GLOBAL CAMPUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS · ACADEMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Identity Politics and Human Rights Education: Perspectives from the Global Campus of Human Rights Community

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Summary

This study explores how members of the Global Campus of Human Rights understand identity politics and its relationship with human rights. It is based on an online survey designed by the Academic Affairs Committee and answered by 196 students, alumni and faculty from the eight regional programmes between July and October 2025. The sample is self-selected, so the findings describe tendencies among respondents rather than the community as a whole.

Five main findings emerge.

- **A plurality of conceptions.** Respondents accept several definitions of identity politics as valid and distribute their preferences among them. Identity politics appears within the community as a field of inquiry rather than an orthodoxy.
- **Valuing identity politics while acknowledging its risks.** Most respondents (58.7%) consider identity politics very or extremely significant for human rights in their region, while 44.4% agree that it can divide rather than unite. Many hold both views at once, and a minority voice insists on universality, class or the risks of fragmentation.
- **Qualified assessments of institutions.** Most consider that human rights curricula address intersectionality only partly (53.6%) and that international human rights law offers only partial protection to marginalised groups (62.2%).
- **A shared pedagogical orientation.** Education and awareness-raising is the most widely endorsed strategy for promoting social justice (84.2%), across roles, programmes and professional activities, followed by intersectional collaboration (69.9%).
- **Identity as commitment and reflexivity.** In their own words, respondents describe identity as a source of commitment to human rights and as a reason to question their own position. They expect universities to integrate intersectionality and plural knowledge, to connect theory and practice, to cultivate dialogue across difference, and to apply their principles to themselves.

Women more often favour definitions centred on collective action and education as a strategy. Legal background makes no clear difference on any question. Variation across programmes reflects the diversity of contexts within the network rather than differences in the quality of its programmes. The report relates these findings to the theoretical debate on identity politics and closes with lines of reflection for the network and directions for future research.

Acknowledgements

This study is the result of collective work. The questionnaire was designed collaboratively by the members of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Global Campus of Human Rights, whose discussions shaped both the instrument and the questions it sought to answer. The directors and coordinators of the eight regional programmes circulated the survey within their networks and made broad participation possible. The Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University hosted the Global Classroom 2025, where preliminary results were first presented and discussed. The Global Campus of Human Rights supported the publication of this revised version.

Above all, gratitude is due to the students, alumni and faculty who took the time to answer the survey and to share, often at length, their experiences and reflections. Their words are the substance of this report.

Introduction

Identity politics occupies a paradoxical position within contemporary human rights discourse. The expression gained currency through the Combahee River Collective Statement (1977), which grounded political action in the specific experience of oppression of Black women. Since then it has served as a framework for the visibility and empowerment of groups historically subjected to exclusion. Kimberlé Crenshaw's work on intersectionality (1989, 1991) showed how antidiscrimination law failed to capture forms of disadvantage arising from the intersection of race and sex, and Patricia Hill Collins (1990) developed a related account of interlocking systems of oppression and situated knowledge.

The same vocabulary has also been the object of sustained criticism. Within political theory, the debate between recognition and redistribution (Taylor, 1994; Fraser, 1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003) raised the question of whether struggles for cultural recognition could displace demands for material equality. Wendy Brown (1995) warned that identities forged through injury may become attached to the very exclusions they contest. More recently, critics from different political positions have argued that identity politics fragments democratic coalitions and erodes shared civic identities (Lilla, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018), while others have defended its emancipatory core against its institutional and elite appropriations (Haider, 2018; Táíwò, 2022).

These debates are easier to follow if three notions that are often used interchangeably are kept apart. Identity refers to a dimension of social and political subject formation: the ways in which people are constituted, and constitute themselves, through categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, class or sexuality. Intersectionality is an analytical tool for understanding how these categories intersect to produce compounded forms of inequality and discrimination. Identity politics, finally, is a mode of articulating claims, mobilising and acting politically on the basis of shared identities. The three are related but not interchangeable; Crenshaw (1991) herself presented intersectionality as a way of complicating identity politics from within rather than as a synonym for it. It is therefore entirely coherent to recognise the analytical value of intersectionality while questioning particular forms of identity-based mobilisation. The questionnaire did not draw this distinction explicitly, but it proves useful in interpreting several of the findings.

These tensions bear directly on human rights. International human rights law rests on the principles of universality and equality, yet treaty bodies have increasingly recognised that discrimination is experienced through intersecting identities. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, for instance, describes intersectionality as a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention (General Recommendation No. 28, 2010, para. 18). How universality and difference relate is therefore not only a theoretical question: it shapes how human rights are taught, interpreted and practised.

The Global Campus of Human Rights offers a particularly suitable setting in which to explore these questions. It brings together more than one hundred universities from all world regions, organised around eight regional master's programmes, and its Academic Affairs Committee (AAC) serves as the space for academic coordination across the network. Diversity, pluralism and transnational cooperation are both pedagogical values and structural features of the

Global Campus, so the debates around identity politics are part of its everyday teaching and learning.

This study was developed within the AAC with a dual purpose: to explore how members of the Global Campus community understand identity politics in relation to the universality and equality underpinning human rights, and to offer the network an empirical picture of how its students, alumni and faculty engage with this debate. It is based on an online survey designed collaboratively by the AAC and answered by 196 members of the community across the eight programmes. Preliminary results were presented at the Global Classroom 2025, hosted by Mahidol University in Thailand. The study is exploratory: it describes the views of those who chose to respond, and it is not an evaluation of the network's programmes.

The report is organised as follows. A methodological note explains how the survey was designed, administered and analysed. Part I describes the respondents. Part II presents the results of the closed questions on definitions, significance, curricula, divisive potential, strategies and international law. Part III analyses the open-ended answers, in which respondents explain their views in their own words. A final section draws together the findings, considers their implications for the network and notes their limitations. The questionnaire is reproduced in the Annex.

Methodological note

This note describes how the survey was designed, administered and analysed, so that readers can judge the scope of the findings. Its main points are recalled where relevant in the body of the report.

Design and instrument. The questionnaire was designed collaboratively within the Academic Affairs Committee (AAC) of the Global Campus of Human Rights. It comprises 22 questions (reproduced in the Annex): eight sociodemographic and institutional questions (Q1–Q8); three items asking respondents to rate alternative definitions of identity politics (Q9–Q11), followed by a ranking of the three (Q12); an optional question inviting definitions by other authors (Q13); six closed questions on the significance of identity politics, curricula, participation in identity-related initiatives, its divisive potential, strategies for social justice and international human rights law (Q14, Q16, Q17, Q18, Q20 and Q21); and three open-ended questions (Q15, Q19 and Q22). The three definitions were formulated by the AAC drawing on the work of Hall (1997), Crenshaw (1989) and Collins (1990); they are not verbatim quotations from those texts.

Data collection. The survey was administered online through Google Forms, in English, between 14 July and 15 October 2025. The eight regional programmes circulated it among their students, alumni and faculty. Respondents gave informed consent at the start of the form. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, and no personally identifiable information was requested. The process yielded 196 valid responses; two test submissions made before the survey opened were excluded.

Sample. The sample is non-probabilistic and self-selected. Participation varied across programmes, from 6.6% to 18.4% of responses. Findings therefore describe tendencies within this group of respondents and cannot be generalised to the Global Campus community as a whole or to any single programme.

Analysis of closed questions. Closed questions were analysed through frequency distributions and cross-tabulations by role, gender, age, programme and disciplinary background. Unless otherwise indicated, percentages are calculated over the 196 respondents. Disciplinary background, main activities and preferred strategies allowed multiple answers, so their percentages do not add up to 100. Owing to the form's configuration, a few respondents (between five and eight per item) selected more than one option in the definition-rating items; a definition is counted as rated 'very accurately' or 'accurately' when either of these options was selected. Answers to the open option of the employment-sector question are reported as given, without recoding.

Comparisons between groups were examined with chi-square tests of independence. A difference is described as clear only when $p < 0.05$; differences close to that threshold are reported as tendencies. Given the non-probabilistic sample, the tests are used as a rough guide to distinguish patterns from differences that could easily arise by chance, not as grounds for generalisation. Respondents identifying as non-binary or preferring not to state their gender ($n = 8$) were grouped together; figures for this group and for other small subgroups are reported for completeness only and are not interpreted. Given the small size of the regional groups and their uneven composition by role, results are not presented programme by

programme; variation across programmes is described in aggregate terms, as an expression of the diversity of contexts within the network.

Analysis of open-ended questions. All answers were read in full and analysed thematically, with themes identified inductively from the answers themselves. Themes are described in terms of their relative weight rather than precise percentages; simple counts are given only where classification is unambiguous, such as plainly negative answers. Quotations are reproduced verbatim from the dataset, including original spelling, identified only by institutional role, and selected to avoid details that could identify a respondent. Answers written in Spanish were translated by the author.

Limitations. Beyond the non-probabilistic sample, three limitations should be noted. The English-only administration may have discouraged participation by non-English speakers. The question on the significance of identity politics referred to the respondent's region, so answers reflect diverse regional contexts. Finally, the intermediate option 'somewhat' in several questions admits a broad range of meanings.

Data availability. To protect respondents' anonymity, the raw dataset is not publicly released. The questionnaire is reproduced in the Annex.

Part I – The respondents

Before examining what respondents think about identity politics, it is necessary to establish who they are. This part describes the 196 respondents in terms of the sociodemographic and institutional questions of the survey (Q1–Q8 and Q17). It serves two purposes: to characterise the group whose views are analysed in Parts II and III, and to identify features of the sample that condition how those views should be read. Three such features emerge, and they are summarised at the end of this part.

1. Regional programmes and institutional roles

All eight regional programmes of the Global Campus are represented. The largest contributions came from APMA (36 respondents, 18.4%), EMA (35, 17.9%) and LATMA (28, 14.3%), followed by HRDA (24, 12.2%), CES (22, 11.2%), MAHRS (21, 10.7%), ERMA (17, 8.7%) and ARMA (13, 6.6%). These figures reflect how widely the survey circulated within each programme rather than the relative size of the programmes. Since the total number of people who received the invitation is unknown, response rates cannot be calculated.

Alumni form the largest group (80 respondents, 40.8%), followed by students (61, 31.1%) and faculty (55, 28.1%). Respondents who identified with more than one category were asked to choose the one most relevant to them.

Roles, however, are not evenly distributed across programmes, as Table 1 shows. Reading the table by column reveals strong concentrations: APMA accounts for 27 of the 61 students (44.3%), LATMA for 17 of the 55 faculty members (30.9%), and EMA and CES together for 39 of the 80 alumni (48.8%). ARMA contributed no student responses.

Table 1. Respondents by regional programme and role (n)

Programme	Students	Alumni	Faculty	Total
APMA	27	7	2	36
ARMA	0	8	5	13
CES	2	17	3	22
EMA	7	22	6	35
ERMA	1	6	10	17
HRDA	12	7	5	24
LATMA	6	5	17	28
MAHRS	6	8	7	21
Total	**61**	**80**	**55**	**196**

Figure 1. Respondents by regional programme and role



This overlap matters for the rest of the report. When students, alumni and faculty answer differently, part of the difference may reflect the regional contexts from which each group mostly comes. Comparisons by role should therefore be read with this composition in mind.

2. Age and professional experience

The sample spans several generations. The largest age groups are those aged 25–30 (62 respondents, 31.6%) and those aged 41 or over (61, 31.1%), followed by the 31–35 group (44, 22.4%). The youngest (18–24) and the 36–40 groups are much smaller, with 14 (7.1%) and 15 (7.7%) respondents respectively.

Professional experience in human rights is similarly spread. One third of respondents report more than ten years of experience (63, 32.1%), while 48 (24.5%) report four to six years, 43 (21.9%) one to three years, 25 (12.8%) seven to ten years, and 17 (8.7%) less than one year.

As might be expected, age and experience are closely associated. This can be expressed through a rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's ρ), which ranges from −1 to 1 and measures how far two ordered variables rise together; values above 0.7 are conventionally read as strong. Here $\rho = 0.75$. In concrete terms, 49 of the 61 respondents aged 41 or over report more than ten years of experience.

Age and experience also map onto institutional role, though not perfectly. Faculty members are concentrated in the oldest and most experienced groups: 41 of the 55 (74.5%) are aged 41 or over, and the same number report more than ten years of experience. Students, by contrast, are not only recent graduates. Although most are between 25 and 35, 13 are aged 36 or over and 15 report at least seven years of professional experience. The Global Campus thus brings together people at different stages of their careers, with a broad but not strict gradient from students to alumni to faculty.

Figure 2. Age group and institutional role (number of respondents)



3. Gender

Women form the majority of respondents (112, 57.1%), followed by men (76, 38.8%). Six respondents (3.1%) identified as non-binary and two (1.0%) preferred not to state their gender. For comparisons by gender, these last two categories are grouped together (n = 8); figures for this group are reported for completeness but, given its size, are not interpreted.

The gender composition varies by role and age. Women make up 65.6% of students (40 of 61) and 61.3% of alumni (49 of 80), but 41.8% of faculty (23 of 55), where men are the majority. Similarly, women account for 68.4% of respondents under 31 (52 of 76), while men account for 55.7% of those aged 41 or over (34 of 61). Since the survey captures a single moment, these data cannot show whether the pattern reflects career progression, changes between cohorts or other factors. They do mean that gender, age and role overlap, which again calls for caution when comparing groups.

4. Disciplines, activities and sectors

The questions on disciplinary background and main activities allowed more than one answer, so the percentages below are calculated over the 196 respondents and do not add up to 100. Over a third of respondents (71, 36.2%) indicated more than one discipline.

Law is the most frequent background, mentioned by 90 respondents (45.9%). It is followed by political science and international relations, with sociology a more distant fourth (Table 2). The remaining disciplines each appear in fewer than 7% of responses. Fourteen respondents indicated only disciplines outside the listed options, mostly education and social work.

Table 2. Disciplinary background (multiple answers allowed; % of 196 respondents)

Discipline	n	%
Law	90	45.9
Political science	54	27.6
International relations	39	19.9
Sociology	27	13.8
Anthropology	12	6.1
History	11	5.6
Philosophy	10	5.1
Economics	9	4.6
Social communication	9	4.6
Journalism	8	4.1
Arts	7	3.6
Psychology	6	3.1

As for main activities, research is by far the most common (122 respondents, 62.2%), followed by advocacy (76, 38.8%), programme management (61, 31.1%), teaching (55, 28.1%) and studying (48, 24.5%).

The employment sector question offered five categories and an open option. Academia is the largest sector (66 respondents, 33.7%), followed by NGOs (37, 18.9%), full-time study (26, 13.3%), international organisations (23, 11.7%) and government (14, 7.1%). The remaining 30 respondents (15.3%) described their situation in their own words. Their answers range from consultancy, private legal practice and think tanks to national human rights institutions and the justice system, as well as unemployment or work outside the field.

Taken together, these data portray a community with a strong legal and social science core, oriented above all towards research, and closely linked to the academic world.

5. Participation in identity-related initiatives

Respondents were asked whether they had participated in student organisations or initiatives focused on identity politics and human rights (Q17). Sixty respondents (30.6%) answered affirmatively. This figure includes three respondents who selected the option inviting them to specify their participation, which only applied to those answering yes.

Participation is clearly lower among the oldest respondents: 18.0% of those aged 41 or over (11 of 61), against between 32.3% and 50.0% in the other age groups. A similar contrast appears between faculty (18.2%) and students (39.3%) or alumni (32.5%), and between men (18.4%) and women (38.4%). Because age, role and gender overlap, as shown above, these three contrasts are not independent of one another.

Figure 3. Participation in identity-related initiatives by age group (%)



One possible reading is generational. Over the past decade, movements centred on gender, race, sexuality and decolonisation have gained visibility in universities and civil society, and younger respondents may have encountered identity-based organising during their formative years. The data cannot test this hypothesis. It is also possible that older respondents took part in student organisations that were not framed in identity terms at the time.

6. Reading the results in light of the sample

Three features of the sample should be borne in mind throughout the rest of the report.

1. The sample is self-selected and not representative of the Global Campus community or of any single programme. The results describe the views of these 196 respondents.
2. Role, age, experience and gender overlap, and role also overlaps with regional programme. A difference observed along one of these variables cannot be attributed to that variable alone.
3. Some subgroups are small, notably respondents who are non-binary or preferred not to state their gender (8), ARMA (13), and the 18–24 (14) and 36–40 (15) age groups. Their figures are reported but not interpreted.

With this profile established, Part II turns to how respondents assess identity politics and its place in human rights.

Part II – Assessing identity politics: the closed questions

This part examines how respondents evaluate identity politics and its relationship with human rights, following the order of the questionnaire. It covers six topics: how respondents assess three definitions of identity politics (Q9–Q12), how significant they consider it for human rights in their region (Q14), whether human rights curricula address intersectionality (Q16), whether identity politics can divide rather than unite (Q18), which strategies best promote social justice (Q20), and whether international human rights law addresses the concerns of marginalised groups (Q21).

Each section first presents the overall distribution of answers and then the comparisons between groups. A word on how those comparisons are read is needed here. With groups of this size, some differences will appear simply by chance. To help separate differences that may reflect a genuine pattern from those that could easily be accidental, a chi-square test was applied to each comparison. The test yields a p-value: the lower it is, the less likely it is that a difference of that size would arise by chance alone. In this report, a difference is described as clear only when $p < 0.05$. Since the sample is not probabilistic, the tests serve as a rough guide rather than as grounds for generalisation. The cautions set out at the end of Part I also apply throughout.

1. Three definitions of identity politics

Respondents were presented with three definitions of identity politics, each formulated by the AAC on the basis of a different body of work. The first, inspired by Stuart Hall, emphasises the social construction of identities and how they shape experiences of power and marginalisation. The second, inspired by Kimberlé Crenshaw, focuses on collective action to empower marginalised groups and challenge systems of oppression. The third, inspired by Patricia Hill Collins, emphasises the diversity of human experience and the intersection of multiple identities. For brevity, they are referred to below as the social-construction, collective-action and intersectional definitions. Respondents first rated how accurately each definition describes identity politics and then ranked the three.

All three definitions were broadly accepted. As Table 3 shows, more than seven in ten respondents rated each of them as describing identity politics 'very accurately' or 'accurately'. Outright rejection was rare: only two respondents considered the social-construction definition incorrect or meaningless, and thirteen and twelve did so for the collective-action and intersectional definitions respectively.

Table 3. Assessment and ranking of the three definitions (% of 196 respondents)

Definition	Rated 'very accurately' or 'accurately'	Ranked first	Ranked third
Social construction (Hall)	84.2	44.9	37.8
Collective action (Crenshaw)	73.5	31.1	27.0
Intersectional (Collins)	82.1	24.0	35.2

Figure 4. Assessment and ranking of the three definitions (% of respondents)



The ranking adds a nuance that the ratings conceal. The social-construction definition is the one most often ranked first (88 respondents), but it is also the one most often ranked last (74). Opinion on it is therefore divided. The collective-action definition, by contrast, is the least often ranked last and the most often placed in the top two positions (143 respondents, 73.0%). One possible reading is that the social-construction definition appeals as a broad descriptive frame, while others find it lacking in a political or justice-oriented dimension. The data cannot confirm this interpretation.

The clearest differences between groups relate to gender. Men ranked the social-construction definition first more often than women (53.9% against 38.4%), while women more often placed the collective-action definition first (37.5% against 21.1%; $p = 0.040$). Women also rated the collective-action definition more favourably (80.4% against 65.8%; $p = 0.038$) and, to a lesser and less certain degree, the intersectional one (88.4% against 77.6%; $p = 0.076$). No clear differences appear by role or between respondents with and without a legal background.

In short, respondents do not converge on a single definition. They accept all three as valid descriptions and distribute their preferences among them, with women leaning towards the definitions that emphasise collective action and intersectionality. This plurality of conceptions is the backdrop against which the following assessments should be read.

2. The significance of identity politics for human rights

Respondents were asked to what extent identity politics is a significant factor in the promotion and protection of human rights in their region (Q14). The reference to the region matters: answers reflect each respondent's own context, not an abstract judgement.

A clear majority attribute high significance to identity politics. Of the 196 respondents, 38 (19.4%) consider it 'extremely significant' and 77 (39.3%) 'very significant', together 58.7%. A

further 62 (31.6%) see it as 'somewhat significant'. Only 10 (5.1%) chose the neutral option and 9 (4.6%) considered it 'not at all significant'.

Gender produces the largest difference: 65.2% of women rate identity politics as very or extremely significant, against 50.0% of men, although the difference falls just short of the threshold ($p = 0.054$). By contrast, role makes almost no difference, with students, alumni and faculty all between 57% and 60%. Nor are there clear differences by age or legal background.

Figure 5. Significance of identity politics for human rights in the respondent's region, overall and by gender (%)



The regional programmes show a wider range. The share of respondents attributing high significance ranges from about a third in some programmes to over four fifths in others. The overall test falls just short of the threshold ($p = 0.054$), and several groups are small, so these differences should not be overstated. Given that the question refers to the respondent's region, they are nevertheless consistent with the idea that the salience of identity politics depends on regional political contexts.

In sum, most respondents regard identity politics as significant for human rights in their region. Women appear more likely to do so than men, and the degree of significance may vary with regional context. The next question moves from the political arena to education.

3. Intersectionality in human rights curricula

Respondents were asked whether human rights curricula adequately address the intersectionality of identities and its impact on human rights (Q16). The question refers to curricula in general and was not designed as an evaluation of any particular programme.

The prevailing answer is a qualified one. Over half of the respondents (105, 53.6%) answered 'somewhat', while 52 (26.5%) answered 'yes' and 39 (19.9%) 'no'. Most respondents thus recognise that curricula engage with intersectionality to some extent, while finding that engagement incomplete.

The assessment appears to differ by role, although the difference falls short of the threshold ($p = 0.07$). Students and faculty give similar answers, with about a third answering 'yes' (34.4%

and 32.7%). Alumni are markedly more critical: only 16.2% answered 'yes' and 26.2% 'no'. This pattern persists when the two programmes with the most uneven role composition are set aside. One possible explanation is that alumni assess their education in retrospect, after encountering the demands of professional practice. The survey does not allow this explanation to be tested.

Figure 6. Assessment of human rights curricula, overall and by role, and of international human rights law (%)



The largest differences in the entire survey appear between regional programmes ($p = 0.001$). In some programmes close to half of the respondents answered 'yes', while in others fewer than one in ten did; in one, almost all respondents chose 'somewhat', and in others over a third answered 'no'. Two cautions apply. Respondents may have had different curricula in mind, not necessarily those of their own programme. In addition, the regional groups are small and differ in role composition. For these reasons, and in keeping with the purpose of the study, results are not presented programme by programme. The variation points to the diversity of contexts and perspectives within the network, not to differences in the quality of its programmes.

No clear differences appear by gender, age or legal background.

Intersectionality, in short, is perceived as present but insufficiently integrated in human rights curricula. Alumni appear to be the most critical group, and perceptions vary considerably across regions. This qualified view of educational institutions finds a parallel in the assessment of international law, discussed in section 6.

4. Can identity politics divide rather than unite?

Respondents were asked how far they agree with the statement 'Identity politics has the potential to divide rather than unite people' (Q18). This is the question on which opinion is most evenly spread.

Agreement is the most frequent position, but it is far from unanimous. In total, 87 respondents (44.4%) agree, 26 of them strongly. Another 51 (26.0%) neither agree nor disagree, and 58 (29.6%) disagree, 16 of them strongly. Only about one respondent in five (42, 21.4%) chose

one of the two extreme options. The distribution therefore shows a plurality of views rather than polarisation between two camps.

At first sight, these answers might seem at odds with the high significance attributed to identity politics in section 2. Comparing the two questions shows that they are not. Among respondents who consider identity politics very or extremely significant, 38.3% agree that it can divide and 39.1% disagree. Among the rest, agreement rises to 53.1% and disagreement falls to 16.0% ($p = 0.002$). Two things follow. Those who value identity politics most are also the most likely to reject the idea that it divides. Yet a substantial share of them recognise its divisive potential while still considering it significant. For many respondents, valuing identity politics and acknowledging its risks go hand in hand.

Figure 7. Agreement that identity politics can divide rather than unite, overall and by significance attributed to identity politics (%)



The distinction drawn in the introduction between intersectionality and identity politics helps to read this result. Of the 161 respondents who rated the intersectional formulation as an accurate description of identity politics, 58 (36.0%) also agree that identity politics can divide; together they represent 29.6% of all respondents. Among the 35 who did not rate that formulation as accurate, agreement reaches 82.9%. For a significant group, then, valuing an intersectional understanding goes together with reservations about identity politics as a form of mobilisation.

Comparisons between groups call for particular care here. At first glance, role seems to matter ($p = 0.032$): agreement is highest among alumni (53.8%), while faculty are the group most inclined to disagree (43.6%), and students most often choose the neutral option (34.4%). Much of the faculty result, however, comes from a single programme, which contributes almost a third of faculty respondents and where most of them disagree with the statement. When that programme is set aside, the differences between roles are no longer clear ($p = 0.13$). This is a concrete illustration of the overlap between role and programme noted in Part I.

Men agree with the statement more often than women (51.3% against 38.4%), but this difference falls short of the threshold ($p = 0.21$). Respondents with and without a legal background show virtually identical levels of agreement (44.4% and 44.3%).

The question on division thus reveals a community that takes the risks of identity politics seriously without rejecting it. The next question shifts from risks to strategies: how social justice can be advanced through identity politics.

5. Strategies for promoting social justice

Respondents were asked which strategies are most effective for promoting social justice through identity politics, and could select as many as they wished from four options, or add their own (Q20). Percentages below refer to the share of the 196 respondents who selected each option.

Education and awareness-raising is the most widely endorsed strategy, selected by 165 respondents (84.2%). It is followed by intersectional collaboration (137, 69.9%), advocacy and lobbying (102, 52.0%), and social movements and protests (91, 46.4%). Most respondents combined several strategies: 59 (30.1%) selected all four, while 22 (11.2%) selected education alone.

Figure 8. Strategies considered most effective for promoting social justice (% of respondents; multiple answers)



The open answers add two kinds of content. Some respondents proposed further strategies, such as representation of marginalised groups in decision-making, community organising, strategic litigation and decolonisation. A few others questioned the premise of the question itself. One respondent wrote 'I am not convinced that social justice is advanced through identity politics', and another proposed 'building alliances on policy asks, not identities'. Although these voices are a small minority, they show that scepticism towards identity politics is present within the community.

The primacy of education holds across all groups. It is the most frequently selected strategy among students, alumni and faculty alike, and in every regional programme (in one of them, tied with intersectional collaboration), where it never falls below 70%. Women select it more often than men (90.2% against 77.6%; $p = 0.031$). Advocacy and lobbying shows some variation between programmes ($p = 0.046$): its share ranges from under a quarter to almost two thirds of respondents across programmes. Students appear somewhat more inclined towards advocacy than alumni and faculty (62.3% against 46–49%), though this difference is not clear ($p = 0.15$). Notably, respondents who teach are not more likely to favour education, and those working in advocacy are not clearly more likely to favour advocacy.

The preference for education is therefore shared across roles, regions and professional activities, which suggests a common orientation within the network rather than a reflection of each respondent's own work. The prominence of intersectional collaboration, the second most chosen option, indicates that this orientation is accompanied by an emphasis on building alliances across groups.

6. International human rights law and marginalised groups

The last closed question asked whether international human rights law adequately addresses the concerns of marginalised groups based on their identities (Q21).

The answers follow a pattern similar to that of the question on curricula, with an even stronger predominance of the intermediate option. Most respondents (122, 62.2%) answered 'somewhat'. A quarter (49, 25.0%) answered 'no', and only 25 (12.8%) answered 'yes'. The international legal framework is thus widely seen as offering partial protection: neither dismissed nor regarded as sufficient.

This assessment is remarkably stable across groups. Students, alumni and faculty give nearly identical answers ($p = 0.79$), as do women and men ($p = 0.61$). Respondents with a legal background are somewhat less critical than the rest, with 20.0% answering 'no' against 29.2%, and 67.8% answering 'somewhat' against 57.5%. This is consistent with the idea that legal training fosters a qualified confidence in the international framework, but the difference is not clear ($p = 0.28$) and should not be overstated. Differences between programmes are not clear either ($p = 0.27$).

The answers to this question are closely related to those on curricula ($p < 0.001$). Among respondents who consider that curricula adequately address intersectionality, 26.9% also consider international law adequate. Among those who answered 'somewhat' on curricula, only 5.7% do so. Respondents thus seem to apply a fairly consistent evaluative stance to the institutions of the human rights field, whether educational or legal.

One methodological caveat applies to this question and to the one on curricula. The option 'somewhat' covers a broad range of meanings, from mild endorsement to considerable scepticism. Its predominance shows that most respondents hold qualified views, but not exactly how qualified they are.

7. Overview of Part II

Taken together, the closed questions portray a community that takes identity politics seriously while keeping a critical distance from it. Four findings stand out.

1. Respondents accept several definitions of identity politics as valid and distribute their preferences among them, rather than converging on a single conception.
2. Most consider identity politics significant for human rights in their region, yet many also acknowledge that it can divide. These positions coexist within the same individuals more often than they separate respondents into opposing camps.
3. Educational and legal institutions receive qualified assessments: intersectionality is seen as present but insufficiently integrated in curricula, and international law as offering partial protection.

4. Education and awareness-raising is the preferred strategy across all groups, followed by intersectional collaboration.

The most consistent difference between groups relates to gender: women favour definitions centred on collective action, select education more often and, with a difference just short of the threshold, attribute greater significance to identity politics. Differences by role and region exist, but they are harder to interpret because of the overlap between the two. Legal background, often assumed to shape views on these issues, makes no clear difference on any question.

The closed questions show what respondents think; they say less about why. Part III turns to the open-ended answers, where respondents explain their views in their own words.

Part III – In respondents' own words: the open-ended questions

The closed questions show where respondents stand; the open-ended questions show how they reason. This part examines four questions in which respondents wrote freely: an optional invitation to share definitions of identity politics by other authors (Q13), how their own identity has influenced their understanding of human rights (Q15), how higher education can better prepare students for the challenges of identity politics (Q19), and whether they envision a role for themselves in promoting human rights through an intersectional lens (Q22).

The answers vary greatly in length and depth, from a single word to several paragraphs. A few are blank or contain placeholders, and some are written in Spanish. They were read in full and grouped into themes that emerged from the answers themselves. Because many answers touch on more than one theme, and because brief answers are hard to classify, themes are described in terms of their relative weight rather than precise percentages. Simple counts are given only where the classification is unambiguous, such as answers that are plainly negative. Quotations are reproduced verbatim, including original spelling, and are identified only by institutional role.

1. Other definitions and authors

The optional question inviting definitions by other authors received 30 answers, of which about twenty are substantive. Though few, they reveal the breadth of theoretical references within the community. Respondents cited, among others, the Combahee River Collective, bell hooks, Barbara Smith, Linda Alcoff, Judith Butler, Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, Susan Moller Okin, Will Kymlicka, Benedict Anderson, William Connolly, Richard Thompson Ford, Donald Horowitz, Paul Brass, Eric Hobsbawm, Francis Fukuyama, John Paul Lederach and Raúl Zibechi.

Three orientations can be distinguished in these answers.

The first draws on the Black feminist genealogy of the term. Two respondents traced it to the Combahee River Collective Statement of 1977, and others cited bell hooks, Barbara Smith and Linda Alcoff. A recurring idea in this group is that identity should be a point of departure rather than a fixed category. One faculty member, summarising bell hooks, wrote that identity politics 'is most effective when conceived as a starting point for critical political analysis, rather than as an endpoint'.

The second orientation is critical-materialist. These respondents insist that identity politics loses its meaning when detached from economic structures, class relations and global power. One alumni respondent warned that 'without addressing material conditions and class relations, identity politics risks becoming a politics of recognition only'. Another argued, in stronger terms, that 'We definitely need a degree of identity politics to identify problems that certain kind of people suffer, but definitely this MUST BE CONTEXUALIZED with sociology , economics, imperialism and race relations.' References to contemporary armed conflicts appear in this group as examples of what these respondents see as a selective application of identity-based discourse.

The third orientation is relational and political-philosophical. Drawing on authors such as Benedict Anderson and William Connolly, these respondents understand identity as contingent and as a matter of the relationship between communities and the state, close to what was once called ethnic politics. As one faculty member put it, 'Identity politics are redefining the relationship between citizens and contemporary States today in a way we haven't started to grasp yet.' Works on ethnic conflict and peacebuilding also appear in this group.

Some respondents also cited critical assessments of identity politics, such as Hobsbawm's objection that it promotes the rights of particular groups only, or Fukuyama's concern about social fragmentation. These answers show that the community's references are not limited to authors sympathetic to identity politics.

2. Identity and the understanding of human rights

Asked whether their own identity had influenced their understanding of human rights (Q15), most respondents answered that it had, often with detailed explanations. Thirty-eight answered no or not significantly, eight gave no substantive answer, and some answered with a bare 'yes'. Negative answers are more frequent among faculty (15 of 55) than among students (13 of 61) or alumni (10 of 80).

Five themes run through the answers.

Lived experience as a source of awareness. The most frequent theme is that experiences of discrimination made respondents aware of inequality and drew them to human rights. Gender is the dimension most often mentioned, followed by ethnicity, race, sexuality, class, migration and displacement; disability, caste and refugee status also appear. Many respondents describe human rights as lived realities rather than abstract principles. One student wrote: 'My identity and lived experience have shaped my awareness of structural inequalities. They allow me to see how human rights protections often fail in practice when systemic discrimination remains unaddressed.' Several also described how their own experience opened them to the experience of others. In the words of another student, 'Facing discrimination as a woman has driven me to appreciate that other social classifications face similar challenges and that although the manifestation of the discrimination is different, the foundations are the same'.

Privilege and positionality. A second group of respondents reflect on privilege rather than disadvantage: being white, middle-class, heterosexual, cisgender or highly educated. For them, recognising privilege is a condition for credible human rights work, often expressed as a commitment to listen rather than speak. As one faculty member put it, 'coming from priviledge you tend to forget how protected you are'. Others extended this reflection to the field itself. One alumni respondent observed that 'sometimes HR norms and standards come from "neutral" position which actually does not exist.'

Geopolitical location. A third theme concerns where respondents come from in the global order. Respondents from the Global South, and from regions they describe as invisible in global debates, explain how this position shaped their view of human rights and of the international system. One alumni respondent wrote that 'the international world responses to human rights violations depends on these classifications'. Some of these answers call for

human rights education to give greater room to perspectives from outside Europe and North America.

Class and material conditions. A fourth group emphasises social class as the decisive dimension of identity. One alumni respondent explained: 'I see identity as inseparable from class and power structures'. For a few, this view leads to scepticism about identity politics as such. As another alumni respondent put it, 'the real battle is between the 99% and the 1%. All these identitarian politics are just ways for them to divide and conquer.'

Universality and distance from identity. Finally, a significant minority, concentrated among the negative answers, hold that human rights should be understood independently of personal identity. One faculty member wrote: 'No. Human rights focus on protecting vital interests that are shared by all humans - that is the whole point of the universality of human rights.' Others drew a distinction between the concept and its application. In the words of a student, 'I think human rights has its own concept that cannot be perceived otherwise or influenced by one's identity, but how human rights is interpreted and implemented can be largely influenced by one's identify.' A few negative answers reveal a different assumption: that only marginalised identities count as identities. One faculty member answered 'No' on the grounds that, as a white cisgender man, he could not approach the issue from his own experience.

Overall, identity appears in these answers as both constitutive and interrogative of human rights consciousness. For most respondents it grounds their commitment, while also prompting them to question their own position and the supposed neutrality of the field. A minority, however, maintain that the universality of rights requires distance from identity, a position that echoes the significant share of respondents who see identity politics as potentially divisive (Part II, section 4).

3. The role of higher education

Asked how institutions of higher education can better prepare students to address the challenges posed by identity politics (Q19), respondents produced the richest set of proposals in the survey. Their answers converge on a shared premise: education is not neutral, and universities either reproduce exclusions or help to overcome them. Five themes emerge.

Integrating intersectionality and plural knowledge into the curriculum. The most frequent proposal is to make intersectionality a core element of human rights curricula rather than the subject of optional courses. Many respondents link this to diversifying the sources of knowledge: including scholarship from the Global South, Indigenous and feminist perspectives, and critical approaches to international law. One alumni respondent wrote: 'More diversity amongst professors and teachers. The combination of academic research and lived experience is essential to the understanding and teaching of intersectionality.' A faculty member offered a concrete example: courses on global human rights law 'could include Indigenous, queer, and postcolonial critiques'.

Connecting theory and practice. A second strong theme is that identity politics cannot be taught in the abstract. Respondents propose case studies, simulations, testimonies, fieldwork, internships and partnerships with grassroots organisations. One student suggested that universities 'should organize field trips to communities—not just NGOs doing desk research—

so students directly engage with marginalized groups and understand how identity shapes access to rights.'

Dialogue across difference. Many respondents see the classroom as a space where disagreement should be cultivated rather than avoided. They propose debates, structured dialogue, joint work between students of different backgrounds and explicit room for dissenting views. One alumni respondent wrote that identity politics 'shouldn't be taught as a divisive or exclusionary perspective, but rather a tool for engagement and understanding.' A faculty member proposed 'making room for other/contrary views as part of the discourse.'

Institutions practising what they teach. A fourth theme concerns institutions themselves: who studies and teaches in them, and how they handle exclusion. Proposals include diversifying faculty and student bodies, affirmative action, staff training and attention to how cases of discrimination are handled. As one faculty member put it, institutions should begin 'By acknowledging exclusion factors and addressign them in their own internal practices.' Another stressed the value of 'educating through example. HEIs must be strict on their own policies and implementation.' An alumni respondent pointed to the role institutions play 'from recruiting students to who gets the position or roles in faculties.' Some respondents, mostly alumni, applied these expectations to the Global Campus itself, drawing on their own experience as students, and asked for a greater diversity of perspectives in teaching and for preparing teaching staff to facilitate identity-related discussions. These are matters that each programme addresses within the institutional framework of its host university. The observations, offered by people who know the network from within, are consistent with the more critical assessment of curricula by alumni noted in Part II (section 3).

Caution and dissent. Finally, a minority of respondents express reservations about the premise of the question. Some ask universities to teach the limits and risks of identity politics alongside its contributions, or to keep universality and class at the centre. One alumni respondent warned that 'Having a specific identity doesn't make you an expert on the topic at hand.' Others question whether universities should take a position at all. One faculty member wrote that 'It is not the role of higher education to engage in politics of any kind. Its role is to understand the social world not change it'. Another called for a gradual approach in conservative societies: 'Insisting and shaming people that don't accept identity politics is the wrong way. Cancel culture is not the solution. Tolerance and understanding is, even if the opposite side does not have it.' One respondent asked institutions to support students who disagree with identity politics.

Taken together, the answers present the university as both a mirror and an agent of society. Respondents expect it to broaden what is taught and how, to open its classrooms to disagreement, and to apply its own principles to its internal practices. These expectations are consistent with the preference for education as a strategy for social justice found in Part II, but they also make clear that respondents judge educational institutions by what they do, not only by what they teach.

4. Envisioning a role through an intersectional lens

The last question asked respondents whether they envision a role for themselves in promoting human rights through an intersectional lens (Q22). Most answered affirmatively (151 of the

196 respondents, 77.0%), often describing what they already do. Twenty-eight answered no, were unsure or questioned the premise, and thirteen gave no substantive answer. As with the question on identity, faculty members are more frequent among the negative or uncertain answers (13 of 55) than students (6 of 61) or alumni (9 of 80).

The affirmative answers describe four kinds of roles.

Teaching and research. The most common role, especially among faculty, is to integrate intersectionality into teaching, supervision and research. 'My teaching provides the most effective form of my involvement in these issues,' wrote one faculty member. A student described the role as 'an educator. I love leading discussion in diverse groups of students to enforce dialogs between them'.

Policy, law and advocacy. Many alumni and students describe roles in policymaking, litigation, diplomacy, international organisations and NGOs. Here intersectionality is presented as a working method. One faculty member wrote: 'I embrace intersectionality as a methodology, not just a concept.' An alumni respondent working in policy described the aim of 'making sure human rights policies account for how people's identities overlap and shape their experiences.'

Accompanying and amplifying others. A third group sees its role as supporting the people directly affected rather than speaking for them. One alumni respondent put it this way: 'My role isn't to lead human rights movements, but to equip those who do — with clarity, context, strategy, and language that reflect the complexity of human identities.' Another stressed the importance of letting 'space to people that are the concerned ones and not speak instead of them'.

Everyday practice. Some respondents locate intersectional practice in daily interactions as much as in professional roles. As one student put it, 'intersectionality is a vision for society and a challenge for day-to-day practice.'

The negative and uncertain answers deserve attention in their own right. Many are brief ('No', 'Not sure'), and some respondents found the question unclear. Others express a conceptual objection. One faculty member noted that 'intersectionality for me is different from identity politics', a distinction that coincides with the one drawn in the introduction. An alumni respondent described their role as 'supporting fairness for everyone without focusing too much on dividing people into many categories.' Another answered simply: 'Not in its current form.' These answers show that the intersectional framework, while widely embraced, is neither familiar to nor accepted by everyone in the community.

5. Overview of Part III

The open-ended answers deepen and qualify the picture drawn by the closed questions. Three conclusions emerge.

1. Identity is, for most respondents, a source of commitment to human rights and a reason to question their own position. Lived experience of discrimination, awareness of privilege, geopolitical location and class all shape how respondents understand rights.

2. Respondents expect universities to integrate intersectionality and plural knowledge into their curricula, to connect theory and practice, to cultivate dialogue across difference, and to apply their principles to themselves. Some respondents apply these expectations to the Global Campus itself, as a network they know from within.
3. Throughout the answers, a minority voice persists, insisting on universality, class or the risks of division. This voice is more frequent among faculty members, and it confirms that identity politics remains a contested notion within the community rather than a shared orthodoxy.

The concluding section brings together the findings of the three parts.

Conclusions and implications

This study set out to explore how members of the Global Campus community understand identity politics and its relationship with human rights. This final section draws together the findings of the three parts, relates them to the debate outlined in the introduction, considers what they suggest for the network as a whole, and notes the limitations that should guide their use.

1. Main findings

Five findings emerge from the closed and open-ended questions taken together.

A plurality of conceptions. Respondents do not share a single understanding of identity politics. They accept several definitions as valid and distribute their preferences among them, and their references range from Black feminist thought to theories of recognition, ethnicity and nationalism. Identity politics appears within the community as a field of inquiry rather than as an orthodoxy.

Valuing identity politics while acknowledging its risks. Most respondents (58.7%) consider identity politics very or extremely significant for human rights in their region, yet 44.4% agree that it can divide rather than unite. These positions are not held by opposing camps: many respondents hold both at once. A minority voice, more frequent among faculty members, insists on universality, class or the risks of fragmentation. Its presence shows that the community debates identity politics rather than taking it for granted.

Qualified assessments of institutions. Most respondents consider that human rights curricula address intersectionality only partly, and that international human rights law offers only partial protection to marginalised groups. Those who view one of these institutions more favourably tend to view the other in the same way, which suggests a consistent evaluative stance towards the field.

A shared pedagogical orientation. Education and awareness-raising is the strategy most widely endorsed (84.2%), across roles, programmes and professional activities, followed by intersectional collaboration (69.9%). The open answers give this orientation concrete content: integrating intersectionality and plural knowledge into curricula, connecting theory and practice, and cultivating dialogue across difference.

Identity as commitment and reflexivity. For most respondents, identity is both a source of commitment to human rights and a reason to question their own position and the supposed neutrality of the field. Lived experience of discrimination, awareness of privilege, geopolitical location and class all shape how they understand rights.

As for differences between groups, the most consistent relates to gender: women more often favour the definition centred on collective action and select education as a strategy, and tend to attribute greater significance to identity politics. Legal background, often assumed to shape views on these issues, makes no clear difference on any question. Differences by role and programme are present but intertwined, since roles are unevenly distributed across programmes.

The variation across programmes deserves a final word. The Global Campus brings together universities from every world region, and its programmes work in very different political, social and academic contexts. The differences observed between programmes reflect that diversity of contexts and perspectives. They are not a measure of the quality of any programme, and the small size of the regional groups would not support such a reading in any case. Seen in this light, the diversity of views within the network is less a source of division than one of its main resources.

2. The findings in light of the debate on identity politics

The introduction situated identity politics between two traditions: one that sees it as a framework for visibility, empowerment and coalition, and another that warns of its risks, whether the displacement of material equality, the fixing of identities around injury, the fragmentation of shared civic bonds or its appropriation by institutions and elites. The survey was not designed to settle this debate, but its findings show how the debate is lived within a community devoted to human rights education.

First, the Black feminist genealogy of the concept is clearly present. The preference for definitions centred on collective action and intersectionality, particularly among women, the prominence of intersectional collaboration among the preferred strategies, and the recurring idea that identity is a point of departure rather than a fixed category are all close to the understanding of identity found in the Combahee River Collective Statement and in the work of Crenshaw and Collins: a ground from which to build coalitions, not an enclosure.

Second, the tension between recognition and redistribution reappears in respondents' own words. The critical-materialist orientation found in the open answers, and the weight some respondents give to class, echo Fraser's warning that struggles for recognition might displace demands for redistribution; one respondent spoke of the risk of 'a politics of recognition only'. Yet most respondents who mention class treat it as one axis of identity among others rather than as an alternative to it, a position closer to Fraser's own call to integrate recognition and redistribution than to a choice between them.

Third, the concerns voiced by critics such as Lilla and Fukuyama find an echo, but in an unexpected form. Nearly half of the respondents acknowledge that identity politics can divide, and a minority voice insists on universality. This concern, however, is not confined to sceptics: it is shared by many who consider identity politics highly significant. Among respondents, the opposition between identity politics and civic unity that marks public debate appears less as a divide between camps than as a tension that individuals hold and reflect upon.

Fourth, the warnings of Brown, Haider and Táíwò about identities fixed around injury and about institutional or elite appropriation have their counterparts in the answers. Respondents' reflexivity about privilege, their insistence that institutions apply their principles to themselves, and the remark that 'Having a specific identity doesn't make you an expert on the topic at hand' express an awareness that identity can harden into a credential or be reduced to institutional rhetoric.

Finally, the qualified assessment of international human rights law is consistent with the gradual incorporation of intersectionality into the international framework, of which the

CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation No. 28 is one milestone. Respondents recognise this progress, but most consider it incomplete.

The distinction between identity, intersectionality and identity politics drawn in the introduction helps to account for this pattern. Most respondents embrace identity as a dimension of their own formation and intersectionality as an analytical tool: four in five accept the intersectional formulation, and three in four envision a role for themselves through an intersectional lens. Their reservations appear directed mainly at identity politics as a form of mobilisation. Read in this way, what might look like ambivalence is better understood as a set of distinctions that respondents draw, explicitly or implicitly, between these three planes.

Taken together, the findings suggest that the community does not align with either pole of the debate. It occupies a reflective middle ground in which identity is valued as a source of commitment and knowledge while its risks are openly acknowledged. This may be the study's most significant contribution. Where public debate on identity politics is often presented as polarised, members of the Global Campus approach it as an open question, a disposition that human rights education is well placed to cultivate.

3. Implications for the network

The findings do not translate into prescriptions, but they suggest several lines of reflection that the network, through the Academic Affairs Committee, may wish to pursue collectively.

- **Intersectionality as a shared, cross-cutting dimension.** Respondents favour integrating intersectionality across curricula rather than confining it to specific courses. The network's diversity offers a particular opportunity here: exchanging materials, case studies and teaching experiences between programmes would allow each to draw on contexts that others know first-hand.
- **Dialogue across difference as a pedagogical practice.** The coexistence of support and caution suggests that teaching on identity politics benefits from spaces where disagreement can be expressed and examined. Joint activities across programmes, such as the Global Classroom, are natural settings for this kind of dialogue.
- **Connecting theory and practice.** The demand for case studies, fieldwork and engagement with affected communities points to the value of experiential learning, for which the network's presence in every region is a distinctive asset.
- **Institutional coherence.** Respondents expect institutions to apply their principles to themselves, through inclusive practices, the diversity of teaching staff and attention to how discrimination is addressed. Within the framework that each programme shares with its host university, these are questions on which the network can reflect collectively, through the cooperation that defines it.
- **Alumni as interlocutors.** Alumni assess curricula more critically than current students and faculty, and offer observations grounded in their professional experience. Their perspective is a valuable source of feedback for the network's ongoing reflection on its teaching.

4. Limitations and directions for future research

The findings should be read in light of the study's limitations. The sample is self-selected and not representative of the Global Campus community or of any single programme. The survey was administered only in English, captures a single moment, and relies on an intermediate option ('somewhat') that admits a broad range of meanings. Subgroups, including several regional groups, are small. In addition, the questionnaire did not distinguish between identity, intersectionality and identity politics, and its intersectional definition itself combines the latter two.

Future editions of the survey could address some of these limitations: by offering the questionnaire in several languages, coordinating dissemination through focal points in each programme, refining response scales, and repeating key questions over time to observe changes in attitudes. Including separate questions on identity, intersectionality and identity politics would allow the distinction proposed in this report to be examined directly. A shared coding framework for open answers would also allow more systematic comparison.

The study also leaves open several questions that merit further inquiry. How can pedagogy reconcile the universality of rights with the situated knowledge through which they are understood and claimed? How might intersectionality move from a theoretical vocabulary to a methodological and institutional practice in human rights teaching and research? And how can a transnational network such as the Global Campus turn the diversity of its members' perspectives into a resource for addressing shared challenges?

One respondent captured the spirit of many answers in a single sentence: 'intersectionality is a vision for society and a challenge for day-to-day practice.' The findings of this study suggest that, within the Global Campus, both the vision and the challenge are widely shared.

Note on the use of AI tools

Generative AI tools were used as assistive instruments in the preparation and revision of this report. ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used for English-language translation and editing of the original report. Claude (Anthropic) was used during the preparation of this revised version to support the recalculation and verification of statistical results against the original dataset, the organisation of qualitative material, and drafting and editing.

All statistical results and quotations in this version were checked against the original dataset. Material that could not be adequately substantiated was corrected or removed.

The analytical framework, methodological decisions, interpretation and final content are the author's, who retains full responsibility for them.

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Annex: The questionnaire

The questionnaire is reproduced below as it was administered through Google Forms, including its original wording and the bibliographic references attached to the three definitions; programme names are abbreviated and minor typographical errors have been corrected. Response options are listed after each question; questions marked (multiple answers) allowed more than one selection.

Q1. Please click on the icon of the regional programme with which you regularly interact as student, alumni or faculty.

HRDA (Africa) · ARMA (Arab World) · APMA (Asia-Pacific) · CES (Caucasus) · MAHRS (Central Asia) · EMA (Europe) · LATMA (Latin America and the Caribbean) · ERMA (South East Europe)

Q2. Which of the following categories do you feel most closely aligns with your primary role or connection to the Global Human Rights Campus? (If you identify with Alumni and Faculty, please choose the one you feel is most relevant for the purpose of this survey.)

Student · Faculty · Alumni

Q3. Age: In which age group do you fall?

18–24 · 25–30 · 31–35 · 36–40 · 41+

Q4. Gender: Please indicate your gender.

Male · Female · Non-binary · Prefer not to say

Q5. Years of experience in human rights: How many years of experience do you have working in the human rights field?

Less than 1 year · 1–3 years · 4–6 years · 7–10 years · 10+ years

Q6. Current sector of employment in human rights: Please specify your current sector of employment within the human rights field.

Full-time student · NGO · Government · Academia · International organizations · Other (open answer)

Q7. Main work activities in human rights: Please describe your main work activities in the human rights field. (multiple answers)

Studying · Research · Advocacy · Program management · Teaching · Other

Q8. What is your main disciplinary background? (multiple answers)

Law · Political Science · Sociology · Anthropology · International Relations · Philosophy · History · Psychology · Economics · Journalism · Social Communication · Arts · Other

Given the various ways 'identity politics' is understood and its importance in addressing legacies of injustice, we recognise that no single definition is exhaustive. We will now present three significant definitions that offer different analytical lenses on this topic. After considering these, you will also have the opportunity to suggest a definition from another author if you wish.

Q9. General approach with emphasis on the social construction of identity. "Identity politics is a political approach that seeks to advance the interests of a particular group, based on their shared social and cultural identities. These identities are often constructed through processes

of social categorization and are influenced by factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, and disability. This approach recognizes the ways in which these identities shape individuals' experiences of power and marginalization." Hall, S. (1997). The Spectacle of the 'Other'. In S. Hall (Ed.), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (pp. 222–279). Sage Publications. Given the multifaceted nature of identity politics and dialogic engagement with legacies of injustice, how well does this statement describe it?

Very accurately · Accurately · Not that accurate · Incorrectly · Doesn't make sense to me

Q10. Focus on collective action and social justice. "Identity politics refers to political movements and strategies that aim to empower marginalized groups and challenge systems of oppression. By foregrounding the experiences and perspectives of individuals who have been historically marginalized, identity politics seeks to create a more just and equitable society." Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989(1), 139–167. Given the multifaceted nature of identity politics and dialogic engagement with legacies of injustice, how well does this statement describe it?

Very accurately · Accurately · Not that accurate · Incorrectly · Doesn't make sense to me

Q11. Focus on diversity of identities and intersectionality. "Identity politics acknowledges the diversity of human experience and recognizes that individuals may hold multiple and intersecting identities. It is concerned with the ways in which these intersecting identities shape individuals' lives and their experiences of discrimination and oppression." Collins, P. H. (1991). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Routledge. Given the multifaceted nature of identity politics and dialogic engagement with legacies of injustice, how well does this statement describe it?

Very accurately · Accurately · Not that accurate · Incorrectly · Doesn't make sense to me

Q12. Please rank the three statements, from first to third, on how well they define identity politics for you.

First · Second · Third (for each of: a) Stuart Hall · b) K. Crenshaw · c) P. H. Collins)

Q13. If you are familiar with a definition of 'identity politics' from another author that you find particularly relevant, please feel free to share it below. (optional, open answer)

Q14. To what extent do you believe identity politics is a significant factor in the promotion and protection of human rights in your region?

Not at all significant · Neither significant nor insignificant · Somewhat significant · Very significant · Extremely significant

Q15. Has your own identity (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class) influenced your understanding of human rights? If so, how? (open answer)

Q16. Do you believe that human rights curricula adequately address the intersectionality of identities and their impact on human rights?

Yes · No · Somewhat

Q17. Have you participated in any student organizations or initiatives focused on identity politics and human rights?

Yes · No · If yes, please specify

Q18. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Identity politics has the potential to divide rather than unite people."

Strongly disagree · Disagree · Neither agree nor disagree · Agree · Strongly agree

Q19. How do you think institutions of higher education can better prepare students to address the challenges posed by identity politics in the field of human rights? Please provide specific examples. (open answer)

Q20. Which of the following do you believe are the most effective strategies for promoting social justice through identity politics? (multiple answers)

Education and awareness-raising · Advocacy and lobbying · Social movements and protests · Intersectional collaboration · Other (open answer)

Q21. Do you believe that international human rights law adequately addresses the concerns of marginalized groups based on their identities?

Yes · No · Somewhat

Q22. Do you envision a role for yourself in promoting human rights through an intersectional lens? If so, what is this role? (open answer)