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The EU’s Approaches to Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Concepts, Instruments and Practice

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Abstract

This work explores how the EU engages Civil Society (CS) in its policies in a peacebuilding context. To what extent the EU engages Civil Society (CS) in its policies in a peacebuilding context? In this work I affirm that CS is recognized by the EU as a key partner and an actor of change for EU polices on the stabilization and sustainability of peace. I start by analyzing the academic debate on CS and peacebuilding. Then, I make use of the theoretical perspective of the School of Conflict Transformation to describe a more inclusive approach of peacebuilding, where CS has a fundamental role in the stabilization of "war-torn societies" and in post-conflicts. Following that, I analyze the EU strategies and practices of engaging/supporting CS in a peacebuilding context. I underline my work with a particular focus on the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Using the categories of peacebuilding literature, I identify the roles of CS assigned to it by the EU such as: monitoring, advocacy and protection. I affirm that the EU perceives the need for a "flourishing CS". However the lack of coordination between its policies and instruments is the main obstacle to success and needs to be improved.
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Introduction:

The decade of Peacebuilding from 1990’s until 2002\(^1\) shown a high incidence and frequency of internal wars, resulting in millions of civilian deaths, 75% of casualties being considered as non-combatants. Therefore the International and Regional Organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union have been improving their framework to better answer to these calamities which constantly threaten the International Security and to overcome these deficits to achieve a lasting peace.

In that regard civilians can take, at first, the responsibility to reconstruct the “social tissue” in war-torn societies, especially in a fragile state context, where the state is absent to accomplish its role. Therefore my aim is to analyse to want extent the EU engages CS in its policies in a peacebuilding context.

In this context, my starting point is to clarify the meaning that CS has in academic literature, what are the main features intrinsically related as well as how it has been perceived. Therefore I will delimitate CS as belonging to an intermediate sphere that is distinct from the state and any political parties, and should include a “civic” virtue, \textit{i.e.}, that respects values of non violence and tolerance. The goal of my approach is to highlight how CS is contributing to democracy, good governance and requests accountability from governmental and state officials toward the arbitrary rules of the governments. Thus CS should be perceived by the International Community as an “Actor of Change” and a “Key Partner” especially in the post-conflict peacebuilding framework. The “inclusiveness” approach in Peacebuilding agendas is related with “multi-stakeholder partnership”, \textit{i.e.} the engagement of CS in different levels of policies (country level, regional level, and international one). That means, bringing together the concerns of the “voiceless” people from the grassroots but also from the International level (CS North and South) to better tackle the global and local threats, and in that sense to address better the “root causes” of the conflicts. This highlights

\(^1\) Smith, D., 2004, p. 17.
the need of Multilateralism (through the engagement) of CS in peacebuilding, and post-conflict frameworks International (UN) and Regional (EU).

As the UN has been developed new strategies and revised its “Architecture towards Peacebuilding”, the EU followed the same tracks. The European Union has given increasing visibility to CS in its documents and Strategy Papers; however, the relation to peacebuilding is not directly established in some of the documents.

I will restrict my analysis of the EU instruments to basically two of them: the Instrument of Stability (IfS), especially under Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP), and to the Human Rights and Democracy (EIHDR). I will highlight the functions, roles and limitations ascribed to CS in both instruments as well as refer to the different terms that EU applies to the CS notion. There are several reasons to analyse the EU’s approach to CS in its peacebuilding policies.

First of all, the EU is the largest donor to developing countries that have often been suffering from long and civil wars, where the violence can outbreak again, even if peace agreements have been signed.

Secondly, democratic governance and the achievement of “a lasting peace” have to be mainstreamed within local CS in order to promote several cross-cutting issues in a peacebuilding agenda such as a reconciliation process, the protection of human rights, as well as to enhance the capacity building of CS in order to promote a democratic development. With capacity building I mean the sharing of expertise, and “best practices” among different NGO’s with local CS.

Thirdly, including in its policies the CS functions the EU can better perceive the “root causes” and establish for instance early-warning mechanisms, or strengthen the accountability of the local CS to limit the impunity of the governments.

Fourth, sharing a “multilateralism view” as the UN do, the EU can better place its policies as “a global actor” and tackle in a more coherent, inclusive and plural way the concerns of the “voiceless” people from the grassroots. However, I will focus my analysis also to demonstrate the limits of this kind of “partnership”, refer to the
critics and to some recommendations and achievements that the EU has already mainstreamed in its “lessons learned” and consultations documents.

In this context my research will analyse to which extent the EU and CS are real partners in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Therefore, I will test the following questions: Is the EU enhancing and strengthening CS to tackle the “root causes” of the respective conflict? Is the CS being “ politicized” or “ depoliticized” by the EU in addressing the complexity of the conflict?

In the first chapter I will focus on the definition of CS, to better understand the complexity that the term entails and to delimit it in relation to other social associations, groups and institutions. Therefore I will be able to mention the features that CS should include in the analysis of my work as well as how it has been perceived especially from the peacebuilding and conflict transformation literature. Following that analysis, the peacebuilding concept is studied in order to better understand how the UN has developed the concept and how it is perceived in the literature. This brief analysis allows me to bridge the critical academic overview with the UN architecture reform on peacebuilding policies. Therefore, I will outline the principles that are pointed out related to the revision of peacebuilding agendas and show to what extent the EU includes them in its framework. I argue that the UN is to some extent orchestrating the principles being followed by other Institutions and Regional Organizations such as the EU.

After this general overview I take reference to some International Relations approaches (Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, Complementary School, and Conflict Transformation School) in order to become more acquainted with the integration of CS in peacebuilding politics in the academic debate. The approach that I will point out on my work is the Conflict Transformation School. It states that not the conflict in general but “violence” threatens the achievement of a lasting peace. Therefore, it aims to ensure non-violent social change and the eradication of the “willingness” to use violence among the societies. Thus “sustainable peace” can only be achieved if CS is engaged in that process. Starting from that assumption, I will examine what kind of CS roles have been described in the literature, taking the
academic analysis of Thania Paffenholz, and pursue the methodological analysis on the basis of some Strategies Papers as well as some project descriptions that I gathered from EU websites.

In the second chapter I will show how the EU perceives peacebuilding in its documents and strategy papers, as well as which kind of instruments and institutions it address directly or indirectly with regard to its peacebuilding strategies. To narrow my investigation, I focus on the Instrument of Stability (Ifs), especially under the provision that is called Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP). This is one of the most important recent achievements to peacebuilding in the EU framework as it aims to strengthen the capacity building of International NGOs and local CS organizations in order to address and combat the root causes of conflicts. I will also present and discuss the EU’s approach to CS by referring to the Human Rights and Democracy Instrument (EIHDR) that funds CS directly and supports initiatives towards Human Rights, Rule of Law and Good Governance in the field. Building on that, I will frame the most important functions/roles that the CS has within the EU framework as well as make some critical points following from my analysis.

The findings of this chapter will allow me to better understand to what extent the EU and CS are “real” partners in peace-building and to point out which kind of problems or “lessons learned” should be taken into account to better address the complexity of the conflicts, which is also related to the space open to a flourishing CS.

The Methodology I use in my work is based on a review of the academic literature as well as an analysis of EU official documents such as the Regulation of the Establishment of the Instruments, Strategy Papers, Annual Papers and the Communications from the Commission related to a peacebuilding frame. Furthermore, I emailed the European Liaison Peacebuilding Office (EPLO), to get more information about EU peacebuilding instruments and I conducted several interviews with experts on the European Commission Instrument for Stability Operations (crisis response/peacebuilding), the Fragility and Crisis Management under Europe Aid – Development and Cooperation Directorate General, and the CO-desk to Democratic Republic of Congo on the Development Cooperation, as well as
to the Human Rights and Policy Division. In this context, I interviewed the Deputy Head of the Division of Human Rights and Democracy as well as the Deputy Head of Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human Rights, of the Instrument of Human Rights and Democracy to get more information on the policies and local projects that EU has been conducted in the field. However, the lack of information with regard to individual countries did not allow me to analyse deeply just one country. Most of these local projects are conducted by the EU Delegations in the field, in a decentralized manner. This means, that it is very difficult to understand the EU’s policies in the field en detail. However, I was able to gather some important information from the interviews relating to some local projects as well as to some projects that EU has developed under the PbP bridging local Organizations with International NGO’s.
Chapter I - Civil Society and peace building/ conflict transformation

a) An introductory view of Civil Society

Civil society (CS) is a complex and diverse concept in the literature. CS is not a new concept though it is currently being debated in modern academic theories and it is on «everyone’s lips» \(^2\) However, the concept as well as the role of CS have been integrated and discussed, especially in post-conflict frameworks, regionally (EU) and Internationally (UN). Therefore, I will describe some functions that CS can, ideally, have in peacebuilding agendas. Positive functions, limitations, obstacles and ways of overcoming the difficulties will be highlighted in this to analyze the deficits and suggest the kinds of efforts needed to improve.

Before entering deeply into the academic debate about the definition of the term, I will start by agreeing that a vibrant CS, as Thania Paffenholz contends, is a precondition to going “beyond formal democracies, long lasting attitude changes and overcome resistance by former, undemocratic leaders and elites”. \(^3\)

CS questions the role of the state and is historically linked with emancipation and the affirmation of the people’s rights to achieve better governance (more pluralistic regimes and not so much state centrism).

From Aristotle to Jürgen Habermas in the 20\(^{th}\) Century, it has been widely discussed over the years. For Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant civil was considered to be the opposite of the state of “nature” or “uncivilized” forms of government, such as despotism\(^4\). In that sense, civil refers to the long way that society has to travel in order to become “civilized”. John Locke, in the seventeenth century, described CS as a body separated from the state, which principal role was to protect the rights of the individual, such as the property rights. \(^5\)

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\(^4\) Kumar, K., 1993, p. 377.
According to several authors mentioned below, CS is thus a term from a Western perspective, almost born in Western politics. This paper will agree with the perspective of Paffenholz that CS is the mirror of society at large and, in that sense, its existence and functions should be able to be found among all countries and nations, not only those in the West.

b) What is the big idea of CS?

Gramsci (1891-1937) contends that CS is the force that questioned the capitalist domination of the state, contesting and debating these values and meanings. 6 As a consequence, CS can integrate all sorts of organizations and ideologies that can confront and question the framework of the political system, changing it with their own initiatives. Habermas argues that CS has an intrinsic role in ensuring the legitimacy of and consensus on political decisions. It should be achieved through open discussion and communication among social actors. Thus he asserts that the political parties and parliaments need «to get informed public opinion beyond the established power structures». 7 From this CS position, we can come to the conclusion that CS can be understood as a force independent from the state, but that it interacts closely with it in order to reaffirm its political demands. In that sense, it can be perceived as an independent sector, “an arena of voluntary, collective actions of an institutional nature around shared interests, purposes, and values” 8 that are distinct from those of the state, the family and the market. This understanding fits in with Thania Paffenholz definition. In addition to this, civil society can exist «in between» these spaces and should be analyzed interdependently of them 9.

However the boundaries between spaces are not always easy to identify. This can be illustrated when specific actors who are categorized by specific roles, can also be perceived to have a broader and more blurred role. For instance, entrepreneurs defending the reduction or the extinction of taxes are carrying out civil society roles,

7 Habermas, 1992, p. 374.
and are acting within civil society, when they question some measures taken by the
governments or the state, as Christopher Spurk\textsuperscript{10} contends. In that sense, the spaces
or the perceptions of the boundaries are more difficult to delimitate.

Despite this blurred picture, CS must be considered as an “an intermediate
sphere” that is distinct from any political parties and, situated between the political
parties and the state, its aim is simply to improve the accountability of the policies
and the government, and not to have political aspirations in the government
(Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, 2010).

Another role of CS is related to media. While Christopher Spurk’s\textsuperscript{11} concept
understands media as a professional organization, belonging to the economic sphere,
impartial so as to improve a pluralist and reliable debate, without serving the special
interest and concerns of CS, then it is not considered to belong to CS. However other
authors, such as Catherine Barnes\textsuperscript{12} and Rolt\textsuperscript{13} consider that the media can belong to
the CS concept, if we have a broad perspective of CS. In that sense, CS is referred to
as the “web of social relations”, described by Catherine Barnes\textsuperscript{14}. In some conflicts,
the media was considered to have a “civic” role intrinsically related to the core of CS
characteristics for the peaceful resolution of a conflict. An example of that was the
UN-Foundation Hirondelle radio initiative in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
which provided “reliable news and current affairs for the first time across the vast
country in a number of different languages”. This, in our opinion, remains and
highlights the “civility” feature that can be a part of their activity.

The researcher Véronique Dudouet, in her paper, “Surviving the Peace”;\textsuperscript{15}
refers to a definition from the London School of Economics (LSE) reflecting that
perspective, which considers CS to be the “arena of uncoerced collective actions
around shared interests, purposes and values”.

\textsuperscript{10} Spurk, C., 2010, p. 7. 
\textsuperscript{11} Spurk, C., 2007, p. 21. 
\textsuperscript{12} Barnes, C., 2005, p. 7 
\textsuperscript{13} Rolt, F., 2005, p. 177. 
\textsuperscript{14} Barnes, C., 2005, p. 7 
\textsuperscript{15} Dudouet, V., 2007, p. 8.
Uncoerced collective actions are the core of the CS framework. Any other view undermines the role that CS can play to sustain democracy and build peace. Or, in other words, CS as Kofi Annan\(^\text{16}\) suggested, can strengthen “the legitimacy and transparency of intergovernmental decision making” and can assure and improve a culture of prevention of the conflicts.

From all the possible definitions that are described above, this thesis will highlight the major characteristics that CS should display as follows: in my view CS has to be the voluntary area, existing in spaces “between” the state, political, private (family) and economic spheres. It includes all kinds of voluntary organizations, without economic profit, with “civil behavior”, that respects the values of non-violence and tolerance. These are the main features that will be considered in the analysis carried out in this thesis.

I share Edwards’\(^\text{17}\) role model view of CS to the effect that CS must comprise three roles: *associational life* (voluntary associations based on tolerance and cooperation), *good society* (there cannot be any uncivil sides of CS, but rather the responsibility to spread positive norms and values) and *public sphere* (where CS promotes adequate space for citizens to debate, question and negotiate to achieve the common good and public interest).

\(\text{c) Terms of Reference of CS in “war-torn societies”: What does it look like?}\)

Critical Assessment

While I have pointed out the main CS characteristics, I would briefly like to review the academic literature with respect to other related terms connected to the notion of CS.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) is another term defining CS, especially used in peacebuilding and conflict transformation literature.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{16}\) Annan, K., 2005b, p. xi.


\(^{18}\) Fisher, M., 2006, p. 3.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are described as being “non-state, non-profit orientated to pursue purposes of public interest”. This term is frequently used, especially by external donors, thus this term is very close in meaning to the above CS notion.

Martina Fisher also refers to the definition of the World Bank as related to the development cooperation field, saying that CS in the World Bank’s Operational Directive 14.70 “Non–state or Nonprofit Organizations” are the ones to pursue activities to “relieve suffering… provide the basic social services, or undertake community development”. In that sense, it underlines the necessity of having an intrinsic civic value to build a “social consensus for economic reforms and long-term development”. This “civic virtue” is visible in the World Bank definition of CS, considering important “actors in building necessary social consensus for economic reforms and long term development”.

Although these characteristics underlined by the World Bank represent a vague definition of what CS can be and the term is concise, under the umbrella of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CS are the ones that, for the World Bank, are “value-based organizations which depend, in whole or in part, on charitable donations and voluntary service”.

What kinds of NGOs does the World Bank consider? It distinguishes two main categories: “operational NGOs” and “advocacy NGOs”. The first ones focus on the implementation of development projects and can be divided into national or international (operating in more than one country), community-based organizations (CBOs) (normally the grass-roots organizations that emerge to help a concrete sector of population, which is why it has a membership of individuals trying to meet their own interests (women´s groups, youth clubs, farmer´s associations etc). Advocacy NGOs, as the term indicates, is concerned with defending a purpose or a cause that can influence politics.

19 Idem.
22 Idem.
Therefore the realism theory of international politics, to which Martina Fisher also refers, is in that sense, very broad and blurred about the notion of CS. It assumes that states are the only actors in the international arena; all the other actors are just referred to as non-state actors (NSAs) without distinction. So all (non-governmental organizations, firms, multinational organizations, international organized crime actors fall under the same definition. This realism limitation shows how difficult it could be to define CS, given just one more blurred and broad picture in the definition.

In that regard the “hijacked” expressions related to civil society reflect, in particular, the rise in importance that CS had in the 90s especially in pursuing development and political projects.

This context show how CS is connected with different “webs of social relations”, emphasizing the values of civility to enforce “bridging social capital”, i.e. characterizing the range of networks that can build a solid and integrated society against any kind of distinct / “uncivil” forces (discriminatory, xenophobic or simply polarizing the division of groups).

Therefore the term that I will adopt is one that classifies CS under the civil society organizations. I will argue that CS is more than just a stereotype and has to be “civil” in its behavior, non-profit and acting as a “social actor”, which means it is distinguished from the economic sphere (companies, business) and the political one (state, political parties and parliaments). In that way, I also agree that the flourishing of the so-called Third Sector, mainly through NGO’s in the 90s, especially in development cooperation, undermines the notion of Civil Society. This sector assumes that CS will take on the roles, such as welfare, that were traditionally taken over by the state (Paffenholz 2010; Stewart 1997; Salamon and Anheier 1999).

Another criticism is that they are not cooperative in “good” constructive terms, as

23 Idem .
26 Barnes, C., 2005, p. 10 (Emphasized).
28 Stewart, S., 1997, pp. 11-34.
they do not always take into account the real needs of local citizens. Other critics have observed that these NGOs, being mainly from the north, have northern agendas, and tend to dismiss or the Southern ones. This, in my view, undermines the role and the place of a “vibrant” and conscious civil society.

Analytically, CS can be captured either through its actors or its functions. To simplify the different concepts, CS should be analyzed using an actor-oriented approach (focus on actors and their identity) and a function approach analysis (Merkel and Lauths’s 1998; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Véronique Dudouet 2007 etc). Such approaches have been developed in the “the donor community” to try to figure out and map which kinds of CS exist and what purposes, aims, functions and actors they can integrate through all the non-defined concepts described above. It is clear that in an actor-oriented approach the “civil” virtue of CS must be highlighted, as this is the basis for not having a polarized society. CS must imply “civic engagement” based on tolerance, honesty and trust to enhance the social capital defined by Putman.

From what has been said above, it is clear that CS is an important force to ensure the accountability of governments, but also to improve tolerance and trust after a war. It is important to look at the main roles plus the functions of CS in war-torn societies, both in the aftermath of a war and in peacebuilding. This is so because war causes huge damage to people’s lives. Reconciliation as well as mediation are needed. Rebuilding security is also a task for CS. People have to live in an environment where “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” are assured, as is stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

But how are peacebuilding policies connected to supporting the CS role, in that process? In that regard I will try to define peacebuilding in relation to a possible “empowerment” of CS to sustain a lasting peace.

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32 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
d) Defining Peacebuilding: The origins of the concept

The peacebuilding idea has been developed within the framework of international and regional organizations and is criticized by academics. I will describe the main debates and also the actors who are relevant for peacebuilding.

It is relevant to observe that after 1945, interstate conflicts have been more lethal, as they frequently lead to outbreaks of civil wars and end up being persistent and of long duration.33

Galtung (1975)34 was the first who, in the 1970s, advocated the need for real implementation of positive peace (peaceful societies at all levels, including the achievement of justice, equity and cooperation among all the groups of society, i.e. confronting «structural» and «cultural» violence and negative peace (the end of violence).

The notion of peacebuilding arose as an attempt by the international community, especially the UN, to respond within a more appropriate framework to the complexity of armed conflicts. According to the Utstein Study of Peacebuilding35 “the decade of peacebuilding has been characterized by frequent internal wars, resulting in 7-8 million deaths, of which 75% are non-combatants”.

Therefore, peacebuilding was largely conceived as a process for addressing the root causes of conflict, eradicating persistent cultural and structural grievances between the different actors in the society and moving towards a more sustainable peace.

Boutros Ghali the former Secretary-General of UN, in the Agenda for Peace 199236, introduced the concept of peacebuilding for the first time in a UN document. It was considered the third element of the tripartite approach towards peace:

peacekeeping - to end the immediate violence and hostilities; peacemaking - to conduct the conflict through peaceful means such as mediation or arbitration, and finally peacebuilding - to aim at the root causes of the conflict in order to establish a sustainable peace. However the definition that is in paragraph 21 of the Agenda for Peace\(^\text{37}\) considers the role of peacebuilding to be to “prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples”. Thus it remains very broad and imprecise, but also relates peacebuilding to conflict prevention. It appears that this goes beyond what Galtung understood as “negative peace”, using the term “social peace”.

Social peace in my view is only possible if it is addressing the “root causes” of the conflict. Otherwise social grievances and violence can increase.

The UN peacebuilding term has been “dynamically” re-conceptualized, in the light of some of the ambiguities and challenges of the complex conflicts nowadays. In that regard, the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace 1995 outlines the necessity of integrated action, in which economic, social, humanitarian and human rights areas should be enclosed in the UN intervention, in order to reduce the risk of another outbreak of a conflict.

The Brahimi Report 2000 on the implementation of peace operations\(^\text{38}\) exposes the necessity of providing the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Even if the terms continue to be unclear with the use of “something”, the concern of the UN shows the need to achieve a better policy. However, here, the long–term is already pointing to peacebuilding and, in that sense, stresses much more the distinction between it and peacekeeping or the negative conception of peace. In that regard, this report gives an added continuity to peacebuilding, which we can interpret as a post-conflict peacebuilding concept, which goes beyond conflict prevention.

The long-term perspective is going to be highlighted in this paper because especially in situations in fragile states, the weakness of the states and the social fabric contribute to the threat for Internal and International stability and especially to

\(^{37}\) Report on the Secretary-General, 1992, para. 21.

the primary goal, which is achieving a lasting and solid peace. In conclusion and according to the UN, it was perceived that a “positive peace” is a long and on-going process that deserves more coherence and coordination by all the agencies inside UN. Thus, the Peacebuilding Commission was designed to overcome this gap. Rather than describe all the follow-up the UN developed over the years to adapt to the complexity and some failures, I will show how UN incorporated CS into their peacebuilding framework and what is seen as the value-added of the Organization. I will focus on that because the EU “peacebuilding policies” have been mainstreamed under the principles and goals of UN guidelines.

In that sense, I will look to explain how CS is perceived in international policies, through the reform of the UN to address a peacebuilding context. Therefore, I will start by explaining what kind of dimensions / features / characteristics peacebuilding should have in its definition and perception.

\[ e) \ How\ can\ peacebuilding\ be\ described\ in\ our\ work?\ UN\ reform\ towards\ a\ better\ definition\ of\ peacebuilding\ agendas \]

“…..It has become apparent to all that the UN is as much in demand as in need of change….we are learning new ways to do what we do better….The fundamental objective of this reform effort is to narrow the gap between aspiration and accomplishment”

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General\(^{39}\)

Peacebuilding as an international intervention should be conceptualized through its five characteristics goal, strategy, activities, context, and actors\(^{40}\): The goal tackles the purpose of “negative peace” in order to transform it into a “positive peace”, similar to the Galtung concept. Secondly, strategies are needed to accomplish this goal Maximalist strategies can address the root causes of the conflict, especially if they are more concerned with the eradication of all kinds of social grievances within the society, i.e. they lead to a “just peace” or to a peaceful relationship among all the parties to the conflict. Minimalist strategies have a limited focus on prevention.


of renewed conflict or diminishment of a possible outbreak. Middle ground strategies aim at achieving no renewed armed conflict and moving on to a good and more stable government. (Call & Cousens, 2007; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Cousens 2001)

The definitions of the strategies are crucial and the UN’s approach has been adopted as a more coherent one. Actually, if we try to address all the “positive” means, i.e., taking into account a maximalist perspective, including the various levels of social, economic and political development, and maximizing their effects, peacebuilding could also be a synonym for development, as a tool “to reduce all the society’s ills” as Lund refers to it. (Lund, 2003.28) Therefore peacebuilding has to engage in a more “narrow” set of activities as defined by the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Actually, this institution was created in 2006 to diminish the lack of coordination inside the UN related to post-conflict strategies. In that sense, it was established to give more coherence to the UN peacebuilding architecture as a more effective and flexible tool or as “a unique opportunity to mainstream and prioritize peacebuilding efforts worldwide”, as Vincent Chetail maintains and also to place peacebuilding at a high political level of the UN framework.

Peacebuilding involves a range of activities, related with how to build a “positive peace”. In other words we can say that, our third dimension is related with the strategies of “laying the foundations for sustainable peace”.

However, in my view, it is also necessary to prioritize policies and activities to ensure the success of interventions in the field.

The fourth dimension of peacebuilding is related to context i.e., it needs to consider whether a conflict is an intrastate war or interstate armed conflict, spreading around different regions, such as “The Great Africa War” in the Congo.

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Finally, the fifth dimension involves the actors who should be taken into account (local, external, international or regional organizations) for a good while to hold a sustainable peace.

Taking this into account, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was created to follow this structure and, beyond that, to be more effective in helping countries “with the transition from war to lasting peace”\(^\text{47}\). This we can describe as the core goal of the Peacebuilding Commission - to achieve a “positive peace”.

Kofi Annan argues that the UN should work together with international donors (representatives of the UN system; major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional authorities of the country concerned) in order to create more coherence between the “security/political” and “development/ economic issues”\(^\text{48}\).

The strategies described above (from a maximalist to a minimalist perspective) have been integrated into the UN Peacebuilding Commission concept. The \textit{inclusiveness} of the activities is at the core of UN policies.

In the review of \textit{the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture}\(^\text{49}\) these points (goal, strategies, activities, context and actors) have been analyzed to give more coherence and to make the process more effective.

The new framework of UN peacebuilding policies is described through five main points: a) complexity of peacebuilding; b) the imperative of national ownership, c) the illusion of sequencing, d) the urgency of resource mobilization, e)

\(^{47}\) Annan, K., Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the UN, 2005a, p. 2.

\(^{48}\) The dualism between security-political and development-economic remains an intervention purely imposing the “Western authoritarianism” instead of “restoring societies’ capacities to deal with their own conflicts as Miall\(^\text{48}\) argues. Therefore for this author the role of the outsiders should entail a role of “facilitators” and not imposing their own solutions to the populations. Moreover the only acceptable condition of an intervention should, in our sense, restore the capacities of the local people especially working in a complicit in order to establish the structures that are also acceptable to the suffered people. (Cf. Miall, 2007\(^\text{48}\)).

the importance of the contribution of women and finally f) the need for connection with the field.  

The complexity of peacebuilding as described takes time and the “boots on the ground” cannot measure or reflect the good results of an intervention. Therefore, I will say that the strategies (maximalist, minimalist and middle-ground) are all interrelated and should be avoided in order to diminish the possibility for escalation of the conflicts. In other words, the UN and its Peacebuilding Commission, more than ever before, are faced with the challenge to better understand that an intervention has to prioritize its strategies and that the time frame of each intervention needs to be planned in order to ensure that their policies are going to match needs on the ground.

On the issue of timing, the World Bank has already done an analysis: it considers that the prevention of the outbreak of a conflict implies reform of structures and institutions to improve social justice, which may take a period of 5 to 10 years.

Furthermore “national ownership” is seen as an imperative and absolutely essential for “peacebuilding to take root”. People are the protagonists of their own peace, and so peace can only happen within communities in the country. This refers to a kind of laying the foundation for a peacebuilding strategy. The international community can only be seen as facilitators to achieve a better sustainable peace, with institutional, economic and other reforms. But people are the key actors who demand what they need from their governments.

The illusion of the sequence once again refers to the “time frame” of these operations. Logical sequencing is related to the complexity of the conflicts, but still more should a preventive dimension be put in practice where peacebuilding is more an add-on “during the lifetime of the peacekeeping operation”.  

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50 Idem., p. 3.
52 World Bank, 2006, p. 5. (emphasized)
53 Idem., p. 10.
The urgency of mobilization refers here to providing the people with the necessary tools to be “free from fear and free from hunger”. Once again, as we have already mentioned above, peacebuilding cannot address all the development dilemmas. However, the priorities should be always be in the forefront in order to ensure that adequate funds and resources are provided to deal with the critical and urgent issues. This does not mean that the Peacebuilding Commission can alert and remind the international community that development perspectives should also be integrated, since without “food, shelter and jobs” the peacebuilding policies cannot succeed and the conflict can break out anew at any time.

The importance of women is also mentioned here. The inclusion of women in this process is essential and women’s roles must be mainstreamed within the Peacebuilding Commission. Gender concerns are also essential to achieve a sustainable peace and should be recognized with targeted recommendations.

Finally, the last objective referred to in the review of the Peacebuilding Commission is related to the need for a connection with the field or, as mentioned above, more related to the context and actors, which have to be taken into account. It is really important for a clearer perception at UN headquarters, that all the actors be aware of the situation in the field and communicate the reality and the difficulties that can crop up.

In conclusion it can be said that the UN is aware of the complexity of the conflicts. The key word in UN reform is “inclusiveness” in that sense that “no one size fits all”, and it is always of first importance to prioritize the policies, and work side by side with indigenous people, i.e. local actors. Even in the absence of a single document or template, the international community should be aware of some principles or strategies that ought to be involved in peacebuilding.

Building capacity in national administrations, but also across borders, is here referred to as best practice to address the complexity of these conflicts. In that way, there is a benefit, as all the actors can be engaged in an inclusive approach to peacebuilding policies. In that regard, women’s organizations are particularly important in light of all the efforts they have made to create peace.
To sum up, the Peacebuilding Commission has been seen as a unique opportunity for the UN to rethink and rebuild its architecture as a global actor. It has three main objectives: “to bring together all relevant actors” and “to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery”; “to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; to provide recommendations and to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN, to develop best practices”.  

54 Miall, H., 2007, p. 32.

f) Civil Society and a Peacebuilding Approach: A “multilateralist” View of International Security

This inclusiveness approach in the UN Peacebuilding agenda was already integrated into the UN reform involving a new form of multilateralism in 2004. Kofi Annan, through the Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society, chaired by the former President of Brazil, Fernando Cardoso, enhances the role of CS.

This inclusiveness to which I will refer is the process of including all CS in a conflict. They are described as agents of change, especially taking in account the roles women play.

Multilateralism is, in that regard, a phenomenon of CS taking part in policy debate, and pioneering action to address the complexity of the conflicts. As John Clark has summarized “civil society is strengthened by opportunities the UN offers, but this gives a new raison d’être that in turn empowers the UN and enhances its relevance”.  


This means that as the Charter established “we the peoples” this expression of humanity is more visible in this multilateral framework. The UN does not work so much inside itself, but rather acts as a facilitator of new partnerships to better address the global challenges. The UN recognizes that engaging with CS is a necessity and
not just an option. Therefore the “multi-stakeholder partnership” is a way to achieve better governance and tackle the global problems. Following that, there are main three aspects where CS has a vital role: The UN is more concentrated on the engagement at the country level (with a better cooperation of CS North and South in the country, to better tackle the local needs); strengthening the Security Council (the dialogue with CS, especially from the conflict-affected countries, is essential as it gives a more realistic view of the social origins and consequences of the conflict); engaging with electoral representatives (national parliaments and local authorities are the key to having a better global governance, and reducing the lack of democratic deficit); and finally to better integrate CS through accreditation in UN forums such as, for instance, in the General Assembly).

This new way of understanding multilateralism is more coherent, more inclusive and more pluralistic.

The UN has in that way orchestrated regional and international politics as we will also see inside the EU.

Multilateralism emerges, in this sense, as a new conceptualization of governance. It puts together different actors in the field missions, taking into account the specifics and the voices of “voiceless” people from the grassroots, or those people oppressed by the elite’s power or arbitrary forms of government.

**g) Academic approaches to Peacebuilding**

In a narrow definition, peacebuilding is conceptualized with four main features: it is *multi-dimensional* if we take into account the analysis of the Utstein Report and the dimensions are: security, socio-economic foundations, political framework and reconciliation and justice; *multi sectoral* (which activities the

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57 Idem, p. 9-11.
international community should do); *multi-leveled* (how much should be done), and *multi-staged* (when should the international community intervene).\(^{59}\)

The aim of peacebuilding is, however, not always clear. Some authors see peacebuilding as “morphological” as Michael Barnett\(^{60}\) described in the international arena through the work of some international and regional organizations. Peacebuilding has been assumed to be the “production of stability and security”\(^{61}\) and “build[ing] a vibrant civil society”, and the other actors just focus “on democracy, justice, and the rule of law”.

In that sense, peacebuilding in this paper will be understood to be in line with the definition of the follow-up approach of the Utstein Report. It seeks to reinforce stability (through security activities i.e., disarmament, demobilization, security sector reform). It also approaches the concept of state-building as providing a democratic and reliable, plural and conscious society which respects human rights. And finally, it should provide and develop a socioeconomic infrastructure or foundations that could assure long-lasting peace between the societies.

**h) Different approaches to peacebuilding in International Relations Schools**

The first approach is the conflict management school that advocates the ending of conflicts through diplomatic initiatives. In that regard, it focuses more on negotiations in order to mediate and achieve the resolution of the conflict\(^{62}\). In that sense, the main authors of peace are the top leaders who have to settle the peace agreement, a kind of “short-term management” of the conflict. This school can also use power mediation, *i.e.*, include financial or military strategies - “carrot and sticks” - to impose a peace project in the short-term. An example of that it can be seen in the United States’ strategy in Bosnia: supporting its reconstruction and, at the same time, threatening to bomb the Bosnian-Serbian forces if the agreement was not made. (Paffenholz 2006, 2010).


\(^{61}\) Idem, p. 36.

Secondly the conflict resolution school addresses the causes of the conflicts and how to rebuild relationships among the different parties to a conflict. In that regard, the scope of actors is broader and larger here. It starts with the inclusion of individuals in communities or civil society organizations and then includes other actors such as international and local NGOs. It also starts with workshops for dialogue, peace education, and conflict resolution training as techniques to use in rebuilding relations in the society. (Stedman 1993)

Thirdly, the literature refers to the complementary school which focuses on the “contingency model of third party intervention in armed conflicts” defined by Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly (1991). As the name indicates, it looks to selecting the most appropriate third party at each point of the intervention. It is based on achieving the de-escalation of a conflict in different phases. Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) redefined the concept of “multi-track diplomacy” saying that there should be different approaches and actors to achieve peace through diplomatic initiatives and actors.

The fourth school is the conflict transformation school. As the name indicates, it looks to answering the question of what should be transformed in a war-torn society. In that sense, the parties to the conflict have to work to change or modify the dimensions of the conflict, i.e., transform the “root causes” of the conflict.

Conflict transformation tackles the substantive dimension (political, economic social etc, discrimination against the parties to the conflict) and the relational dimension (addressing the interests of the parties to the conflict in order to find a solution that can eliminate, eradicate or mitigate them). Furthermore, the conflict transformation school recognizes that conflicts are a normal characteristic of everyday life. Francis, in that regard, maintains that “violence, not conflict is the problem”, and so the main goal of the conflict transformation school has to be

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ensuring non-violent social change, \textit{i.e.}, trying to ensure that the conflict is not destructive but rather constructive.\(^{66}\)

Conflict transformation analysis envisages the eradication of the “willingness” of societies or parties within the society to use violence and strengthening the society’s reconciliation potential. In that sense, I can say that in comparison with other schools, the conflict transformation school addresses a more \textit{inclusive} framework, as it looks to include all levels of societies, in order to achieve a lasting and a “just peace”.

In that sense, I will take conflict transformation as a goal that should be pursued by peacebuilding actors such as the EU and explain how the EU perceives this theory in its framework and what the problems are with its implementation. However, we can say that both of the schools are looking to rethinking peacebuilding policies through the integration of more actors and better bridging of the global, national and local civil society in implementing peacebuilding agendas.

In the conflict transformation literature, there are two interesting approaches to understanding the role of civil society in peacebuilding: an actor-oriented and a function-oriented approach.

\textit{i) Conflict Transformation School and a “bottom-up” perspective}

According to John Paul Lederach, Civil Society plays an important role in sustainable peacebuilding and conflict transformation. CS participates on different “levels”, particularly those which build peace from the “bottom-up”.

Lederach describes peacebuilding as taking into account a “\textit{comprehensive}”, “\textit{coordinated}” and “\textit{inclusive}” \(^{67}\) approach, among all the segments and activities involved in all groups of the society. Sustaining peace in that way is better accomplished by the middle range of actors. These actors are better able to establish “social bridges”, especially by horizontally connecting all the activities to peace

\(^{66}\) Dudouet, V. 2006, p. 15.
\(^{67}\) Dudouet, V. 2006, p. 60.
within the population, or to the grassroots. This is seen in their informal networks, which can be integrated into different “lines of the conflict”, as Lederach puts it. In that sense, we can agree that these actors are capable of interrelating the “macro” level (top leaders) and the micro level (grassroots). Lederach concludes that these middle-range actors are the ones most likely to sustain conflict transformation long-term.

This work considers that *peacebuilding* is an understanding process that is divided into three main approaches: top leaders; middle-range; grassroots. Top leaders can intervene through mediation at the level of the states (Track 1); they are the ones with more visibility and legitimacy to influence a peace accord. For Lederach, they are defined as the *peacemaker’s* actors who are supported by a government or international organization. The role of the top leaders is translated into a kind of “monolithic” power, *i.e.*, CS here has just a contractual role (implementing the decision of the top leaders).

The middle-range approach involves resolution-orientated or problem-solving workshops. It belongs to a group of leaders that can have a significant role in the transformation of the conflict, especially because of the place that they occupy in society. They can be integrated by ethnic leaders, academic intellectuals, humanitarian leaders (NGO’s) etc. Through these workshops, all the actors can cooperate in a “collaborative analysis” to identify the main points that separate them and what kind of differences there are between them. It is more oriented to conflict resolution and is not coercive.

Another activity is training - spreading awareness to other people on how to deal with the conflict.

The Peace Commission is also mainstreamed by this middle-level society. This entails providing a conciliation commission through mediation and dialogue; it can integrate individuals who belong to different parties to the conflict to enforce a better balance between the various parts.
A grassroots level is more micro-level, related to local actors where the initiatives of the population can be integrated into a peace process in a non-coercive manner. Moreover CS can serve as a “social bridge” to the “top leaders” level and establish horizontal relations in a peacebuilding process. This is the group of people who have suffered most from the war and even if they were hardly damaged, they are, as the author comments, in a “survival mode”.

In that sense, Lederach considers that “unresolved human conflict” is at the center of their attention. In the conflict transformation literature, there are, however, some critics of the actor-oriented approach. According to Paffenholz, this framework also has some weak points. Focusing too much on the middle level actors undermines the role that some grassroots organizations have in the peacebuilding approach. However, this criticism, though, does not undermine the benefits that the literature reports. We see as an academic theory that take in account and highlights how the engagement of all parties especially through CS can contribute to bridging the dialogue and creating a culture of peace.

The lack of participation of civil society and the politically weak institutions created have often resulted in failed interventions.

In that regard, the peacebuilding agenda is a result of some “lessons learned” from interventions in Somalia, the Rwandan crisis in 1994 or in the Balkans. Therefore peacebuilding is, in itself, undergoing continuous adaptations by the international community.

The Balkans case, especially after the Dayton Peace Agreement (the 1995 end of the war in Bosnia), is largely reviewed in the literature as a reference to several points of criticism of international intervention, such as too much imposition of democracy and a market economy as the only preconditions for conflict resolution and prevention of violence. In that regard, Bosnia was an example of the polarization of the ethnic groups not being addressed by the international intervention, thereby spreading intolerance and state fragmentation. As Martina Fisher commented, it

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68 Lederach, P., 1997, p. 52
“was the first time that the issue of civil society was put on the agenda by international organizations”, which also encouraged the development of the grassroots. The top-down approach was challenged by a bottom-up one, in the hope of solving the problems and creating more local commitment to the transition to democracy and peace.

The role of civil society was ignored as were the roots causes of the conflict, such as ethnic division problems. The government in power was composed of the extremist national parties resulting from the early elections.

\[ j) \text{ Civil Society functions / roles: academic analysis in conflict transformation/peacebuilding} \]

Approaches other than actor-oriented ones were developed as a “lessons learnt” from interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans. The experience was that grassroots involvement and more local commitment were needed for the development of democracy and peace. This contributed to the development of more function-oriented approaches that try to define how CS can engage in a peacebuilding context.

The literature in this area is very limited, focusing on CS only in respect to “peace support”, “dialogue” and “capacity building” functions. However, recent authors such as (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Fisher 2006, Dudouet 2007) introduced in the literature another overview of what CS functions might entail.

Véronique Dudouet\textsuperscript{70} prefers to portray CS through two distinct approaches: the vertical and the horizontal one. The vertical approach identifies CS as a “counterweight to the power of central political authorities”; “opposition and protest against violent or anti-democratic state polices” and as “channeling state-society communication and collaborating in policy making”. This underlines the importance of CS as an element in a healthy democracy and in good governance. More than existing just to “perform a role of watch-dog” it is also seen as a precondition to

\textsuperscript{70} Dudouet, V., 2007, pp. 10-16.
achieving more accountability and effectiveness in a situation of violent conflict. CS can bridge issues for the political agenda such as: human rights violations, participation in peace negotiations and also the creation of CS lobbying to address the concerns of oppressed people who have no voices. These concerns are sometimes undermined by the international organizations and the government.

A vibrant CS is an essential condition for “the accountability” of the governance but also for the achievement of a more coherent, just and equitable peace.

The “horizontal approach” centers on the intra and inter-community interactions that can be integrated into two main functions - participatory socialization and service delivery. It can be summed up in three different schools or three different visions (the school of democracy; the Frankfurt school and the Putnam bases approach). The school of democracy is where citizens, through their participation in voluntary associations, can promote civic participation and are more likely to ensure a dialogue and dealing with differences in a conflict transformation. The Frankfurt school promotes civil society as a public sphere, or the space where the citizens can have a free debate and open-ended communication from below, thus enhancing active citizenship in a decentralized model of self-government.

The third school is based on Putnam’s perception that CSO can increase «social capital», constructed on the same values of trust, empathy and cooperation; they can overcome the divisions of ethnic characteristics and they promote the cohesion of civil society.

Therefore CSOs can have an intrinsic role in conflict transformation involving: resolution training, dialogue meetings, educational activities, cultural initiatives, cultural peacebuilding programs aimed at demilitarizing minds etc.

The role of «service delivery» belongs to development and peacebuilding agendas. Therefore in peacebuilding they are also at the core of reconstructing war-torn societies, supporting and providing emergency relief and may also be combined
with trauma counseling, reconciliation, and parallel education - in other words, they are initiatives toward human rights and peace support.

**k) Thania Paffenholz Concept: Civil Society functions in peacebuilding**

Another framework related to CS is a legacy from the works that Merkel and Lauths 1997 and, later on, Paffenholz and Spurk 2010 introduced to the literature debate. For these last authors, there are seven main functions that we can outline in a peacebuilding context: protection, monitoring for accountability, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social-cohesion, intermediation and facilitation, and service delivery).

The first one, protection, can be understood as the way to protect individual rights and property against any kind of arbitrary interventions of the state or its despotic actions. This task is an essential one, seen as the first step to achieving a stage of stability and making further progress towards peace. All the armed actor forces represented in a conflict can be perceived as potential threats, which affect the positive development of peace. So, protecting individuals from these acts is a role assumed by civil society, once the state is so weakened that it cannot perform its functions. Protection can be defined in narrow terms according to Paffenholz; it can be included in the concept of eradicating all the structural violence, conceived by Galtung. In that sense, protection should be referred to as a concept that includes: “watchdog activities”, creation of «zones of peace», “humanitarian aid”, “demining”, “small arms control and disarmament”, “demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants”, all activities geared towards the eradication of violence. An example of that is the NGO Peace Brigades International which cooperated in Colombia to protect national peace and human rights activists. This is an example of how an international NGO could collaborate with local civil society in order to protect them from any threat. This would enable the local CS to engage in meetings or other activities freely without any risk from other segments of the conflict.71

The second function is called monitoring for accountability. As the name already suggests, it centers its activities on monitoring the human rights situation, and also providing “political early-warning systems”. International and regional organizations and NGO’s cooperate closely – also with the local groups - to assure the eradication of violence and especially human rights abuses. This cooperation creates “safe spaces” that permit putting these monitoring activities into practice in the field. A case of early-warning activities is for instance the conflict early warning response mechanism that prevents violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa through the collaboration of relevant stakeholders but also through the local CS.  

The third function is advocacy and public communication. It is considered to be a primary function, intrinsic to national CS. This is clearer when we understand this function through the need that local CS has to put their concerns and needs on the political agenda. This function is also very important during all phases of the conflict. In that regard, CS can advocate participating in the negation of peace agreements more directly(opinion polls) or indirectly(information campaigns) as well as redefining the strategies or the problems that continuously present in a post conflict phase, such as reworking the political agenda to construct a more sustainable peace.

Another important function, in-group socialization, refers to the way that individuals organize themselves in groups or associations to improve «a culture of peace», creating new spaces for peace and reconciliation. Individual participation (based on an in-group identity or even among groups that do not belong to the adversaries) contributes to enhancing reconciliation and conflict resolution. This is even more feasible with alternative mechanisms such as: radio, TV, street theater or other activities that can strengthen the ties that exist among the groups and lead to a culture of peace. Here, a “micro-peace” is an important element. Peace acquires a prefix of “micro” if we conceive it as starting at the individual level within a group or groups rather than targeting the whole society at once. However, this function, even though it is an important one in our view, has been criticized especially because

of the lack of coherence and coordination and the spontaneity that has not resulted in a long-term peace culture.\textsuperscript{73}

The fifth function mentioned by Paffenholz is social cohesion. This concerns the capacity that people have to create binding ties within groups and «build bridging ties» across adversary groups; the main aim is to learn how to live together, especially in a divided society or a multiethnic one. In that regard, conflict resolution workshops as well as initiatives by other elements of the society are also taken into account. For instance, cooperating with multiethnic chambers of commerce is seen as a way to build ties and solve some root causes of the conflict, such as access to water for different ethnic groups.

Intermediation and facilitation is considered to be another supportive function of local CS, which entails helping warring parties to negotiate peace zones or to protect the delivery of goods or other services. Local CS is seen as a facilitator or mediator among all the parties to the conflict - warring parties, state NGOs, and international and regional organizations - to ensure that the needed “gates” between the populations are built.

The last function described by Thania Paffenholz is service delivery. This is defined as a “problematic role” sometimes analyzed in the literature as being a less relevant feature of CS. Therefore, it can be seen as a point to distract the attention of international organizations in relation to the important roles that CS can have in a peacebuilding context. However, it is my view that this function should not be undermined, but actually should rather be perceived as an important function of CS engagement. If the international/regional organizations could cooperate and also enhance CS in its activities, aid could be provided better and in a more targeted way to meet real needs, especially among the vulnerable groups in the society.

\textsuperscript{73} Paffenholz, T., 2010, p.71.
l) *Peacebuilding and external engagement*

In the debate in the literature, there are, some critics of the way in which the external community donor empowers and supports CS in a peacebuilding context.

In that regard, there are misconceptions about a peacebuilding agenda too close to a liberal perspective (Richmond) that can also undermine all the other kinds of initiatives endorsed by civil society. Hannah Reich and Timothy Donais are really critical of the role of ownership and of the empowerment of civil society in the aftermath of conflicts. Anderson\(^74\) in her book *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War*, underlines on the fact that aid can have negative effects on conflict dynamics, especially when the funds are concentrated in NGOs, mostly seen not to be independent from the governments, and when others are only conduits for funds for the implementation of the activities of Northern NGOs, sub-contracting to southern NGOs\(^75\), so that their engagement in respect to the local people and their communities is weak. Other authors mention that INGOs are more keen on supporting middle class groups\(^76\), citing case studies of El Salvador, Timor, Bosnia and Sri Lanka donors. There is a general perception of commercialization of civil society.

On the other hand, there is the danger that these CS groups may be heavily polarized and be considered to be uncivil actors increasing the violence through ethnic cleavages, social injustice and the appearance that several actors have been instrumentalized by political elites (for xenophobic and racist policies and agendas) that can perpetuate the causes of violence.\(^77\).

To sum up, *peacebuilding* challenges other debates and politics in and after armed conflicts, through security or development policies. In that regard, civil society defined as a space «between» spaces (market, state, and family) is essential to

\(^74\) This work, *Do not Harm* had such relevance especially after the negative effects that aid policies had after the Rwanda conflict.


improve good governance and sustain peace in a conflict. But what functions does CS perform and how can we describe them?
Chapter II - EU and Peacebuilding: Is there an EU concept for peacebuilding? What does it look like? And what role does CS play in it?

a) The EU’s general approach to peacebuilding

There are important principles that have always guided the EU as a peacebuilding actor in its history. In the aftermath of World War II, the EU, through its founding fathers, was looking to establish a community of stability, prosperity and democracy. As Churchill\(^78\) commented it was necessary “to unite Europe whose moral concepts will be able to win the respect and recognition of mankind … will dare to hold up its peaceful journey towards the future”.

In that regard, the Lisbon Treaty clearly states that the EU aims to promote peace (Title I, Article 3-1) in the first place and that at its core are development and enlargement (Title V, Article 21). This article of the Treaty is the reflection of EU core policies, as it outlines the meaning of peace to the EU: based on the indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, democracy, respect for human dignity and all the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, all of its worldwide actions and even the countries on its external borders, should “safeguard its values, interests, security, independence and integrity” (Title V, Article 21, 2.a).\(^79\) Moreover, its aim is to preserve peace and prevent conflicts in the world, thereby contributing to strengthening international security (Article 11: “strengthen international security in accordance with the United Nations Charter”; “to promote international co-operation”, (see also the European Security Strategy 2003).

Europe has always looked for a kind of mission to humanity\(^80\) to ensure a force based on support for peace rather than on the ability to fight wars. Through the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, we come to the conclusion that there is also a duty of morality and of solidarity which binds “Europe and the overseas countries and

\(^80\) Merlingen, M. with Ostrauskaite, R., 2006, p. 2.
desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations “. 81 This solidarity mission is also mentioned in the Conflict Prevention Communication of the EU as a “82 duty to address the many cross-cutting issues that generate or contribute to conflict”.

Catherine Ahston, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated that for peacebuilding there “is currently no officially agreed international definition”; 83 however, there is a common sense that the peacebuilding goal is related to “aiming (for) a solid and lasting peace”. She considers that conflict prevention is at the heart of EU activities, perceived here as providing early assistance to countries at risk. Therefore, peacebuilding should comprise such activities that strengthen and pave the way for a sustainable peace and go beyond conflict prevention. In this way, these activities are related to the medium-term and long-term stabilization (root causes) of a war-torn society.

Taking a closer look, however, it becomes obvious that the EU peacebuilding notion is difficult to pick out as one single concept (Major, Duke). 84 It is sometimes perceived as a process that includes all aspects (conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilization). 85 This broad notion is the reason why peacebuilding is summarized as post-conflict peacebuilding, related “to actions undertaken over the medium and longer term to address the root causes of conflicts in a targeted manner”. 86

Ahston also underlines the importance and the crucial role that international/regional organizations and civil society must have in this process, as they are “vital partners for the European Union”. She maintains that peacebuilding projects should also be “owned” by local communities as a condition for achieving this lasting peace. In my view, this is an interesting approach underlined by the High

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81 Treaty Establishing the European Community, preamble, article 2, para. 5.
82 Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 5.
83 Ahston, C., 2005, “Foreword”.
84 Major, C.; Molling, C. 2010, pp. 4-15.
Representative of the EU, as it already shows a commitment to work together with the different parties of the conflict and engage civil society in that.

The substance behind the EU’s concept of peacebuilding may be best understood when looking at the so-called “security-development nexus”.

It implies at its core “structural stability”, perceived as a way to help and to foster peace and stability, develop democracy and the respect of human rights, to achieve a “social transformation” of the conflict. In this process, security and development issues are mutually reinforcing. In that regard, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Commissioner for External Relations of the EU) says “Without security there can be no development, and without development no security”. The two policies are inter-related in order to assure better governance, human rights protection, democracy and the rule of law especially in fragile states.

Even if, according to Ahston, it is difficult to define peacebuilding in international and in EU policies, we can, however, highlight some documents and achievements related to a peacebuilding framework that the EU has identified, especially those aimed at achieving a lasting peace, as previously mentioned. Therefore, they also address the nexus between “security and development”.

The communication of the EU Commission about Conflict Prevention 2001 was the landmark, or the first in-depth analysis of the concept of peacebuilding, and how it is perceived in EU policies. According to Gourlay even if the term peacebuilding were not mentioned in this document, we could already pick out some components and issues that are targeted and addressed in peacebuilding interventions.

The EU Conflict Prevention of 2001 includes three main objectives that are related and can be observed in a peacebuilding intervention, summarized by

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88 EC Communication, 1996, pp.2-5.
Gourlay\textsuperscript{91} : “a) adapt long-term EU instruments to address the root causes of conflict”, such as development policy and other co-operation programs; b) improve the EU “ability to react quickly” and c) “promote cooperation with international partners”. In that sense peacebuilding is also defined as “multi-sectoral”, taking in a range of activities to address the root causes of the conflict. EU instruments should, thus, accomplish this as stated in the Communication: “Development policy and other co-operation programmes provide the most powerful instruments” to address the root causes.\textsuperscript{92} Once again, we have the relationship between security and development. Therefore, to better respond to pre-crisis situations, the EU should combine all the instruments that can best tackle the short and long-term to address the complexity of the conflicts, as well as “international co-operation in the long-term”\textsuperscript{93}.

This is the same as saying that European Union is using Galtung’s framework. Between the short-term and long-term we can also perceive the connection between a Galtung’s negative peace (the absence of war) and his positive peace (involving social change and transformation to achieve “a lasting peace”) created by Galtung. In other words, the communication highlights the EU role as a global player, putting the emphasis on activities that, in my view, go beyond conflict prevention. It distinguishes the long term as “projecting stability” and the short-term as “reacting quickly to nascent conflicts”\textsuperscript{94}. Furthermore, it recognizes that its instruments can have an impact directly or indirectly on the prevention of conflicts (using everything from its policies on trade, development, humanitarian aid and all that falls under security issues etc.).

Another document that followed the EU Conflict Prevention of 2001 that we can frame within the scope of peacebuilding is the European Strategy of 2003\textsuperscript{95}. Once again, it is recognized that “security is a precondition of development”\textsuperscript{96}. This is the same as saying that peace is connected with conflict transformation, and the

\textsuperscript{91} Idem.
\textsuperscript{92} Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, 2001, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{93} Idem, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{94} Idem, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{96} Idem. p. 2.
eradication of all social grievances if a sustainable and lasting peace is to be achieved. Therefore, the notion of “human security”\textsuperscript{97} is indirectly underlined. In that regard, it is broadly recognized that the challenge is to put together, in a coordinated manner, all the EU instruments (European Development Fund, Assistance Program, military and civilian capabilities), to achieve the social transformation, or, as I would put it, as a way to achieve human development and thus social stabilization. This is even more illustrative as it is recognized in this document that, in wars 90\% of the casualties are civilians and 18 million people are homeless as a result of conflict. In my view, there is beginning to be a better perception of CS and recognition of the need for it to be included in EU policies, to improve the good governance lost by autocratic regimes or even by failed states (corrupted, weak institutions and lack of accountability).

Furthermore, another document that follows the previous one was on EU support for peacebuilding \textsuperscript{98} in 2006. Here, we can identify further how peacebuilding is perceived in the EU lexicon. It constitutes a large range of activities (rule of law, human rights and democratization, children’s rights, disarmament, mine action, security sector reform as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Another step forward to the continuing implementation of polices related to peacebuilding was the European Consensus on Development of 2006\textsuperscript{99}. This has three main goals: reducing poverty according the Millennium Development Goals, enhancing and promoting democratic values such as respect for human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in a multilateral cooperation with the UN, and enhancing responsibility for their “own development”,

\textsuperscript{97} “Human Security” it is here used as related with post-conflict peacebuilding policy agenda. According to Keith Krause it means to how to provide security in people daily lives. \textit{i.e in a peacebuilding policy agenda, the same it to say how address “the conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, vulnerable groups in conflicts, the role of small arms, effective security sector reform”. To take more clear the same actor agrees that human security would mean “protecting individuals from existential and pervasive threats to their personal safety and physical well-being”, in Krause, Keith “ Human Security”, Post-conflict peacebuilding : a lexicon, 2009, Chetail Vincent, oxford, Oxford university press, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{98} European Commission, 2006a.

i.e., improving the national strategies and policies of each country, through EU aid that “will be aligned with partner country’s systems and procedures”. Thus, in this document it is broadly recognized that sustainable development is the key to a “wider peace and stability”. Furthermore, it is also interesting to analyze the participation of civil society as one of the principles actors in improving this policy. However, CS is defined as belonging to economic and social partners, trade unions, NGO’s, non-state-actors, and European civil society etc. Even if promoting democracy, social justice and human rights is considered to be a vital role, the amalgam of terms illuminates Martina Fisher’s description of the concerns community donors have about finding who can support this and which part of the budget will be allocated for this broad definition of CS.

It is also interesting to note that “effective aid” is implied to be “supported by and via the civil society”\textsuperscript{100} in order to strengthen ownership. However the gap between the theoretical principle and practice is different. The EU as a donor channels 50% of its aid into government-to-government assistance. Another point mentioned is the fragility of the states as an obstacle to achieving sustainable development and stability. Therefore the document that followed this up, the Communication of the Commission in 2007, referred to the EU response in a situation of fragility\textsuperscript{101} where linking peace, security and development\textsuperscript{102} should be the principal concern in order to address root causes of insecurity and violent conflict.

In that document, we can relate a combination of several activities such as: security, socioeconomic foundations, political framework, and reconciliation and justice to the approach of peacebuilding in the Utstein Report. Furthermore it is a combination of strategies and a mix of instruments that enables more flexibility and quick reaction. In that regard, sanctions are seen as a way to pressure the political dialogue, as well as being intensified methods to respond to the immediate needs of the population and this can be prolonged in more long-term policies. Thus cooperation with the population is essential, especially with vulnerable groups: children, youth

\textsuperscript{100} The European Parliament Council Consensus on Development, 2006.
\textsuperscript{101} European Commission, 2007, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{102} Idem, p. 8.
and women. Indeed, they are considered as the “drivers of change” as essential actors in the creation of ways to provide sustainable peace and social stability.

It is also recognized that the short and long-term of the time frame for the activities is essential to integrate policies bridging “Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)”.

Another aspect in this document on which I will focus is related to the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. Under this goal, it is relevant to describe four main points of the EU strategy towards a more sustainable peace, addressing the root causes. The first one tackles the principle of ownership, that it is perceived to enforce all the reforms needed within the whole society, as well as enhancing the funding to the ACP countries. Second is the focus on human rights promotion as a way to eradicate all violations against human beings, especially through direct support to civil society organizations, and inter alia other human rights institutions such as ombudsmen. The third one addresses the promotion of democratization, but through a prioritization of needs. It is broadly understood that merely implementing the electoral process does not translate into better governance. Thus, this should be accomplished within the engagement of CS and all the political parties of the society (national authorities and parliaments). Therefore, once again, CS acquires special significance as the actor which can ensure better accountability from the national authorities and through its “civil” character can eradicate any kind of arbitrariness in government policies. In that regard, I can say that this also directly addresses all kinds of root causes of the conflict to create a sustainable peace. However, it is also interesting to note that “service delivery” is referred to here as a task for the government and not for CS. This, once again, relates to the academic debate highlighted by Thania Paffenholz, to the effect that this CS function is critical and should be carefully analyzed. It my view, following Paffenholz, it can be accomplished by CS if the donor community is aware of the positive contribution that CS can make to tackling the problems of vulnerable groups and other real needs of the society.

103 Idem, p. 7.
Finally, the last point is related to the effectiveness and the accountability of a reliable judiciary and legal sector. Justice is seen here as essential in order to improve reconciliation and in a word to promote a stable society.

In that regard, the EU should use all the instruments it has at its disposal to be more pro-active and flexible, but also to achieve better results in the face of the new challenges of the conflicts, always trying to eradicate the many root causes that there may be. Therefore it should be mentioned that the European Development Fund (EDF), Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Instrument of Stability, Humanitarian Aid, and finally the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and Thematic Programme “Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development” are all EU instruments to achieve better stability and governance for these fragile, unstable states.

In conclusion, from what has been described above, peacebuilding remains ill-defined but is indirectly understood in the EU lexicon. Thus, there are several documents that let us frame and better understand how it has been perceived and incorporated into EU policy frameworks. It started with the notion of conflict prevention conceived to tackle and better respond to the pre-crisis - to pre-empt it. It seems that the two terms are quite similar. However, I will agree that peacebuilding goes beyond conflict prevention as an attempt to achieve a lasting peace, in the post-conflict period. Thus it is no coincidence that in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 2008\(^\text{104}\) it is noted that even if conflict prevention must be the core of the EU framework, peacebuilding is the policy that should address the more long-term situation. Having a post-conflict function is essential to the reduction of poverty and instability among the population.\(^\text{105}\)

The security-development nexus in the EU also helps us to understand the mix or combination of short- and long-term instruments and policies that the EU has to use in order to achieve peace in a country and address the root causes of conflict.


\(^{105}\) Idem, p. 9.
This is also related to the extent to which the EU achieves good coherence among this variety of instruments, services and institutions Commission and Council. EU needs to be more determined to take the “way forward”, in order to have better coordination mechanisms between Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security Defense Policy (ESDP), short-term and long–term in order to achieve a positive peace.

Therefore, I will agree that the EU seeks to improve conflict transformation in a country as it tackles the substantive dimension (political, economic social etc, discrimination against the parties to the conflict) and the relational dimension (addressing the interests of the parties to the conflict, in order to find a solution to eliminate, eradicate or mitigate the issues). It seeks to eradicate the “willingness” to violence between societies or parties, through social reconciliation. In that regard, it looks forward to putting all the social fabric as Lederach has maintained, cooperating for better social engagement and a clearer perception of what peace really means. However, there is still a lack of coordination especially between EU pillars. For this reason I will show how the fragmentation and amalgam of actors does not help the EU to have a real strategy on peacebuilding.

b) The EU’s Institutional Structure and peacebuilding

Tackling the global and regional security threats cannot “be solved by purely military means” but through a convergence of policies based on good governance and on supporting social and political reform, i.e., it brings together and, of necessity, combines several different EU instruments.

According to the EU, tackling peacebuilding is perceived as an intrinsic link between security and development as has already been mentioned. This nexus is, in practice, represented by the two EU institutions- the Commission and the Council. The issues around peacebuilding are divided between the two Pillars: the First Pillar of the EU (European Community) and the Second Pillar in (CFSP/ ESDP). As a

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consequence, the lack of coordination between the main actors, the European Commission and the Council, on peacebuilding policies is not coherent, resulting in fragmented approaches.\(^\text{108}\)

Within the First Pillar, the main actor is the European Commission. Conflict prevention and the goal of transformation, which it addresses in its policies, have become important aspects of the Commission’s external policies. It has been promoting regional initiatives, contributing to the empowerment of local capacities through the local civil society, assuring good governance, human and minority rights and also addressing environmental factors, economic and development issues, the promotion of democratic rights as well as the rule of law. All this is part of the Commission’s External Relations policy.

Under the Second Pillar (CFSP-ESDP) in Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, “the common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy”. The EU is encouraged to take part in missions beyond its borders and to pursue activities such as forming peace-keeping missions, engaging in conflict prevention and contributing to a multilateral perspective to strengthen international security, based on the UN Charter principles.

In that regard, it is also mentioned that the EU should use all civilian and military capabilities to accomplish its goal within the Second Pillar (some of them known as the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking). This instrument combines both military and civilian crisis management, particularly since the European Council meeting in Feira (Portugal) in 2000\(^\text{109}\). The EU has developed more means of civilian crisis management targeting in four areas - police, security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law and strengthening civilian administration and civilian protection. These aims have also been reiterated in the Civilian Headline Goals of 2010\(^\text{110}\). However these tasks address more the short-term in a peacebuilding context. Therefore we can agree that the Second Pillar (Council) it is more related with the short-term. This is also an effect of that the crisis management

\(^{109}\) Council of the European Union, 2008a.
under the Second Pillar are mainly funding and supporting by the Member States, what creates a limitation, reveal in short-term perspective. The First Pillar (Commission) with the long-term, as it addresses more the issues related with security-development (eradicate poverty, and implementing good governance). In conclusion we can already observe a lack of coordination between the first Pillar and second Pillar. The responsibilities to the rule of law and human rights can be develop among the Commission or Council, what reveals a duplication of roles and intrinsic a lack of coordination.\(^\text{111}\)

The Commission is essentially trying in to address the root causes of conflicts. The EU attentively observes situations in third countries. For instance, in its concern, the European Commission makes use of a Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict\(^\text{112}\), which is a reference for all delegations to evaluate the situation/context of a country and especially to prevent the outbreak of conflict. This is also an important document to enable more efficient measures to be taken between the Council and the Commission. To ensure its work, the Commission has its activities spread over the department of External Relations and Development through EuropeAid and its office AIDCO, DG Development, Trade and Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO), DG Enlargement and European External Service (EEAS).

Under the umbrella of the Commission, several policies connected to peacebuilding can be highlighted:

Through external trade there is the Regulation of 2001 “Everything but Arms” that launched duty free for developing countries for all imports except arms and ammunition.\(^\text{113}\) With this instrument, the Commission contributes “to promot[ing] economic development, regional integration”\(^\text{114}\) and enhances security. In that regard, the Community can also use sanctions but only targeted in a way that does not cause negative humanitarian consequences or threaten neighboring

\(^{111}\) Cf. Duke, S. 2010, p. 44

\(^{112}\) http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/European%20Commission%20Check-list%20for%20Root%20Causes%20of%20Conflict_ENG.pdf.


countries etc. \(^\text{115}\) In that context, the Kimberley process was also created as a way of providing transparency and regulating the trade in diamonds that is the cause of conflicts such as in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Angola.

Development cooperation is another policy that is implicitly related to *peacebuilding*. The EU is actually providing over 60\% \(^\text{116}\) of development aid around the world, involving different approaches to ensure a sustained peace. This makes the EU the largest donor in the world, if we take, by comparison, the US which only provides 21\% of external donations. Through the European Fund Development and other agreements such as the *Cotonou Agreement* (2000) the EU’s aim is to address poverty though sustainable economic and social development, in African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the overseas countries and territories (OCT), in accordance with the principles of *OECD-DAC*. Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement provides funds directly to “CS in all forms according to the national characteristics”. \(^\text{117}\) This is very important as CS is playing a crucial role in the resolution of the conflicts as will be underlined in this paper.

Furthermore and in regard to Africa, the EU has established the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership in order to “promote peace, security, democratic and human rights, ensuring the Millennium Development Goals, and promoting a sustainable economic development”, as well as to ensure effective multilateralism, also providing a “people centered partnership”. In that way it combines all the issues to address the frequently fragile situation in Africa.

I would like to emphasize that under “People Centered Partnership” \(^\text{118}\) it is recognized that civil society organizations are vital to enhance “the global accountability”; monitoring, as they can be crucial partners to achieve reconciliation, providing, in that sense, a sustainable peace. In that sense, the EU, in my view, has

\(^{115}\) Council of the European Union, 2004, para. 6c.  
\(^{116}\) Information given by an interview.  
\(^{117}\) Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 2000.  
adopted a perspective of conflict transformation, trying to tackle all the social grievances, as well as empowering CS to promote local ownership.

In addition to this, the instrument for humanitarian aid centers on relief and giving assistance to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflicts outside Europe.

The enlargement policy can also be highlighted as one of the indirect peacebuilding initiatives. The Copenhagen criteria are a way of guaranteeing that the accession countries have stable institutions (within democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), as well as through the agreement by the accession countries to accept the acquis communautaire (the law that is the core of EU).

Furthermore, the European Neighborhood Policy is focused on how to promote stable peace in the neighborhood of EU. This includes policies that tackle the respect for human rights and the rule of law as well as economic reform, to create the conditions for economic prosperity and security cooperation, and stability. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aims to provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in third countries. It can intervene without the agreement of the host government. It aims essentially to guarantee and promote human rights and the fundamental freedoms especially in the countries, where they are most at risk. It works directly with and through civil society organizations. I will describe this in detail later on.

Finally, the instrument of stability aims to provide the EU a tool that can react immediately or give an immediate response to a crisis, but also aims to prevent conflict and support post-conflict stabilization as well as early recovery after a natural disaster. Furthermore, it includes a provision that enables that the EU cooperates with non-state actors on the prevention of conflicts (enhance the post- and preparedness capacity building of non-state actors), that I also will describe latter on. From the following, I will show that even if some strategies related to peacebuilding can be framed, there is a lack of coordination between the two main institutions (Commission and Council) that affects the peacebuilding strategy of the EU:
The Lisbon Treaty with this “double-hat arrangement” for the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HR) and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, has the right of initiative, given by the European Council, to implement security policy matters. She has also the double function of linking “civilian and military tools within the Council, and linking the civilian tools of the Council with those of the Commission”\textsuperscript{119} Her job is also to deal politically with the coordination of civilian and military aspects of a crisis management. In regard to the Council, it is still concerned with the development of civilian missions and military operations.

The fragmentation of the capabilities, approaches to and tasks of dealing with peace and security issues is even more infamous with the European External Action Service (EEAS). As Major contends, its aim was to create a service with competencies to integrate the activities between the Commission and the Council and to develop strategies towards third-party actors.

Actually, the uncertainty of coherence in this service is also a constant. Major points out two factors: which strategies and competences this service will perform when there is no strategy defined and also how the political strategies (thematic and geographical aims) can be converted into operational reality, focusing especially on the European Neighborhood, development cooperation or even though the Partnership Instrument already created by the Commission.

If Catherine Ashton agrees that \textit{peacebuilding} is certainly central to what the EU does externally, it is, in our view, clear and well defined though the EU framework. There is no policy statement, nor is there a mainstreamed policy concept on \textit{peacebuilding} inside EU institutions, which gives us even an implicit understanding of the concept. Furthermore, there are diverse visions between the member states about what \textit{peacebuilding} means. This is especially important when we think that the High Representative needs to have the agreement of the member states to implement the policies under CFSP (Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in EU), as it is still an intergovernmental decision-making structure. Moreover, the military tools as well as the civilian ones need to have a general, but more

\textsuperscript{119} Major, C.; Molling, C., 2010, p. 5.
comprehensive, scenario of how to integrate more long-term strategies to address and prevent the conflicts and how to implement the strategies between actors more efficiently (including police, military etc). In that context, the NGO’s role and civil society should be concretely integrated to better deal with the framework of the EU in the field and create policies and initiatives that are more defined, coherent and pragmatic within the framework of the threats /limits/ difficulties that each region or country has.

The “Thematic Programme Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development Strategy Paper 2007-2010”\textsuperscript{120} was designed to be “actor-oriented” program towards non-state actors and local authorities, in order to promote their engagement on aid delivery. This programme is very interesting to our work for mainly two reasons: how it understands the meaning of non-state actors and secondly because it describes the roles that these actors must mainstreamed in the field. This document points out in a broad notion of Non-State Actors. It is considered that they should be perceived as “independent from the state and in a voluntary basis”, but sharing and promoting common interests. However this general definition can include under the same umbrella of Civil Society Organisations (community based organizations that entail efforts between the “grassroots” and the authorities, in order to improve the dialogue, and the concerns that the populations have). Thus is a kind of “bottom-up” approach that allows better governance, where the local ownership can take place and gives space to CS contesting, confronting and complement the policies of the authorities. Therefore I will include other groups that are defined in this document such as Youth Organizations and Academic institutions. I’m doing this distinction because in my analysis of CS “social partners”, that here including (trade unions) and political contacts don’t belonging to our definition of CS; they have to be independently of any political or economic orientation or participation. However what I would like to highlight is that Non-State Actors to the EU remains very broad, putting in the same definition a “web of social relations” that can’t damage the real local ownership, or even to understand the criteria for that.

\textsuperscript{120} Thematic Programme Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development Strategy Paper 2007-2010,
Even if we can perceive some limitations derive from the fact that the EU support can include several actors, on the other hand we recognized an attempt to better deal with the development aid, tackling the local needs, and the country specifics. Moreover it highlights the need to engage the citizens in development policies as a way to reduce poverty. Thus this instrument can be overseen as an add-value to the other EU policies as it emphasis the need to development cooperation policies not being (top-down) determined by the government of the EU partner Country but from the society (down-top). Indeed this entails an open dialogue with the local authorities to address the roots causes of the conflict, if we considered that poverty is most of the times a cause of violence and conflict. In other words we can agree that indirectly EU is engaging also the CS. If it creates more local authorities responsible and more accountable it is going to give also more space to a flourishing CS grown.

However from the “lessons learned” we can perceive that along the years EU has faced some deficits. First of all the latter years were focused on European NGO’s without a strategic development policy. Therefore this instrument will revise that in order to prioritize the needs as well as support community engagement. Moreover it is also stated that local organizations should be directly supported and funded by this instrument, as well as developing partnership between Northern and Southern Organisations.

Therefore EU will tackle three main goals with this programme: first one concerns to create “room” for a flourishing CS can be empowered and engaged in the politics in the partner countries, secondly contribute to enhance the capacity building of the social tissue (CS and local authorities) about development education, and promote more fairer relations, *i.e.* increase the awareness from developed countries to contribute to the eradication of poverty in developing ones, and not “patronage” or feed situation of inequality, thirdly to strengthen the coordination and communication of activities between Non-state actors and local authorities.

I will describe the IfS and EIHDR as the main instruments, in my view, that have a more concrete approach to peacebuilding, mainly through the efforts entailed in working directly with non-state-actors and, in the case of EIHDR, with civil society organizations. I will once again point out the differences between these two terms,
especially because they mean the same, but I will also discuss why the EU has the need to use these two terms, to refer to the civil society sector.

c) Instrument for Stability:

The Instrument for Stability is managed by the Directorate of External Relations of the EU. Among all the EU instruments that can address peacebuilding policies, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) will be analyzed in depth here, especially with respect to the actors that it supports and its scope. The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) reports that the IfS has been the main source of funding for the EU’s activities in supporting of peacebuilding.\(^{121}\)

The IfS was created in 2007 to follow up the rapid-reaction mechanism and to provide the EU with a more coherent and flexible tool to address a “situation of crisis or emerging crisis”, in order to provide “an effective response to help preserve, establish, re-establish the conditions essential to the implementation of the Community’s development and cooperation policies”.\(^{122}\) It was especially designed to confront the security and development challenges in situations of political crisis, conflicts etc.

In that context, it is also concerned with the necessity to “build capacity to address specific global and trans-regional threats” that can have a destabilizing effect.

The IfS should be used according to the Community’s overall strategic policy framework for partner countries, and only in case those others Community instruments for external assistance cannot provide an adequate response, as stated in Article 2 paragraph 1 and 2.

Through Article 1 of the IfS we can come to two conclusions: first it clearly expresses a link between security and development as this instrument follows up the

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\(^{121}\) European Liaison Peacebuilding Office (EPLO), 2011.

previous conclusion on the Council, stating that the effectiveness of EU external action is determined by the intrinsic link between “peace, security and stability as well as human rights, democracy and good governance”, as they are “essential elements for sustainable economic growth and poverty eradication”. (cf. Preamble of the instrument). So from that, we can come to the conclusion that security and development are interlinked and belong to the “high politics” of EU foreign affairs.

Furthermore the IfS aims to increase the EU’s role and to have the EU acting “as a global player”.

That is to say, that the EU should combine its common foreign and security Policies and guarantee that the two main institutions of these policies (the Commission and the Council) can work and cooperate right from the beginning to ensure consistency and coherence in peacebuilding and stabilization policies.

According to Stefan Gänzle, IfS is more than a budget line. It looks for a coherence of actors in EC external relations by providing a common tool to address the objectives referred above.\[123\]

Moreover, it is also recognized that relief, rehabilitation and development should be guided through a real effectiveness and consistency among the EU instruments, especially to be able to address state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises.

The third objective of the IfS is that of strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organizations as well as state and non-state actors, (Article 4, paragraph 3) in their efforts in relation to “promoting early warning, confidence–building, mediation and reconciliation and addressing inter-community tensions, as well as “improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery”. Last but not least, in that way, this provision has created a unique tool under the EU that seeks to develop the capacity of its potential partners to respond to crisis situations worldwide. This goal is termed a peacebuilding partnership (PbP) and is addressed in provision 4.3 of the IfS.

This overview of the IfS allows us to expand on three main points: the coherence, the flexibility and the inclusiveness of the instrument: coherence through the nexus security-development as the Commission has to inform the Political and Security Committee as well as the European Parliament about the planning for the crisis. It also provides the possibility for member states to comment on the Commission proposals\footnote{Gänzle, S., 2010, p. 17.}. (cf: Gänzle) flexibility and rapidity since it can take from 8 to 12 weeks or even up to 18 months more than its predecessor (RRM) that was viable for only 6 months.

And finally, the IfS is one of the most flexible tools the EC has at hand.

The inclusiveness of the instrument centers on the length of time that it can be used in a third country. In that regard, the short-term component can be mobilized more rapidly but only for actions up to 18 months. However the long-term component is programmable and the “decision cycle is longer and aims to address crisis preparedness and peacebuilding; transnational threats such as organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as is mentioned in provisions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of the regulation”\footnote{Information given by e-mail.}. This inclusiveness deals with the gap that IfS may fill after a crisis and prepares the ground for cooperation under European Development Fund (EDF).

In conclusion the IfS can combine long- and short-term approaches to peacebuilding. The long-term approaches concern addressing the root causes of the conflicts and assuring a “structural stability”. In that regard, it aims to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening the capacities of non-EU members to fight against organized crime, trafficking etc, as well as assuring and strengthening “the pre-post crisis preparedness capacity building”.(cf./ article 4.1 and 4.2 of the IfS). On the other hand, the short-term is more related to how to prevent another outbreak of violence and how to make an immediate contribution to post-crisis stabilization.
Furthermore, internally the inclusiveness is felt within the European Parliament participate in the scope of the CFSP, giving a more democratic sense to the EU in regard to their foreign policies. Moreover, externally the role of NGOs and non-state actors can be strengthened and included in EU policies.

However, it is through Article 4.3 that we can better perceive the long-term time frame to support pre- and post-crisis capacity-building through strengthening the capacity of “international, regional and sub-regional organizations, state and non-state actors”. This especially concerns early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions as well as improving the post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Therefore, this provision is also mentioned as constituting the “Peace-Building Partnership”. The concerns, deficits and limitations are expressly shown in three main documents: the Annual Strategy Paper, the Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper for a period of time of 4 years 2007-2011 and also the first study to review and give some recommendations for the following years of IFS implementation “Stocktaking and Scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership”.

d) Partnership Peacebuilding: CS functions within the IFS

The EU has developed close relations with non-state actors in the area of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. At the beginning of the 90s, the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), the first platform of NGOs, was launched at the initiative of the Director General of External Relations (DG1A), with the aim of sharing expertise in the area of conflict prevention. Another networking platform group that followed this one was the Conflict Prevention Partnership (CPP). CPP has gathered together diverse NGOs such as the European Policy Center (EPC), the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) inter alia. And in 2007, another project, the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) was established. In summary, it can be said that the EU has a tradition of consulting NGOs and sharing with them the best practices to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In other words, the EU
gives NGOs the possibility, through advocacy, of putting on EU political agenda the concerns and perceptions they want to be taken into account in EU high politics.

This brief description helps us to understand the objectives, goals and strategies of provision 4.3 under the IfS, related to the peacebuilding partnership. Thus, the EU, in that way, has always given some preference to dialogue in order to have more evidence-based policy and better success with their initiatives. Provision 4.3 reflects this principle and is based on enhancing the capacity building of non-state actors and strengthening their capacities to address conflict prevention.

The Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper 2007-2011 states that a peacebuilding partnership constitutes one of the three main priorities: “to strengthen the international capacity and regional capacity to anticipate, analyze, prevent and respond to the threat to stability and human development posed by violent conflict and natural disasters, as well as to improve international co-operation in post-conflict and post-disaster recovery”. 126 This need to build the capacity of international systems is related to the support of non-state actors. It ensures a structured dialogue between the European Commission and the civil society sector, through the cooperation with other international organizations.

In that regard, non-state actors have three main priority areas to implement. The first one is to strengthen their capacity in the areas of mediation, “track-two” diplomacy and reconciliation, and also to engage in informal diplomatic initiatives. In my view, this priority is related to the CS function of intermediation/facilitator described by Thania Paffenholz. CS is perceived here as an actor that “bridges ties” between local groups and international/regional/national political organizations. Through this function, CS can effect change at the grassroots level and also improve social reconciliation. At the local level, this is really important in the sense that peace agreements and the reconciliation process are going to have to take into account the needs and expectations that are relevant for the grassroots or local level.

126 European Commission, 2006b, p. 16.
The second priority is related to strengthening the capacities of CS in order to provide an “early warning” system to prevent any kind of crisis situation. Once again, this is a crucial role. It provides for CS to transmit or report any kind of human rights violation or to pre-empt any kind of possible violence that could become widespread. This role is intrinsically related to the monitoring function that can also be led by CS. Actually, CS is considered to be deep-rooted in the field, as CS actors are aware of any kind of social grievance or violence. Thus, together - through a solid network - they can inform regional or international organizations about the limitations and problems there are in the field. For EU policy, this is considered a value-added as they can better adapt their policies on the ground.

The third objective has to do with providing a “well-trained body of experts” in CS to deal with the issues under Article 3(2) of the IfS. It should ensure development assistance to address the root causes. In this aspect, it is expected that CS can combine different functions such as protection, service delivery and advocacy.

If we take into account that article 3 (1) of IfS refers to: “protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of individuals, or a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict…” this integrates a range of issues that can be related to the functions as described by Thania Paffenholz.

Under the “protection function” we can outline the potential threats that could affect the good development of peace. In that regard, activities related to this function, such as demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into CS, measures that target specific needs of women and children, or all the initiatives established to develop a democratic and pluralist state against all possible arbitrary behavior of the state, can be identified. Furthermore, the service delivery function here can be related indirectly to the provision of aid and services. In my view, for instance, it can be related to “rehabilitation and reconstruction of economic assets” by CS. Finally, advocacy is perceived in activities such as “measures to enhance the role of women in institutions” and”…measures to support the development and
organization of civil society and its participation in the political process, such as enhancing the role of women in such processes”.

All of these last-mentioned activities can be attributed to the contesting role of CS, challenging the way that government acts, setting new priorities in the political agenda and changing political behaviors. This, in my view, is extraordinarily relevant because CS can enhance the public sphere through peaceful confrontation, improve good governance and tackle real needs, especially the concerns that people have in their daily lives.

The EU Peacebuilding Partnership, as I see it, is a new EU framework to bring together international NGOs, local civil society and international and regional organizations working on the same goal of achieving a lasting peace and sharing “best practices” in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Even if it is not explicit which kind of organizations can be integrated into the term non-state actors, with a brief analysis of the annual reports and the Instrument for Stability Strategy Paper we come to the conclusion that they are mainly related to international non-governmental organizations that work in partnership with other local non-governmental organizations. In the annual report of 2009 they represented 22% of the funds channeled through these organizations.

In conclusion, the roles of CS that can be underlined in a peacebuilding context within the EU framework are as a “watchdog” (oversight mechanisms, monitoring situations, providing different voices), as an “informative actor” intrinsically positioned to build bridges between the grassroots and political organizations at national, regional and international levels and finally as a “monitor” developing early-warning mechanisms). For example in Kenya, that the local CS, after some speeches on the radio that could have increased the violence of the electoral process and might have led to the outbreak of a conflict; sent an SMS

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alerting the international and regional organizations to a possible occurrence of violence.\textsuperscript{128}

It is also interesting to note that after two years of PbP, funding was directed to organizations with expertise in state fragility, inter-community tensions and early-warning systems to prevent and respond to a crisis situation\textsuperscript{129}. Furthermore, as Sarah Bayne highlights, the call for proposals in 2008 presented two main objectives: assuring cooperation between civil society organizations (North to South and South to South) especially in the areas of early-warning and advocacy and also sharing and developing know-how and best practices in specific fields such as those covered under article 3 of the IfS. In that sense, as also mentioned, this cooperation could be vital to ensure a better policy response from the EU. The advocacy role of CS should be encouraged in order to strengthen the EU response to a potential crisis situation and to clarify for the EU the real difficulties or problems that can occur.

I have highlighted the long- and short-term activities as these can also help us to get an overview of the different approaches of the function-oriented concepts of Thania Paffenholz and see how they match the four areas that we identified in peacebuilding, i.e.: security, socio-economic foundations, political framework and reconciliation and justice.

a) Weakness of Partnership Peacebuilding: Critics

The Report “\textit{Stocktaking and Scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership}” makes a critical assessment to analyze some “lessons learned” from the initial years of the implementation of the “Peacebuilding Partnership”.

1) “Wide” peacebuilding issues:

Focusing the projects on a national /country-specific basis can undermine the international and regional capacity of peacebuilding initiatives. There are conflicts such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo that assume a regional perspective and

\textsuperscript{128} Information given in an interview from the Commission. Fragility Crisis Management.
so addressing the root causes of the conflict means having a more transnational perspective, acting with regional organizations and local civil society as well as adopting more creative and innovative approaches by all the stakeholders, and not so much through traditional capacity building such as training workshops. Furthermore PbP essentially should build international and regional capacity and not only focus on the specifics of one country, to ensure a “best practice” peacebuilding policy.

The exchange of expertise among different partners (local NGOs and networks of NGOs) in a range of geographical contexts can provide a better understanding and generate better learning from practice. This can be observed, for instance, in the project on Political Participation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo. Such projects create a kind of consortia with different organizations to address peacebuilding.

In that regard, PbP should be seen more as a value-added in relation to other instruments, such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Thus PbP should be perceived as an instrument with regional, multi-country and cross-sectoral activities, in order to avoid duplication of activities that are also implemented by the other instruments.

2) Incoherence between IfS and other EU instruments in regard to “locally focused projects”

Also mentioned is a lack of complementarity and coherence between other EU instruments and IfS. If IfS can also tackle the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (referred to in Article 3(1)) this could deal with the same issues as the mainstream EIDHR in the field. In that sense, there would be no value-added of the IfS but only a duplication of activities. Thus Sarah Bayne criticizes this aspect, suggesting that the call for proposals should be the responsibility of EC delegations instead of being “global calls”. This could also be the consequence of the lack of sufficient human resources within the PbP Services to communicate with other EU directorates about their policies / projects.
3) Imbalance of EU beneficiaries: Focus on international NGOs

In respect to the beneficiaries of these “grants” there is also some criticism. These grants were made mainly to big NGOs, thus undermining the equal opportunities for small organizations to get funding. However, from the EU perspective, this is explained by the lack of “a solid resource” that these smaller organizations present, especially because they have a limited membership and expect to get these funds as a remedy for their “survival”. Thus the experience needed to submit these proposals is also seen here as a precondition to succeed and for being funding by the EU.

Finally, there is a preference for funding organizations that work in partnership, i.e., they are not working to enhance their own capacity-building, but to improve the capacity of the “others”, as I will show with some projects below.

4) Deficits in Peacebuilding PbP Evaluation Grid

The evaluation grid of the IfS does not particularly aim at the objectives of this instrument. The grid is the same as the one used for EuropeAid applications. Therefore, the political core of peacebuilding cannot very well be precise nor can it be well evaluated as the same grid cannot properly target the peacebuilding features.

5) Divergence of opinions among different stakeholders around PbP

Among the different actors - the Commission, Parliament and NGOs - there are three divergent concepts or understandings about the goals that PbP should have. Some refer to the fact that PbP is designed to react quickly to the emergence of conflicts by improving civilian capabilities at a “grass-roots” level. This is perceived as a way to avoid the escalation of the conflicts. Others agree that PbP should be conceived to implement more long-term peacebuilding policies, planning the issues that could then be addressed in depth by other Commission instruments, or even “beyond” that. And there are those who insist that PbP become just a “budget line”, thereby losing its dimension of constructive approach to peacebuilding.
6) Inconsistency of aims in EU documents

According to Sarah Bayne, there is an inconsistency of objectives between the narrow activities defined under provision 4.3 and the broad issues outlined in the Strategy Paper 2007-2011. If we compare the two documents, we come to the conclusion that “strengthening the capacity building” referred to in provision 4.3 of the IfS, is associated with a range of activities that go beyond the “promoting early warning; mediation and reconciliation...” mentioned in the Strategy Paper.

The PbP has three main priorities that are referred to by Sarah Bayne: “funding to support the capacity-building civil society actors and enhance the dialogue between policy makers at European level and in the field, cooperating directly with international /regional organizations and strengthening the European Union’s (EU) capacity to contribute to international civilian stabilization missions with EU experts”.  

In the short-term, it can also include capacities that are related to the prevention of violence and the outbreak of conflict, thereby also contributing to stability in the immediate post-crisis phase. These concerns fall more under PbP activities such as: “early warning, political process (including elections); mediation, dialogue and reconciliation work (track-two, diplomacy), monitoring etc”. 

A long-term focus is essential to protecting and strengthening the activities of the EU in order to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to control acts of terrorism and organized crime, and also to enforce post-crisis capacity building. Some other documents have a geographical approach and tackle geographically the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership and the African Peace Facility, which address issues such as local ownership of the peace process, a form which enhances and empowers regional actors. To sum up, the PbP also can address, in the long-term, thematic issues such as “justice and security sector reform, community policing, ...SLAW, armed violence reduction, media and conflict, management of

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131 Idem.
The critical assessment of the document “Stocktaking and Scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership” was taken into consideration by the EU in the IfS Annual Action Program 2010 to target crisis preparedness. In that regard, the main objective is to “build capacity in the international system”: To accomplish this goal the EU wants to focus its policies on how to improve the capacity of non-state actors, and how to ensure better cooperation through dialogue between the EU Commission and CS. It also targets strengthening cooperation with relevant international organizations such as the ONU, as well as “training for civilian stabilization missions” (Cf. Annual Action Program 2010, p.1). Out of all of these points, I will concentrate my analysis especially on how the EU supports non-state actors and, in that regard, how the EU has taken into account the criticisms mentioned above.

In that context, the EU wants to mobilize more efforts to strengthen the capacity of non-state actors with respect to peacebuilding. Therefore, it looks to enhance the dialogue between the EU Commission and the CS sector, to share best practices and expertise on how to prevent crises, how to improve “early warning mechanisms” and how to improve responses. Thus, the approach to peacebuilding should also be transverse, i.e., include strategies that can complement EU policies related to the conflict and improve other measures that could be even more relevant to peacebuilding as a whole. Moreover, these strategies should entail close cooperation with the EPLO as it can bring together all non-state actors relevant in the field (development, humanitarian aid, etc.) through dialogue, and regular consultations. Therefore, it is also crucial that the Commission prepare strategic program papers and the policy on cooperation with the EPLO and other relevant stakeholders. There are also several thematic areas related to fragility and conflict that should be taken into account in peacebuilding agendas, among them, women, peace and security as well as human security.134

The priority to fund the EPLO is simply because it is considered unique at the EU level as it is the only entity at the European level that can bridge networks of NGOs, think tanks and the EU institutions. Therefore, this is a way to facilitate dialogue and “best practices” to achieve common positions on peacebuilding issues in EU policy. Thus in this paper, the EPLO is considered to be the “natural interlocutor” of EU policies.

Another point that should be highlighted in this annual program is how to enhance the “Peacebuilding Partnership Support” on the basis of “lessons learned” (mentioned in the critical assessment document.). In that regard, the EU wants to improve its peacebuilding strategies through focusing more on transverse issues and combining short- and long-term policies to complement other activities that the EU may already have in the field. It also aims to give preference to CS organizations that have a broad geographical scope of work, that can address a variety of peacebuilding themes and help share “best practices” among different local organizations, across countries.

With this purpose in mind, the Commission, under PbP, will focus on organizations that can provide within its framework, a combination of strategies “mediation, dialogue ...” to address the most complicated issues in a fragile conflict, such as women, peace and security and human security. However to accomplish these objectives it is desirable, as mentioned, to provide more human resources, who can deal with and conduct peacebuilding policies. With all these objectives, the EU seeks to improve its response to all situations mentioned under article 3 (situations that damage or threaten democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms or the security and safety of individuals etc) that could have a spill over effect in a conflict situation. Therefore, by enhancing this kind of cooperation with non-state actors, the EU can reinforce its position as a global actor, contributing to the achievement of a lasting peace. For this purpose, the EU will develop four main priorities for becoming more effective in supporting non-state actors. The first concerns “mediation and dialogue”. It envisages that some guidelines would be created to gather the best practices related to mediation and dialogue. Secondly, the EU wants to better address situations of fragility and conflict
to promote, among non-state actors, strategies that could be carried out with international organizations (World Bank, UN) to promote peacebuilding and “state-building”. Thirdly, non-state actors are to be supported to promote gender issues, in order to deal with conflict prevention under the theme “Women, Peace and Security”. It is recognized that CS organizations and platforms of NGOs should be enrolled in advocacy strategies and be supported for that, in order to empower women to participate in peace and security processes, to monitor mechanisms to prevent gender violence in conflicts and to exchange best practices with local authorities through national action plans (to ensure the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 resolution and 1820 by local authorities).

Fourthly, the EU wants to focus on “human security”. Therefore, to accomplish that goal, the EU wants to support - especially through advocacy and monitoring for accountability - all human rights that are violated and damage the dignity of individuals (sexual violence, light weapons trafficking etc). In that way, the EU sees the possibility of eliminating, with the help of non-state actors, the impunity of local authorities and governments and eradicating all the violence, especially of the sort that can occur in conflicts against CS. It will contribute to developing the rule of law in order to stop the arbitrary actions of the state. In conclusion, the EU also wants to improve implementation of “the responsibility to protect“(strengthening the capacity building of CS, through the advocacy and monitoring) enshrine the “responsibility to protect” as an international norm (cooperating and engaging all the political authorities to achieve that aim). This should be launched with calls for proposals on a delegation basis.

In conclusion, I will agree that the PbP strategy is one of the EU peacebuilding tools that can best respond to the complexity of conflicts that frequently damage international security.

There is common consensus that peacebuilding strategies have a “security-development nexus”. As stated in the preamble to the establishment of the Instrument of Stability, “peace, security and stability as well as human rights, democracy and good governance”, are “essential elements for sustainable economic growth and
poverty eradication”. Therefore, peacebuilding strategies as we have described them under *PbP* are multi-dimensional (ranging from a minimalist (prevent the outbreak) aim to a maximalist one (address the root causes of the conflicts). Thus the short- and long-term must also be combined.

Furthermore, the EU rather than building walls, seeks to build bridges through the inclusiveness of the all CS. Therefore, it supports non-state actors who should be defined here as voluntary associations without any profit motive, but I will say with a “civic virtue”. In that regard, the EU recognizes the value-added that CS can have for the resolution and the transformation of a conflict.

*PbP* was also designed to enhance the “capacity building” of CS in order to improve the “best practices” (at all levels of CS - international and local), including a diversity of cross-cutting issues. Thus *PbP* provides the EU with a flexible tool for “crisis preparedness” characterized by an intense dialogue with CS in order to target the prevention of conflict and stabilization of a post-conflict situation. The international CS is supported because it is seen from the EU side as the way to bridge local CS with EU institutions, since they have proximity to and close cooperation with the local ones. The EPLO is seen as a European platform that can provide the EU with good consultations with respect to peacebuilding.

Furthermore and from the “lessons learned”, the EU is more open to cooperating directly with local CS actors. In that way, the EU will establish a new project that will directly fund local CS, managed by the delegations in each country. Therefore, it can been seen, that direct improvement of the issues raised by the critics of “Stocktaking and Scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership” has been made.

In conclusion, the EU seeks as much inclusiveness, coherence and coordination as possible, even if there are some issues that are overlapping and redundant. However, the most important thing is that the EU already understands that to achieve a lasting peace it should integrate the Peacebuilding Commission principles, such as: “*bring together all relevant actors*” and “*advise on and propose integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery*”; “*focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support*
the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development”.

I will describe some projects to better clarify what has been discussed above, which are funded under the EU PbP.

From the Annual Report of the Commission on the Instrument of Stability 2009, I will highlight some initiatives under Peacebuilding Partnership. This is relevant to our work to mapping the functions of CS in a peacebuilding context and how we can observe it from the EU side.

For the Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP) the main goal is to “build the capacity of non-state actors to prevent violent conflict and to contribute to post-conflict and political stabilization and early recovery after natural disaster”. 135 In that regard, both long- and short-term approaches are used, including those activities that non-state actors have to carry out. As we have already seen, the complexity of the conflicts nowadays is huge, posing new challenges to regional and international organizations. Achieving a “positive peace” is difficult but not impossible. To illustrate, I will describe some activities that have been implemented in the field and supported by the EU.

1) First Function: Advocacy and Public Communication:

The project on “Political Participation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo” is mainstreamed by Medica Mondiale together with other partner organizations, PAIF in Goma (the Democratic Republic of Congo / DRC) and ISIS Europe as well as other regional branches in Afghanistan and Liberia. This project has a duration of 36 months from March 2009-February 2012.

The aim of the project is to share “best practices” with other women’s organizations in Afghanistan, the DRC and Liberia to participate in peace and security planning and implementation in their countries. It tackles the need to empower women within civil society and at state level. It advocates putting women’s rights on the political agenda and ensuring the visibility of the gender dimension within their community.

The 16 days of activism the project organized in Liberia, Afghanistan and Congo gave visibility to their concerns through information campaigns. This aspect is referred to by Thania Paffenholz as “advocating indirectly”, as they can put their concerns on the political agenda, not by using polls (advocating directly), but through the transfer of know-how and the exchange of information. Thus, these women’s groups organize workshops and roundtables on family law, reinforcing the rule of law and the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 (related to Women, Peace and Security).

Finally, they have a public hearing in the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights to put the gender perspective as a priority on the political agenda, especially advocating that lasting peace is only possible with the eradication of violence against women, and through the engagement of women in peace and security policies. This function is considered to be primarily a function intrinsic to national CS. I will agree with this in the sense that through advocacy the population can tackle the issues that cause a perpetuation of violence and that this is sometimes forgotten by the international community.

2) Second Function: Social Cohesion

One InS project is conducted by the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs that aims to enhance civil society’s role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Cyprus. Some difficulties or obstacles to achieving a peace agreement have been underlined, among them societal and political “mistrust” and

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137 Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, Enhancing Civil Society’s role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Cyprus, available at http://www.rcenter.intercol.edu/round_tables/, (consulted on 2 July 2011).
some social grievances, reflected in a need to better understand the positions of the “other”. This “think tank” contributes to a better understanding of possible reconciliation measures that can be more creative and effective for the achievement of the “culture of peace”, especially by better understanding the “other”.

This is a project where individuals, researchers (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) together with the participation of other actors such as the UN, the EU and third states can work together to reintegrate mechanisms to give more effective advice to regional or international institutions on crises and their anticipation/prevention/resolution. Their aim is to create an early-warning mechanism, to avoid the outbreak of crises or other conflicts.

3) Third Function: Intermediation and Facilitation

The Center for Civic Initiative is another NGO that is developing a project to enhance reconciliation in the West Balkan countries, such as Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The main tools are dialogue and political consultation with different actors to provide recommendations and reconciliation mechanisms in the Balkans, which will also be taken in account in EU institutions. CS also plays a crucial role as it is seen as vital to improve interethnic relations - the most critical threat to a sustainable peace. This platform of networks is, in that sense, a facilitation service and intermediary between local CS, international organizations and the state.

This project will have duration of 10 months.

4) Fourth Function: Monitoring for Accountability and Promotion

Monitoring is one of the most important functions that CS can provide to assure good governance. Even though it may be close to other CS functions such as protection, advocacy and public communication, it is, in my view, crucial to also have space to perform the other CS functions. Without accountability, the arbitration of the states and violations of human rights may always be on “on stage”.

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This function is very important if we take as an example the EU policy objectives in the Annual Action Programme 2010 - Crisis Preparedness for the IfS.

In that regard, PbP has two main objectives related to monitoring: enhancing a CS dialogue network and constructing a peacebuilding partnership support with related long- and short-term issues, taking into account a range of geographical areas.

These two functions are really important as they strengthen the “early warning mechanism” as well as the “protection of human rights”. Enhancing the dialogue with the CS network, mainstreamed by the EPLO, can give more visibility to reporting human right abuses as well as serving as prevention through a better early warning mechanism. This exchange of expertise in the field of peacebuilding policies can also represent, in my view, a monitoring activity to alert the international or regional organizations about the arbitrary governance of some states towards their people or also about intrinsic cultural violence that some ethnic groups impose on their populations.

This kind of prevention in a post-conflict situation or even in a pre-crisis is essentially to preempt any conflict or massive violations of human rights. This also can help to prioritize peacebuilding policies towards a country at European and international levels.

5) Fifth Function: Protection

The international NGOs’ cooperation with local CS organizations is essential to address some critical issues such as women, peace and security and human security. These points were considered as the main objectives of the Annual Action Programme Paper 2010 of the If$^{138}$, also a response to the critical overview of “Stocktaking and Scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership” that I have described above. Therefore, the activities to address the fragility of the conflict are related to women, peace and security (to empower women to participate in peace and security aspects, to develop mechanisms to address gender-based violence, to facilitate

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exchange of practices and to implement national plans where the UNSCR 1325 and 1820 are integrated into the political agenda).

All these activities can improve good governance and the protection of human rights at local, regional and international levels with a network of NGOs that can enhance the visibility of some human rights violations and share best practices related to that.

Concerning human security\textsuperscript{139} it should also be mainstreamed with CS advocacy. The range of threats – several of them against CS - can include small arms and light weapons, antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war, sexual violence, internal displacement and trafficking of human beings. Therefore, the implementation of the rule of law, through monitoring and advocacy activities is essential. It is also essential to implement in CS, capacity building, dialogue and enhancing the operational capacities to answer these kinds of threats.

Furthermore, these priorities are seen as being connected with the responsibility to protect \textit{i.e.}, giving the capacity and expertise to CS to react and ensure their own rights. On the other hand, it should also be seen as an obligation of the international community, to oblige governments and institutions at national, sub-regional and regional levels to respect the international norms in order to stop violations of human rights.

6) Sixth Function: Service Delivery

This project aims to reduce the violence in urban areas in Haiti. It is mainstreamed by \textit{Concern Worldwide}\textsuperscript{140} which works in cooperation with Glencree Center for Peace and Reconciliation. The objective of this project is to prevent delivering conflict sensitiveness. Here, the CS plays the role of providing security and, in humanitarian assistance, of preventing any kind of violence targeting the

\textsuperscript{139} It will be here perceived as the security of individuals and communities to eradicate all the kind of issues related with “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”.

delivery of the humanitarian assistance, especially for the vulnerable groups of the population.

Even though we can find most of the functions described by Thania Paffenholz in the EU projects under PbP, I will highlight advocacy and monitoring as they are crucial to achieving a lasting peace. Through these primary functions, CS can provide international visibility for violation of human rights, as they perform a “watchdog role”. They also serve as mediator actors as they create spaces of peace between the warring parties in a conflict, thereby contributing to social stabilization and the achievement of a lasting peace.

e) Civil Society’s engagement with the EIDHR

This European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights was created in 2006\(^\text{141}\), and entered into force in 2007. It foresees development worldwide and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that sense, it contributes to enhancing, complementing and giving even more visibility to the EU principles, in parallel to the other EU policies (development cooperation instrument DCI, EDF, ENPI or IPA etc.).

In that regard, it complements the visibility that the EU has in promoting solidarity between peoples and its intrinsic character of promoting its mission for humanity, as already mentioned. Therefore, the EU insisted on having these principles in its policy agenda as defense for human rights, democracy and the rule of law during EU enlargement (with the Copenhagen Criteria to guarantee that the fundamental rights are respected in the accession countries). This is also clearly stated in European Neighborhood policies as well as in the partnership agreements with ACP Countries, especially through the Cotonou Agreement. Thus the EU under the EIDHR can promote this visibility through its human rights dialogues and consultations (with the aim of convincing third countries to adopt and ratify the international human rights legislation, guidelines (to third countries, especially in issues related to children in

armed conflicts, human rights defenders, on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law), and through declarations and statements - and ultimately also through the CS projects worldwide that the EU can fund.

There are five main goals under the EIDHR Strategy Paper (2011-2013)\(^{142}\) which include: “promote the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of groups of interests and consolidating political participation and representation; supporting actions on human rights and democracy that are covered by EU Guidelines”, strengthening international and regional promotion of human rights, and finally “building confidence and enhancing the reliability of democratic process”. I will focus my analysis on how CS engagement is perceived under this instrument especially as related to post-conflict situations.

Before coming to an analytical description of some projects, I will highlight the three main points and unique ones, in my view of this instrument, that allow CS to be considered vital and a real key partner.

First, CS is considered crucial to enhance the accessibility and the protection of international human rights tools for individuals.\(^{143}\) They are seen as the “vital tools for conflict prevention and resolution”.\(^{144}\)

The Instrument of the EIDHR is, however, a value-added in EU policies because it contributes to creating a more pluralistic and more democratic society. Several components of this instrument need to be present to sustain this pluralism.

CS is also considered a “key partner”, and therefore 90%\(^{145}\) of the funds are allocated to civil society organizations. Just 10% of the funding goes to international organizations. In practice the EIDHR has 400 projects. 300 local civil society

\(^{144}\) Idem,p.6.
projects were directly financed. 146 There is a common understanding that through CS initiatives, the democracy and peace process can be more reliable, responding in that way to the needs of the population, improving the accountability of the governments and engaging people in claiming their own rights.

Secondly this instrument does not need the consent of a host government and, in that regard, can act directly towards CS, the ones that are often in need, and in which their basic rights are not always respected by the local authorities. Thus this gives this instrument a unique feature: It is more flexible, independent and neutral than other EU instruments. Moreover, it can more precisely touch the sensitivities of the conflict, often where human rights are at risk (all the social grievances, inequalities, disrespect of human rights).

Thirdly, the EU delegations worldwide can fund local CS in line with the priorities needed in the field or in the country. This is really important once CS is better aware of the difficulties and people in need in the field. It is, therefore the EIDHR, a way to address the root causes of a conflict and achieve a lasting peace. Although it is used also or primarily in non post-conflict countries. Thus there is a common sense that “local ownership” should be empowered in order to ensure more accountability for local governance and engage the citizens as actors in this democratic process.

In that sense CS, supported by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, is pointed out as a “key partner” for external relations. In that context, they participate directly in EU policies through consultations and also as the “target of EU policies”. Through consultations, CS can participate in developing political dialogue guidelines in more than 40 countries, addressing policy changes as well as reviewing the strategy program for the EIDHR. Moreover, they are also taken into account when revising new policy developments, such as, for instance, those related to violence against women etc. In that regard, we can sum up the role of CS as a real key partner to the EU in formulating policies.

CS is also a “target of EU policies” once that CS is seen to be an actor of change, change for peace, development, democracy etc.

This is why Brussels supports these initiatives with funding through calls for proposals issued in Brussels according to thematic issues such as abolition of the death penalty, Women rights, right to freedom expression and belief etc, and also among all the EU delegations worldwide that can allocate these funds directly to support local CS organizations in the field in some 90 countries.

In that regard, CS is perceived as a target for improvement, also of its “inclusiveness” i.e., to make sure that all groups of the society are heard and that their complaints and needs are taken into account. Inclusiveness means “coming together”, giving voice to the voiceless, substituting for the lacks of government in providing for public needs. Thus, this lack of democracy can threaten a lasting peace. Therefore, the EU considers that CS has a crucial role in improving democracy and human rights. Democracy and human rights are considered147 “the vital tools” and the “public goods”148 to address the root causes of the conflicts as well their prevention and resolution and this is where CS can have a value-added to compensate for the lack of governance.

CS is a vital partner or a key contributor to peacebuilding strategies, also within the EIDHR Instrument. The EU has shown, through some projects, some positive accomplishments along those lines. In the Israeli and Palestinian conflict149, CS projects funded by the EIHDR called on Palestinian and Israeli CS “to join hands”, fostering dialogue, notably between platforms of women, to achieve reconciliation and a peace process.

Another example of CS working for the improvement of good governance through EIDHR has to do with the initiatives to ensure accountability of local authorities. Thus, the EU has developed some initiatives to work together with CS to assure

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better governance and the consolidation of democracy. An example of that was developed with African CS on best practices on NGO laws, which had been a very sensitive issue thanks to some arbitrary decisions of local authorities. These ones, for instance did not allow local NGOs to receive funds from foreign donors. Thus international European CS, together with African NGOs, have designed a study to address all the constraints that African laws on NGOs place on them and sharing best practices to improve the capacity of the governments to deal with CS. That is also the case of the CS “World Organization against Torture” (OMCT), another project that has involved increasing the capacities of the African Commission on Human Rights in Abuja\textsuperscript{150}. This was a way of helping African countries to establish a mechanism to prevent torture. Instead of giving a ready-made mechanism from the EU directly to African countries, they developed the mechanism with African CS engagement.

CS is perceived as a key partner” especially to address the root causes of the conflicts, as already mentioned. In that regard, I will highlight some crucial functions that the EU has underlined in its strategy papers. Under objective two of the EIDHR Strategy Paper\textsuperscript{151} 2011-2013 we can come to the conclusion that “strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in facilitating the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation”, are the crucial functions that CS can have in preventing conflict and contributing to a lasting peace.

In that regard, CS is mainly performing three functions of Thania Paffenholz’s framework - monitoring for accountability, advocacy and public communication and protection. To better illustrate these functions I will describe some “success stories”.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)\textsuperscript{152} several EIDHR projects were established to rehabilitate child soldiers. The project was mainstreamed by the NGO, War Child International, to ensure the rehabilitation of more than 800 girls who were

\textsuperscript{150} Information giving in a interview by an expert on the Instrument of Human Rights and Democracy.


obliged to fight in the war and were also raped and forced into prostitution. The project is concerned with rehabilitating these children from the horrors of the war as well as giving them shelter and an education and health care. This initiative is related to the protection function described by Thania Paffenholz. In a conflict, all of the armed forces can be perceived as potential threats, which can affect good development of peace. Thus, CS organizations are the key actors protecting people from these dangers, especially when the state is weak, fragile and non-functional. Demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers is a way, advocated by Galtung, to eradicate all the structural violence.

Monitoring for accountability and also advocacy can be illustrated with EIDHR project on “Promoting land and women rights in Red Sea State, Eastern Sudan”, mainstreamed by the local association, Abuhadia Society for Women and Community Development (ASWCD)\(^{153}\). The aim of this project is to support women’s rights in eastern Sudan, especially after the conflict. Women are seen as having been deprived of their basic human rights. Here, we can identify a function of advocacy. Thereby, it aims to eradicate violence against women, especially through educational campaigns and training sessions to combat the anti-female practice of genital mutilation. Moreover, we can also associate this project with the monitoring for accountability function, since it looks to eradicate all human rights abuses. It has been shown that women here were constantly denied their economic rights, such as the right to own land. In that regard, I can see here a kind of monitoring function related to the reporting of human rights abuses, as the local groups are doing but also, trying to eradicate these abuses. In that regard, this function is closely related to the protection and advocacy action already mentioned.

In conclusion, the EIDHR has unique features that distinguish it from the other EU instruments. Here, CS gains a new space. It is generally agreed that CS can enhance political participation and representation. Putting their concerns on the political agenda creates new space for combating all kinds of discrimination on the ground,

thereby contributing to conflict prevention, and reconciliation between the warring parties as well as the other segments of the population. Through capacity building and training sessions, as well, it can enhance the sharing of best practices, advocate and ensure more awareness of and visibility for the real concerns of CS. It also gives voice to the local CS (of 400 projects, 300 were directly addressed to local CS organizations). These receive the majority of EU funds, especially through micro projects, as a way to enhance the inclusiveness of all elements of society. This ensures a culture of peace; pulling together all the parties in order to achieve reconciliation among the groups and, ultimately, a sustainable peace.

Even if, through the use of this instrument, we can find all these positive achievements, there are also some recommendations or “lessons learned” which could improve effectiveness. It is recognized in this document that it is important to create better monitoring of the projects that have been developed, to give even more priority to the mix of strategies so as to have a better impact on the field, i.e., combine advocacy with training and “local with global”. Furthermore, it has also been mentioned that is necessary to unravel the red tape to facilitate access to funding from the South CS organizations.

Even if it was not mentioned as a “lessons learned”, the bureaucracy on drafting these proposals under EIDHR is also point to be an obstacle. It is seen as a challenge by most of the organizations. This view is also shared by Regina Heller who, in relation to EIDHR, found the same lack of flexibility or rigidity in the proposals: “The intensive application process at EIDHR is a big obstacle for local NGOs and small ones”, she wrote, drawing on the Russian experience. This kind of rigid bureaucratic tradition in the EU is widely criticized and considered to be the main obstacle to successfully applying for funds.

As I have described above, the EU contributes to promoting conflict transformation, through strengthening the CS in its policies. Thus, the EU is not only focusing on formal diplomatic efforts and on the negotiation of peace agreements to settle the end

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of a conflict. It looks beyond those strategies. The EU tries to work within the Lederach framework, *i.e.*, “pursue a dynamic social construct”.\textsuperscript{156}

In conclusion, the EU addresses a conflict with the perception, also shared by Lederach,\textsuperscript{157} that “*a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels*”. In that sense, the EU wants to transform the structural features of a conflict, eradicating all the structural violence mentioned by Galtung and thereby achieve a sustainable and lasting peace. With such a theoretical panorama, the EU is addressing peacebuilding through a “*comprehensive*”, “*coordinated*” and “*inclusive*”\textsuperscript{158} approach, with all the segments and activities entailed in all the groups of the society.

\textsuperscript{156} Lederach, J.P, 1997, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{157} Idem, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{158} Lederach, J.-P., 1997, p. 60.
Conclusion - Civil Society and the EU in peacebuilding: what kind of relation?

The purpose of this analysis was to see to what extent the EU engages CS in its policies in peacebuilding contexts. From this analysis, I can draw a number of conclusions.

First of all, the EU, at its essence, is a “peace project” focusing on promoting a mission towards “humanity”. Thus, it seeks to include within its peacebuilding framework, multi-dimensional and multi-leveled activities (that I will define here as engaging different actors). Thereby, the EU shares some principles of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, mentioned in the review of the *United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, including, the imperative of national ownership and the inclusiveness of all groups of CS, especially with respect to the most vulnerable ones (women and children). The EU under its Peacebuilding Partnership (*PbP*) aims to better empower women to participate in peace and security processes, to strengthen mechanisms that enable gender violence to be controlled, especially during conflicts, and to support national authorities to incorporate into their legal frameworks all the resolutions (UN1325; 1820), so that women may be engaged in the resolutions of peace. This is especially important as the EU considers that women are the “drivers of change” and it is through and with them that the EU can contribute to a sustainable peace. Moreover, the EU points to other priorities related to the responsibility to protect human security as the international norm and as a duty that should be advocated and monitored by CS. All these initiatives are mainstreamed in a partnership perspective. In that regard, the EU, through *PbP*, wants to encourage a “broad conception of peacebuilding”. It maintains that taking on projects on the basis of national country specifics can undermine the international and regional capacity of peacebuilding initiatives. Therefore, it gives preference to international NGOs that can cooperate with local CS, to adopt more creative and innovative approaches among all the stakeholders. Thus, this instrument maintains that “cross-sector” activities as well as a “multi-country perspective” in peacebuilding are values-added, which enhance the sharing of expertise among different partners (local NGOs and networks of NGOs) to better understand the threats and to generate more effective
learning from practice. In that sense, the EU agrees with the UN that not all interventions can have the same approach, *i.e.*, “no one size fits all”.

I will highlight two sub-points of conclusions that I have drawn from the EU’s practice: first of all, the “local ownership” criteria is undermined or sub-optimal. Imposing mainly agendas of NGOs from the North, especially from the European NGO Platform (EPLO), we cannot perceive to what extent the policies and activities are taking into account the real needs of the local grassroots. This could, then, entail a kind of “patronage” relationship. Furthermore, focusing on the agenda of these NGOs could, in my view, create a politicization of CS and in that way negatively affect the establishment of a sustainable peace. Moreover, the evaluation of these projects is also difficult to grasp, especially to what extent they are effective in the field (in relation to the grassroots). We cannot really understand how using these intermediary NGOs is really affecting changes at the local level.

Secondly, the EU, after the critiques of “lessons learned”, wants to be more effective, as stated in its 2010 Annual Strategy Paper, by allocating funds directly to the delegations as they are considered the “eyes and ears” of the EU. In that regard, the EU wants to avoid incoherency among its strategies by adopting a more horizontal approach (or bottom-up) taking into account the real needs of the population as well as the coherence of other programs that may already have been launched in the field. However, in my opinion, this would be even more pro-active if the EU were already developing a project that could directly fund local CS organizations under PbP. Indeed, we will have a better idea of the CS initiatives that could be developed in the field, as well as a better response to the real “needs” of the society. Therefore, the EU should make every effort to diminish its “bureaucratic machinery” by respecting, for instance, the criticism of the calls for proposals that are seen by the small NGOs or local ones as too complex and very rigid.

Even if we emphasize these two main criticisms/“on-going” achievements, there are other assessments to which we can refer, related to the functions/roles of CS. Taking this into consideration, it is possible, from our analysis, to map the functions of local organizations in accordance with the academic analysis of Thania Paffenholz.
Included in the “Annual Action Program 2010”, under the topic “crisis preparedness”, are all the strategies to strengthen the capacity building of CS to prevent conflict and contribute to enhancing “social stabilization”. Under this aim, we can identify four main functions: monitoring for accountability, advocacy and public communication, social cohesion and protection.

Through monitoring for accountability, CS tries to foster the eradication of violence and human rights abuses. This is associated with the establishment of “early warning” mechanisms, one of the most important tools of CS to improve the good governance and democratization considered to be major priorities of the Instrument for Stability (2007-2011). This is even more illuminating if we take as an example the contribution CS can make to the monitoring of human rights abuses: in Kenya, for instance, the local CS alerted other organizations by SMS to speeches on the radio that could have enhanced the violence of the electoral process.

Advocacy and public communication are other functions highlighted in the strategies, plus the practices of the EU in establishing peacebuilding partnerships. These functions create local, regional and international awareness of the concerns and needs of the population (grassroots) and gets these topics onto the political agenda. We can perceive this best through women’s activism against gender violence in the conflicts, as well as through dialogue in information campaigns among NGO networks such as the EPLO. A cross-country project, for instance, was one that included Political Participation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo. This gave voice to the “voiceless”, raised awareness among those setting the political agenda about the violation of women’s rights in many countries, and facilitated sharing “best practices” to tackle one of the “root causes of the conflict”. The EU also responded to this concern with the creation of a webgate to peacebuilding partnership, where the organizations can be informed about the calls for proposals as well as the principal concerns in the debate on peacebuilding. This emphasizes the social arena of the debate and discussion as well as best practices that should enhance and promote peacebuilding. Thereby, the EU achieves close cooperation with CS.
Social Cohesion is associated with the capacity of CS to build bridges across groups at odds with each other and to promote mediation to strengthen efforts towards the achievement of a real social peace. This reconciliation process often has to go beyond the diplomatic “peace agreements”. In that regard, the EU, under its neighborhood policies (EU Partnership for Peace Program) promotes several local CS initiatives for peace and tolerance, related to the social capital notion of Putnam or our “civic virtue” that can be a feature of CS in different countries (for instance Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria). It tackles the eradication of violence and all kinds of “willingness” to violence as well as social grievances among the populations.

Another function that I would like to underline from my analysis is related to protection, i.e., how to protect human rights against the arbitrary rules of local authorities and how to ensure that these authorities cannot act with impunity. This is also related to one of the priorities stressed in the Annual Paper of the IfS for 2010 - protecting “human security” and “women’s rights” both of which are especially vulnerable to being damaged in fragile and conflict situations.

The European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) also follows the functions that we have highlighted. Even though this instrument was not created to directly address CS in a peacebuilding context, we find much evidence that can be related to peacebuilding, and that will have a value-added by comparison to other instruments. Under this instrument, 90% of the funds go to support CS. By comparison with the IfS, it is a huge amount as IfS only allocates 22% of its funding to NGOs (in 2009). Thus the percentage of financing under PbP is comparably small. That, in my view, is a point that the EU should improve over the next few years, as the engagement of CS is essential to address the root causes of the conflicts. Moreover, in the allocation of EU funding, the Instrument of Stability only receives 4% and the EIDHR receives 12%. This also reveals the lack of capacity that this instrument has to fund long-term initiatives.

Despite these constraints CS for the EU is a “key partner” for external relations and sustaining peace. Under EIDHR it is a “key partner”, one that participates in
consultations on guidelines for all political human rights dialogues, and also in the reviewing of the strategy papers on human rights and democracy. In that respect, both of the instruments, the IfS and the PbP include CS on the formulation of EU policies through consultation and this is underlined in the priorities and thematic issues under the strategy papers (EIDHR) and the Annual Action Programs (PbP) related to crisis preparedness. On the other hand, this also highlights the functions of CS with respect to advocacy, public communication and protection essential to guaranteeing the protections of fundamental rights as well as enhancing their role as actors of change for the EU.

CS is an actor of change for development, peace and human rights, putting their concerns on the EU political agenda and also contributing to improving the advocacy role and defending the “voiceless”, especially the ones that are in need at the grassroots level. Therefore, we can say that they contribute to creating stability within societies.

I want to point out that under the EIDHR, funds can be allocated directly to local CS through calls for proposals from the EU Delegations. Thus, of 400 projects that were put into practice, 300 were carried out directly by local CS organizations. This is, in my view, a real value-added feature. PbP is only to put a similar project into practice at the beginning of next year.

The principle of “inclusiveness” can also be observed in this instrument. It makes sure that women’s rights are taken in account as a key factor of peace and under EIDHR it contributes to promoting and supporting the protection of the minorities. Moreover, “inclusiveness” also protects the “victims of repression” or opponents of the government. In that sense, it contributes to enhancing the accountability of CS as they can be aware and more conscientious about the international human rights laws. This is a very important feature if the EIDHR wants to target all the individuals whose fundamental rights are not respected by the governments. Therefore, it aims to strengthen the pluralism indispensable for a strong democracy and good governance. This is even more noticeable as this instrument does not need the consent of a host
country to implement its projects and to support the CS that is in need or that has had its rights violated.

So we can say that CS is seen by the EIDHR in a way as a mechanism to allow people who are in difficulty to have some peace, to express their concerns and to get together. It is a key contribution to post-conflict peace strategies even if the link is not allocated directly to peacebuilding strategy as is PbP.

That means that the EU conceives CS as “actors of change” for human rights and democratization issues. Enhancing the capacity of CS under PbP is a vital tool to better respond to, anticipate and prevent conflict situations and for dealing with their aftermath. An example of that were the local projects in Sudan carried out by the local organization (Abuhadia Association for Women and Community Development) to target all human rights abuses against women as well as to develop some educational campaigns. The monitoring of accountability, protection and advocacy are seen under this instrument as “public goods” that should be ensured through and with CS:

Even though CS may be, for the EU an “actor of change” as we have described, there is no common agreement among the EU documents on a single definition of the term. For EIDHR, CS means non-state actor, every entity that does not belong to a state body or to the business sector or to a public authority or political party. They have a non-profit, non-public mandate. In EIDHR there is criticism of working with non-legal persons (such as opponents, who are not considered legal). However the definition under PbP is related to non-state actors, which include NGOs, local CS organizations, think tanks and universities. Furthermore, in the paper related to “non-state actors and local authorities in development” they are considered under the same umbrella (civil society organizations, social partners, political and social contacts, youth organizations and academic institutions). This latter definition goes beyond my concept of the term. It includes the profit sector, as well as political associations which, in my view cannot have a “civic virtue”.

The non-precise definition of the term also implies a lack of rigor on the EU side when targeting its policies. Thus, I will contend that this incoherence can damage the
goal of its policies. Putting all the associations in the same “basket” can also contribute to the privatization of aid and polarization of the same, affecting, in a negative way, the “civic virtue” that I have been emphasizing.

Another criticism noted in my analysis is related to the lack of an EU peacebuilding strategy. In that regard, the instruments such as the EIDHR, the PbP and the EDF may tackle the same group targets, i.e., CS in the same country with similar policies. If, under PbP, the protection of human rights or mediation and reconciliation projects can also be developed by EIHDR or EDF polices, there is no value-added for PbP. The duplication of policies like this should be avoided. However, the EU multi-stakeholders are fragmented throughout the various institutional actors and DGS such as external relations, EuropeAid, AIDCO. The European delegations worldwide enhance this “bureaucratic machinery” and exacerbate the lack of coordination while detracting from the visibility that EU should have.

Furthermore, respecting the time frame of the projects, we cannot have an evaluation to measure the effectiveness of contributing to a sustainable and a lasting peace. The complexity of peacebuilding, with multiple actors, goals and strategies, makes this analysis more difficult. But the “illusion of sequencing” also mentioned in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture must also be included inside the EU. Therefore, with the projects under PbP having duration of 2 years we cannot perceive whether the local CS is already prepared to exercise its own ownership or not.

In our analysis, the EU, must, in the first place, improve its coordination and the complementarity of policies, even if CS is viewed as an “actor of change” and a “key partner”. The PbP was created as a value-added, to be implemented when no other instrument could respond to crisis preparedness. However, the overlapping of policies and duplication of goals does not allow us to know whether the EU is really contributing to a flourishing and conscious CS. As the EPLO, the single platform at European level, concludes about the EU peacebuilding strategy: policy commitments do not lead to action policy approaches. Once they are developed they become fragmented among the institutions. There is no holistic EU approach to peacebuilding. Instead of adopting a whole peacebuilding EU strategy, once different
actors act together to support third countries in particular. However, the EU does try to improve its policies on peacebuilding to conform as closely as possible to the school of Conflict Transformation. More than establishing peace agreements through diplomatic efforts, generally called “stick and carrots”, the EU wants to transform society through the eradication of any kind of “willingness” to use violence, by trying to abolish any kind of social grievance. Thus the EU wants to build “social bridges” through and within CS actors.

The EU wants to have a “comprehensive”, “coordinated” and inclusive approach, among all the segments and activities that involve all the groups of society, with a focus on enhancing good governance and on the eradication of the “root causes” in order to achieve a positive peace. In my view, the EU also shares the perspective that it is violence and not the conflict that is the problem. Therefore, it engages directly with CS and recognizes the essential roles in peacebuilding: “watchdog”, monitoring and accountability functions as well as protection. Furthermore, even if it does not have a strategy defined as peacebuilding, the EU has as in integral part of its policies, the nexus between security and development intended to especially to address the “fragile states”. The EU shares the same concerns of other international organizations to better respond to the complexity of these conflicts. Therefore, CS should be a key factor to be enhanced when a state in incapable of accomplishing its role, CS should be supported (in matters of early-warning, monitoring, reconciliation and mediation). However, the EU should also improve and prioritize its relations with these actors and not only with governments. CS if it encompasses “civic virtue” should contribute to the political reform as well as a consolidate democracy. They are fundamental to building stable societies, given that the majority of deaths in these conflicts are those of civilians. Furthermore, the EU should be aware that rather than creating more instruments and geographic and thematic issues, it should improve the coordination of the ones it has already established. To preserve people’s “freedom from fear”, and “from want”, entails long–term approaches. The stability of societies has to be created not only with local authorities but within societies. The EU does keep this in mind and has certainly contributed indirectly to a “flourishing CS”, promoting democracy and human rights as vital tools to reduce the risks of
governments acting with impunity and to contribute to a open and plural society that is the real concern of EU policies. The EU, in its documents, highlights the importance of this concern globally and channels significant funds to developing countries. In practice, however the EU’s support to the transformative power of CS could be even more improved and better coordinated.
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The EUs approaches to civil society in peacebuilding: concepts, instruments and practice

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