RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: *the never-ending rhetoric or actual baseline for the EU’s possible action*

Student: Lenka Homolkova
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Olympia Bekou (The University of Nottingham)
European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation
Academic Year: 2010/2011
Many thanks to:

Dr. Olympia Bekou for excellent supervision, support and always being there for me.

Mr. Jan Kaminek from the Department of Human Rights and Transitional Policy of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs for advises, RtoP consultations and overall support of my work.

My family for the trust they have always had in me.
Abstract

The thesis focuses on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) within the framework of the European Union’s external action. The RtoP presents the newly emerging international norm aiming at prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, therefore its operationalisation is highly desirable. The regional organisations are well placed to play an important role in this respect. The thesis analyses to what extent can the EU invoke the RtoP in its foreign policies in the future showing that the RtoP elements and obligations already exist in the EU law as well as the EU possesses the impressive toolbox of the mechanisms ready to be deployed in the RtoP situations. Furthermore, the EU has been vocally very supportive of the RtoP since its creation. To what extent is/will be the EU able to transcend the mere rhetoric and actually regularly use the RtoP in its external policies? The current case of Libya shows that EU is able to follow the RtoP guidelines reflecting already the existing practice, however, one main obstacles hamper the full RtoP realization by the EU – lack of its codification in the EU law and instruments.
**Table of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crises Management</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate General of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU MS</td>
<td>EU Member States</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>EWM</td>
<td>Early Warning Mechanism</td>
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<td>EWU</td>
<td>Early Warning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLPT</td>
<td>High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<td>RtoP</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty Establishing the European Community</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nation’s Security Council</td>
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1 Introduction

The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) was created in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).\(^1\) Building upon the obligations inherent in the state sovereignty and existing international law it has been designed to address failures in preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Through the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild embodied in the RtoP such atrocities were to be diminished.\(^2\)

The international community\(^3\) unanimously adopted the RtoP at the 2005 World Summit attributing it the status of the newly developing legal norm.\(^4\) However, the consensus on the RtoP’s scope has yet to be reached, especially considering the persisting disagreements among states, lawyers and scholars on the legality of the humanitarian intervention, the important RtoP part.\(^5\) But the RtoP encompasses much more than mere humanitarian intervention, therefore its operationalisation remains highly desirable. Enshrining the RtoP principle into relevant international or regional organization other than the UN can contribute to this objective.\(^6\)

The European Union (EU) has been generally supportive of the concept since its creation including it regularly into the documents of its institutions as well as statements presented under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\(^7\) proclaiming its adherence to the human rights (HR) and fundamental freedoms stemming from the Constitutional traditions of its Member States (MS), general principles of law and the EU’s Primary legislation (currently, the HR present a very heart of the Lisbon Treaty\(^8\)).\(^9\)

\(^2\) ICISS, 2001(1)
\(^3\) The term ‘international community’ refers generally to the United Nations Member States.
\(^4\) A/RES/60/01, 24 October 2005, paras 138-140.
\(^6\) Evans, 2007.
\(^8\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended).
Moreover, it seems equipped with various mechanisms and tools able to carry the RtoP components and therefore can possibly play important role in the RtoP realisation.\(^{10}\)

Unfortunately, despite the EU’s vocal supportiveness, the evidence in its actual work as well as regular and systematic use of the RtoP concept is still lacking.\(^{11}\) EU seems to be cautious to invoke the RtoP in the real situations attributing it the status of the ‘rhetoric’ rather than that of an actual legal and policy norm.

At this point, it becomes crucial to move beyond mere legal considerations and discuss how the EU can actually carry out the RtoP concept, more precisely, how the decisions concerning the RtoP would have to be taken. The EU presents the intergovernmental organisation (IGO). Despite the deeper integration, it still possesses no real sovereignty and is dependent on the voluntary decisions of its MS.\(^{12}\) Especially within the EU’s CFSP, where significant part of the RtoP would be dealt with, the EU can have its ambitions reverberating in its statements and documents, however, the particular decisions will often depend on the individual states. The EU has learnt in the past years for example during the Yugoslavian conflict, that its foreign policy can be effective only if spoken out with one voice.\(^{13}\) Needless to say, even if this has been acknowledged, the inter-governmental decision-making can still hamper the one-voice foreign policy and the related EU’s power limiting the RtoP realisation.\(^{14}\) This would be the case especially if the national interest of any of the EU member state is at stake.\(^{15}\)

By the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU codified its willingness to enhance its capabilities in the field of the external action and become more coherent and effective international player capable of the rapid response to the emerging problems.\(^{16}\) The steps undertaken in relation to the recent crises in Libya present the positive evolution in this

\(^{10}\) Evans, 2007.
\(^{11}\) Idem.
\(^{12}\) Malici, 2008, pp. 5-6.
\(^{13}\) Idem., p. 13.
\(^{14}\) Fraser, 2009, pp. 172-174.
\(^{15}\) Idem.
direction. However, is there a fair prospect that the EU will generally overcome the above-mentioned problems and in relation to the RtoP move beyond the mere rhetoric and start regularly using the concept in its external policies?

Considering the EU law, the existing tools and mechanisms at the EU’s disposal and the nature of the EU as an IGO, the guidelines are drawn explaining how the EU’s action should be led under the RtoP concept. By the assessment of the EU’s conduct in the Libyan crises in the light of the proposed guidelines, the thesis critically discusses the EU’s ability to carry out the RtoP showing that prospect of the explicit inclusion into the EU’s external action exists especially taking into account the EU law. Having in mind that scholars rather focus on the RtoP at the international level, the topic remains quite new within the European studies. Taking further into account the role the EU can play in the RtoP’s operationalisation, the thesis should contribute to this crucial, and hopefully emerging, debate.

2 Methodology\textsuperscript{17} and the structure of the thesis

As outlined in the introduction, the thesis focuses on the possible inclusion of the RtoP into the EU’s external action. The RtoP is the legal, political as well as a HR concept. As David P. Forsythe argues, the HR is an interdisciplinary subject, therefore its study can entail number of approaches.\textsuperscript{18} Having this in mind, the approach emphasises wide range of aspects relevant to the topic studied, with the aim to accommodate the important perspectives from the other disciplines.

The legal analysis creates concededly the major part of the thesis and permeates the entire work. Some parts, however, transcend the mere research on what the binding law says and focus rather on the normative viewpoint a question: ‘What ought to be? What would the good practice look like?’\textsuperscript{19} Taking into account its present normative setting would

\textsuperscript{17} The methodology has been inspired by Kamminga, Coomans, Grunfeld, 2009, pp. 45-108.
\textsuperscript{18} Forsythe, 2009, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{19} Brems, 2009, 78.
the EU be able to embrace the RtoP in its external action? Does it fit into its current normative setting as such?

Next to the legal studies, the issue of the system performance must be addressed. Understanding the characteristics of the EU as an IGO and the procedures of its decision-making is crucial to examine how the legal framework is being implemented to the EU’s policies.

Lastly, the possible translation of the laws and policies into the actual practice is assessed. Building on the existing laws, norms and tools, is the EU able to carry out the RtoP in practice? Studying the mere law can bring the misleading results. The social and political reality influences the use of law. Considering such realities helps to discover possible problems in the implementation of the proposed laws and policies and allow me to realistically assess the prospect of the RtoP’s explicit implementation into the EU’s external action.

Having said that, the third chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the RtoP concept focusing on the analysis of the existing international law and seeking whether it encompasses the responsibilities proposed by the RtoP concept. The evolution of the concept and its acceptance by the international community creates the necessary basis for the working RtoP definition drawn in the end of the chapter and used throughout the thesis.

The fourth and fifth chapters then focus on the basis for the RtoP within the EU itself. Firstly, the EU’s primary and secondary legislation as well as the soft law instruments are examined. The purpose is to find the legal basis for the RtoP to assess whether the EU law as it exists can actually carry out the RtoP concept. How would be the RtoP defined in accordance with the EU law?

\[20\text{ Idem.}\]
Secondly, the thesis focuses particularly on the RtoP seeking when the EU has actually invoked the concept. The examination of the legal and political implications of the documents is a necessary part since the research goes further beyond the analysis of the legislative texts. The purpose is to confirm the EU’s own perception of the RtoP.

Without the existence of the RtoP basis in the EU law similar to those endorsed at the international level, the EU would never be able to invoke the concept in its external action, which becomes the same for the explicit acknowledgement of the RtoP existence by the EU. Therefore, the mentioned analysis becomes crucial to the thesis question.

The subsequent chapter examines briefly what kind of institution the EU is and what are its decision-making procedures, which becomes important while assessing the operativeness of the instruments to uphold the RtoP assessed later in the thesis. What kind of implications raise for an effective exercise of the RtoP?

The seventh chapter examines what kind of tools and mechanisms are at the EU’s disposal to carry out the RtoP. Since the instruments are built on the EU’s legal provisions, the underlining factor of the chapter is still the legal analysis. The structure of the organisation drawn in the previous chapter would be considered to assess what parts of the RtoP may create the difficulties for the EU to carry out.

The subsequent chapter creates the guidelines on how the best practice would look like taking into account all the aspects examined in the thesis. It therefore provides a reflection of the existing laws, mechanisms, procedures and tools and proposes the way to consolidate all these aspects into one universal step-by-step approach that should be used in the case the RtoP situation emerges.

The rationale behind such analyses remains simple. In case the EU possesses enough mechanisms to carry out the RtoP concept as a whole (in case the possibility exist to create the realistic guidelines), it indicates the possibility the EU would be able to use the
RtoP in its external action. Therefore, the considerations become crucial for the research question.

To support the hypothesis that the EU is actually capable of carrying out the RtoP the case study on Libya is included in the last chapter. The application of the guidelines to the actual practice helps to assess whether the proposed step-by-step approach can be implemented and whether the hypothesis that the EU is equipped to carry out the RtoP are valid.

Taking into account the analysed EU law, rhetoric, existing mechanisms and current practice, the conclusion answers the question to what extent will the EU be able to carry out the RtoP in the future and pinpoints the possible problems.\textsuperscript{21}

3 Responsibility to Protect: evolution, legal basis and definition

Since it remains crucial to present the concept in question before moving towards the analysis at the EU level, the chapter addresses the definition and the legal basis of an international RtoP. Starting with the concept as proposed by the ICISS,\textsuperscript{22} the other crucial documents and their legal value are mentioned in order to discuss the RtoP’s endorsement at the international level and present the definition accepted internationally.

Analysis of the RtoP’s legal basis emanates primarily from the concept of the state sovereignty and the related obligations, the UN Charter, the international HR law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law and the customary international law that create strong grounds for the general idea as well as the specific responsibilities envisaged RtoP. The individual obligations are discussed in the second part of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{21} The thesis assesses merely whether the RtoP can be explicitly invoked in the EU’s external actions in the future. The effect of the EU policies on the actual operationalisation of the RtoP at the international level goes beyond the scope of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{22} ICISS, 2001(1).
3.1 The birth, the evolution and the endorsement

The creation of the RtoP reflected, among others, upon the horrors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the atrocities committed one year later in Bosnia. The particular attention has been paid to the failure of the international community to prevent a bloodshed stemming from the implications of the Article 2(7) UN Charter and related lack of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention. Responsive to the then UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) calls for a need to use existing legal basis and re-think the idea of the humanitarian intervention and the concept of the state sovereignty, the independent ICISS presented its proposal in December 2001. It created core principles for the RtoP rooted in the obligations inherent in the principle of the state sovereignty, the responsibility of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in maintaining international peace and security, the obligations under international law and the developing states’ practices concluding that every sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If the state is unable or unwilling and the population suffers the serious harm thereof, the responsibility to protect should be borne by the international community. Peaceful means must be employed first, but the military intervention remains an option as a last resort and under certain rules. One of the rules is the right authorisation, which lies primarily within the UNSC. The ICISS nevertheless proposes the possibility in case the UNSC is paralysed by the veto of one of its permanent members The RtoP embraces the responsibility to prevent, react and re-build, while the prevention is emphasised.

24 Art. 2(7) states that nothing in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state and together with the principle of sovereignty (Art 2(1) and non-use of force (Art 2(4)) serves as a legal argument against the humanitarian intervention. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html (consulted on 11 July 2011), Art. 98.
28 Idem., Art 1.
29 Idem., pp. XI-XII.
30 Idem., pp. XI-XII.
Despite the fact that the ICISS has been solely an advisory body founded to support the UN and to reconcile the international community over these issues\(^{32}\) and its report therefore has no real legal value, it contributed significantly to an ongoing debate on how the international community should respond to the massive violations of the HR and humanitarian law. The UN High Level Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change (HLPT) appointed by the UNSG has further taken up the concept in 2004 document ‘More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ encouraging prevention and focusing on development as a primary strategy. Emphasis was placed on the primary responsibility of the national state, but the further obligation of the international community in case the national state fails to act also found its place in the report.\(^{33}\)

One year later the UNSG himself endorsed the RtoP concept in the report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All’\(^{34}\) in 2005. Despite the fact the UNSG lacks the legislative function, the legal value of the report can be derived from the power attributed to the UNSG under the Article 98 of the UN Charter, namely to perform functions in the area of the maintenance of the international peace and security.\(^{35}\) Together with the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that endorsed the RtoP by the UN MS in paragraphs 138 and 139\(^{36}\), the subsequent modest resolution on RtoP adopted by the UNGA in 2009\(^{37}\) and the UNSG recent report focusing on the RtoP implementation,\(^{38}\) it presents the ‘soft law’ instruments whose value cannot be underestimated. UNSC has also recalled the RtoP in its resolution on protection of civilians in the armed conflict\(^{39}\) as well as in its other resolutions often acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter attributing the resolutions the enforceability by law.\(^{40}\)

\(^{32}\) The Responsibility to Protect: About the Commission (Mandate and organisation), available at \url{http://www.iciss.ca/mandate-en.asp} (consulted on 22 May 2011).
\(^{34}\) Annan, 2005.
\(^{35}\) UN Charter, Art. 98 Supra note 24, Conforti, 2005, pp. 227-229 for the interpretation.
\(^{36}\) A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 138 – 139.
\(^{38}\) A/63/677, 12 January 2009.
Despite of its wide citation at the international level and some legal value of the resolutions invoking it, the RtoP cannot be considered a legal norm ‘yet’. Carsen Stahn even argues that the RtoP might have rather been meant as a ‘soft law’ norm or the political principle rather than hard legal norm. Irrespective of these considerations, the operationalisation of RtoP would play a role in preventing gross HR violations threatening the international peace and security that seems to be understood at least a moral duty. The repeated citations of the RtoP in numerous UN documents show the concern of the international community and the willingness to uphold it. The question remains in which form and to what extent. The answer shall now be sought in the existing body of the international law.

3.2 The legal basis

The international law shows that some of the RtoP components are already deeply rooted in the existing legal norms. Understanding the legal basis of the concept will help to establish the RtoP definition accepted by the international community and identify elements that still remain controversial and need to be reconciled. Such considerations will become crucial while assessing the EU’s perception of the RtoP. Since the RtoP is an international norm, the EU’s analysis must move along the RtoP at the international level.

Bearing in mind the definition proposed by the ICISS the RtoP’s legal core is firstly sought in the obligations inherent in the UN Charter and the concept of the state sovereignty and the international security, and secondly in IHRL, IHL, international criminal law and customary international law. The legal analysis is complemented by the references to changing international law and the state practice.

41 Stahn, 2007, p. 118.
43 See for example the later UNSC resolution on protection of civilians in the armed conflict (S/RES/1894(2009), 11 November 2009) or various Human Rights Council resolutions on situations requiring the special attention of the council (for more information consult http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/), etc.
3.2.1 The UN Charter, emergence of the human rights discourse and the changing concept of the state sovereignty and the international security

The emergence of the HR norms played a crucial role in the shift in the Westphalia understanding of the state sovereignty\textsuperscript{44} hand in hand with the uncontested legal sovereignty allowing the states to enter international legal regimes and let the supranational authorities to control their affairs.\textsuperscript{45} The adoption of the UN Charter provided for many possibilities to recognise HR internationally.\textsuperscript{46}

The purposes of the UN listed in the Article 1 of its Charter are among others to maintain international peace and security and promote respect for the HR and fundamental freedoms.\textsuperscript{47} The foundation of the UN created as Oppenheim argued ‘[…] at least moral, and however imperfect, a legal – duty to use their best efforts […] to act in support of a crucial purpose of the Charter.’\textsuperscript{48} The Charter expresses in its Preamble the determination ‘to reaffirm faith in the fundamental HR.’\textsuperscript{49} Further, these rights are to be of the UN objective in the economic and social cooperation as understood as a prerequisite for the stability and well-being - the basis for the friendly relations among the nations.\textsuperscript{50} In the Articles 55 and 56 the UN MS pledge themselves to achieve purpose of the UN and promote universal respect for HR.\textsuperscript{51}

The sovereignty in this sense encompasses not only rights but also duties and obligations. The Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter cannot be read in isolation, but rather understood in the framework of the entire document. The relevance of the Articles 1(3) and 55 UN Charter cannot be doubted.\textsuperscript{52} One of the aspects of the RtoP reflects such an interpretation of the UN Charter and stresses the importance of understanding

\textsuperscript{46} Oppenheim, 1992, p. 989.
\textsuperscript{47} Supra note 24.
\textsuperscript{48} Oppenheim, 1992, p. 989.\textsuperscript{49} Supra note 35.
\textsuperscript{50} UN Charter, Art. 55 Supra note 24. See Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 988-993 for further analysis.
\textsuperscript{51} Idem., UN Charter, Art. 55-56 Supra note 24.
\textsuperscript{52} Stahn, 2007, pp. 110-112.
sovereignty not as a control, but as a responsibility to protect the rights of the citizens of the state concerned.\textsuperscript{53}

However, the Charter alone cannot fully guarantee the protection especially due to the vague definition of HR related obligations.\textsuperscript{54} Subsequent proliferation of the various HR instruments such as the International Bill of Rights,\textsuperscript{55} the UN Convention against Torture,\textsuperscript{56} the UN Genocide Convention\textsuperscript{57} as well as the establishment of the international criminal tribunals\textsuperscript{58} further shaped the HR discourse. Some of the included provisions became a customary international law and some imposed the binding and enforceable obligations upon the parties to them.\textsuperscript{59}

Besides the sovereignty the concept of security has also been evolving reflecting upon the provisions of the Charter. Firstly, by the adoption of the UN Charter, the international community has acknowledged that HR are crucial to maintain international peace. Secondly, security does not mean purely the absence of the war anymore, but reflecting upon the provisions in the Charter includes inter alia the social development and the social justice as part of the conflict prevention and stability maintenance strategies.\textsuperscript{60} Broadening of the conception of international peace and security has played an important role in possible overcoming of the non-intervention principle.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{53}ICISS, 2001(2), pp. 5-13.
\textsuperscript{54}Particularists support the non-intervention principle enshrined in the Article 2 UN Charter claiming that human rights remain within the domestic jurisdiction of every state.
\textsuperscript{55}International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
\textsuperscript{56}A/Res/39/46, 10 December 1984.
\textsuperscript{57}A/Res/260(III)A, 9 December 1948.
\textsuperscript{59}Many of the provisions of the UDHR became a customary international law, moral obligation and standard for the action. Instruments like a Genocide Convention became legally binding. (See Oppenheim, 1992, p. 1002).
\textsuperscript{60}Oppenheim, 1992, p. 988, Annan, 2008.
\textsuperscript{61}ICISS, 2001(1), p. 9.
Furthermore, the scope of the threats to the international peace and security has broadened absorbing new security issues such as proliferation of armed conflicts of internal nature and related weakening of state structures and institutions and increasing vulnerability of civilians. The humanitarian catastrophe in any country regardless how distant it is may affect the world peace and security.\textsuperscript{62}

The shift in the understanding of the state sovereignty and established link between the HR violations and the instability presents the starting point for the RtoP reasoning. However, its core lies within the crimes it encompasses and obligations it promotes. We shall now turn to these particular RtoP aspects.

\textbf{3.2.2 The four RtoP crimes in international human rights, humanitarian, criminal and customary law and the primary obligation to prevent adjudicated to the home state}

The acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity are considered as flagrant breaches of international law codified in the existing international instruments. The analysis of these instruments is necessary in order to discuss whether the RtoP obligation exists.

The core of the RtoP lies in the 1948 \textit{‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’} (Genocide Convention).\textsuperscript{64} Genocide is defined by the Convention as an act with the intention to \textit{‘[…] destroy in whole or a part of the national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’}\textsuperscript{64} The Article 1 of the Convention confirms the genocide a crime under the international law\textsuperscript{65} including next to the act of genocide itself also the conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit the genocide as well as the complicity in it and explicitly obliges the parties to the Convention to prevent and punish such a crime.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{62} ICISS, 2001(1), pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{63} A/Res/260(III)A, 9 December 1948. For the explanations see Ben-Naftali, 2007, pp. 27-57.
\textsuperscript{64} Idem., Art. 2.
\textsuperscript{65} Idem., Art. 1.
\textsuperscript{66} Idem., Art. 3.
The punishment should work as a deterrent and play a role in discouraging the future crimes. The responsibilities to prevent and punish are often understood as connected.\textsuperscript{67}

To examine the obligation to prevent attributed to the parties to the Convention it becomes necessary to assess the Genocide Convention as an instrument of the international criminal law first. Next to the Article 1, the Article 9 provides for the disputes relative to the responsibility of states for genocide, to be referred to the ICJ,\textsuperscript{68} which in the case of \textit{Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia} ruled in favour of the state’s obligation to prevent under the Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, with the emergence of the IHRL, many other HR instruments started to oblige the state to ensure protection to its citizens.\textsuperscript{70} IHRL places the state not only under the negative obligation to refrain from violating HR, but also under the positive obligation – duty to prevent the violations.\textsuperscript{71} The obligation to prevent has been further confirmed as a legal duty by the ICJ in the 1951 Opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention confirming the crime of genocide a crime under the customary international law.\textsuperscript{72} Therefore, every state even without being the party to the Convention carries such an obligation.

The RtoP concept further encompasses war crimes and crimes against humanity – both confirmed by the International Law Commission (ILC) as crimes under the international law.\textsuperscript{73} The war crimes, the oldest of the four RtoP crimes, derives already from the 1907 Hague Convention.\textsuperscript{74} The status of punishable international crime has been further confirmed in many international instruments defining it as a grave violations of the

\textsuperscript{67} Idem.

\textsuperscript{68} Idem., Art. 9.


\textsuperscript{70} Idem., para 429, A/RES/39/46, 10 December 1984, Art 2, A/RES/49/59, 9 December 1994, Art. 11. ICCPR states that all parties to the Covenant must respect and ensure to all individuals the rights recognized by the Covenant (GA RES 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, Art. 2(1)). For commentary see Seibert-Fohr, 2009, pp. 356-361.


\textsuperscript{72} Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) 28 May 1951 \url{http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf} accessed 2 June 2011 [23] stated that ‘[…] the principles underlying the Convention are recognized by civilized nations as binding even without any conventional obligations.

\textsuperscript{73} A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1, 6 June 1957.

\textsuperscript{74} Hague Convention, 18 October 1907, Schabas, 2010, p. 195.
Geneva Conventions\textsuperscript{75} and the laws or the customs of war,\textsuperscript{76} however, no consensus existed whether the crimes committed in the non-international armed conflict should also be included,\textsuperscript{77} which would be the key question for the RtoP. Current conflicts are rather of non-international character. The 1998 Rome conference confirmed the willingness of the international community to ensure the international criminal liability also for the acts committed during the non-international armed conflict,\textsuperscript{78} which resulted in four categories of war crimes recognised in the Rome Statute – two of them dealing with international and the other two with non-international armed conflict.\textsuperscript{79}

The ICC has the jurisdiction over all three abovementioned crimes. Such principle of the universal jurisdiction is related to the norms recognised as erga omnes and the jus cogens bringing certain obligations binding upon the states.\textsuperscript{80} Most norms of the IHL, especially those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide obtained such status and therefore are non-derogable.\textsuperscript{81} States, even though they are not party to the ICC, Geneva Conventions or other international treaties, must refrain from and prevent such acts and also punish the individuals responsible for these crimes.\textsuperscript{82}

The last RtoP aspect, the ethnic cleansing, notwithstanding no agreed legal definition exists and the crime is not explicitly included in the ICC jurisdiction, can also to some extent be considered as a crime under the international law. The term has emerged in relations with Bosnian war and is included in the Statute of the International Criminal

\textsuperscript{75} A/CONF.183/C1/SR.5, 15 June – 17 July, para 75.
\textsuperscript{76} Idem., para 33.
\textsuperscript{79} First and third category deals with grave breaches of Geneva Conventions, former during the international armed conflict, and later during the non-international one. The second and forth category encompass ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs’ applicable similarly in international and non-international armed conflict (A/CONF/183/9, 17 July 1998, Art. 2).
\textsuperscript{81} Talman further argues that the analyses of the travaux preparatoire and the provisions show that the Geneva Convention provide for the universal jurisdiction (Talman, 2009, p. 252).
\textsuperscript{82} See A/CN.4/SER.A/1950, 9 April 1957, p. 55, para 89 confirming that Crimes against humanity constitute crimes under the international law; IMT Charter, Art. 6(c) \textit{Supra note} 58 and A/RES/3074 (XXVIII), 3 December 1973 for the obligation under international law to punish such crimes.
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in relations to the grave and widespread breaches of the humanitarian law. In fact, ethnic cleansing can be defined as more or less isolated violations of international HR law and international humanitarian law ranging from administrative and political measures to the most egregious violations such as terrorising civilian population with the intent to force their flight. In the worst case such practices can amount to the other three above-mentioned crimes.

Scholars argue that ethnic cleansing is included in the crimes against humanity, therefore, encompassed in the Article 7 ICC and the Article 5 ICTY Statutes. The ICTY ruled in the Krstic case that there are obvious similarities between the genocide and the policies of ethnic cleansing. UNGA later condemned these practices and called for the necessity to punish the crime of ethnic cleansing. Such a wide acceptance of the inclusion of the ethnic cleansing within the crimes against humanity or genocide gives it recognition as a crime under the international law. Possibly, in relation to the RtoP, the wide definition of an ethnic cleansing provides for additional space of what can be considered an RtoP case.

The assumption that could be made from the analysis of the core RtoP crimes is threefold. Firstly, the RtoP is based on the violations of the HR widely recognised as crimes under international law and even more importantly under the customary international law. Therefore, the obligation to prevent directly stems from these crimes. Secondly, as it has been shown, the state obligation to prevent in relation to these crimes has been widely recognised in the international law. Thirdly, every state then carries

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84 Petrovic, 1994, p. 353.
89 Prosecutor v Krstic (Judgment) ICTY-98-33-T (2 August 2001), paras 560 and 562.
91 Together with the establishment of the international criminal tribunals, the international jurisprudence developed and for example rape is now legally recognized as a part of ethnic cleansing in relation to the Bosnian conflict and even as a part of the genocide (See ICISS, 2001(1), p. 22).
inherent legal duty to protect HR of individuals under its jurisdiction. Such conclusions underline the proposed first pillar of the RtoP concept referring to the undisputed primary obligation of the home state to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

The crucial consideration for an RtoP remains whether the obligation to protect exist for the Third parties. Without such an obligation, none international or regional organisation, importantly for the topic analysed - the EU, would have the Responsibility towards the citizens of other states. Such issues shall then be assessed now.

3.2.3 The third parties and the obligation to prevent

Since the Genocide Convention played significant role in imposing the RtoP like obligations, the analysis turns again to it. The Article 8 Genocide Convention provides for the right to call for an attention of the competent UN organs to take appropriate action in order to prevent or suppress genocide.92 Basing the reasoning on Judge Lauterpacht’s 1993 Separate Opinion,93 Ben-Naftali argues that while the Article 8 is read in conjunction with the Article 1 Genocide Convention the obligation of the third parties to prevent and punish genocide exists under the international law.94 ‘The duty to prevent genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every other.’95

Lauterpaht’s opinion opened the door for considerations of the states’ responsibility to employ all necessary means to prevent genocide.96 Similarly such an obligation falls to the international community. Moreover, we shall remember that the obligation to prevent is a jus cogens norm, therefore the obligation erga omnes, which has the implication regarding the obligation of the third parties.

93 Separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht (Provisional Measures Order) [1993].
94 Ben-Naftali, 2009, pp. 36-41.
95 Supra note 93, para. 86.
Building on existing base in the international law for the duty of third parties to prevent genocide, the issue of the acceptance of such an obligation remains crucial. Firstly, justification of the NATO’s intervention to Kosovo by UNSG and part of the international community was based in the obligation to prevent genocide.\textsuperscript{97} The reluctance of the international community using the term ‘genocide’ in relation to the events in Rwanda shows the acknowledgement of the responsibilities to prevent this particular crime.\textsuperscript{98} Furthermore, the mechanisms established under the UN auspices such as the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions,\textsuperscript{99} The Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide,\textsuperscript{100} the UN Special Advisers on Genocide\textsuperscript{101} and the RtoP\textsuperscript{102} including the Early Warning Mechanisms (EWM) aiming to prevent genocide as well as the acknowledgement that the international community should help the state concerned to protect its population from genocide\textsuperscript{103} demonstrates the acceptance of such a responsibility. However, does it apply to other RtoP crimes?

Turning the attention towards the obligations erga omnes in relation to the crimes under the international law, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VLCT) states that while constructing the Treaty obligation, the other existing relevant international obligation must be taken into account. Bearing such consideration in mind, Ben-Naftali suggests that the jurisdiction over genocide should therefore be similar to that over other international crimes.\textsuperscript{104} Such assumption seems sufficient to conclude that the obligation of the international community to prevent is inherent in the existing international law.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{97} Idem., p. 43.
\footnote{98} Williams, Bellamy, 2005, pp. 27-29, Ben-Naftali, 2009, p. 43.
\footnote{100} SG/A/1000, 3 May 2006.
\footnote{102} Idem.
\footnote{103} A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 138 – 139. The UN activity in the area of peacekeeping also encompasses the preventive component. See for example the mandate of the UN mission in Congo (MONUC) pursuant the UNSC Resolution 1291 (2000) explicitly including the prevention and punishment of the genocide. S/RES/1291/2000, 24 February 2000.
\footnote{104} Ben-Naftali, 2009, p. 52.
\end{footnotes}
3.2.4 Responsibility to react

The responsibility to prevent has been accepted by the international community with the relative ease. The opposite is, however, truth as regards the responsibility to react that still seems to struggle due to the controversies surrounding the humanitarian intervention.\(^{105}\)

The difference between RtoP and the humanitarian intervention shall be addressed first. The ICISS presented the responsibility to react as a necessary response ‘to situations of compelling human needs with appropriate measures which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. ‘\(^{106}\) The humanitarian intervention is contrary to this concept being defined as a forcible (military) intervention to another state without its consent to address humanitarian catastrophe usually caused by the grave breaches of HR.\(^{107}\) Fernando Tesón talks about three types of intervention aiming at influence the policies of the state concerned: (1) Discussions about the HR situation, recommendations and use of diplomatic means; (2) Adoption of the coercive measures such as economic sanctions or arms embargoes; and (3) forcible intervention – the humanitarian intervention.\(^{108}\) The RtoP comprises all these three aspects, which shall be employed in the consecutive order. Less coercive measures shall always be considered first.\(^{109}\) The analysis regarding the EU must be later in the thesis lead exactly in these lines.

Moreover, the humanitarian intervention could have been carried unilaterally, which proved unacceptable for many states.\(^{110}\) The RtoP seeks to reconcile the issue of the state sovereignty and intervention dividing the responsibility between the home state and the international community stating that the primary responsibility remains within the home state and the forcible intervention is possible only as a last resort when the home state is

\(^{109}\) ICISS, 2001(1), XI.
manifestly unwilling or unable to protect its population.\textsuperscript{111} Taking into account these considerations, legal basis for the responsibility to react shall be sought from different perspective than those for humanitarian intervention, namely through the obligation inherent in the Charter and the existing legal instruments.

As demonstrated on the UN Charter provisions and related IHRL, the state has the obligation to act in certain ways to protect HR,\textsuperscript{112} while breaching these obligations now constitute the legitimate concern of the international community. Notwithstanding the Article 2(7), the legal basis exists to act in case of the grave breaches of the HR, which presents the crucial element for the RtoP reasoning.

Having discussed the Article 8 of the Genocide Convention\textsuperscript{113} as a legal basis for the international community’s obligation to prevent, the similar conclusion can actually be drawn as regards the Responsibility to react since the Article 8 provides not only for the prevention but similarly also for the suppression of the crime of genocide. However, the main basis for the responsibility to react stems from the UN Charter and the obligation of the UNSC, the most important UN body in this respect, to maintain international peace and security.

The UN Charter explicitly authorises the UNSC to deal with issues relative to the international peace and security in Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI orders the UNSC to seek solution primarily by peaceful means in case that it identifies the issue that could endanger international peace and security. Under the Article 11 of the UN Charter, General Assembly “may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{112} The rules concerning the basic rights of the person such as ‘Right to life’ constitute the obligations erga omnes as well as are reflected in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Preambular paragraph of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (A/RES/2200A/XXI, 16 December 1996) and the UN Charter obligation to promote universal respect for human rights. Non-compliance with such obligations shall be viewed as an unfriendly act in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VLCT, 23 May 1969, Art. 26). Art. 2(1) ICCPR mentions the positive obligation to refrain from the human rights violations and negative obligations to prevent, punish, investigate and redress harm under the jurisdiction of the state concerned. Failure to do so constitutes a legitimate interest of the international community. See CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add 13, 26 May 2004, Ben-Naftali, 2009, p. 43.
\bibitem{113} See the section 3.2.3.
\end{thebibliography}
likely to endanger international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{114} The UNSC itself can in accordance with the Article 39 ‘[…] determine the existence of any threat to peace […] make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken […]’.\textsuperscript{115} The peaceful means must be exhausted first.\textsuperscript{116} The UNSC shall act under the Chapter VII of the Charter and use forcible means that can even amount into military intervention.\textsuperscript{117} Since the UN, more specifically, the UNSC is in accordance with the Charter responsible for maintaining international peace and security, it is therefore further obliged by the Charter to protect HR in the world and act in the case of grave breaches. Mentioned provisions than create legal basis for the responsibility to react under the RtoP.

The question of the right authority to approve the intervention remains very valid. In the first place, the UNSC shall be the first to authorise the intervention. That seems clear and generally accepted by the international community.\textsuperscript{118} However, what if the UNSC fails to act or stays paralyzed by the veto of one of its permanent members? In answer to that question, the international community remains divided, which will later be visible also at the EU’s approach.

Following the interpretation of Carsten Stahn, the rights authority differs in the ICISS report, 2005 Summit outcome document, Report of the HLPT and UN Secretary General’s report.\textsuperscript{119} The ICISS proposes the possibility to overcome the UNSC by bringing the agenda to the UNGA under ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution\textsuperscript{120} or leaving the regional organisations or coalitions of states to act. Unilateral action is undesirable.\textsuperscript{121} Contrary to that, the World Summit outcome document leaves the possibility of unilateral intervention opened, but the problem must be dealt on case-by-case basis. Furthermore, no explicit responsibility is explicitly stated in the document. States more endorsed the

\textsuperscript{114} Supra note 35, Art. 11(3).
\textsuperscript{115} Idem., Art. 39.
\textsuperscript{116} Idem., Art. 41.
\textsuperscript{117} Idem., Arts. 41 and 42.
\textsuperscript{118} Supra note 33, para 81, ICISS, 2001(2), pp. 29-37, Annan, 2005, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139.
\textsuperscript{119} Stahn, 2007, pp. 99-120.
\textsuperscript{120} A/RES/377(v), 3 November 1950.
\textsuperscript{121} ICISS, 2001(2), pp. 47 – 55.
preparedness to conduct possible action, rather than accepted an obligation.\textsuperscript{122} The HLPT and the UN Secretary General have expressed the most cautious approach. Both reports allow the humanitarian intervention only with the authorisation of the UNSC acting under the Chapter VII of the Charter without providing for any other possible option.\textsuperscript{123}

To sum up, legal basis for the RtoP remains undisputed, however, how to carry out the Responsibility to react needs further considerations at the international level.

3.2.5 Responsibility to rebuild

As it has been shown the RtoP goes beyond the responsibility to prevent and react aiming at helping the states after the conflict providing full assistance that would lead to recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation during their transition to durable peace, good governance and sustainable development.\textsuperscript{124}

As it will be explained in more detail later in the thesis, the Responsibility to rebuild primary stems from the Responsibility to prevent. Given the cyclical nature of the conflict it remains often that the society falls back into the conflict if the peace is not effectively consolidated and the issues that caused the conflict tackled.\textsuperscript{125}

The international community in the World Summit Outcome Document endorsing the RtoP has also acknowledged that.\textsuperscript{126} The UN MS claimed the commitment to build capacity of the war-torn societies in order to protect the population from the RtoP

\textsuperscript{123} Idem, pp. 102-110.
\textsuperscript{125} See Swansström, Weissman, 2005. The conflict cycle will be explained in the detail in Chapter 8. The example could be the conflict in Sierra Leone that re-escalated after the signature of the Abijan Peace Agreement signed in November 1996 as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the root causes of the problem (ethnic division) were not effectively tackled and despite of the robust rebuilding efforts of the international community, the country is now again about to fall into the conflict phase (UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone: background (Public), 2005, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html (consulted on 3 May 2011), International Crises Group, Bosnia: The State Institutions under Attack, Europe Briefing No. 62, 6 May 2011, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b062-bosnia-state-institutions-under-attack.aspx (consulted on 20 March 2011).
\textsuperscript{126} A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139.
crimes. Therefore, the primary legal basis has to be sought in the confirmed Responsibility to prevent and rebuild. The responsibility to of the international community to rebuild war torn societies has been codified in many UN resolutions and the rampant state practice.

Based on this presumption, it is worth noting that the Responsibility to rebuild is directly linked to the Article 55 of the UN Charter seeking the international co-operation in economic and social affairs. Promotion, protection and respect for HR without discrimination including minority rights and attempts to integrate all groups into decision-making process must create a part of peace consolidation, but also conflict prevention strategies which generally supports my hypothesis. Such consideration must be addressed since it will play an important role while assessing the EU’s perception of the RtoP and its possible action. As it will be shown, the EU places huge emphasis on the structural prevention that stems from the link between the development, HR, security and the emergence of the RtoP situation. However, before turning to the EU it remains necessary to conclude the chapter with the international RtoP definition.

3.3 RtoP definition: The current RtoP concept by the international community

It is worth repeating that the ICISS does not present the UN body, therefore its report provides rather guidelines for an interpretation. Notably, the RtoP concept can be found

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127 Idem.
128 The UNGA Resolutions confirmed the right of victims of conflict to receive international assistance as a part of post conflict building in the resolutions A/RES/43/131, 8 December 1988 and A/RES/45/100, 14 December 1990. The outcome document also confirmed this right of victims/responsibility of the international community (A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005).
129 The international community is active in building post-conflict societies through complex peace operations including peace-building component, capacity-building, justice and reconciliation as well as transfer of the institutional ownership to the people. See for example S/RES/1289(2000), 7 February 2000 mandating the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, S/RES/1925/2010, 30 June 2010 UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).
130 The lack of development, economic instability and poverty often fuel the internal conflicts. Political repression, drive for power and corruption must also be taken into account. Supra note 35.
131 Idem., Art. 55(c).
132 Annan, 2005.
in the international law, however, must be interpreted within the current conditions. As it has been shown, the international community is now moving farer from the rigorous concept of the state sovereignty towards the international protection of HR.

Since the RtoP is not a legal norm yet, the most powerful document to uphold it remains the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit adopted unanimously by all the UN MS and the subsequent consensual adoption of the UNGA resolution on the RtoP. Therefore, the each state’s obligation to protect inherent in the principle of the state sovereignty (RtoP’s ‘pillar one’) remains undisputed. Such a consensus has further been confirmed in many legally binding UNSC resolutions issued under the Chapter VII UN Charter. The acknowledgement that international community should further assist the states to carry this responsibility, especially through the preventive mechanisms can be considered as a support for the third party obligations to prevent (RtoP’s ‘pillar two’).

Second paragraph of the outcome document allows for the intervention without the consent of the state concerned (RtoP’s ‘pillar three’), but rather than a duty states the preparedness to act through the UNSC on the case-by-case basis. Which shows that the agreement of the international community on the obligation to act remains yet very fragile. Taking into account the previous considerations, the obligation to act remains rather linked to the maintenance of the international peace and security. The link with HR violations under the responsibility to act is therefore rather implicit.

133 A/Res/63/308, 7 October 2009.
134 A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 138.
135 As a recent case we can cite the S/RES/1970/2011, 26 February 2011, PP 4 on the situation in Libya explicitly stating that the primary responsibility to protect must be carried out by the state concerned.
136 A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.
137 Idem., para 139.
138 The discussion in the UNGA while adopting the RtoP resolution confirmed that many states still have the problem with the RtoP concept being afraid of its possible misuse by the powerful nations (Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan, Nicaragua, Iran). Some states explicitly stated that there is no RtoP consensus yet. See GCR2P Summary of Statements on Adoption of Resolution RES A/63/L.80 Rev 1, September 2009, available at http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/GCR2P_Summary_of_Statements_on_Adoption_of_Resolution_on_R2P.pdf (consulted on 7 June 2011).
Considering the responsibility to rebuild, according to Carsten Stahn the World Summit Outcome is a result of the compromise on one hand and an attempt to give the idea a legal meaning on the other.\textsuperscript{139} The statement does not imply any obligation after the military intervention and seems that it does more refer to the prevention rather than post-conflict reconstruction.\textsuperscript{140} The Responsibility to rebuild is contained in the positive obligation and extraterritorial application of the obligations included in the international HR law as well as the responsibility to prevent itself.\textsuperscript{141}

Even thought the legal basis for the RtoP exists, there is not yet a place for an overall consensus in our political reality. The international community still remains caught between the universal and particular understanding of HR, the power politics and the fear of the misuse of the concept by the stronger states to intervene into the small ones persists. Taking into account the evolution of the human rights discourse during the past 60, and more profoundly, past 20 years and the evolution in the international law, the place for the RtoP consensus exists. The need for further consideration by the international community was still and all reverberated in the World Summit Outcome Document.\textsuperscript{142} We shall now examine whether the EU, one of the strongest RtoP supporters, can already carry out the RtoP idea.

4 Compatibility of the Responsibility to Protect with the law of the European Union

As it has been said, the EU can be an important player in the actual realisation of the RtoP doctrine that in the time being lies somewhere between simple rhetoric and a baseline for an action. Before assessing the EU’s abilities to use the concept for its own action, it is necessary to find out, whether a basis for RtoP could actually be found in EU law.

\textsuperscript{139} Stahn, 2007, pp. 109-110.
\textsuperscript{140} Idem.
\textsuperscript{141} Idem.
\textsuperscript{142} A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139.
The sources of EU’s law comprise of primary legislation, which consists of founding treaties including the amendments, the international agreements involving the EU, the secondary legislation through which the European institutions exercise the EU’s competence (Directives, Regulations, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions), the international treaties that are binding upon all EU MS in the areas where the EU assumed the responsibility, the judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU (formerly ‘European Court of Justice’ (ECJ)), the general principles of law and the recommendations that have been adopted in the light of the existing Treaties. Other non-binding acts also create part of the European law. The following chapter seeks the legal framework for the RtoP in these sources of the EU law.

Primarily, as a definition stemming from the previous chapter states the RtoP is a concept seeking to reconcile the existing tension between the HR on one hand and the sovereignty and non-intervention on the other. To seek the meaning of HR, sovereignty and non-intervention in the EU law is essential in order to establish the legal basis for the entire RtoP concept. Subsequently, the existence of the RtoP obligations in the EU law must be analysed. In this sense, the internal dimension, e.g. which responsibility the EU has towards its MS will be assessed. If the EU would not be able to act in accordance with the RtoP in its internal policies it would hardly be able to assume such obligation at the international level. The EU clearly declares the goal to be an active global player. Would it be able to carry the RtoP if a non-EU state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population?

The second part of the chapter seeks to identify the legal basis for the EU’s external action and the values and principles the EU foreign policy stands on. Does the link

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144 E.g. joint declarations, recommendations of the Joint Committee, communications, etc. (Wyatt, Dashwood, 2006, p. 127). In accordance with Article 290 the Commission may also adopt non-legislative acts that may have general implications. TFEU (Treaty of Lisbon, as amended), Art. 290.
145 See Section 3.2.
146 EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, 12 October 2010.
between the HR and international peace and security exist in EU law? Is there any legal obligation in the RtoP sense?

The third part of the chapter then focuses on the four RtoP related crimes. Are they explicitly mentioned in the EU law? Do they imply any related obligations?

Further, the legal basis for the individual RtoP parts (prevent, react and rebuild) are discussed assessing whether they are clearly coming up or the EU law must be extended and interpreted in the way that would allow for the accommodation of the particular RtoP components. Here the law must be interpreted in even broader way and also non-legislative acts must be taken into account.147

4.1 Internal dimension: Human Rights, sovereignty and non-intervention principle in the EU law and related obligations

Despite the fact the first treaties relative to the European integration148 did not include any reference to HR, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case that HR are contained in the General principles of law and in the constitutional traditions of the EU MS, and therefore applies to the acts of the Community.149 A Joint declaration of the European Parliament (EP), Commission (COM) and the Council to respect fundamental rights150 and the subsequent link to democracy promotion on the basis of HR in the Single European Act151 further confirmed that HR have always had a place in EU law. The Treaty of Maastricht already explicitly stated

147 E.g. documents that have been anonymously adopted by the Council in the area of CFSP, communications form the Commission aiming to interpret some Treaty provisions, common positions and statements anonymously adopted and presented in the international forums.
150 Joint Declaration concerning the protection of fundamental rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1977] OJ C103/1
that ‘[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the MS, as general principles of Community law’\textsuperscript{152}. The EU shall conduct its policies in the light of this objective.

Probably the biggest breakthrough establishing a stable fundamental rights system in the EU was introduced by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. The former, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the HR and fundamental freedoms as a founding principle of the EU\textsuperscript{153} and even provided for a preventive mechanism, if there is a risk of a serious breach of these principles.\textsuperscript{154} The Article established the procedure for an action amounting to the possibility of a suspension of the voting rights of the state concerned in case that it would seriously and consistently violate the human rights. The Treaty of Nice further added so called Haider clause that allows the Council to make recommendations to the state concerned.\textsuperscript{155} The discussions and recommendations are already considered as a kind of an intervention, therefore the treaties provide for part of the responsibility to react.

The Articles 6 and 7 brought up by these treaties imply primarily that the HR are deeply rooted in EU law. Second assumption could be made on the principle of sovereignty. The Treaty provisions allowing to invoke the measures against the EU member state in case of grave breaches of the HR and fundamental freedoms reaffirm that the EU MS voluntarily agreed to give up part of their sovereignty and share it with the EU institutions.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} TEU (Maastricht Treaty), Art. F (2).
\textsuperscript{153} TEU (Treaty of Amsterdam, as amended), art. 6.
\textsuperscript{154} TEU (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 6 and 7.
\textsuperscript{155} Idem., Wyatt, Dashwood, 2006, p. 260.
\textsuperscript{156} Tillotson, Foster, 2003, p. 49.
The new provisions in the Treaty of Nice also imply that the EU finds itself responsible for upholding the HR and fundamental freedoms in its territory. The same conclusion could be made regarding the non-intervention principle. Based on Article 7 TEU, the HR definitely do not fall under the explicit jurisdiction of an individual MS.\(^{157}\) Furthermore, Art. 6 states that ‘[t]he Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies’.\(^ {158}\) In this sense the Article 6 may imply an obligation to protect HR of the EU citizens.

The Lisbon Treaty that has entered into force in December 2009\(^ {159}\) further confirms that HR lie in the heart of the EU.\(^ {160}\) The document enhances HR protection and related obligations in Europe even more, while moving the established EU values to the forefront.\(^ {161}\) Article 6 provides for two important changes. It puts formerly no binding Charter of Fundamental Rights to the same place as the EU’s primary law\(^ {162}\) making it legally binding.\(^ {163}\) The EU is therefore obliged to ensure the observance of HR of its citizens. The primary responsibility to protect own people naturally lies within the EU MS taking into account the subsidiary principle.\(^ {164}\) Extending this statement further, in accordance with Art. 3 TEU, EU’s “aim is to promote […] well being of its own people.”\(^ {165}\) Further, the Lisbon Treaty provides for the EU’s accession to the European Convention of HR (the act of the accession is currently under the preparation\(^ {166}\) to ensure that EU’s acts will not violate fundamental rights of the EU citizens and do not go against

\(^{157}\) TEU (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 7.
\(^{158}\) Idem., Art. 6(4).
\(^{159}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended)
\(^{160}\) Piris, 2010, p. 71.
\(^{161}\) Idem.
\(^{162}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 6(1).
\(^{163}\) Idem, p. 50-72.
\(^{164}\) Idem., p. 60-70. Subsidiary principle provides for the policy making at the most de-centralised level, therefore, the individual Member States play crucial role within the EU.
\(^{165}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 3.1.
\(^{166}\) 18244/10, 22 December 2010, pp. 1-2.
the protection of the fundamental rights offered by the individual EU states.167 Such a change confirms the legal meaning of the Article 2 TEU showing that the EU values are not only symbolic political words anymore. It provides for a condition to be respected by the EU as a whole, its institutions and MS and reaffirms that breaches of those values will not remain unpunished.168

The demonstrated evolution in the EU law and the constant EU’s approximation to the HR standards, their excessive articulation in the legislation and the mentioned provision adopted in the Lisbon treaty suggest that the EU and its members adhere further to the principle of protection of fundamental rights inside of the EU. The law therefore lies down the primary basis for the accepted of the primary RtoP of the EU towards its citizens. The next chapter will examine, whether the EU accepted this responsibility explicitly in its rhetoric.

4.2 External dimension: responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in non-EU countries

In contrast to the long tradition of HR protection within the EU MS and institutions, the creation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dates back only to the Treaty of Maastricht that entered into force in 1993.169 However, since the beginning it has been based in fundamental rights and values of the EU. The Article J.2 stated that one of the objectives of the CFSP shall be “to safeguard the common values […] of the European Union, […] strengthen security of the Union and its MS in all ways, […] preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter [and] develop the consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for HR and fundamental freedoms”.170

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167 TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 6(2).
169 TEU (Maastricht Treaty).
The dissolution of the Yugoslavia led later to the reform introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam reflecting the need of the EU to be more effective in its external action and to be able to react to the threat in a timely and coherent manner.\textsuperscript{171} The recognition that gross violations of HR constitute the threat to the EU’s security by incorporating Petersburg tasks into the Title V of the Treaty stating that the EU shall safeguard its security through humanitarian aid, peace-keeping missions, etc.\textsuperscript{172} The EU link between the HR and the security of the EU plays important role in the further realization of an obligation towards non-EU states under the RtoP since such a link is one of the basis for the RtoP principle at the international level. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon reaffirms the connection between the HR and security in its aim to create a more efficient EU able to better meet current challenges.\textsuperscript{173}

According to the author, the \textit{Title V: General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on CFSP} as amended by the Lisbon Treaty serves as a legal basis for the RtoP beyond the primary responsibility of the home state. The Article 21(1) states that:

\begin{quote}
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles that inspired its own creation and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of HR and fundamental freedoms respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

The Article 21.2 further mentions that the common policies, which the EU pursues externally, shall “safeguard its values”,\textsuperscript{175} “support democracy, rule of law, HR and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{171}\text{Common Foreign and Security Policy, at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a9000_en.htm (consulted on 11 July 2011).}
\textsuperscript{172}\text{Idem.}
\textsuperscript{173}\text{Piris, 2010, p. 14.}
\textsuperscript{174}\text{TEU (Treaty of Lisbon, as amended), Art. 21.1.}
\textsuperscript{175}\text{Idem., Art. 21.2(a).}
\end{flushleft}
principles of international law”, 176 “preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security in accordance with purposes and principles of the UN Charter”177 and “assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disaster”. 178 Article 21.2(g) explicitly mentions the obligation to assist the population or country in need – in case the government of the state concerned finds itself unable to protect its own population.179

As regards the possible intervention, the situation remains more complicated. Since the EU has adhered to the fundamental freedoms and especially to the respect for human dignity also in its external action where it intends to promote and protect them, it would be against the Treaty not to act in case if any of four RtoP crimes occurs. Moreover, the EU stresses its acceptance of the principles in the UN Charter and in the international law. Since the interpretation of the Charter provides for the grounds for intervention in order to safeguard people’s lives as it has been shown in the previous chapter, the EU’s external action could be lead in the same manner. Moreover, genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity violate the international law. If the EU wants to act in respect of the international law, it must take an action to prevent serious breaches to it. One may argue that the sovereignty and non-intervention also presents principles of international law and the EU shall respect it in its actions, however, as the previous chapter explained, there has been growing consensus that the serious breaches of HR can no longer be hidden behind the fig leaf of the sovereignty or non-intervention principles and that rigorous state sovereignty has never existed and has always been doubted and breached by the individual states for number of reasons. In accordance with the explanation of the EU Treaty the fundamental rights and the principle of the human dignity that has been deeply rooted in the EU

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176 Idem., Art. 21.2(b).
177 Idem., Art. 21.2(c).
178 Idem., Art. 21.2(g).
law prevails while considering the possible action in order to deal with the four RtoP crimes.\textsuperscript{180}

The situation of military intervention is even more complicated therefore I will address it in detail later in the chapter. However, it remains undoubted that due to the above-mentioned reasons the possibility of even military intervention for the humanitarian purposes could be justified on the basis of the EU’s Primary law.

4.3 RtoP specifics and related obligations in the EU law

To sum up briefly, it has been shown that the EU law explicitly encompass the provisions to protect and safeguard HR internally and externally, therefore carries the necessary potential to uphold the RtoP doctrine. Next part of the chapter focuses on the specific elements of the RtoP – the four RtoP crimes and the three responsibilities it encompasses.

4.3.1 Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the EU law and related obligations

As soon as the legal basis for the general RtoP idea can be found in the primary source of the EU law as well as in the general principles of law, it obviously also encompass all four RtoP crimes, which are all to the simplest possible extent covered by the international HR and humanitarian law. However, to be more specific it is necessary to go into particular details of the EU’s responsibility as regards these particular crimes. Due to the fact that the treaties do not explicitly mention them, we must look into other sources of the EU law.

\footnote{180 In the Communication from Commission on implementation of the Human Rights in the Charter, the Commission confirmed that through its external policy, the EU shall wider HR and promote respect for human dignity on the international scene. It has also confirmed that the Charter on Fundamental Rights applies to the EU’s external action. The Communication of the Commission is not a legal act, however, can play a role in interpretation of the EU law. COM 2010(573)final, 19 October 2010, p. 5.}
As regards the genocide all EU MS are parties to the Genocide Convention. The international treaties binding upon all MS are also considered as a source of the EU law in case that the EU has assumed the responsibility in the area.\textsuperscript{181} Even though the EU has not assumed the responsibility over all the areas of the EU policy that would deal with the RtoP (particularly the CFSP), it has accepted the responsibility to adhere to the promotion and protection of HR. Since all the MS ratified the Genocide Convention, which is now binding upon them, it can be assumed that also the Genocide Convention is now part of the EU law even thought a crime of genocide is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties.\textsuperscript{182}

More importantly, the ECJ ruled that international treaties ratified by the EU MS are to be considered as general principles of the EU law.\textsuperscript{183} Any EU act cannot order the Member state not to comply with its obligations under the international law. Further, stemming from the Article VI of the Lisbon Treaty, by the accession of the EU to the ECHR, it should be ensured that the EU offers at least the same HR protection as its MS. The same has been confirmed earlier by the above-mentioned \textit{International Handelgesellschaft case}.\textsuperscript{184} Since the obligation exists to prevent and punish the crime of genocide here, the EU also assumes the same obligation. Besides, genocide is a crime under customary international law that also applies to the EU and brings about related responsibilities.\textsuperscript{185}

The genocide together with the war crimes and crimes against humanity is furthermore dealt with by the ICC jurisdiction. Since all the MS are parties to the Rome Status the same assumption as above may apply. Going even further, the legal basis for the mentioned three crimes can be found in the EU secondary law. Namely, in the recently adopted ‘\textit{Council Decision on the ICC}’\textsuperscript{186} as well as the ‘\textit{Council Decision on the

\textsuperscript{181} Wyatt, Dashwood, 2006, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{182} Tillotson, Foster, 2003, pp. 227-228
\textsuperscript{183} Idem. for an interpretation of the case. For ECJ rulings see Noldt KG v Commission [1974] ECJ 2 CMLR 338.
\textsuperscript{184} Internationale Handelgesellschaft case \textit{Supra note} 149.
\textsuperscript{185} See Section 3.2.2.
\textsuperscript{186} The recently adopted Council Decision repealed the Council Common Position on ICC
investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes\textsuperscript{187} the EU MS explicitly declare that crimes falling under the ICC jurisdiction are of common concern and oblige themselves to prevent these crimes and bring perpetrators to the justice. The EU confirmed the position in its ‘Guidance on Promoting a Compliance with the International Humanitarian Law (IHL)’ adopted by the Council of Ministers\textsuperscript{188} in order to express its obligation to promote compliance with international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{189} EU acknowledges that breaches of the humanitarian law are of huge international concerns also due to the fact that it makes the post-conflict reconciliation even harder.\textsuperscript{190} Through the guidelines the EU MS voluntarily accepted the responsibility to prevent breaches of the IHL.\textsuperscript{191} In accordance with the previous explanations, these considerations would also include the crime of ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{192}

As we can see the four RtoP crimes are not only included within the HR but the EU has also acknowledged separately that these particular four require increased attention because they are of a considerable gravity. The obligation to prevent these breaches and prosecute the perpetrators explicitly stem from the EU Primary and Secondary legislation and the customary international law. The voluntary guidelines to prevent the breaches of the IHL confirm such a commitment. But does any obligation to react when any of the four crimes occur or to help rebuild the societies torn by the conflict legally arise for the EU?

\textsuperscript{187} Council Decision 2003/335/JHA on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes [2003] OJ L118/12

\textsuperscript{188} Guidelines are not legally binding, however, as soon as they have been adopted under the CFSP, all member states must have agreed upon them. That attributes them the significant political value. From that point of view it could be assumed that at least rhetorically, all EU MS feels abide by the international humanitarian law and the necessity of its promotion. Besides, all EU MS are parties to all four Geneva Conventions and their Additional protocols that also oblige state parties to the Convention not only to abide by the international humanitarian law, but also to its dissemination.

\textsuperscript{189} 2005/C 327/04, 23 December 2005, para 3.

\textsuperscript{190} Idem., para 5.

\textsuperscript{191} Idem.

\textsuperscript{192} Refer to the section 3.2.2.
4.3.2 Responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild

The conflict prevention has a long tradition in the EU. One of the ideas of the EU Founding fathers was to create the security community in order to prevent conflict. In this sense, enlargement appears to have been a massive conflict prevention program.\textsuperscript{193} Despite such ideas the treaties including Maastricht did not carry any specific reference to the conflict prevention and the changes have not been introduced until the Treaty of Amsterdam that incorporated Petersberg tasks.\textsuperscript{194} The humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and crises management finally appeared in the Treaty.\textsuperscript{195} After the Cologne Council in 1999 and the subsequent inclusion of the peace building, the conflict prevention and resolution into the Cotonou agreement\textsuperscript{196} the European Commission mainstreamed conflict prevention to all areas of development programming.\textsuperscript{197} Such thinking has been further endorsed by the EU MS at the Goteborg Council,\textsuperscript{198} where it was decided that the EU should assume fully its responsibilities in the area of conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{199} Later the Treaty of Nice has already carried legal basis for the conflict prevention within its article 177 TEC stating that through the development programs, the European Community shall contribute to the developing and consolidating democracy and rule of law.\textsuperscript{200} Together with Title V, article 11 TEU on CFSP aiming at preserve peace and international security,\textsuperscript{201} legal basis for the conflict prevention appears to already exist in the primary EU law.\textsuperscript{202}

The responsibility to prevent emanates further from the above-mentioned EU commitments to the IHL and the ICC. As already argued in the relation to the Genocide Convention the punishment of perpetrators is meant to work as a deterrent and therefore

\textsuperscript{193} Fraser, 2007, pp. 172-174.
\textsuperscript{194} EUROPEAID/122888/C/SER/Multi, July 2009, pp. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{195} TEU (Treaty of Amsterdam), art. J.7(2).
\textsuperscript{196} Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) included article on peace building, conflict prevention and resolution. See Cotonou Agreement, 23 June 2000, Art. 11.
\textsuperscript{198} SN200/1/01 REV1, 15-16 June 2001, para 52.
\textsuperscript{199} Nice European Council Presidency Conclusions, 7-9 December 2000, Annex 6, Art. VII.
\textsuperscript{200} TEC (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 177.
\textsuperscript{201} Idem., Art. 11.
play a role in the conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{203} But the prosecution of the perpetrators creates also an important part of the rebuilding of the society after the conflict therefore the EU’s commitment to ICC would likewise refer to the obligation to rebuild.

As regards the responsibility to react, the conflicts in Balkans and Africa showed that inaction is not always an option and the complex response is needed.\textsuperscript{204} Similarly, the treaties have not explicitly included any reference to crises management until the treaty of Amsterdam that first included among others tasks concerning the combat forces in crises management and peacemaking.\textsuperscript{205} Council Regulation No. 381/2000 further created the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in order to deal timely and effectively with the urgent cases or crises.\textsuperscript{206} The Cotonou agreement has then called for a reaction in any case of the flagrant breaches of HR.\textsuperscript{207}

The TEU defines the questions relative to the EU’s security.\textsuperscript{208} As the legal service of the European Council stated, the creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and interim military committee to manage the crises, as discussed by the EU MS at the 2000 Nice summit,\textsuperscript{209} did not require the change of the existing Treaty (Treaty of Amsterdam). Conflict management tasks could then have been established on its basis as well;\textsuperscript{210} i. e. TEU (as adopted in Amsterdam) can already serve as a legal basis for the possible conflict management.\textsuperscript{211} By incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the Title V of the TEU, the EU MS not only expressed their commitment to the conflict prevention, but

\textsuperscript{203} See section 3.2.2.  
\textsuperscript{204} Fraser, 2007, pp. 174-175.  
\textsuperscript{205} TEU (Treaty of Amsterdam, as amended), Art. J.7(2).  
\textsuperscript{206} Council Regulation EC (No) 381/2001creating a rapid reaction mechanism [2001] OJ L 57/5, Art. 1. The Regulation further builds upon the legal instruments dealing with economic aid and cooperation with developing countries, food aid and reconstruction, therefore, reaffirm the link between the development, human rights, stability and conflict – important basis for the RtoP doctrine. See Art. 2&Annex 1.  
\textsuperscript{207} The agreement (or its part) can be suspended in such cases. Supra note 196, Art. 96.  
\textsuperscript{208} TEU (Amsterdam Treaty, as amended), Title V.  
\textsuperscript{209} Supra note 194, pp. 8-9.  
\textsuperscript{210} Santa Maria de Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 7-9 December 2000, Annex I, Art. II(e).  
\textsuperscript{211} EU MS decided to create such bureaucratic structure within the Council Secretariat in order to make CFSP more operational by providing military expertise reflecting inter alia Laeken Council declaration on operational capability of the ESDP. EU is equipped to conduct conflict management operation. See SN300/1/01, 14-15 December 2001.
also their determination to safeguard the security in Europe through the operations providing the humanitarian aid and restoring peace.\textsuperscript{212}

The crises management and the peace-building operations are being authorized under the Title V in accordance with Articles 14\textsuperscript{213} stating that the Council shall adopt joint action in order to make the CFSP operational, and Article 25\textsuperscript{214} mandating PSC to monitor crises and if needed exercise under the Council supervision strategic exercise of the crises management. EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo as well as EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit among others have been created on these grounds.\textsuperscript{215} The usage of the Title V for the authorisation of such operations further proves the existence of legal basis for possible reaction and re-building.\textsuperscript{216}

Drawing on such events and evolution, the recently adopted Lisbon Treaty goes even further accommodating all components of the RtoP doctrine. Besides the general provision to preserve international peace and security\textsuperscript{217} that can serve as the ground for all three components taking into account the already established link between the HR and the international peace and security, the Section 2, Article 42(1) Lisbon Treaty provides for the ESDP to be internal part of the CFSP. It therefore provides the EU with operational capacities to be used during conflict prevention, re-building and crises management.\textsuperscript{218} Further, the Protocol 10 provides for an establishment of the specific procedures to make the funds available for the tasks in the Articles 42(1) and 43.\textsuperscript{219} The Article 208 re-confirms the link between the conflict prevention and the development and states that the development aid and cooperation shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives of the CFSP.\textsuperscript{220} The same applies to the humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{212} TEU (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Title V.
\textsuperscript{213} Idem., Art. 14.
\textsuperscript{214} Idem., Art. 25.
\textsuperscript{216} Refer to the section 3.2.5.
\textsuperscript{217} TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 21(2).
\textsuperscript{218} Idem., Art. 42(1).
\textsuperscript{219} Idem., Protocol No. 10.
\textsuperscript{220} Idem., Art. 208.
confirms the grounds for the conflict prevention and peace building. Furthermore, the Article 216 provides for the basic agreements in the field making the EU more operational when it comes to the need of the rapid reaction in a case of emerging problems.\textsuperscript{222}

It is worth noting that neither the treaties nor the other legislative acts explicitly mention that the EU has the responsibility to prevent, react or rebuild beyond its borders. However, considering the EU’s commitment to HR, the Lisbon Treaty confirmed that EU’s work in the area of HR and fundamental freedoms extends far beyond its internal policies. Charter of the Fundamental Rights having now the legal value applies also to the EU’s external action, therefore, in accordance with the Treaty, the EU’s role at the international scene is to wider democracy, promote and protect human dignity, justice and principles of the UN.\textsuperscript{223} The confirmed link between HR and international security and stability leads the EU towards the action in order to protect its citizens from possible consequences. Therefore, the responsibility of the EU in the RtoP sense to some extent exists in its law. The question remains how the EU wants to exercise it?

\textbf{4.3.3 The relationship with the UN and the possibility of the military intervention}

Before turning to the whole RtoP concept itself, it is worth noting the relation of the EU to the UN and other regional and international organisations in questions concerning the conflict prevention, reaction and re-building. Article 21 TEU states that the EU ‘[…] shall promote multilateral solution to common problems, in particular in the framework of the [UN].’\textsuperscript{224} Operational capabilities of the EU (military or civilian) shall be used in accordance with the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{225} Protocol 10 to the Lisbon treaty even provides for the possibility the UN may request the urgent implementation of the mission.\textsuperscript{226} Articles demonstrate the adherence of the EU to the established UN rules as regards the dealing

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{221} Idem., Art. 214.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Idem., Art. 216.
\item \textsuperscript{223} COM(2010)573final, 19 October 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{224} TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Idem., Art. 42.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Idem., Protocol 10.
\end{enumerate}
with the conflict and imply possible envy of the EU MS to implement its capabilities preferentially within the UN action. In the European Security Strategy (ESS)\textsuperscript{227} the EU MS confirmed that the UNSC has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The EU’s priority is to equip the UNSC to allow it better perform its duties. With the entry to force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is able to assume its own responsibility in the field of conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace making and peace building, however, the EU sees this opportunity to contribute to the activities mainly of the UN or other international or regional organisations.\textsuperscript{228}

Even though the EU law does not explicitly provide for the military intervention for humanitarian purposes, as demonstrated inter alia on the examples of the EU mandated operations, the reaction/intervention would be possible on the basis of the Title V. The references to the multilateral solution to the problems and to the UN Charter and primary responsibility of the UNSC in the crises management, however, imply that the EU does not seek to pursue such operation on its own. Therefore, without the UNSC mandate, the EU operation should not take place.\textsuperscript{229}

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Taking into consideration the existence of the legal basis in the EU law to carry out the RtoP doctrine, the next chapter will focus on how the EU on this basis actually invokes the RtoP concept as a whole. Does the EU then intend to implement the RtoP through multilateralism and within the framework of the activities of other international organisations?

\textsuperscript{227} ESS is not a legal document, however, since it has been agreed upon by all EU MS, it has considerable political value and can be used to support the legal argument. European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (consulted on 20 March 2011).

\textsuperscript{228} Majority of the EU mandated operations existed to support or complement the active UN or other organization’s operations in the particular country. E.g. EULEX Kosovo undertook the Rule of Law element from UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), in Bosnia, the EU has deployed the Police Mission (EUPM) followed the UN international police task force, as well as the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa has been established while the UN Organisation and Stabilization Mission (MONUC) has existed in the DRC (See Supra note 194). EU Mission has also been deployed to Darfur/Sudan to support activities of the AU mission AMIS (2005/557/CFSF, 20 July 2005) or in Georgia to support OSCE observer mission (See Supra note 194, p. 60). The operations adopted under the framework of the Title V are being adopted in the partnership and co-ordination with the UN or other organisations aiming to support them.

\textsuperscript{229} The EU seems to move along the lines of the internationally endorsed RtoP, Supra note 4.
5 Invoking RtoP: the reflection of the EU law and the RtoP concept in the EU statements and other non-legislative instruments

Notwithstanding the RtoP components are codified in the EU law, the RtoP concept, as a whole, has not yet been explicitly included in any existing EU’s legislation. In order to find out how the EU truly understands the RtoP and whether it accepts it, it becomes necessary to seek the documents explicitly invoking the concept. We shall therefore examine EU’s soft law as well as the documents without attributed legal value, but rather political importance.

As a soft-law instrument the Council Conclusions are examined. They can neither be treated as legislation nor attributed a norm-setting effectiveness, however, since the RtoP as a whole falls under the EU’s CFSP, the Council Conclusions relative to the RtoP must be approved by the unanimity.\(^\text{230}\) The consent of all the EU MS gives them a significant political value, demonstrating the wide-acceptance of their content. The same, as for a political value, apply to the EU statements within the international organisation agreed under the CFSP. The statements, however, have no soft law status and are rather considered the political declarations.\(^\text{231}\) The strength that could be attributed to them lies in the EU’s external representation. Once, the organisation of such an importance as the EU expresses publicly its position, it is difficult to change it quietly thereafter without losing credibility. Taking this into consideration the statements must be carefully agreed by the entire EU members and generally reflect the true EU position.\(^\text{232}\)

Another document used is the Communication from the European Commission (hereinafter ‘Commission’). Even though it does not present the legally binding

\(^{231}\)Idem.
\(^{232}\)The considerations reflect the authors own observations during the 65\(^{th}\) session of the UNGA held in autumn 2009.
instrument, it explains how the Commission would act in certain situation. The Communications play significant role in the area not covered by the existing legislation and their content can have a recommendatory character, therefore, they must be taken into consideration.  

Similarly, the European Parliament’s (EP) resolutions do not present binding instruments. Since the EP is the only EU body directly elected by its citizens and the most vocal on RtoP, its resolutions often invoking the RtoP while considering situation in particular country, cannot be left unconsidered.

The chapter directly reflects the content of such documents explicitly mentioning the RtoP and presented in detail in the Table 1 annexed to the thesis. Based on this Table the way the EU accepts the RtoP and what should be the EU’s role within the RtoP framework.

5.1 The adoption of the RtoP

Obviously, the EU has been vocally very supportive of the RtoP and the concept has been welcomed as an emerging legal norm reflecting upon what has been already stated in the international law. Before the endorsement of the RtoP in the World Summit Outcome Document 2005, the EU referred to the RtoP as presented by the HLPT or the UNSG, focusing on the rights and responsibilities inherent in the principle of state sovereignty and the exclusive role of the UNSC to maintain international peace and security drawing also a link with the justice and the importance to fight impunity in relation to the conflict prevention.

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235 See Annex in Section 12.

236 For relevant documents see Annex, pp. 113 – 114.
The EU attributed high importance to the RtoP prior its adoption and its acceptance has therefore been perceived as a progress by all the EU institutions understanding the RtoP as an instrument to combat atrocities and the HR violations. The emphasis has been placed on the growing international consensus on the possibility of the collective action through the UNSC. EU further reiterated the acceptance of its RtoP towards the EU citizens.\textsuperscript{237}

The push for an adoption and the absence of the EU statements contrary to the RtoP as well as any observed caution towards the concept or its parts shows that the EU accepted the RtoP at least in the form as endorsed at the world summit. Such a position has also been reflected in the 2006 Joint statement that has the particular importance due to the consensus of all the EU institutions needed for its adoption.\textsuperscript{238}

Further, the EU started to focus on the implementation of the RtoP claiming it its utmost importance.\textsuperscript{239} Expressed support for the mandates of the UN Special Adviser on Genocide and on RtoP also represents the way to push the RtoP from the rhetoric to an action. Later on, after the incumbent UNSG’s issuance of the new report on the implementation of the RtoP\textsuperscript{240} the EU claimed the willingness to integrate the concept in its normative framework to make it accepted legal norm and contribute to the more operational approach through well functioning preventive, reactive and rebuilding measures at the disposal of the international community.\textsuperscript{241}

\textsuperscript{237} Idem.
\textsuperscript{238} Idem., 2006/C 46/01, 24.2.2006.
\textsuperscript{239} See the changes in the EU’s RtoP speak reflecting the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document, Annex, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{240} Supra note 38.
\textsuperscript{241} This is the general overview of the EU reflected in most of the statements. See Annex pp. 113 – 120.
5.2 The EU’s perception of the RtoP concept

Not only the EU vocally supports the RtoP’s operationalisation. It stems from the analysis of the documents reflected in the Annex that while invoking the implementation, the EU goes a little beyond the internationally recognized definition.\textsuperscript{242}

Reflecting upon the EU’s statement during the UNGA debate on the RtoP the EU, unless the MS decide otherwise, wants to keep the RtoP scope narrow focusing on the particular four RtoP crimes.\textsuperscript{243} The doors remains therefore opened for the extension. First assumption can be made that the EU advocates narrow but deep approach focusing on the prevention. The prevention permeates through the whole RtoP concept and should be included in all three pillars. Even the UNSC shall act in sake of preventing RtoP crimes. As a matter of prevention, the EU often mentions the cooperation with the ICC.\textsuperscript{244} The obligation to punish international crimes as a mean of the conflict prevention has been already mentioned in relation to the Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{245}

As regards the second RtoP pillar not only the international community is obliged to provide assistance if the state is unable of its RtoP. According to the EU, under the RtoP concept, the home state is obliged to accept the assistance. The EU draws the link with the humanitarian assistance. The delivery of aid reflects the primary responsibility of the home state – if it is unwilling, the humanitarian assistance will never be effective.\textsuperscript{246} Therefore, the one of the responsibilities of the international community under the RtoP remains to push for the acceptance of the individual responsibility of the home state even during the emergence of the crises.

\textsuperscript{242} Idem.
\textsuperscript{245} See section 3.2.3. For the further examination of emphasis placed by the EU on the conflict prevention consult the documents included in Annex, pp. 113-123.
\textsuperscript{246} See Supra note 243. Führer, nearly every EU statement mentions the humanitarian assistance in relation to the RtoP. Consult Annex, pp. 113-123.
As regards the responsibility to act, the EU has stressed that such an obligation exists and has been agreed by the international community – despite the fact that such international agreement has not been that strong and rather states the preparedness to act than the obligation.\textsuperscript{247} Similarly to the international RtoP, the Responsibility to act shall be exercised primarily through the UNSC.\textsuperscript{248} The EU has never stressed that the UNSC assumes the explicit competence on one hand. On the other it remains silent on possibility to surpass the UNSC.\textsuperscript{249} Such position reflects the best the EU’s primary legislation emphasising the multilateral solution to the problems, however, does not create an obstacle for the possible action without the UNSC authorisation as proposed by the ICISS. The EU seems to realistically assess what it can achieve, which is the reason why it works along the line with the internationally agreed RtoP.

Showing that the EU has accepted an RtoP in the above-mentioned form moves us to the role the EU should play under the RtoP.

5.3 **Assuming the EU’s responsibility, defining the RtoP: The EU’s role within the RtoP framework during the emergence of the RtoP case**

The role the EU seeks within the RtoP framework is threefold: Firstly, the EU sees itself primarily as a civilian power ready to employ its diplomatic means and push for the acceptance of the primary RtoP by the government concerned.\textsuperscript{250} The EP invoked the RtoP in many situations condemning the Burma/Myanmar, North Kivu, Chad, DRC, Darfur or Zimbabwe, while regretted that the EU did not work more unilaterally to push the authorities to accept their RtoP.\textsuperscript{251} Reflecting the EP’s concerns the EU has recently committed to continue exerting pressure on Kaddafi in Libya to firstly assume the

\textsuperscript{247} Idem.
\textsuperscript{248} Idem.
\textsuperscript{249} Idem.
\textsuperscript{250} Fraser, 2007, pp. 172-174.
\textsuperscript{251} See Third column of the Annex attributed to the EP documents, pp. 113-123.
responsibility of his regime towards his people reaffirming its position of the civilian power.\textsuperscript{252}

Moreover, as previously stated, the EU emphasizes the prevention. That is where it considers itself to be the most important player. The EU aims to contribute to the regional organisations to enhance their capacity to prevent conflict including the donor support.\textsuperscript{253} EU has also expressed to pressure on the states to ratify the ICC, if they have not done so yet, as the ICC is perceived a part of prevention.\textsuperscript{254}

As regards solely the Responsibility to rebuild, the EU accents its leadership role in the humanitarian assistance, however, it is necessary to bridge the gap between immediate post-conflict reconstruction and long-term peace building. The EU claims it engages through the electoral observation and assistance, rule of law missions and other capacity building.\textsuperscript{255} Reflecting upon the mentioned conflict cycle and possible fallback into the conflict if the re-building strategy is not effective, the above-mentioned role in the field of prevention shall also be employed in the post-conflict rebuilding phase.\textsuperscript{256}

Overall, the EU generally accepts the UN primary role in the conflict prevention and leading role in the realization of the responsibility of the individual community.\textsuperscript{257} As demonstrated in the previous chapter, together with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has assumed its role as a global player willing to assist the UN in the realization of its obligations. The EU is willing to commit on the ground through the civilian and military deployment and contribute its capacity to the UNSC to ensure that the UN can react rapidly. It can be concluded that in contrast to the prevention and post-conflict

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{252} EU’s position towards Libya is included in the ‘2011’ Section of the Annex. pp. 123.
\textsuperscript{253} Supra note 243.
\textsuperscript{254} Supra note 244.
\textsuperscript{255} 2985\textsuperscript{th} Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Conclusions on HR and democratisation in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} countries, 8 December 2009, at \url{http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_9308_en.htm} (consulted on 23 March 2011).
\textsuperscript{256} Similarly, the references to the peace-building and the EU role in it permeate all the analysed statements, See Annex, pp. 113-123.
\textsuperscript{257} Idem.
\end{footnotesize}
building, where the EU desires to assume more independent role, in relations to the Responsibility to react, it aims to work in the line with the UNSC leadership. 258

Based on the analysed documents, it can be assumed that the EU has proven to accept the RtoP. Further the EU law provides more space for the RtoP realisation than the international law permits – especially while talking about the responsibilities to react and rebuild. The analysed EU statements and other documents precisely reflect the EU law as examine in the fourth chapter implying the possible RtoP codification in the future. The EU seems willing to adhere to the RtoP, however, lacking the ‘RtoP speak’ in the legislation it seems not to intent completely abide itself by the concept. On the other hand, the EU claims having sufficient toolbox of mechanisms ready to uphold the RtoP.

We shall now move towards more practical analysis to examine them since the EU could carry out the RtoP doctrine through its external action notwithstanding the law does not explicitly provide for the concept.

6 Organisational structure of the EU and the decision-making relative to the mechanisms to be analysed

Having proven the legal basis to uphold the RtoP exists in the EU law as well as the ‘theoretical willingness’ of the EU to adhere to the concept allow us now to move towards more practical assessment of the possible RtoP’s translation into the EU’s external action. According to the hypothesis presented and confirmed by the EU law, 259 the EU possesses under its external policies a variety of mechanisms relative to the conflict prevention, management and the peace building that, if used correctly in the relevant situations, can carry out the RtoP concept in its entirety. These mechanisms exist under the EU’s former ‘Community (First) pillar’ 260 and under the CFSP/CSDP (Second pillar) subjected to the intergovernmental decision-making. 261 Since the policies deciding

258 Idem.
259 See Section 3.2.4&3.2.5.
260 Piris, 2010, p. 239.
261 Idem.
on the deployment of the mechanisms play an important role in their operational capacity the decision-making in every pillar needs to be examined, the chapter briefly discussing the EU’s organizational structure, decision-making and the level of coherence relevant to the EU’s external action is included.

The EU is an intergovernmental type of organisation (IGO) created to ensure the stronger position at the international level that no single EU MS would be able to achieve alone.\textsuperscript{262} It is worth recalling that for this reason the EU MS shifted part of their sovereignty to the EU institutions, so the decisions of the common interest can be made at the level of the organisation. In confirmation that the part of the sovereignty only has been transferred the EU has been originally divided into the ‘pillar structure’ moving along the lines of the TEC\textsuperscript{263} and the TEU\textsuperscript{264} presupposing two different ways of decision-making, the former stemming from the supranational European Community law, the latter reflecting the intergovernmental EU law allowing the MS to maintain national policies through possible exercise of the veto power in some policy areas.\textsuperscript{265}

Originally, the legal personality belonged exclusively to the European Community (EC) – First Pillar, therefore the treaties the EC concluded bound the EC institutions and its MS.\textsuperscript{266} Mere three Articles of the Rome Treaty that time carried the provisions relative to the external relations: Articles 131 – 133 TEC on common commercial policy\textsuperscript{267} and Article 300 establishing the procedure for the conclusion of the international agreements.\textsuperscript{268} The external trade policy has therefore fallen directly under the explicit competence of the EC\textsuperscript{269} subject to the procedures set out in the Article 300 TEC\textsuperscript{270} applicable to the cases of concluding the international agreements or adopting the trade

\begin{footnotes}
\item[262] Portela, Raube, 2009, p. 5.
\item[263] TEC (Treaty of Maastricht, as amended)
\item[264] TEU (Maastricht Treaty).
\item[265] Idem., Art. 3(1).
\item[266] Piris, 2010, p. 239.
\item[267] TEC (Rome Treaty), Art. 131 – 133.
\item[268] Idem., Art. 300.
\item[269] TEC (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 133, Piris, 2010, pp. 238-239.
\item[270] Idem., Art. 300.
\end{footnotes}
With the entrance into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the development policy has been added under the EC competence, while the 2004 Nice Treaty included economic, financial and technical co-operation with the Third countries.

Article 300 stipulated that the Commission in this area of external policy makes recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to begin the negotiations. The Council shall then conclude the agreement after the consultation with the European Parliament exercising its qualified majority vote. So called ‘co-decision procedure’ confers considerable powers to the European Commission.

The Commission as a body of the institution rather supports the objectives of an organisation and obviously its decisions are not hampered by the national interest. It could therefore be assumed that the Commission would be willing to act in case of the RtoP situation since the protection of HR would be one of the objectives of the EU’s foreign policy. The Commission has for example played an important role in pushing the Council to pursue actions to prevent the conflicts. Further, the qualified majority vote makes it easier for EU to adopt the decision. Therefore, speaking about the operationalisation of the RtoP, the mechanisms under the former Community pillar would be easier to rapidly deploy.

On the other hand under the Title V, Article 23 the Council shall act unanimously as regards the provision of the EU’s CFSP (Second pillar). The entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty abolished the original pillar structure stipulating that “[t]he Union shall be founded on the present Treaty and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union […]. Those two Treaties shall have the same legal value. The Union shall

\[272\] TEC (Maastricht Treaty, as amended), Art. 177 – 181.
\[274\] TEC (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 300.
\[276\] Fraser, 2007, pp. 52-74.
\[277\] TEU (Nice Treaty, as amended), Art. 22.
replace and succeed the European Community.*275 The Treaty has also established the EU’s legal personality merging the two mentioned legal orders into one279 and enhancing the ‘cross-pillarisation’ of the EU policies,280 which has been to some extent already a practice for example in the area of sanctions.281 However, the EU MS insisted on the separation of the area of the CFSP/CSDP, which was then included into the TEU under the Title V.282 The rest of the EU policies and activities have been included into the TFEU.283 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned provisions the decision-making procedures in the areas of the EU’s external relations remained largely unchanged maintaining the former Community and inter-governmental distinction in the decision-making.284

Two conclusions could be drawn from these considerations. Firstly, two persisting different bases for the decision-making in the area of an external action obviously imply the certain level of incoherence between the EU institutions and also the possible tension between the decisions taken at the EU level and the policies of the EU MS.285

The voting by the unanimity and the exclusive competence of the Council in the area of the CFSP further imply difficulties to adopt certain decisions if the national interest of one or more MS is at stake. This has proven for example during the crises in Iraq and the subsequent intervention or in relation to the decision over the Kosovo’s independence, where the EU was not able to find a common position and therefore some states did not

276 TEU(Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 1.
279 Idem., Art. 47.
280 Cremona, de Witte, 2008, pp. 20.
282 Idem., Title V.
284 See Cremona, de Witte, 2008, pp. 20 for deeper analysis.
contribute to the civilian and military activities conducted by the EU in the country concerned.\textsuperscript{286}

The problem could then arise for an RtoP. The complexity of the concept requires the coherent strategy and the clear and well-designed allocation of the competences among the EU institutions as well as its MS. The Lisbon Treaty made an attempt to address the problem establishing the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter ‘the High Representative’).\textsuperscript{287} Such a step makes the EU more operational and therefore enhance the possibility the RtoP would be able to play a role in its external action.

Even though the CFSP/CSDP has been included separately into the Title V of the TEU\textsuperscript{288} the corresponding chapter has also been created in the TFEU in the relevant EU’s external action session\textsuperscript{289} aiming to ensure that all EU external activities will be guided by the same objectives – democracy, rule of law, HR, fundamental freedom and respect for human dignity – to name some of them relevant for the topic analysed.\textsuperscript{290}

On the other hand, notwithstanding the provisions exist that the “MS shall ensure that their national policies conform to the EU positions […]”\textsuperscript{291} under the Title V, in accordance with the Article 275 TFEU, the ECJ has no jurisdiction over the area of the CFSP, therefore the conformity is not enforceable. The only provision we can rely upon remain the reputation of the EU at the international scene largely weakened by such incoherencies, which may be of the EU MS concern. Further, the similar provision exists under the external action included in the TFEU Articles\textsuperscript{292} subjected to the ECJ

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287}TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 18(1).
\item \textsuperscript{288}TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Title V.
\item \textsuperscript{289}TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended).
\item \textsuperscript{290}TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Title V, Art. 21(1), Idem., Part 5, Title I, Art. 205.
\item \textsuperscript{291}TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Title V, Art. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{292}TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Arts. 208 (1), 212 (1), 214(1).
\end{itemize}
jurisdiction. Therefore, the EU seems moving on one hand closer to embrace the RtoP concept in its external action, on the other, the obvious obstacles still exist.

These considerations must be taken into account while drawing the guidelines for the deployment of the EU mechanisms to uphold the RtoP as well as while discussing their implementation. Despite the problems caused by still separated legal basis for the EU’s external action, at least in the law, the RtoP mechanisms can even though be deployed timely and effectively. We shall now examine these mechanisms and see whether they are sufficient to possibly carry out the entire RtoP related action.

7 Mechanisms available to the EU to uphold the RtoP concept

The rationale behind addressing the mechanisms relevant to the RtoP is twofold. Firstly, to support the argument that the EU is equipped to respond to the RtoP crises. Secondly, if the first argument proves right and the EU has capacity to respond and the existing mechanisms are sufficient to create the coherent EU strategy, it further supports the hypothesis that the EU would be able to carry out the RtoP in its foreign policies. The chapter divides into three parts. Reflecting the previous chapter, the former EC mechanisms currently stemming from the provisions included in TFEU are assessed first. Second considerations are given the Community interaction with the second pillar and focus on the competences shared between the First pillar and CFSP/CSDP. Thirdly, the attention is turned to the mechanisms existing under the CFSP/CSDP. The observed mechanisms will be used in the following chapter to formulate the step-by-step EU approach in the face of an RtoP situation (guidelines).

293 Since the Lisbon Treaty has not in fact affected the division between the former EC pillar and the CFSP (except of the explicit inclusion of the CSDP under the Title V TEU) the thesis continues using the qualification ‘First pillar mechanisms’ for those instruments stemming currently from the TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), and the ‘CFSP/CSDP’ or ‘Second pillar’ mechanisms for the tools included under the Title V of the current TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended).
7.1 Mechanisms available to the EU under the First pillar

Following the previous analysis, it has been shown that the EU emphasises the conflict prevention with the focus on the long-term (structural) approach,\(^\text{294}\) which is addressed first followed by the mechanisms aiming at react quickly to the nascent conflicts (immediate short-term prevention). Further the focus turns to the specific mechanisms designed for the post-conflict building.

7.1.1 Structural (long-term) prevention

Recalling primarily the nexus between development and the conflict prevention\(^\text{295}\) the legal basis for the action under the former Community competence would lie in the Articles 177 – 181 TEC\(^\text{296}\) (current Articles 211 – 213 TFEU)\(^\text{297}\) dealing with the development co-operation with the Third Countries aiming at foster sustainable economic development, fight against poverty and “[…] contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, HR and fundamental freedoms.”\(^\text{298}\) The countries most vulnerable to the conflict are those lacking the economic development, which subsequently implies poverty and those where the democratic processes are the least advanced.\(^\text{299}\) Therefore the development and co-operation programs are one of the tools aimed to tackle the root causes of the conflict.\(^\text{300}\)

The promotion and protection of HR, democracy and the rule of law would also play similar role. Having in mind the overall objective of the EU the former Article 301 TEC (current Article 215 TFEU) provide for the possible suspension of the development and co-ordination programs therefore provide the legal basis for the conditionality widely used in the European external policies. In conjunction with the Article 133 TEC (current Article 207) stating that the common commercial policy shall be conducted in accordance

\(^{294}\) See sections 4.3.2 and 5.3
\(^{295}\) See sections 4.3.2. The European Consensus on Development marked also the milestone in the area of development policy referring to link between development activity and the conflict prevention with the particular focus on the need to tackle the root causes of the conflict. See Supra note 238.
\(^{296}\) TEC (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Arts. 177-181.
\(^{297}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Arts. 211-213.
\(^{298}\) TEC (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Arts. 177(2) and 181a(1).
\(^{300}\) Idem.
with the objectives of the EU’s external action, the HR clauses and conditionality in the trade agreements can also play a role in the structural prevention (the Cotonou Agreement similar instruments related to EU’s neighbourhood present the example of these policies).301

Drawing upon the EU’s perception of the RtoP, the structural prevention plays an important role. The crucial element remains its effective use having in mind the vulnerability of the proposed measures to the political considerations.302 The EU must use the available instruments coherently otherwise the possibility of the systematic use of the RtoP in its external action becomes limited.

The structural prevention, however, cannot always tackle the root causes of the problem completely effectively, especially if the ethnic division play a main role. It can be demonstrated in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that currently faces one of the most serious crises since the war.303 If the country is likely to fall into the conflict, would the EU be able to undertake an appropriate action?

7.1.2 Reaction to the nascent conflicts: Rapid Reaction Mechanism – Instrument for Stability

The Helsinki European Council stressed the need for the establishment of the rapid financial mechanism to make response to the sudden crises possible in case the structural prevention fails demonstrating the EU’s willingness to uphold the conflict prevention –

301 Supra note 196. Turkey presents the example of such policies since its human rights record improved significantly after it has become a party to the EU co-operation and integration policies (Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999, Art. 13). Obviously, the prospect of the EU member ship would play the strongest role. International Crises Group, EU Crises Response Capability Revisited, Europe Briefing No. 160, 17 January 2005, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/160_eu_crisis_response_capability_revisited_edit.ashx (consulted on 20 June 2011).

302 The EU’s unwillingness to go beyond the mild political dialogue when human rights violator is the large strategic partner – China, demonstrates the case. Fraser, 2007.

303 See International Crises Group Supra note 125.
and therefore possibility to uphold the RtoP.\textsuperscript{304} The Council Regulation No 381/2001 later created in 2001 the Rapid-Reaction Mechanism (RRM) allowing for the short-term, quick reaction in case of the nascent conflict providing for the quick mobilization of the existing Community instruments such as the fast financial support.\textsuperscript{305}

In November 2006 reflecting the developments in the EU institutions and the overall step forward as regards linking the development, HR and security, the RRM has been superseded by the Instrument for Stability (IfS).\textsuperscript{306} The mechanism has undertaken the RRM functions, while adopting the Exceptional Assistance Measures and the Interim Response Program in order to rapidly re-establish the conditions favourable for the EU activities such as the development aid or the co-operation programs.\textsuperscript{307}

The IfS can be used for the conflict prevention, the crises management and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation in situations threatening the stable conditions for co-operation such as threats to the law and order and the safety and security of person.\textsuperscript{308} Therefore, from the point of view of the RtoP, the IfS would now be able to carry out the whole concept as regards the possible intervention of the civilian nature since the complex set of possible reactions to the crises are under its ‘roof’. The possibilities range from the technical and financial support, economic, political and juridical assistance and food supply to the efforts to strengthen the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors, promotion of the early warning, capacity and confidence building as well as mediation and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{309}

In relation to the RtoP, the IfS must be activated in case of the emerging RtoP situation. Being placed under the former Community pillar makes it quite flexible and more easily

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{304} Helsinki Council Conclusions, Annex II-VI Supra note 301.
\footnote{305} RRM Supra note 206.
\footnote{307} Idem., Art. 6.
\footnote{308} Idem. Art. 4.
\footnote{309} See International Crises Group, pp. 12-14 Supra note 301 for detailed analyses of the mechanism.
\end{footnotes}
deployable stipulating the possibility of the EU to invoke such an instrument in its foreign policies.

7.1.3 Special instruments relative to the post-conflict re-building

The Community has also at its disposal the special instruments relative directly to the post-conflict building aiming primarily to contribute to the consolidation of the peace, prevention of the future conflicts and support the reconciliation process. The programs under the First pillar more or less consist of the targeted assistance and the funding of the reconstruction and the rehabilitation projects and the Disarmament, demobilisation and Reintegration programs (DDR) focusing on the linking relief, rehabilitation and the development strategy. Such link therefore put again together the strategies under the structural prevention and the post-conflict building.

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To sum up, excluding some exceptions such as the association agreements, the mechanisms are deployed following the Community decision-making referred to in the previous section. The Commission further implements the agreed policies using usually the EC financial instrument. The mentioned instruments present usually those the most effective and generally deployable from all the EU’s mechanisms and therefore very relevant for the prevention of the RtoP crimes. However, before turning to such a relation other mechanisms must be addressed.


312 Supra note 301.
7.2 Mechanisms reflecting the interaction between the First and Second pillar

The instruments under the following section (the election observation and assistance, humanitarian aid, sanctions and the political dialogue) transcends/has transcended the pillars and are now deployable under the TFEU. This presents the considerable step confirming the EU’s willingness to become more effective in the conflict prevention. This obviously has an indirect effect for the RtoP. As it will be demonstrated, similarly to the previous ones the proposed mechanisms can be used in order to prevent the RtoP crimes or to some extent react to their occurrence. As the previous chapter explained, the deployment of the second pillar instruments remains more difficult therefore, having more mechanisms under the first pillar decision-making makes the EU policy in the relation to the RtoP more operational. We shall now present the instruments and assess their use in relation to the RtoP concept.

7.2.1 Election observation, electoral assistance and humanitarian aid

The election observation, electoral assistance and the humanitarian aid present the Second pillar instruments, however, in both cases, the decision-making relative to their deployment has been moved under the First pillar following the relevant Council decisions. The analysis becomes important because such transfer of the competence makes the deployment of the mechanisms much easier, which will be one of the important criteria regarding the question of the possible implementation of these instruments in a relation to the emergence of the RtoP crises.

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313 TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended)
314 Refer to the Section 6.
315 Portela, Raube, 2009, pp. 15 – 16.
The election observation and assistance present an important instrument in the area of the conflict prevention (structural or immediate) and the post conflict building.\textsuperscript{316} The elections play an important role in the democratisation process, which becomes crucial for the societies emerging from the conflict.\textsuperscript{317} The Responsibility to rebuild does not cease when the conflict gets relatively under the control. The long-term commitment in the form of the peace building and the peace consolidation becomes necessary. Wide range of the political, developmental, HR, humanitarian programs in the form of the short term or long-term commitment must be deployed.\textsuperscript{318} The Responsibility to rebuild gradually yields back to the Responsibility to prevent.\textsuperscript{319}

The legal basis for the election observation lied originally within the Title V CFSP in the Article J.3 TEU\textsuperscript{320} and remained currently in the TEU as one objective of the EU CFSP/CSDP.\textsuperscript{321} The electoral assistance has however been codified also as part of the democratic support in such instruments as the Cotonou Agreement and Regulations dealing with the relations with the countries having the elections in place (First pillar).\textsuperscript{322} The EU election observation or assistance mission could have been deployed under the EC pillar or similarly under the CFSP/CSDP pillar that could lead to the incoherence and possible tension between the EU institutions.

In 1999 the provision has been put in place for the electoral observation and assistance allowing for the rapid deployment for the electoral experts to the emergency situations.\textsuperscript{323}

\textsuperscript{316} Mayer-Resende, 2006, pp. 1-2, Homolkova, Lenka, \textit{Elections and beyond: role of election observation in different understandings of democratisation}, Venice: European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation, 2010, unpublished essay, pp. 1-10. Liberia presents an example of the country where the EU election observation plays a post-conflict building role, while in Nigeria, the observers were many times deployed in order to contribute to the stability of the country and prevent the conflict. The author has participated in the EU Election Observation Mission to Nigeria in 2011 – the given information is based on author’s own observations.).

\textsuperscript{317} Idem.

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{Supra note} 194.

\textsuperscript{319} See \textit{Supra note} 316, 2001 COM Communication \textit{Supra note} 299.

\textsuperscript{320} See Council Decision 94/403/CFSP concerning the observation of the elections to the Palestinian Council and the coordination of the international operation for observing the elections [1995] OJ L 238/4

\textsuperscript{321} TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Title V.

\textsuperscript{322} See instruments the Cotonou Agreement, Art. 9, \textit{Supra note} 301 mentioning the pledge of the EC to assist the democratic processes. For the overall assessment see 2001 Communication, \textit{Supra note} 300.

\textsuperscript{323} Council Regulation (EC) No 975/1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of
Further, the 1999 provisions conferred the implementing powers in both areas to the Commission providing for their flexible deployment under the First pillar procedures again making the action to be launched easier.\textsuperscript{324}

Humanitarian aid relates rather to the RtoP’s second and third pillar when the population is already affected by the conflict.\textsuperscript{325} The humanitarian assistance may firstly prevent the situation deteriorating into the crises. As regards the Third RtoP pillar, the humanitarian assistance is among other instruments such as capacity building, development aid and diplomatic measures, one of the primary means to be used in reaction to the crises.\textsuperscript{326} The targeted humanitarian assistance would again be an important element that may curtail the suffering of the victims of the conflict. It could be in a form of the assistance to the government concerned in case it is unable to protect its own population or deployed without the consent of the government concerned in case of the RtoP’s Third pillar.\textsuperscript{327}

The humanitarian aid has also found its place in the primary legislation under the Title V in the Article 17 CFSP. Similarly, the humanitarian aid, however, has also been codified in the 1996 Council Regulation provided for the procedure that allows the Commission to decide on an emergency action in case of the situation of the urgent and unforeseeable humanitarian needs.\textsuperscript{328} The similar 1999 provisions conferred the decision-making powers in the area of the humanitarian aid to the Commission.\textsuperscript{329} With the entrance into the force of the Lisbon Treaty the humanitarian aid has been included into the TFEU that codified it as a First pillar instrument (without prejudice to the activities of the EU MS in this area).\textsuperscript{330}


\textsuperscript{325} ICISS, 2001(2), 27.


\textsuperscript{327} Idem.

\textsuperscript{328} Idem.

\textsuperscript{329} Supra note 324.

\textsuperscript{330} TFEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 214.
The presented cases of the codification of the instruments within the EU’s First pillar decision-making demonstrate the EU’s willingness to make its mechanisms rapidly deployable, which becomes crucial for the RtoP’s operationalisation. Similar case concerns the sanctions and political dialogues that has been now made more coherent within the EU’s pillars and provide for more effective and flexible use of the sanctions along the emergence of the RtoP situation. We shall now assess closely these mechanisms.

7.2.2 Sanctions and the political dialogues

The political dialogue is more moderate playing already an important role during the structural prevention under former Community legislation.\textsuperscript{331} It should be deployed throughout the phase of the conflict deterioration as part of the Responsibility to prevent and react playing also its role in the conflict management, mediation and post-conflict rebuilding.\textsuperscript{332}

Similarly, the legal basis for the sanctions and political dialogues can be found in both, in existing first pillar legal practice, such as the Cotonou agreement\textsuperscript{333} and also under the Second pillar in the primary law\textsuperscript{334}, which may cause the incoherence and actually lead to the concurrent adoption of sanction and tension between institutions.\textsuperscript{335} The possibility to overcome the problem has however been demonstrated by the better co-ordination of the EU institutions and so-called ‘two-step’ approach as demonstrated on the case of Zimbabwe where the Regulation under the first pillar initially disconnected the development aid and subsequently the Council Common position imposed the visa ban and arms embargo on the Zimbabwean authorities.\textsuperscript{336}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{331} Cotonou Agreement \textit{Supra note} 196.
  \item \textsuperscript{332} ICISS, 2001(1), pp. 19-27.
  \item \textsuperscript{333} Idem., see Art. 8 for provisions relative to political dialogue and Art. 96 for sanctions.
  \item \textsuperscript{334} See Art. 26 TEU on political dialogue and Art. 25 TEU on possible measures under the Second pillar. TEU (Treaty of Nice, as amended).
  \item \textsuperscript{335} Portela, Raube, 2009, pp. 15 – 16.
\end{itemize}
In the end it is worth mentioning that the EU applies the restrictive measures not only autonomously, but also and more often within the framework of the UN imposed sanctions. Similarly, the restrictive measures and the political dialogue can be at the same time conducted by the EU MS, while the Lisbon Treaty aimed to include the provisions ensuring the complementary of their individual policies with those of the EU.\textsuperscript{337} Coordinated response to the emerging RtoP situation through the deployment of the sanctions by the UN, EU and also its MS can present an important tool to uphold RtoP. The carefully tailored decision-making in this matter remains of crucial importance and therefore the case of the two-step approach moves the EU again closer to the possible upholding of the RtoP.

### 7.3 Mechanisms available to the EU under the Second pillar

The EU also possesses the mechanisms under its Second pillar crucial to the possible RtoP action. As stated, their deployment may be limited due to the inter-governmental way of the decision-making and different national interests of the individual EU MS.\textsuperscript{338} The Second pillar mechanisms, however, remain crucial to the possible operationalisation of the RtoP and must be examined, especially because they provide for the possible military intervention, the most difficult element of the RtoP concept. Due to the complexity of the Second pillar mechanisms the analyses move along the structures created under the European Council emphasising the operations launched in the CSDP framework, which is the most relevant to the RtoP’s operationalisation.\textsuperscript{339}

#### 7.3.1 Political and Security Committee

Under the Article 25 TEU\textsuperscript{340} (current Article 38)\textsuperscript{341} the PSC mandated for the civilian and military crises management\textsuperscript{342} reflects the inter-governmental decision-making being

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\textsuperscript{337} However, as explained in the section 6 the reality often differs.
\textsuperscript{338} Consult Section 6.
\textsuperscript{339} Supra note 194, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{340} TEU (Treaty of Nice, as amended), Art. 25.
\textsuperscript{341} TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 38.
composed of ambassadorial level diplomats of the every EU MS. The PSC is advised by the EUMC and the CIVCOM.

The CIVCOM\(^{343}\) focuses on the civilian aspects of the crises bringing together the contributions from the Commission and the Council.\(^{344}\) Since the Community instruments presented in the previous part are only of the civilian character, the CIVCOM plays important role in their coordination.\(^{345}\)

The EUMC\(^ {346}\) complements the CIVCOM focusing on entire military activities. It becomes the forum for the military consultation mandated to deal with current and potential crises, suggesting the military strategic options and planning the operation after its approval by the Council. It assesses financial implications of the operation and monitors its proper execution.\(^ {347}\)

Reflecting the Article 17 TEU\(^ {348}\) (current Article 42), the Council established the EUMS, the only permanent military structure within the EU with the mandate to provide early warning, situation assessment and the strategic planning as well as to provide the High Representative with the military expertise.\(^ {349}\)

The structures explained already stipulate the possible military action. The EU may therefore be able to carry out even the last responsibility under the RtoP – responsibility to react. On their advice, the Council may unanimously provide for the deployment of the CSDP operation exercised through the Council Joint Action (JA) operationalising the EU’s policies.\(^ {350}\) If adopted under the Title V, they have direct legally binding effect.\(^ {351}\)

\(^{343}\) Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP setting up the Committee for Civilian Aspects of crises management [2000] OJ L 127/1

\(^{344}\) International Crises Group, Supra note 301, pp. 19-20.

\(^{345}\) Idem.


\(^{347}\) Idem., Annex.

\(^{348}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 17


\(^{350}\) TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 14(1).

The JA organises the CSDP operation. It defines the mission, designates its structure and the chain of command that often very much differs. The JA could relate to the police, military or civilian operation deploying missions for the disarmament, humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, post-conflict stabilisation and the fight against terrorism. Not only the wide range of activities possible, but also more importantly, the CSDP mission presents the only possibility to be deployed by the EU as a military intervention envisaged the responsibility to react, therefore play a crucial role for the RtoP concept and its entire realisation.

7.3.2 Special Representatives and the Fact Finding Missions

The JA also provides for the establishment of the EU Special Representative, which plays important role within the CSDP structure promoting the EU’s interest in the troubled regions and therefore contribute to the structural prevention, may play an active role in peace consolidation, promotion of stability, rule of law, HR and democratisation. Further, similarly to the EU election missions its activities lead to the gathering and the assessment of the information contributing significantly to the EWM, conflict prevention and post-conflict strategies. Under the CFSP/CSDP structure, the Special Representative advises the High Representative and the EU Council. Similarly, the Fact finding missions that could be deployed under the CFSP/CSDP through the JA play such a role.

354 TEU (Lisbon Treaty, as amended), Art. 43.
356 See mandate of the EU Special Representative. Supra note 355.
357 International Crises Group, Supra note 301.
358 14513/02, 19 November 2002, pp. 7-10.
The rationale behind mentioning these mechanisms together with the previously discussed election observation and assistance becomes primarily their contribution to the Early Warning Mechanisms (EWM) assessed in the following paragraph. EWM plays a crucial part of the RtoP concept.\textsuperscript{359} The role in moderating conflict cannot be doubted, however, the information gathering still remain crucial for the RtoP prevention, the first and foremost RtoP pillar. Existence of these mechanisms provide the EU with the possibility to carry in accordance with the ICC, the most crucial task relative to the conflict prevention and therefore to the RtoP.\textsuperscript{360}

7.3.3 \textit{Early Warning Unit}

The EWM represents the complex mechanism that must bring together all the possible policy instruments that can possible contribute to the diagnose of the situation, alert the decision-makers and operational centres about the emerging situation, analyse it and design the timely and effective response.\textsuperscript{361}

The EWU is composed of the eight task forces with the split competences into the particular thematic and geographic sections\textsuperscript{362} has been placed under the Council Secretariat together with the other Second pillar instruments reporting directly to the High Representative.\textsuperscript{363} The Joint situation centre support its work bringing together the expertise from the Policy unit and the military Situation centre monitoring and assessing crises worldwide twenty-four hours a day.\textsuperscript{364} The EWU further maintain close co-operation with other actors and entities coordinated within the Council Secretariat such as CFSP working groups, European Correspondents and MS.\textsuperscript{365}

\textsuperscript{359} ICISS, 2001(1), pp. 21-22.
\textsuperscript{360} Idem.
\textsuperscript{361} Supra note 357, pp. 16-21, ICISS, 2001(1), pp. 35-37.
\textsuperscript{362} The task forces are: European Security and Defence Policy, Western Balkans/Central Europe; Early Warning/Conflict Prevention/Terrorism; Horizontal Questions; Latin America; Russia/Ukraine/Transatlantic/Baltic States; Asia; Mediterranean/Middle East/Africa; and Administration/Security and Situation Centre/ Crisis Cell. See Supra note 357.
\textsuperscript{363} Gegout, 2010, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{364} Supra note 357, pp. 16-18, Gegout, 2010, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{365} Idem.
However, the critics pinpointed that the EWU focuses solely on the situations under the Second pillar often overlooking instruments and activities under the Community pillar that can also bring crucial data.\textsuperscript{366} The EWM should work as an umbrella concept bringing together the information not only from the entire EU system, but also from the systems at the disposal of the EU MS and the institutions. The existing mechanisms and legal basis together with the newly created post of the High Representative provide chances for the overcoming of the existing gaps and creation of the complex EWM.

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The chapter presented the instruments under the entire EU’s external policy. As it has been shown, the mechanisms exist to prevent the conflict, including the long-term structural prevention largely emphasised by the EU. In case of the emergence of the conflict, the EU has tools to react rapidly not only through the diplomatic means but also militarily under the framework of the actions of other organisation or autonomously. The specific mechanisms are also at the EU’s disposal for an immediate and the successive long-term post conflict reconstruction.

To sum up briefly the previous findings, the existing Primary EU law already provides basis to uphold the RtoP. Even though there are no legal texts yet explicitly mentioning the RtoP, the EU at least invokes it in its documents that have the considerable political value, therefore based on the previous explanations, it can be assumed that these documents express the EU’s consent with all parts of the RtoP concept. Similarly, in spite of the fact that the existing mechanisms have not been explicitly designed to carry out the RtoP, but deal rather with the conflict situations, they are available to the EU to respond to the RtoP situations in accordance with the RtoP guidelines therefore providing for their possible inclusion into the EU foreign policy.

There is no need to create either new EU law or new instruments, the coherent strategy designed exactly to carry out the RtoP is needed. The next part of the chapter shows how the EU can use its well-equipped external action toolbox within the RtoP framework.

\textsuperscript{366} Supra note 357.
8 Proposed guidelines for an EU action in the face of the RtoP situation: the conflict cycle, the emergence of the RtoP situation and the appropriate response

Since the EU’s mechanisms have been designed in relation to the conflict, it becomes crucial to draw the guidelines for an action based on the link between the individual parts of the conflict cycle, the emergence of the RtoP situation and the appropriate response. The analysis is based in the model of the conflict cycle designed by Swanström and Weissman.\(^{367}\) Going beyond their analyses the complex model is proposed showing during which phase of the conflict may the RtoP situation arise and what anticipates such an emergence, what strategy and simultaneously which of the RtoP responsibilities become relevant and which of the previously examined mechanisms should be employed. The Figure 1 shows in detail the relationship between the conflict cycle, the RtoP and the phase when the particular EU mechanisms shall be deployed and will be explained throughout the chapter.

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\(^{367}\) Swanström and Weissman, 2005, p. 11.
Figure I: Conflict cycle, RtoP and the deployment of the available EU mechanisms

**STABLE PEACE**

**Root causes:** illiteracy, lack of/uneven distribution of resources, religious, ethnic, cultural differences, illegitimate undemocratic regimes, lack of democracy, good governance and rule of law, insufficient HR protection

**UNSTABLE PEACE**

The unrest (electoral), demonstrations against the regime, disputes among the various groups in the areas potentially prone to the conflict

**OPEN CONFLICT**

Systematic human rights violations amounting/having the potential to amount into the RtoP crimes, refugee flow, displacement of persons

**CRISES**

>>CONFLICT CYCLE, CONFLICT DURATION>>

**STRUCTURAL PREVENTION** *  
**DIRECT PREVENTION** *  
**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT** *  
**CRISES MANAG.**

**RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT** ➔

Early warning mechanism 24/7 mapping the potential conflict zones

**RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT** ➔

RRM-IFS ➔ Exceptional assistance, Interim response

TARGETTED ASSISTANCE, FACT FINDING, EU SR ➔ MEDIATION, ➔ POLITICO ➔ DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS, ➔ POLITICAL DIALOGUE

SANCTIONS (2-step approach – Community and CFSP/CSDP pillars), EU CRISESA 
MANAGEMENT MACHINERY, CIVILIAN PROTECTION TEAMS, ASSESSMENT TEAMS PERSONNEL TO DEPLOY INTO INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS, ESDP MISSIONS, UN, NATO SUPPORT

WAR (PEACE ENFORCEMENT)

HR violations certainly amount to the RtoP crimes

**EU SPECIFIC POST-CONFLICT MEASURES:** REHABILITATION PROGRAMS, RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES, DDR (PROGRAMS SUPPORT OR COMPONENT OF THE CSDP MISSIONS)

**POST-CONFLICT PHASE**

The cessation of the hostilities, the perpetrators must be brought to the justice (trials), repatriation of the victims, DDR, reconciliation process
* The diagram has been inspired by the conflict cycle proposed by Swanström and Weissman.

According to Swanström and Weissman, the conflict can be described as cyclical regarding its intensity emerging from the relative stability with the possible escalation into an open conflict, crises and war, while the de-escalating phase leads again to the relatively stable peace. The cycle usually recurs until the durable peace has been achieved and conflict therefore resolved.

8.1 Stable and unstable peace

Undoubtedly, to launch the conflict prevention, the perception of the potential or already actual conflict must be detected. As the Figure 1 shows, the baseline situation could already be the relatively stable peace showing factors indicating the vulnerability of the society to the warfare – the root causes.

The conflict always causes the large human suffering, which can later amount to the RtoP crimes. The Responsibility to prevent then starts already during the stable peace encompassing the necessary long-term and structural prevention - the initial step, the EU must conduct thorough structural prevention without being afraid to push for the agreed commitments.

If the prevention fails and the country concerned moves into the stage of the unstable peace the immediate short-term conflict prevention becomes necessary. The EWM paying the attention to any dispute in the potentially conflict area presents the crucial instrument. The EWM must further play a role during the whole conflict phase starting from the period of the stable peace, the first pre-requisite for the effective response in

369 Idem.
370 Idem., p. 8.
373 ICISS, 2001(2), p. 32.
relation to the RtoP is the working EWM to monitor and warn about potential instability/emerging conflict that should be followed by the rapid reaction to the first sight of instability.\textsuperscript{374}

Considering the instruments the EU possesses as explained in the previous section, the humanitarian assistance can be provided if deemed necessary at this early stage of an emerging conflict.\textsuperscript{375}

The preventive measures suggested represents the civilian measures, which can only be deployed with the government of the state concerned and accord to the RtoP’s Second pillar, when the government becomes unable to uphold its RtoP.\textsuperscript{376} Having in mind the analysis in the previous two chapters, the mentioned action seems not that difficult to launch and therefore creates the baseline for on of the EU’s first actions in the face of the emerging RtoP situation. Similarly to the EU law and rhetoric\textsuperscript{377} the prevention would be the least difficult RtoP element for the EU.

8.2 The stage of open conflict and crises

The situation may deteriorate into an open-conflict and later to the crises. The large-scale and systematic HR violations already amounting or having the potential to amount into the four RtoP crimes are typical for this part of the conflict cycle.\textsuperscript{378} The displacement of the persons and the refugee flow becomes massive. Prevention continues playing the role of the crises diplomacy (conflict management) aiming to prevent the situation from

\begin{enumerate}
\item See Figure 1. As regards the co-ordination within the EU the studies, reports and assessments by the Commission must be taken into account next to the sole analysis of the CFSP/CSDP issues. The Commission prepares under the IfS the Multi-country Strategy Papers, Thematic Strategy Papers, Multi-annual Indicative Programmes and Annual Action programs relative to its implementation.\textsuperscript{374} The papers could also be used as an important source of the information (\textit{Supra note} 194).
\item See section 7.2.
\item Refer to the Chapters 4 and 5.
\end{enumerate}
deteriorating into the war.\textsuperscript{379} Notwithstanding the EU would be able to uphold the responsibility to Prevent, does not mean that it can carry out the whole concept. More severe measures and possibility to intervene must exist if the government concerned is unwilling to uphold its RtoP. In the time of crises, the coercion in the form of sanctions should already take place (part of the crises management). The responsibility to Prevent yields into the responsibility to react that continues through the situation of the war, where the peace enforcement operations become possible.

The deterioration of the situation into an open conflict already requires a targeted response effectively using the soft power and employing all possible financial and political mechanisms. The EU Special Representative shall exercise its mandate to contribute to the mediation of the situation as well as the political dialogue (under the CFSP/CSDP pillar) must be launched, while the measures from the previous step continues. The EU can also launch the fact-finding mission in order to gather as many information possible on the situation and the nature of the conflict in order to respond adequately, timely and effectively.

In case the conflict escalates to the crises, the responsibility to react of the international community becomes even more relevant than in the previous case. Emphasising the multilateral solution of the problems, the EU should in the first place speak loud at the international forums and call for an adequate measures. The ‘name and shame policy’ and the diplomatic demarches within other international organisations or a deterrent in the form of a possible suspension of the trade agreements or the development cooperation can be effective at the stage of an open conflict.

Sanctions against the country concerned must without doubts be launched at this stage. If the sanctions have been place under the UNSC Resolution, the EU must ensure that the organisation and its MS comply with the measures. The EU can also decide to place

\footnote{Idem.}
additional sanctions.\textsuperscript{380} The possible hesitance of the UNSC to place sanction shall not prevent the EU from the autonomous measures.\textsuperscript{381}

The EU emphasises the possibility to launch the intervention in order to prevent the situation from the escalation into the war.\textsuperscript{382} The CSDP mission either to support the existing crises-management activities ongoing under the UNSC Resolution or autonomously intervene should be then deployed at this stage. Protection and assessment teams would be well positioned to manage the conflict. Taking into account the effective multilateral engagement approach, the EU should not launch the military intervention at the stage.\textsuperscript{383}

8.3 The war

The escalation of the conflict into the war signalise that all the peaceful, diplomatic and humanitarian means failed and therefore the international community is in accordance with the RtoP entitled to exercise its Responsibility to React. In case the UNSC with the contribution of the EU lobbying, decides to act and launches the military intervention the EU must be ready to contribute the civilian and military capacities and work along with the partners (the UN, NATO, the African Union, the coalition of willing) to execute the UNSC resolution.

In case the UNSC fails to act the EU may think about the possible initiative in accordance with the ICISS proposal.\textsuperscript{384} However, the EU rather accepted the RtoP as endorsed at the World Summit 2005 and remains silent on the possibility to find the alternatives to the UNSC emphasising its primary responsibility for maintaining the international peace and security. On the other hand, the EU law does not explicitly prohibit the possible EU

\textsuperscript{380} ICISS, 2001(1), pp. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{381} Portela, Raube, 2009, pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{382} See Section 5.
\textsuperscript{383} See sections 4.3.2, 5.2 and 12.
\textsuperscript{384} ICISS, 2001(1), pp. XII-XIII.
mandated humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the EU should remain open-minded as regards the possible alternatives as it stated in one of its speeches. One way could be to launch the mission through the NATO as happened in 1999 in Kosovo. Establishment of the Coalition of willing explicitly under the EU mandate could also be possible and justifiable under the EU law.

8.3.1 The post-conflict phase

During the conflict, the peace-agreement is usually negotiated or measures are put in place to cease the violations, however, the peace and the stability, especially immediately after the cessation of the conflict, remains extremely fragile. Swanström and Weissman suggest that the conflict exists in the cycle and until the peace is really consolidated and the root causes are effectively tackled, the situation may repeat.

In the first place, the EU must ensure that the peacekeeping mission is in place. Such a role is in the most cases played by the UN, therefore the EU must be ready to support their activities either by the providing capacity or personnel. It can also deploy the CSDP mission to support the existing peacekeeping operation. It is highly unlikely that after the military engagement by the UN or other international organisation such as NATO, there would be no peacekeeping mission. Such possibility could hypothetically arise in the future in case the EU would launch its own peace enforcement mission surpassing the paralysed UNSC. In that case, the obligation to mandate the CSDP peacekeeping mission arises explicitly for the EU.

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385 Refer to the Section 4
387 Supra note 286, Fraser, 2007, pp. 172-174.
388 It goes beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss the legality of an intervention under the international law.
390 Supra note 129.
It is worth recalling that during the post-conflict period we deal with the responsibility to rebuild. Taking into account the conflict cycle, the rebuilding actually means prevention from the recurrence of the conflict.\textsuperscript{391} In line with the Figure 1, the mechanisms deployed during the escalation of the conflict shall take place also after the conflict. Next to the activities relative directly to the end of the conflict, such as DDR activities, reconciliation and the punishment of the war related (RtoP) crimes, the structural prevention, emphasises by the EU comes again to the play as demonstrated in the Figure I. The EU has at its disposal similar mechanism for the prevention of the conflict as well as post-conflict phase.\textsuperscript{392}

One extra component remains the capacity building. Post-conflict societies would demonstrate significant signs of badly managed, corrupted and not working law enforcement organs such as the police or judicial organs.\textsuperscript{393} The EU shall therefore support the civilian capacity-building activities or launch own mission to train police, judges and other state officials. Capacity building must also be directed to the civil society since it presents the viable role in the democratisation processes.\textsuperscript{394} Fundamental freedoms and HR must also be supported and therefore be component of every mission, office or activity deployed to the region.\textsuperscript{395}

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The proposed guidelines represent the ideal case. However, since they are based on the existing laws, tools and practice, they show that there is a way the EU could uphold the RtoP in its external action. The nature of the organisation and the way of the decision-making can play a role in the deployment of some of the mechanisms and lower the EU’s

\textsuperscript{391} Idem., ICISS, 2001(2), p. 32. The example could be drawn on the conflict in Sierra Leone between the 1991 and 2000, when the coup d’etat and crises reoccurred couple of times even despite two negotiated peace agreements in 1996 (Abijan Peace Agreement) and. 1999 (Lome Peace Agreement). Despite the currently relatively stable peace, the situation in Sierra Leone remains fragile and the country therefore needs the continuous peace building that in the same time represents the conflict prevention. Structural conflict prevention plays the crucial role. See UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone: background (Public), 2005, available at \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html} (consulted on 3 May 2011).

\textsuperscript{392} Swanström and Weissman, 2005, p. 5-20.

\textsuperscript{393} \textit{Supra note} 275.

\textsuperscript{394} See the EuropeAid Study dealing with the post-conflict building \textit{Supra note} 194.

\textsuperscript{395} Moeckli, Nowak, 2007, pp. 88-90.
ability as an external actor, which has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. However, one important conclusion seems to be arising at this stage: basing the guidelines in existing cases, it has been shown that the EU generally acts in the line with the RtoP. The major problem seems lack of the ‘RtoP speak’ within the EU’s action.

We shall now move towards the application of the guidelines on the real case examining whether they could be operational and whether the EU can to some extend be able to invoke the RtoP in its external action. Secondly, it shall be assessed, whether the EU, in case it acts in accordance with the RtoP concept, uses the appropriate wording. These too considerations would play important role while assessing to what extent will the EU be able to invoke the RtoP in its foreign policies in the future.

9 Focus on the implementation: Case study - Libya

The last chapter of the thesis moves to the practical level focusing on the implementation of the findings and proposed guidelines to the real situation. It has been shown that based on the EU law and its understanding by the organisation as well as the existing mechanisms, the EU would be able to carry out the RtoP. The Guidelines proposed the ideal way of its action. However, the research question to what extent will the EU be able to use the RtoP in its external action, cannot be answered without the examination of the real case. As one of the co-founders of the RtoP concept Gareth Evans pointed out, the international response to the crises in Libya follows precisely how the RtoP principle should be applied. With the exception of the couple of states that expressed concerns about the military intervention for humanitarian purposes into Libya, the international community remained surprisingly united in condemning the events in the country as well as in its response recalling the RtoP concept. Libya presents the textbook case for the

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396 Evans, 2011.
RtoP and therefore the ideal case to examine the EU’s reaction to the emerging RtoP situation.

The chapter is divided into three parts. Firstly, the conflict, its origin, nature and phases are examined followed by the international response. The EU’s reaction is drawn in the last part of the chapter.

9.1 The conflict overview and the emergence of the RtoP situation

In the assessment of the Libyan conflict and the international reaction, the chapter moves along the lines of the proposed conflict cycle. The rationale is to ensure that the assessment of whether the EU has deployed effectively all the mechanisms at its disposal relevant to the particular phase of the conflict and the related responsibility under the RtoP explained in the previous chapter, which is going to be one of the criteria for the evaluation of the EU’s response.

The conflict in Libya started in mid-February 2011. During the so-called ‘Arab spring’ marked by the uproars in the Arab world starting in Tunisia and Egypt, the number of peaceful anti-governmental demonstrations happening in Libya has been violently suppressed by the forces of the Libyan regime. Contrary to the events in the neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, the situation in Libya soon escalated into the civil war dividing the country between the opposition-led East and the West controlled by the regime. The ongoing conflict, leaving behind thousands of death and wounded, is the consequence of the history of more than 40 years of the Gaddafi’s regime and the persistent problem of the constant widespread violations of civil and political rights. The problem of the corruption, the abuse of power and the undemocratic government have not been tackled

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either, which contributed to the escalation of the conflict.\footnote{Idem.} We shall now turn to the conflict in more detail.

\subsection*{9.1.1 From stability to the conflict}

Assuming from the UN action that lifted the embargo on Libya in 2003, the situation in the country has been stable and relatively peaceful until the mid-February.\footnote{EuropeAid: Libya, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/libya/libya_en.htm (consulted on 1 July 2011).} However, considering the root causes that can possibly escalate into the RtoP situation, the problems could have been anticipate. First problem can be named the nature of the regime.

Overthrowing the monarchy in power, Gaddafi came into force in 1969. On the basis of his own role he established the Jamahiriya (‘the state of masses’) creating the Constitution that has generally prohibited the state representation as well as liberties similar to the democratic freedom of expression.\footnote{Supra note 398, The Constitution of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 11 December 1969} The radical refusal of the political representation together with the institutionalisation through the reliance of the regime on the family and the tribal solidarities to support its power, has not allowed for the creation of any civil society.\footnote{Idem., Gaddafi, 1975.} To maintain such an order in the contemporary world became simply impossible on one hand, on the other, the Gaddafi’s unwillingness to leave something of his own creation should have been expected.

The second reason leading to the uprisings was Gaddafi’s undemocratic ruling and the violations of the HR. Already during period of stability Libya has demonstrated failure to comply with the IHRL refusing the whole range of civil and political rights to its population.\footnote{Libya is part to the major human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified on 15 May 1970) and the Convention against Torture (ratified on 16 May 1992). Moreover, many human rights that are repeatedly violated in Libya has been attributed the status of the customary international law (See Section 3.2). For more information about the Libyan human right record see CPR/C/LBY/CO/4, 15 November, 2007, U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Report: Libya, 8} Arbitrary and unlawful detentions have been widespread. The regime has
violated the right to fair trial and held prisoners of consciousness, while the torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment and punishment, forced disappearances, extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions have been reported as well as the violations of the freedom of expression. The 1969 Constitution already limits the freedom of speech to the “within the limits of the public interest and the principles of the Revolution,” however, in practice the free speech has been much more restricted and those discussing sensitive political topics faced the reprisals. The Publication Act of the 1972 Articles 18, 19, 21, 22 and 25 further severely limits the freedom of opinion and expression. The law has also prohibited the foundation of the political parties, the membership in them or any other kind of the political affiliation. Law 71 of the 1975 Penal Code condemned all political activity as treason and the 1969 Revolutionary Council Decision explicitly abolished all forms of the political opposition. Many individuals has also been imprisoned or sentenced to death on the basis of the Law 80 of the 1975 Penal code for the offences against the security of state. The denial of the economic and social rights also lasted over years.

The mentioned consequences became the reason for the ongoing civil war. First protests held already in January reflected the discontent of the population with the governmental corruption and housing and development provisions followed by calls for a larger freedom. The Amnesty International and other organisations claim that the initiators, 


[405](#) See CPR/C/LBY/CO/4, 15 November 2007, para 14, 15, 19.

[406](#) Libyan Constitution, Art. 13 *Supra note* 402.

[407](#) *Supra note* 405, para 23.


[409](#) *Supra note* 405, para 23.

[410](#) The ‘security of state law’ is well known for being misused by many repressive regimes to eliminate the political opposition. See U.S. Human Rights Report: Libya, *Supra note* 404.


HR activists, journalists and other have been arrested, while some reported the beating, torture, rape or other sexual harassment while in detention.\textsuperscript{413}

In the conditions similar to those, any such kind of action endangers the stability of the country as it exactly happened in this particular case. Over 500 protesters stepped against the imprisonment of the activists in the mid-February in Benghazi, but were violently repressed by the police that let into other series of the subsequent peaceful anti–governmental demonstrations suppressed by the forces of the Libyan regime.\textsuperscript{414} The instability caused by the protests and the subsequent response of the government escalated quickly into the open conflict with the relevant humanitarian implications.

The detentions of the demonstrators and the use of force against the peaceful assembly after the beginning of the protest have violated the IHRL, more specifically, the use of lethal force against the protester signalize the violation of the obligation established under the right to life, therefore those responsible can be prosecuted by the international criminal justice or the universal jurisdiction mechanism.\textsuperscript{415}

\subsection*{9.1.2 From conflict to the war}

February clashes of the protesters in Tripoli, Tobruk, Misrata and Benghasi with the armed government forces extremely quickly escalated into the crises\textsuperscript{416} causing the emergence of the RtoP situation, signalised already during the previous phases of the conflict. Gaddafi launched the counter offensive on 6\textsuperscript{th} March with the army of his

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\textsuperscript{414} FIDH, Libya towards a bloody revolution, 18 February 2011, http://www.fidh.org/Libya-Towards-a-bloody-revolution (consulted on 29 June 2011), ACHPR v Libya, Supra note 413.


\textsuperscript{416} FIDH, Libya towards a bloody revolution, 18 February 2011, http://www.fidh.org/Libya-Towards-a-bloody-revolution (consulted on 29 June 2011), ACHPR v Libya, Supra note 413.
supporters and the hired mercenaries from Africa and Europe dividing the country into the above-mentioned opposition-led East and the regime-controlled West.\textsuperscript{417} Since then, following the conflict cycle, the country fell into the civil war, which is still ongoing. The systematic and widespread violations of the international law, IHRL and IHL by the Gaddafi’s forces became one of the said everyday realities marking current situation in Libya.

HR violations typical for the early stages of the conflict became widespread and systematic and amounted to the RtoP crimes. Libya reached early the stage of the war of the non-international character (the stage classified as a crises and in its later stage a war in accordance with the Figue I)\textsuperscript{418}, therefore the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions,\textsuperscript{419} together with the Common Article 3\textsuperscript{420} and the provisions of the customary international law apply. The HR Council has found that Libyan authorities has systematically violated the right to life, liberty and security of person and the human dignity,\textsuperscript{421} which in the course of the conflict amount to the breach of the international humanitarian law and therefore to the war crimes.\textsuperscript{422} Further, the attacks directed indiscriminately to the civilian targets, attacks to the protected persons such as medical units, transports using the Geneva Conventions emblems as well as the humanitarian workers.\textsuperscript{423}

Using of the rape systematically as a method of warfare by the regime, torture and the use of mercenaries to systematically commit massive violations of HR of the people of Libya amounted to the crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{424}

\textsuperscript{417} Supra note 398.  
\textsuperscript{418} Consult Figure 1 in Section 70.  
\textsuperscript{420} Idem., Preamble.  
\textsuperscript{421} A/HRC/17/44, 1 June 2011, p. 7.  
\textsuperscript{422} Idem., Art. 2(a).  
\textsuperscript{423} Idem.  
\textsuperscript{424} See A/HRC/17/44, 1 June 2011 for detailed list of crimes committed in Libya. For the definition of the Crimes against humanity refer to the Section 3.2.2 of the thesis.
Based on these criteria, the situation clearly falls into the category of the RtoP case, therefore requires adequate international response and of course that of the EU.

9.2 The international response

Before turning particularly to the subject of the EU’s reaction, the international response under the UN, especially in the phase of the open conflict, crises and the war, must be examined. As it has been shown the EU law, rhetoric and action rather imply that the EU would exercise its responsibility to react in the framework of the international action.\footnote{See Chapters 4&5 of the thesis.} The mechanisms also exist rather to support the international community in action.\footnote{Consult Chapter 7.} The assessment of the international reaction in the phases of the conflict where the responsibility to prevent yields into the responsibility to react becomes therefore very relevant for the examination of the EU’s action and is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The first international action that came already during earlier stages – the late open conflict stage/early crises stage, was the Arab League’s suspension of the Libyan membership on the 22 February due to the assault of the civilian population.\footnote{S/2011/393 – A/65/877, 27 June 2011, para 34.} Following this act, the HRC decided to urgently dispatch the independent international commission of inquiry mandated to investigate the violations of the IHRL\footnote{See A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, 1 March 2011, para 11. The resolution was adopted without vote on 25 February 2001.} and the UNGA unanimously suspended Libya from the HR Council.\footnote{A/RES/65/265, 1 March 2011, para 1.}

During this time even the UNSC unanimously adopted the Resolution 1970\footnote{S/RES/1970(2011), 26 February 2011.} that explicitly recalls the RtoP of the Libyan authorities, mechanism typical for the crises phase of the conflict.\footnote{Idem., Preamble.} Acting under the Chapter VII UN Charter the UNSC used the
measures included in the Article 41.\textsuperscript{432} Calling for an immediate ceasefire and respect for the IHRL and IHL it imposed the arms embargo and travel ban on Libya and order to freeze the accounts and possible financial resources of the regime official’s.\textsuperscript{433} The Resolution has also allowed for the referral of Libya to the ICC.\textsuperscript{434} As it has been shown in the previous parts, the punishment under the international criminal law can work as a deterrent, however, can also play a role later during the post-conflict building, therefore such a step is definitely reasonable at this stage of the conflict. The UN has further engaged in the political and humanitarian dialogue dispatching the Special envoy to Libya.\textsuperscript{435}

The mentioned measures have been implied already in the situation of an open conflict/crises, therefore they are of a forcible nature, but have no military implications. The responsibility to prevent still prevail trying to eliminate the possibility of the further escalation of the conflict on one hand, on the other, they present a form of the international reaction to the atrocities committed in Libya. As regards the sanctions, the instrument of a more coercive nature, their use usually comes to the play when the situation escalates to the crises. As it has said, the process of the escalation of the situation into the crises has been very fast in Libya therefore it becomes difficult to draw the clear line between the individual stages. The approximate division remains however necessary to later link the EU’s action to the different phases of the conflict and to the international response.

The crises escalated even more quickly into the war. Therefore, the UNSC adopted another Resolution assuming the responsibility of the international community in reaction to the Libya’s unwillingness to carry out its RtoP.\textsuperscript{436} The Resolution established the non-fly zones aiming at protect the population and authorised UN MS and regional

\textsuperscript{432} The Article 41 UN Charter allows the UNSC to decide on the coercive measures except the use of force. UN Charter, 26 June 1945, Art. 41.  
\textsuperscript{433} Supra note 430, para 9-21.  
\textsuperscript{434} Idem., para 4-8.  
organisations to enforce it through all the necessary means.\textsuperscript{437} The international operation started on 23 March 2011 led originally by the France and UK sharing the command with the US.\textsuperscript{438} The NATO took first control over the arms embargo, later the enforcement of the non-fly zones has been transferred to the organisation and on 27 March it undertook control over all the operations in Libya.\textsuperscript{439} Such an action shows that the RtoP has actually been followed to the most extreme extent since the military intervention can be applied only as a last resort and only if other means proves not to work,\textsuperscript{440} which has been the case of Libya.

The conflict stopped currently at this stage therefore the responsibility to rebuild can only be estimated, which is important in order to discuss possible reaction of the EU. The assumptions can be based on the up-to-date practice since the peacekeeping and the engagement of the international community in the post conflict rebuilding became quite common. As the contemporary practice shows,\textsuperscript{441} the international community is willing to engage in the country rebuilding processes, while the contemporary peace-keeping missions include the component aiming at tackle the root causes of the conflict and consolidate the peace. Taking into account the causes of the conflict in Libya, the HR and rule of law component must definitely be included. Since the country is without the real democratic experience, the capacity building, training of judges, police and other organs will be necessary as well as the assistance with the organisation of the country’s first elections. The arrest warrant issued by the ICC following the Resolution 1970 against three prominent regime figures (including the president Muammar Gaddafi) holding them responsible for crimes against humanity at the Libyan territory\textsuperscript{442} implies necessity to punish the perpetrators and the willingness of the international community to do so.

\textsuperscript{437} Idem., para 4-12.
\textsuperscript{440} See section 3, ICISS, 2001(1), pp. XII-XIII.
\textsuperscript{441} See for example mentioned Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, etc. Supra note 103&125.
\textsuperscript{442} The Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Pre-trial Chamber I) [2011] ICC 01/11-01/11
therefore, the establishment of some kind of the truth and reconciliation position can be anticipated.

The analysis show that the international community moves truly in accordance with the RtoP concept and it can be estimated that it will further continue since the most difficult and controversial part of the action (the possibility of the military intervention) has been past. Based on the international community action and the background of the conflict, we can now assume, whether the EU also follows the guidelines based in the RtoP concept and its law and expressed will.

9.3 The EU and Libya: The EU’s response to the crisis

As regards the EU, the long-term structural prevention will also be briefly analysed. This dimension has not been discussed in the case of the international community because the EU has its own policies to deal with the structural prevention and is not at all dependent on the international community action. Such an analyses would not be of relevance for the topic studied.

9.3.1 Before the Libyan crises: the structural prevention

The EU has had no political relations with Libya until the 2003 when the UN lifted the sanctions. Even though the political contacts opened between both countries immediately after this action, Libya still has not been part to any association agreement. In 2006, the Council Regulation 1638/2006 laid down the provisions for the Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument for the period between 2007 and 2013 including Libya into its plan. Since the 2007, the negotiations started to possibly

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443 Supra note 401.
444 Idem.
conclude the EU-Libya framework agreement\textsuperscript{446} aiming to strengthen the economic integration and political cooperation based on the EU values and principles.\textsuperscript{447}

Lack of the structural prevention and the promotion of the HR, democracy and the rule of law definitely contributed to the escalation of the conflict into such an extent. The Tunisia and Egypt were much more involved with the EU and are now ready for the elections – the first step towards the democratic practices. The existence of an agreement with the stronger conditionality rewarding the democratic values and the rule of law could have tackled some of the root causes and prevent the conflict from escalating into such an extent. However, such an agreement was not possible without the political will of the country concerned. Taking into account the character of the abovementioned Libyan regime condemning the majority of the democratic principles, the agreement based on the European values becomes generally impossible.

That brings us to the limitations of the EU’s structural prevention. The EU does not have mechanism to do much if the country is unwilling to co-operate and is not interested in the possible advantages of the partnership with the EU. The only way remaining is the ‘name and shame policy’ that the EU applies to for example to the North Korea or Burma through tabling every year the resolution in the UNGA condemning the HR situation in the particular country.\textsuperscript{448} The resolution against Libya has not however been tabled. It can be assumed that even though the characteristics of the regime mentioned above indicated possible problems, the structural policy in the RtoP sense that would focus on the possible root causes of the problem in the countries potentially prone to the conflict was incomplete and insufficient and therefore the responsibility to react came to play.

\textsuperscript{446} Supra note 401. Negotiation of the EU-Libya framework management: Report on budgetary and financial management – Financial year 2010 [2011], OJ C 167/1

\textsuperscript{447} Idem.,

\textsuperscript{448} A/RES/64/238, 26 March 2010, A/RES/64/175, 26 March 2010.
9.3.2 First signs of instability: The EU’s initial reaction to the nascent conflict

Reacting quickly to the emerging situation of instability, the EU through the ECHO dispatched humanitarian aid and the civil protection teams into the Libyan-Tunisian and Libyan-Egyptian borders to assess the overall situation and the humanitarian needs. On the 20 February on the request of Italy, it dispatched the border control operation Hermex supported financially and technically by the 14 EU MS. It has also immediately suspended the negotiations of the EU-Libya framework agreement.

Taking into account that most of the instruments employed in the early stage of the conflict deal with the emergence of the refugee related problem, it could be assumed that the EU acknowledges the link between the HR violations and the international security. Therefore it tries to primarily focus on the stability in the region including its own territory. Such an approach reflects the second pillar of the RtoP. If the state finds itself unable to uphold its RtoP it must seek the international assistance. The EU therefore decided to first help Italy, Egypt and Tunisia taking into account the possible consequence of the massive refugee flow that could often lead to the conflict and also to the emergence of the RtoP situation. The use of the humanitarian aid as a direct conflict prevention exactly reflects the proposed guidelines. The use of conditionality leading to the suspension of the negotiations of the agreement corresponds to another EU tool used for the conflict prevention.

9.3.3 The conflict and the crises: interaction with the action of the international community and other organisations

When the situation escalated into the conflict and subsequently into the crises and the UN has imposed first restrictive measures through the resolution 1970, the EU has immediately implemented the UNSC sanctions through the Council Decision 2011/137 adopted under the Second pillar. To ensure the coherence and the appropriate

450 Hertog, 2011, pp. 7-11.
451 Supra note 449.
application of all proposed sanctions, the EU has simultaneously adopted the Council Regulation 204/2011 stating that the measures must be applied under both TFEU and the TEU.\textsuperscript{453} Such a double legislation for one action reflects the mentioned two-step approach during the implementation of the sanctions and leads to the conclusion that the EU in practice managed to overcome the problem of the incoherence between the institutions and achieved the better level of coordination between the Commission and the Council.

Besides the mere following of the action of the international community the EU has mobilised the Humanitarian assistance instrument of €70 million\textsuperscript{454} for the medical and food aid, shelter and other necessities and the Civil protection mechanism established for the repatriation of the third country nationals wanting to leave Libya.\textsuperscript{455} Additional money through the Emergency Aid Reserve has been channelled through the Civil protection mechanism.\textsuperscript{456} The EU has also coordinated closely with the partners and allocated funds to their operations.\textsuperscript{457}

The targeted humanitarian aid and economic assistance again reflects the mechanisms to be used for the direct conflict prevention and the conflict management. The Civil protection mechanism has not been included in the guidelines, however, reflects the emphasis of the EU of its primary RtoP towards its citizens.\textsuperscript{458} As it is reflected in the EU law and the EU’s rhetoric, the EU’s foreign policy similarly seems primarily to carry out this objective. The cooperation and the funding of the partner’s operations support the argument that the EU wants to carry out its conflict management policies within the framework of the other organisations.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[454]{As explained in the Chapter 7, the instrument for the humanitarian action is deployed under the Regulation on humanitarian aid, Art. 13, \textit{Supra note 326}.}
\footnotetext[455]{COM/2011/0303final, 3 March 2003.}
\footnotetext[456]{\textit{Supra note 449}.}
\footnotetext[457]{The key partners are the IOM, UNHCR, IFRC, ICRC and the money the funds are used among others to the needs of the emergency humanitarian assistance, evacuation, transport of refugees, distribution of food, aid, shelter and the construction of transit sites and similar. \textit{Supra note 301}. For more information consult also \url{http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/actors/partners_en.htm}.}
\footnotetext[458]{See chapter 5.}
\end{footnotesize}
In order to receive up-to-date information about the situation and draw the response adequately (including the allocation of funds), the EU has sent the expert from the ECHO department to Libya and also dispatched the fact-finding team\(^\text{459}\) again following the mechanisms proposed in the guidelines. The High Representative has also travelled to Libya to negotiate and lead the political dialogue.

To sum up briefly, except of the effective structural prevention, the EU seems to further follow the RtoP concept in this case. We shall now move to the most difficult part of the RtoP – the responsibility to react that in many case put the EU into the difficult situation and showed its weaknesses stemming from the different national interests of its MS and related inability of the EU to act unanimously.\(^\text{460}\) Do the new provisions in the Lisbon treaty designed to overcome these problems already have some effects? The next part of the chapter will deal particularly with the EU’s action under the responsibility to react.

### 9.3.4 The phase of the civil war: reflecting the UN action

The EU kept in the first place extending the restrictive measures against Libya following the UN Resolution 1970/2011 and the later UN Resolution 1973/2011. In the recent sanctions it went even further beyond the UNSC Resolutions, however, it remained in its framework.\(^\text{461}\) As regards the authorization of the enforcement of the restrictive measures in the UNSC Resolution 1973/2011, the contribution of the EU MS and the way the operations has been carried out was already explained. We shall therefore move to the problems that emerged at the EU level.

The similar situation arose again – the EU did not reach unity. Instead of speaking with one voice while adopting the resolution, Germany together with other four non-European countries abstained from the vote\(^\text{462}\) stating that together with the abstention it does not intend to contribute funds, troops or personnel to the operation. However, this time the situation has been to some extend overcome. The argument for that is threefold: Firstly,

\(^{459}\) Vogel, 2011.

\(^{460}\) See the Chapter 6.


\(^{462}\) See SC/10200, 17 March 2011.
Germany, even though abstaining, did not use the language condemning the intervention.\textsuperscript{463} It rather judged Libya for the atrocities committed against its citizens and expressed support for the sanctions and the involvement of the international community.\textsuperscript{464} The cautious language seemed to be used exactly for purpose not to undermine completely the EU’s unity.

Secondly, despite the Germany’s abstention, the EU, precisely the President of the European Council and the EU High Representative, still managed to adopt the common statement\textsuperscript{465} acknowledging the Resolution 1973 as clear legal basis for protecting Libyan people and expressing the EU’s commitment to implement the Resolution.\textsuperscript{466} The speech has been followed by the new sanctions adopted in the light of the Resolution 1973.\textsuperscript{467}

Thirdly, the EU was able to adopt the Decision mandating the stand-by CSDP mission EUFOR deployable upon the possible request of the UN.\textsuperscript{468}

Due to these reasons, it can be assumed that the EU in this particular case overcame the problem of the national interest of one of the MS. The inter-governmental decision-making did not affect too much the performance of the EU as a whole. The troops from other EU MS exist to contribute to the intervention, while the EU as an entity supports it in its rhetoric. The intervention is however not carried out as a EU intervention. Taking into account the previous consideration, the EU did generally never touched the issue of the possible autonomous EU intervention without the UNSC authorisation and without

\textsuperscript{463} Idem.
\textsuperscript{464} Idem.
\textsuperscript{466} Idem.
\textsuperscript{467} Supra note 461, The Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 288/2011 implementing Article 16(1) and (2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 204/2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya extended the visa ban and asset freezes. The measures show that the EU went beyond the UN sanctions.
partners. Therefore, such an approach reflects the previous findings and is led exactly in line with the proposed guidelines.

9.3.5 **The Rebuilding phase: the expected EU conduct**

Similarly to the international action, the conduct of the EU in the post-conflict phase can only be estimated taking into account the previous cases. Since the EU is directly involved in the conflict resolution in Libya, the territory, where the conflict is held lies close to the EU border therefore the instability may negatively influence the peace and security in the EU, therefore it remains of the EU’s concern to engage in the peace building. Similarly to the previous case, the EU will probably support the EU peacekeeping mission in case of its deployment. Further, the fact-finding mission and the Special Representative for Libya may continue their work providing the EU with the necessary information, advice on activities necessary to bring the situation to the stable peace and if necessary contribute to the necessary post-conflict management.\(^{469}\)

Taking into account the nature of the conflict, the democratic training of the police, judges and officials and possible security sector reform will be necessary as well as the assistance with the first possible democratic elections. The assistance to the creation of the civil society will also be necessary taking into account the missing experience with representative democracy and the overall democratic processes. The EU has the long tradition in such an activities,\(^{470}\) therefore it could be estimated that it will conduct its own activities or support the peace building processes of the other international and regional organizations.

From the point of view of the peace consolidation it could be expected that the EU will continue the negotiation of the framework agreement and learning from the previous lessons, it will try to integrate Libya into the EU partnership, aid, trade and development

\(^{469}\) See Figure I.

\(^{470}\) See inter alia EU contribution to the establishment of the EU Police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure follow up of the UN IPTF, EU Police Mission for the Palestinian territories, EU Police Mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector and its interface with the system of justice in the DRC (EUPOL RD CONGO), Contribution from the EU to the conflict settlement process in South Ossetia, EU Rule of law mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS), etc. *Supra note* 194.
programs and agreements since such policies has proven the most effective in preventing the conflicts in Europe.\footnote{471}

\section*{9.4 Conclusions stemming from the Libyan conflict}

The case of Libya has shown that the EU is able to conduct its action in accordance with the proposed guidelines, therefore, to follow the RtoP framework. The operationalisation of the Civil protection mechanism demonstrates that the EU primary carry out the RtoP towards its citizens, however, it strives to prevent the conflict and therefore uphold its responsibility towards the Third country citizens to prevent the mass atrocities amounting the to the RtoP crimes.

In case the crimes occur as in the case of Libya, the EU plays a role in the responsibility to react, however, at this stage, taking into account the current organisational setting enhanced by the inter-governmental decision making and the self-interests of the EU MS, it is highly unlikely that the EU would conduct the action on its own. Such possibility only exist under the EU law, however, has not yet been reflected in any practice. Stemming from the previous experience, it could be possible that the UK or France would possibly support the autonomous EU’s intervention, however, other states such as Germany would not approve.\footnote{472}

To assume the responsibility to rebuild does not create the problem for the EU since it is its practice for past years, therefore, it can be estimated that the EU will also assume the responsibility to rebuild in the case of Libya that will yield into the structural prevention. However, the political will of the country concerned remains one of the most important aspects to make it successful. That has also bee acknowledged by the EU.\footnote{473}

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item See Section 7.1.1.
\item The assumption has been made from an observation that the UK or France are generally more willing to go into the war. On the other hand the case of Germany has proven that for other states, the UNSC authorisation is still not sufficient.
\end{itemize}}
10 Conclusion

The research question asked to what extent will be the EU able to invoke the RtoP in its future external action. The answer has primarily been sought in the EU law analysed carefully in line with the international RtoP showing that the EU law provides for the space for the RtoP even going beyond the international definition. The existing responsibility to prevent cannot be doubted. The legal basis for the reaction and responsibility to rebuild were also found building upon the HR as heart of the EU’s external action (especially after the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty) but also the link between the security and prosperity of the EU and HR.

It is worth recalling the EU’s willingness to seek the multilateral solution to the problem, which implies likelihood of the EU’s action relative to the RtoP’s third pillar under the UNSC umbrella rather than the autonomous intervention. It could be assumed that the EU moves along the RtoP as endorsed at the 2005 World Summit, but focuses more on prevention and therefore can push its operationalisation.

Having found the normative setting to uphold the RtoP within the EU, thesis then analysed the mechanisms available to the EU to uphold RtoP. The EU proved to have at its disposal the toolbox designed for a possible RtoP action, which has been shown on the subsequent guidelines and their application to the Libyan case.

The Libya case demonstrated that the EU is even able to overcome the tension caused by its institutional setting. However, the role of the separate legal order for an external action cannot be underestimated.

Even though the analysis implies that the EU can carry out the RtoP policies, one crucial element must be mentioned. EU keeps supporting the RtoP in its statements that are not binding, however, it never invokes in the legal instrument. The case of Libya created an excellent opportunity, however, the EU did not benefit it. To answer the research question, it becomes necessary to think what is missing at this stage. The EU does not
lack the RtoP rhetoric on one hand, but it does not either lack the RtoP related activities on the other. The combination of these two sides is what is missing. As Gareth Evans argues cannot yet invoke the RtoP in the relevant situations.\textsuperscript{474} It goes beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss the reasons why the EU does not use the RtoP properly since it is able and seemingly willing to act accordingly. The thesis shall conclude by saying that to large possible extent the EU already uses the RtoP in its external action. The only element, which is lacking is the explicit codification of the concept in the EU law.

\textsuperscript{474} Evans, 2001.
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The Prosecutor v Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Pre-trial Chamber I) [2011] ICC 01/11-01/11

Useful links
The EU-UN: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-un.org
Summaries of EU legislation: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
Human Rights Council Webpage: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
ECHO Webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/actors/partners_en.htm
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<th>OTHER DOCUMENTS</th>
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<td>GAERC: Council Conclusions on UN summit, 18 July 2005 (<a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_4929_en.htm">http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_4929_en.htm</a>)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In relation to the RtoP it is necessary to strengthen the UN HR machinery and build capacity for the rapid action. Speech by the Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP Benita Ferero-Waldner, The UN at the Cross Roads – signposting the way to the successful summit, International Peace Academy 3 June 2005 (<a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_4767_en.htm">http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_4767_en.htm</a>) The emergence of the RtoP acceptance seems encouraging. If the states shows themselves unwilling or unable to uphold their RtoP, the international community must step in. Failure to act in Rwanda and Darfur is shameful and caused only by the political implications and the tough action. There is a need to bridge the gap between the post-conflict assistance and long-term stabilization.</td>
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<td>2687th Council Meeting: EU Council Conclusions – UN World</td>
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<td>EU, Presidency Statement: General Assembly Consultations on cluster</td>
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<td>11 November 2005</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5245_en.htm">http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5245_en.htm</a></td>
<td>EU strongly welcomes the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. For the first time, UN member states have affirmed their responsibility to protect their own populations, and the international community has acknowledged that it should act collectively, through the UN Security Council, if states fail to protect their populations from these violations. The Responsibility to Protect will be an important tool of the international community for addressing the worst atrocities.</td>
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<td>22 November 2005</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5345_en.htm">http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5345_en.htm</a></td>
<td>EU Council Conclusions: EU strategy for Africa. Broaden and invigorate the EU-AU political dialogue and co-operation in the field of peace and security, including crisis management, as well as on multilateral issues such as the UN Peace Building Commission, the Responsibility to Protect, and counter-terrorism. Structure this political dialogue through meetings at the EU or AU, involving EU HOMs. Enhance joint monitoring and reporting on these related subjects by EU HOMs for enhanced EU policy response. Reinforce co-operation with the UN, AU and sub-regional Organisations in the areas of conflict prevention and peace support, including issues of good governance and human rights. Develop the ESDP/Euromed dialogue in this context.</td>
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legitimate interest if national governments fail to uphold this primary responsibility. EU further emphasises prevention. UNSC plays a key role if the international peace breaks down. Its major role would be to establish multi-dimensional operations ensuring humanitarian considerations are taken into account.

**EU Presidency Statement: UN/regional organisation, 25 July 2005**


With sovereignty comes rights and responsibilities. The EU endorses the concept of the RtoP. The primary responsibility rests with the national state. If state is unwilling or unable to carry out this responsibility, the IC should act properly to maintain international peace and security. Flagrant HR violations call for a strong action.

**EU Presidency Statement: Draft outcome document of the High Level plenary meeting of the UNGA, 28 July 2005**


EU welcomes the paragraphs on the RtoP in the World Summit Outcome Document. The international agreement has finally, with the long overdue, been reached. Primary responsibility stems from the UDHR. If the national state is unable or unwilling the international community should help or take action. International community responds or to decide to act through a comprehensive range of measures including collective action through the UNSC. If necessary the use of force would be possible with the UNSC authorisation.

**EU Presidency Statement: UN World Summit 2005, 14 September 2005**


EU, the global player, EU strongly welcomes the agreement on the RtoP. Primary responsibility lies with each individual state. If the state is unable or unwilling the international community should act through the UNSC having at its disposal comprehensive range of measures, collective action… The force could be used in extreme cases.

**European Community statement: UN High level meeting, 16 September 2005**


The recognition of our collective RtoP is an important outcome.

**EU Presidency Statement: General Debate of the 60th Session of the UNGA 60th, 17 September 2005**
EU refers to the progress made in the world by the recognition of the RtoP at the 2005 World Summit.

EU Presidency Statement: UNSC Open Debate, role of civil society in conflict prevention, 20 September 2005

The interaction between civil society and international community would be vital if we are to implement the RtoP.

European Parliament: Joint resolution on the UN reform, 29 September 2005

EU welcomes the recognition of the RtoP of the international community. Clear RtoP of each state and the importance of that of the international community.

EU Presidency Statement: Report of the UNSG on the work of the organization, 29 September 2005

The Secretary General has said that we will achieve neither development nor security without respect for human rights. Over fifty years the UN has had remarkable success. It has built a framework of international human rights law that sets clear standards by which all states are judged. As has long been recognised, however, when those standards are breached, we have not always done enough. The EU welcomes the unprecedented recognition of the international community's responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.

EU Presidency Statement: First Committee UNGA, General Statement, 3 October 2005

EU strongly welcome the agreement on the RtoP. It is an important step towards the peace and security. EU is committed to play its role on the ground having currently the military, police and civilian presence in Bosnia, Aceh, Iraq and supports African Union in Darfur.

EU, Presidency Statement to the UNSC: Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict, 9 December 2005

At the World Summit three months ago, our Heads of State and government reached a historic agreement on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The European Union regarded this outcome, embracing the concept at the highest level, as one of the most important of the Summit. R2P is a distinct concept, carefully set out in the World Summit Outcome. But it clearly relevant to the issue of the

Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. The EU, within the respective competences of the Community and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries, and take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in line with the European strategy against the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons and their ammunitions. **The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect.**

We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate donor support in the area of conflict prevention.

### EU Priorities for the 61st UNGA, 18 July 2006,

EU strive that the agreement reached in 2005 will be translated into willingness to act in specific cases.


Para 8.1.3. Responsibility to protect: The EU should support the concept of the responsibility to protect and make sure that this concept is translated into meaningful commitments and action on the part of States, including making full use of the International Criminal Court. The Summit should endorse the concept of the responsibility to protect. If the Summit decides to invite the General Assembly to continue the debate on the issue, such an invitation should be accompanied with a clear objective and timeframe (not beyond the 60th General Assembly).

### EP Resolution on the situation in Darfur, 28 September 2006,

EP urges Sudanese to accept peacemakers supporting the UNSC resolution on situation in Darfur under Chapter VII. Sudan has failed its RtoP and therefore is obliged to accept the UN force in line with UNSC res 1706. EP calls upon the EU and other international actors to work especially with the UN to ensure the peacekeeping force in Darfur will have enough capability to react rapidly to cease the violations.

### 2740th External Relations Council Meeting: EU Council Conclusions on Sudan/Darfur, 15 September 2006,

Council reminds the Sudanese government of its individual RtoP. In line with the UNSC Resolution of 11th September 1706 (2006) it strongly condemns the policies leading to death and suffering and call for their immediate end.

### European Parliament resolution on the situation in Darfur [15.12.2006] OJ C 306/395: Whereas the UN "Responsibility to Protect" provides that, where "national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," the UN Security Council can agree to a Chapter VII military force, 2. Underlines that Sudan has failed in its "responsibility to protect" its own people and is therefore obliged to accept a UN force in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1706; calls on the UN Security Council to bring pressure to bear on the

### EU Presidency Statement: UNSC Open Debate – Protection of civilians in the armed conflict, 28 June, 2006,

At the World Summit the UN Member States underlined the issue of the protection of civilians. But the most important was the historic agreement on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which has been reaffirmed by SC Resolution 1674.

### EU Presidency Statement: UNSC Public Meeting on Sudan, 29 June 2006,

If the government cannot fulfil its RtoP, it has an obligation to accept the outside help. The EU welcomes the planned UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
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<tr>
<td>European Parliament resolution on the reform of the United Nations [15.5.2006] OJ C 124/549.</td>
<td>Whereas the RtoP clearly states that the use of force, whenever necessary, should be deployed as a last resort, to be reiterated in a resolution of the Security Council on the principles relating to the use of force, and clearly endorses the &quot;emerging norm&quot; that there is a collective international responsibility to protect in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. Para 4 approves the strict limitation of the notion of self-defence and the use of force and responsibility to protect civilian populations defined by the High-level Panel in accordance with the spirit and wording of the UN Charter, and agrees that such a definition should not prevent the Security Council from acting preventively — and even in a more proactive manner than in the past — since it is the only legitimate body for such action; recalls that there can only be effective crisis protection if the UN has the means to monitor and to observe on a</td>
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<td>European Parliament resolution on the outcome of the United Nations World Summit of 14-16 September 2005 [21.9.2006] OJ C 227/582.</td>
<td>The EP welcomes the recognition of the international community's responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as the clear responsibility of each individual state to protect their own citizens from these crimes, including by means of the prevention of such crimes; further underlines the importance of the International Criminal Court as an essential body in the task of prosecuting the perpetrators of any such crimes;</td>
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<td>European Parliament resolution on the reform of the United Nations [15.5.2006] OJ C 124/549.</td>
<td>Whereas the RtoP clearly states that the use of force, whenever necessary, should be deployed as a last resort, to be reiterated in a resolution of the Security Council on the principles relating to the use of force, and clearly endorses the &quot;emerging norm&quot; that there is a collective international responsibility to protect in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. Para 4 approves the strict limitation of the notion of self-defence and the use of force and responsibility to protect civilian populations defined by the High-level Panel in accordance with the spirit and wording of the UN Charter, and agrees that such a definition should not prevent the Security Council from acting preventively — and even in a more proactive manner than in the past — since it is the only legitimate body for such action; recalls that there can only be effective crisis protection if the UN has the means to monitor and to observe on a</td>
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In developing this Communication, the European Commission reviewed lessons learnt in its responses to crises[3], and conducted an intensive consultation process of its humanitarian partners, which showed considerable consensus on the challenges faced by humanitarians[4], including on the “responsibility to protect” and “human security”  
"RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
General Assembly Resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005 stipulates that "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". It further provides that "the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate full-time basis the ethnic, linguistic or religious tensions likely to degenerate into a crisis;  
In the 2005 World Summit the Heads of State and Government recognised that the protection of civilians in armed conflict is a key concern of the international community. The EU reiterates its support for the historic Summit Outcome conclusion that each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, conclusion which was reaffirmed by the Security Council Resolution 1674.  
The EP deprecates the fact that the violence in Darfur has continued unchecked, and that the Sudanese government has not been held accountable for its repeated failures to comply with international demands and protect its citizens from violence, while welcoming the recent indictments issued by the ICC; regrets that the EU has not taken more unilateral action regarding the crisis in Darfur and has not tried harder to persuade the government of Sudan to accept an international peacekeeping force; stresses that persistent diplomatic pressure is needed to demonstrate to the government of Sudan that its verbal commitments must be followed by comprehensive and sustained efforts aimed at halting the violence in Darfur, and that the international community will not accept further neglect by Sudan of its commitments and its responsibility to protect its citizens; urges the Council to agree a plan of specific, targeted sanctions to be imposed on the Khartoum regime, in accordance with a clear timetable, in the event of non-compliance with the... |
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". It also makes reference to the use of Chapter VII of the Charter, if peaceful means are inadequate.

demands of the international community; urges the EU to contribute (and to put pressure on others to also contribute) to an international peacekeeping force and the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Darfur, and to ensure that the African Union is adequately resourced and assisted to fulfil its mandate; asks that the EU push for a UN peacekeeping mission in Chad with a strong civilian protection mandate; implores the Member States, the Council and the Commission to assume their responsibilities and to provide effective protection for the people of Darfur from a humanitarian disaster.

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Darfur [29.11.2007] OJ C 287/542. Whereas the UN "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine provides that where "national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," others have a responsibility to provide the protection needed. Calls on the UN to act in line with its "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, basing its action on the failure of the Government of Sudan to protect its population in Darfur from war crimes and crimes against humanity, and also its failure to provide humanitarian assistance to the population;


EU Presidency statement: Strengthening the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, 10 November 2008, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8288_en.htm As stated in the WS OD, the international community must act through the UN if national state is manifestly failing its RtoP. Effective implementation of the RtoP is of the utmost importance for the EU. We
States, acting individually or collectively, have the legitimate and permanent responsibility to promote and safeguard human rights throughout the world, particularly in the context of the responsibility to protect. | Minutes of the sitting of Thursday [20 March 2008] OJ C271/04. In relations to the elections in Kenya and the ameliorant situation, the EP invoked that the response of Kenyan government and that of regional organisations reflect the internationally agreed RtoP. | Report on implementation of the ESS, 11 December 2008, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8370_en.htm – The lasting solution to the conflict must bring together all regional players. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for consequences of their actions and hold shared responsibility. |

| | EP Resolution on the situation in Chad [24.4.2009] OJ C259/20. Whereas in view of the current humanitarian and security situation, the deployment of the EUFOR mission authorised by the UN Security Council has become essential, not least because the UN and the EU have a 'responsibility to protect' civilians in this region by all means necessary and to provide humanitarian assistance as well as security for humanitarian personnel. | European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2008 on the tragic situation in Burma [2008] OJ C279/16. Whereas several governments, including those of EU Member States, have called for the principle of 'responsibility to protect', established by the UN to rescue the victims of genocide and crimes against humanity, to be applied in the case of Burma... 1. Reiterates that the sovereignty of a nation cannot be allowed to override the human rights of its people, as enshrined in the UN principle of ‘responsibility to protect’; calls on the Government of the United Kingdom, which holds the May Presidency of the UN Security Council, to take urgent action to put the situation in Burma on the agenda of the Security Council, and calls on the Council to examine whether aid shipments to Burma can be authorised even without the consent of the Burmese military junta; | |

| | | European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2008 on Sudan and the International Criminal Court [2008] OJ C279/23. Whereas the UN ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine provides that where national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations, others have a responsibility to provide the protection needed. | |

| | | European Parliament recommendation of 9 July 2008 to the Council on the EU priorities for the 63rd Session of the UN | |
**General Assembly [2008] OJ C 294/05.**
The EP urges the EU Members State to support efforts by the UN Secretary-General in the process of implementation of the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, as endorsed at the 2005 World Summit; calls on EU Member States to participate actively in this process,

**European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2008 on the EU response to the deteriorating situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo [2008] OJ C 16/10.** Having regard to Resolution 60/1 of the United Nations General Assembly of 24 October 2005 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and in particular paragraphs 138 to 140 on the responsibility to protect populations,

**European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2008 on development perspectives for peace building and nation building in post-conflict situations [2010] OJ C/45/14.** Having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and in particular paragraphs 138-140 thereof on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,

**Why the EU is present and has interest in conflict zone**
1. Supports ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as affirmed by the UN in order to reinforce rather than undermine state sovereignty and stresses that the EU and its Members States should regard themselves as bound by it; stresses that ‘Responsibility to Protect’ should be considered as a means to promote human security; by stressing that the primary responsibility for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against a population lies with the state itself, reinforces the responsibility of each government towards the protection of its own citizens; considers, however, that where governments are unable or unwilling to provide such protection then the responsibility to take appropriate action becomes the collective responsibility of the wider international community; notes further that such action should be preventive as well as reactive, and should only involve the use of coercive military force as an absolute last resort; recognises this as an important new application of the principle of human security; 2. Demands the implementation of then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s declaration made in his report to the 2000 General Assembly: ‘state sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself; where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, or state failure, and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international Responsibility to Protect;

Whereas the combination of economic, political and social crises has taken a particular toll on women and girls, and whereas they are particularly at risk of cholera infection because of their responsibility for the home-based care of the sick and whereas Zimbabwe is close to meeting the criteria for invoking the declaration, endorsed at the UN Summit in September 2005, that there is an international ‘responsibility to protect’ people facing crimes against humanity, the EU shall support the action against Zimbabwe.

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<td><strong>Speech by the EU Commissioner Waldner, Effective multilateralism: Building for a better tomorrow, <a href="http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8644_en.htm">http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8644_en.htm</a></strong> One of the UNSG’s proposals was to abstain from the veto in face of the humanitarian crises. The EU should have a permanent seat in the UNSC at some stage. Now it suggests the majority voting and the fast track procedure for disasters requiring fast response. To make the RtoP a reality, it must be constantly implemented emphasising the prevention and the capacity building (help for states to support their responsibilities). UN role is however irreplaceable. The EU makes full use of the UN standards, reports in its own HR policies and is committed to work in order to promote an effective multilateralism.</td>
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| ** European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 on the European Security Strategy and ESDP [2009] OJ C 76/13.** General considerations: Embraces the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’, adopted by the UN in 2005, and the concept of ‘human security’, which is based on the primacy of the individual and not of the state; underlines that these concepts entail both practical consequences and strong political guidelines for the strategic orientation of European security policy in order to be able to act effectively in crises; highlights, nevertheless, that there is neither an automatic obligation nor the means available for the EU to deploy ESDP missions, be they civilian or military, in all crisis situations. |
| **EU Presidency Statement, UNGA: Debate on the Responsibility to Protect, 23 July 2009, [http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8901_en.htm](http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8901_en.htm)** We collectively recognised the responsibility of each individual State to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We also collectively recognised the responsibility of the international community, through the United Nations, to help to protect populations from such crimes. The EU warmly welcomes that important report and this debate, for which our focus should be operationalisation and implementation unless Member States decide... |
otherwise, the responsibility to protect only applies to the four specified crimes and violations: namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Responsibilities is the responsibility of each State to protect the populations within its own borders - that comes first – in international law and treaties (1st pillar).

Turning to the second pillar, the assistance that should be made available by the international community is not only the humanitarian aid that is crucial once individuals and groups are already affected, but also in this context, very importantly, the assistance available to help prevent manifest risks from developing and build capacities of States to act before risks deteriorate into crises (EU believes more could be done, esp. in terms of EW).

Third Pillar: It must be absolutely clear that this should, first and foremost, be discharged through diplomatic, humanitarian and other measures, such as support to capacity building and other development activities - enforcement measures through the Security Council or approved by the Security Council should be possible – EU and regional organizations to contribute.


EU Presidency Statement after adoption of Resolution: Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 23 July 2009, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8917_en.htm Rwanda and Srebrenica demonstrate that Africa and Europe both have an interest in the concept of responsibility to protect. We look forward to the debate on that concept which is to follow. We also look forward to working with Africa on how to strengthen our capacity in this regard.


Resolution on aid effectiveness and defining official development assistance [16.3.2009] OJ C 61/2

Points out that the principle of non-
interference must not lead to toleration of serious crimes such as genocide and mass murder, ethnic cleansing, expulsions and mass rape, but, rather, that in this instance the international community has the responsibility to protect and to take resolute countermeasures, in particular to protect the population in danger and in the process, if possible, involve regional organisations in overcoming conflicts; Not only the responsibility of every state towards anyone within their jurisdiction but also a responsibility and preparedness of the UN to take collective action in accordance with IL and the UN Charter against serious international crimes as endorsed at WS 2005 (RtoP) plays critical role.

The EP suggests to:
- Foster the debate initiated by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, about the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, so as to achieve strengthened consensus on, and develop a more operational approach to, this cornerstone of the UN doctrine whilst resisting attempts to reduce its scope;
- Ensure that the preventive character of R2P is adequately emphasised in the above-mentioned debate and that adequate attention is paid to helping vulnerable and unstable countries develop the capacity to shoulder such responsibility, focussing specifically on regional actors as the most effective interlocutors in unstable situations;
- Ensure that the R2P principle is applied in crisis situations where the state concerned fails to protect its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
- Encourage the African Union to further develop its crisis management capabilities, and call on both EU and UN actors to support these efforts and to deepen the cooperation with the African Union in the establishment of peace and security on the African continent;

EU Presidency Statement: UNSC Open Debate – Protection of civilians in the armed conflict, 11 November 2009, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_9214_en.htm In many countries the impunity prevails due to the lack of political will and attention and allow the violations to continue to thrive. The EU calls for the ratification of the ICC and support steps for the RtoP implementation.

European Parliament resolution of 26 November 2009 on a political solution to the problem of piracy off the Somali coast [2009] OJ C 285/08

The EP recalls that the international community and all parties to the present conflict have a responsibility to protect civilians, to allow delivery of aid and to respect humanitarian space and the safety of humanitarian workers; demands therefore that the right conditions for an adequate response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia be created immediately;

The UN plays a central role in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. With the Lisbon Treaty the EU is now ready to assume its role as a global actor intending to contribute to the crises management in the relevant UN operations (UNSC mandated).

EU strives to operationalise the RtoP as agreed in the World Summit Outcome Document, however, the RtoP is opened for negotiation. The EU is for narrow but deep approach and practical focus on the preventive pillar.

South Africa – EU Summit: Joint Communique, 28 September 2010, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10134_en.htm – EU-Africa supported the inclusion of the RtoP into the World Summit Outcome Document. They recognize that each state has its RtoP but similarly the international community through the UNSC. To help protect population it is necessary to advocate RtoP to make it accepted international norm. Regional organizations have the particular role to play as regards the operationalisation of the RtoP.

The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and challenges of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2008, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II, Section G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 (2009/2057(INI)) [2010] OJ C 349/12. The EP calls on the Vice-President/High Representative and her services to develop – with a view to deepening the Union's collective strategic thinking – a coherent EU foreign policy strategy based on the objectives and principles established in Article 21 TEU; is of the opinion that such a strategy should clearly identify the common security interests of the EU and thereby serve as a reference framework for policy-making as well as for the formulation, financing, implementation and monitoring of the EU’s external action; calls on the Vice-President/High Representative to fully associate the European Parliament’s relevant bodies in such an endeavour; believes that the concepts of Human Security as defined by the 2007 Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group, and Responsibility to Protect, as defined by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, should become two of its guiding principles;

EU Presidency Statement: UNSC Open Debate – Protection of civilians in the armed conflict, 7 July 2010, http://www.eu-
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Responsibility to protect: the never-ending rhetoric or actual baseline for the EUs possible action

Homolkova, Lenka

https://doi.org/20.500.11825/913

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