). Due to the findings of the mission, the AU authorised the deployment of a 5 000-member peacekeeping force (African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi – MAPROBU). The mandate of the mission would have been to restore order and protect civilians from wanton killings and serious violations of human rights. The AU decision, however, was rejected by the Nkurunzinza regime, which threatened to view such a force as an invading force and fight it accordingly (AUPSC Communiqué DLXV 2015: para. 13). Due to this impasse, the AU had to put their decision to send peacekeeping troops on hold as they sought a negotiated solution to the current crisis in Burundi (AUPSC Communiqué DLXXI 2015: para11). It may be argued that this was an abdication of responsibility on the part of the AU contrary to its mandate in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act empowering it to send in troops even without the acquiescence of the governing regime if the necessary threshold has been reached, as was the case in Burundi.

The UN similarly had been seized of the situation in Burundi with the UN Security Council adopting Resolution 2248 (2015) in which it condemned the increasing violence in Burundi and called on the government to respect, protect and guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms to all. The Resolution further called on Burundi to institute the Inter-Burundian Dialogue, and to co-operate in the EAC-led mediation to bring an end to the political impasse. It also reflected the intention of the Security Council to adopt additional measures to deal with the actors perpetuating violence in Burundi (UNSC Resolution 2248 2015: paras. 3-6). The Resolution was followed by a High Level UN Security Council Mission to Burundi from 21 to 23 January 2016 that held meetings with the government, political parties, civil society organisations, religious organisations and other relevant sectors of society. This visit did not yield any meaningful way forward on the resolution of the crisis, with the President remaining recalcitrant and unresponsive to efforts by the international community to bring the crisis to an end (UNSC Dispatch 2016). The International Criminal Court had also warned that it would undertake investigations in relation to crimes against humanity and hold those responsible for such violations to individually account for the crimes (Statement of ICC Prosecutor 2015). Due to the threats of ICC prosecution, the Burundian government started the process of withdrawal from the Rome Statute, with the aim of foreclosing the possibility of perpetrators being held criminally accountable at the ICC (HRW October 2016). Although an uneasy calm has returned to Burundi in late 2016 and early 2017, the peace negotiations under the EAC, facilitated by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, have not borne much fruit. This has led to fears that Burundi will remain on the verge of deeper violence, with the threat of a third genocide still present (Rift Valley Institute 2017: 1-2; UNPBC 2017: 1-4).

In Rwanda, the process of constitutional amendment was brought about by an apparent massive petition by members of the public for the amendment of the Rwandan Constitution; especially article 101 on presidential term limits. This petition apparently was a popular initiative, with at least 3.7 million signatures received in support by August 2015, representing 60 per cent of the registered voters (Moestrup 2015). This led to the formation by parliament of a Constitutional Review Commission in
September 2015 to review the petition and develop possible amendments to the Constitution. After its analysis of the petition, the Commission made recommendations for the review of several provisions of the 2003 Constitution. The recommended amendments, which were affirmed by parliament, reduced the term of office of the President from a seven to a five-year term, with the period between 2017 and 2024 being a transitional period in which the President serves a seven-year term. Subsequent to serving in the presidency for the transitional period, the President still has a constitutional right or permission to serve another two five-year terms. This means that should president Kagame so wish, he can continue vying for the presidency and, if elected, could stay in power until at least 2034. The proposed constitutional amendments were challenged in the Rwandan Supreme Court by the opposition Democratic Green Party. However, the suit was lost, with the Court leaving the decision to be made by the people through a referendum. In making its determination, the Court stated that ‘it would be undemocratic to deny the people the right to choose how they want to be governed’. Subsequent to the decision by the Supreme Court, the proposed amendments were subjected to a popular referendum on 18 December 2015 where the overwhelming majority of Rwandans, namely, 6.16 million voters (98 per cent of the cast votes) voted for the proposed amendments. This referendum vote to ratify the constitutional amendment effectively permits President Kagame to run for not only one, but three subsequent presidential terms, which would allow him to govern Rwanda until 2034. Following the entry into force of these constitutional amendments, President Kagame has confirmed that he will seek a third term in office by contesting the 2017 presidential elections, despite pressure from donors and the international community that he should step down.

With regard to democracy, the constitutional change in Rwanda and the threefold extension of the incumbent President’s ability to run for election is more deleterious than the one-term extension of office by the Burundian President. Yet, the reaction in Rwanda has been more subdued, with Rwandans voting in a referendum to make an overwhelming decision to allow the President to again run for office while, in Burundi, the decision was met with massive popular protests, an attempted coup and continued rebellion which has led to the death of over 500 people and the displacement of over 216,000 civilians. The question this article has sought to deal with is why it was possible for Rwanda to maintain relative peace and stability in the face of this anti-democratic challenge, while Burundi crumbled, reverting to violence and destruction. It is argued that the reason why Rwandans chose relative stability was due to the general popularity of President Paul Kagame and his RPF regime because of the increased socio-economic and human development that had been occasioned by the government’s implementation of comprehensive socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies, a strategy that has generally led to increased economic growth, increased access to socio-economic goods and services, a reduction in the levels of poverty and the general reduction in inequality. As a result, the Rwandan people have felt valued and included in the state’s efforts to develop the country, thus creating popular buy-in and local ownership of the developmental agenda of the state. This, however, has not been the case in Burundi, where the government failed to effectively implement socio-economic and resource redistribution policies, instead engaging in corruption and other short-
term rent-seeking behaviour that has generally impoverished the masses. This has generally led to destitution, despondency, disenchantment and outward opposition to the Burundian government, reflected in mass protests and violent opposition to the government. From the above analysis, it may be argued that comprehensive socio-economic development and redistribution policies, that engender pro-poor development and the reduction of poverty and inequality, are an important tool which can be utilised, in the context of a comprehensive and holistic response to conflict, to create post-conflict peace and stability where long-term reconciliation and social cohesion can be built, with long-term dividends to positive peace and conflict prevention.

6 Conclusion

Post-conflict peace building and reconciliation play an important role in creating stable societies capable of preventing the recurrence of cycles of violence that lead to intractable conflicts. For very many generations, this peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation has been based on the cessation of conflict, political deal making, and accountability for the violation of civil and political rights as well as the creation of Western-style liberal democracies. The missing link has been a clear policy of addressing the socio-economic and structural causes of violence, such as poverty, destitution, inequality and the general socio-economic exclusion of the majority of the population. Research has shown that this method of addressing conflict has largely been unsuccessful in effectively dealing with intractable conflicts, as the socio-economic and developmental aspects of civil war and sectarian violence remain unaddressed. This failure leaves the relevant society fractured and fragile, and thus easily manipulated to generate subsequent cycles of violence. Suggestions have been made that post-conflict peace building and societal reconstruction efforts must take into account the critical human needs of the majority of the population. This can be done by designing comprehensive and holistic conflict-resolution, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction mechanisms that are responsive to these human needs. Such comprehensive mechanisms must take into account the need for the successor governments to implement comprehensive socio-economic development and resource redistribution policies that engender pro-poor growth capable of addressing the critical human needs of the populace. Specifically, these policies must address concerns relating to social service provision, access to education and employment opportunities, the enhancement of the livelihoods of the poor sectors of society and the general reduction of poverty and inequality in society. The viability of such a comprehensive approach in responding to intractable conflicts was affirmed as far back as 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States in his famous ‘Four Freedoms Speech’ address to Congress, where he recognised that socio-economic inequalities were the root causes of World War II and had to be addressed if the international community was to achieve international peace and security (Roosevelt 1941: 6-7). This article, taking into account the example of Rwanda as contradistinguished with Burundi, strives to show that the adoption of comprehensive socio-economic development and resource distribution policies can go a long way towards creating a more tolerant and stable society, a prerequisite for
societal reconciliation and conflict prevention in relation to subsequent cyclic conflicts.

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Socio-economic development and resource redistribution as tools for conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building in fragile societies: A comparative analysis of Burundi and Rwanda

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