

The Comprehensive Approach – a foreign policy tool?

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ABSTRACT

The international crisis management is dealing with direct threats to wider international and national peace and security and has developed capacities to manage diverse aspects of recent complex crises. Understanding in this area has been produced largely by formative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. While today the dominant paradigm is stabilisation, the key concept to realise this paradigm is the comprehensive approach and the main environment to exercise it remains Afghanistan.

Though there is not commonly agreed upon definition, the comprehensive approach is usually understood as an endeavour to integrate different dimensions of stabilisation – development, governance, humanitarian, human rights, political, rule of law and security – in stabilisation operations. In this study the term comprehensive approach is used to signify initiative, a way of thinking, and, a wide range of parallel concepts used by different actors. This thesis seeks to examine the nature of the comprehensive approach based upon its theoretical background, conceptual rationale and practical realisation. More precisely its purpose is to discover what the comprehensive approach is really for.

I will argue that despite the noble rhetoric of international and human security, human rights, democracy, development and humanitarian assistance, the driving force of the crisis management and the comprehensive approach can be traced to the fundamental question, much like in all levels of social interaction whose vision of the future will prevail. These visions are formulated as policies and in the international context this implies foreign policies.

The thesis goes through the theoretical framework of crisis management, elaborates upon stabilisation as the present focus of crisis management operations, and clarifies the content and nature of the comprehensive approach at large. This thesis concludes that the seminal topic connecting all these issues – crisis management, stabilisation and comprehensive approach – in the theoretical level is foreign policy. The subsequent case study supports this finding at the global, regional and national levels of a crisis.

As a final conclusion, it declares that the comprehensive approach in the crisis management context is ultimately for realising foreign policy goals.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CA	Comprehensive Approach
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
COIN	Counterinsurgency
EU	European Union
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MNE	Multinational experiment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OSCE	Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USG	United States Government
WGA	Whole of government (approach)
3-D / 3D	Defence, Development and Diplomacy

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PART I – THEORETICAL STUDY

1. INTRODUCTION

From the first month of this year violent crisis have been the top stories of daily news coverage with the reports increasingly arising from the area of instability between West Africa and Pakistan. This has brought international actors as well as different national governments to realise the necessity of examining their crisis management policies, capabilities and practises². The international crisis management is dealing with direct threats to wider international as well as national peace and security, and has developed capacities to manage diverse aspects of recent complex crises³. Understanding in this area has been produced largely by formative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan; while today the dominant paradigm is stabilisation⁴, the key concept to realise this paradigm is the comprehensive approach and the main environment to exercise it remains Afghanistan⁵.

Though there is not commonly agreed definition⁶, the comprehensive approach is usually understood as an endeavour integrate different dimensions of stabilisation – development, governance, humanitarian, human rights, political, rule of law and security – in stabilisation operations⁷. In this study the term comprehensive approach is used to signify initiative, a way of thinking, and a wide range of parallel concepts used by different actors. These concepts have been formed during the last decade starting from the United Nations (UN) Security Council’ (SC) statement in February 2001 calling for a “comprehensive, concerted and determinate approach” into quest for peace⁸. Particularly this statement was passed in context of Afghanistan, where the UN

² (Dombey 2011) p. 1.

³ (Boin, Hart and Stern, *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. 2005) pp. 2 – 5, 7 – 10.

⁴ (Blair and Fitz-Gerald, *Stabilisation and Stability Operations: A Literature Survey*. 2009) pp. 2 – 3.

⁵ (Marincic 2010) p. 1.

⁶ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 9.

⁷ *ibidem* p. 9, 19.

⁸ (The United Nations 2001)

Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested the comprehensive approach in August 2001⁹. However, the comprehensive approach was realised only several years later, following the United States' (US) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), launched October 2001¹⁰, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) security mission, established by UN SC December 2001. ISAF was lead by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)¹¹, which was expanded (authorised by UN SC) in October 2003, completed in July 2006 throughout Afghanistan¹². Officially NATO adopted the comprehensive approach for use in its operations November 2006¹³ and also the US expressed need for the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan early 2007¹⁴. Nevertheless, there have not been the anticipated results towards stabilisation since, and instead the situation remains highly volatile¹⁵.

The main success factor for comprehensive approach in stability operations have said to be “coherence”¹⁶ or “unity of effort”¹⁷ between different actors and hence poor success is explained with the lack of it, internally or externally¹⁸. Other presented explanations for weak performance are the difference of the actors (military, humanitarian, state-building) perceptions of their own identity and reasons for the crisis¹⁹. These might be very valid arguments to describe why comprehensive approach is fairly inefficient and slow in producing results, but they do not reveal reasons for the

⁹ (The United Nations 2001) p. 9.

¹⁰ (Stewart 2004) p. 10.

¹¹ At the start, ISAF was neither a NATO nor a UN force but a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of the UN SC. Volunteering countries led ISAF for six-month rotations (firstly the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands). In August 2003 NATO assumed command, control and coordination of the mission and created a permanent ISAF headquarters in Kabul.

¹² (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF/NATO n.d.)

¹³ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 26 November 2006) para. 10.

¹⁴ (E. Edelman 2007) p. 4.

¹⁵ (The United Nations 2011) pp. 2 – 3, 8 – 10, 14 – 15, 17 – 19.

¹⁶ (Ahtisaari 2008) p. 5; (De Coning and Friis 2011) p. 244.

¹⁷ (Volker 2006) p. 18; (Department of the Army October 2008) p. 1-3 (note: paged numbered chapter – page = chapter 1, page 3).

¹⁸ (Noetzel and Scheipers October 2007) p. 2; (Viggo Jakobsen January 2010) pp. 80 – 83, 86 – 88; (Rynning 2011) pp. 11 – 13; (De Coning and Friis 2011) p. 245.

¹⁹ (Friis, *The Politics of the Comprehensive Approach: The Military, Humanitarian and State-building Discourses in Afghanistan* March 2010) p. 5; (De Coning and Friis 2011) pp. 259 – 260.

deteriorating situation in operations and the growing local opposition towards the entire comprehensive approach, especially in Afghanistan²⁰.

This thesis seeks to examine potential explanations to declining development from the comprehensive approach itself, from its theoretical background, conceptual rationale and practical realisation. More precisely its purpose is to discover what the comprehensive approach is really for. For clarification purposes, with the intention of situating the comprehensive approach in the crisis management field, this thesis places the comprehensive approach within the context of the international stabilisation operations. In order to observe practical implications and to present existing examples of implementation on the field, a seminal case study was selected. The case study examines Balkh province in the northern part of Afghanistan; chosen because the OEF originated there²¹ and in this part the negative development has been most evident²².

Yet while the practical implications of the comprehensive approach are analysed in the context of Afghanistan, it is more a theatre than the crux of the thesis. Certainly this complex context counts, but some of the challenges, key components and characters analysed are probable to be found in other stabilisation operations as well. While, as mentioned earlier, the comprehensive approach is attempts to integrate different actors' acts, it also has a more profound aim: "the Comprehensive Approach is not an end in itself but a means to an end"²³. Thus, a question rises what is this "end". I will argue that despite the noble rhetoric of international and human security, human rights, democracy, development and humanitarian assistance, the driving force of the crisis management and the comprehensive approach can be traced to the fundamental question, much like in all levels of social interaction, whose vision of the future will prevail. These visions are formulated as policies and in the international context this implies foreign policies.

²⁰ (Davies and Leigh 2010); (National Public Radio 2011)

²¹ (Stewart 2004) p. 11.

²² (The international Council on Security and Development 2009)

²³ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 9.

Acknowledging the fundamental different positions of actors in the stabilisation context should help to understand the core factors that are critical for the success and sustainability of stabilisation operations, it should also help to see beyond the lack of coherence and coordination or political / security and development / humanitarian confrontation to true causes of the comprehensive approach's problems²⁴. Proposing a more accurate picture of what the comprehensive approach is should also reduce the risk of the whole comprehensive approach initiative losing its credibility, caused by inaccurate expectations and consequent disappointments. Despite adversaries' opposition and hostility towards different visions of future, the comprehensive approach idea has the necessary elements to create long term solutions for crises.

This thesis consists of a list of acronyms and abbreviations, an introduction, three main sections: a theoretical study, a case study, and the final conclusion and the bibliography. The introduction (chapter 1) states briefly the issues discussed in the thesis and research focus and significance of the thesis. The theoretical study introduces a theoretical framework for crisis management (chapter 2), which develops a general view of crises and their management in different levels based on array of multidisciplinary studies, and stabilisation (chapter 3), which elaborates upon stabilisation as the conception is portrayed in the present thought of crisis management operations and related academic writings. The conceptual framework of the comprehensive approach (chapter 4) clarifies the content and nature of the comprehensive approach at large and the conclusion (chapter 5) sums up the abstract processing of issues. The case study examines the empirical implementation of the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan and its northern part, in Balkh province (chapters 6 and 7) derived from available textual and other sources, followed with the conclusion (chapter 8) which sums up the case study. The final conclusion (chapter 9) presents a summary of conclusions, observations and suggested recommendations from both previous parts.

²⁴ According to Lt. Gen. John R. Allen, ISAF commander from April 2011, institutional cultures of the military and development side, including NGOs, are largely in harmony (US Agency for International Development, USAID April/ May 2011) p. 45.

2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

When exploring crisis management it is appropriate to consider, as a starting point, how a crisis, particularly for our purposes, an international crisis, is understood. How does it diverge from ordinary events?²⁵ To begin with a quick overview of the term crisis should be suitable before moving towards more specific analysis of the international crisis.

2.1 *The term Crisis*

The term crisis came to the English language via Latin from the Greek noun *krisis* (“a separating, distinguishing, discrimination, decision, judgement”), obtaining from the verb *krinein* (“separate, decide, judge”). In the first English translation, around 1425, the term was used with the medical meaning of “turning point in a disease” and later, in 1627, it was applied as a figurative addition in the similar sense of “decisive moment” in a disease: sudden change for better or worse, i.e. crisis of nerve, anger, mad laugh etc. Noteworthy is that in Chinese equivalent term – *wēijī* – don’t have similar connotation, it is, from the onset, “always something worrisome and unwanted”²⁶. Outside its medical sense the term emerged 1690 in use describing “a grave phase in the evolution of things, events, ideas”²⁷ and during the eighteenth century it obtained its modern meaning, in reference to historical processes, periods, or events, of “a moment of danger or insecurity”²⁸, which was formalised during the second half of the nineteenth century from the European Revolutions of 1848 on. This unambiguous use of the term remained until second half of the twentieth century, when its usage was expanded and sense altered to be used additionally as an overall term for an essential or decisive period or state of affairs. In this sense the term crisis is only partly or not in the least related to the original idea of a defining moment, to a short time²⁹. The term has feature – being at the same time the definitive reason (for something) and quite

²⁵ This question has been primary in crisis research from the beginning. For further details take a look to (McClelland, *The Acute International Crisis* 1961).

²⁶ (Mair 2005 Retrieved September 2009)

²⁷ (Dumont 2001)

²⁸ (Wilton 2006) p. 1.

²⁹ (Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*. Trans. by Thomas McCarthy 1975) p. 2. The original book was published as (Habermas, *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus* 1973).

“Chinese” (complex) – that makes it accepted without a doubt enabling its use instead of other, more revealing, terms and this might explain the expansion of its usage³⁰. Thus, the term crisis is widely used in various situations³¹ and the next step is to see how this corresponds to its understanding in the scholarly field.

Clearly the notion of crisis is used in the scientific arena in its original sense on the medical field, what is more, the social sciences along technical disciplines have propagated its usage, with morphed sense, and it is used by epidemiologists, ecologists, economists, psychologists, sociologists, computer scientists, historians, and political scientists to describe events in cultural, social, political, and economic systems. This variety of disciplines might explain why there is no harmonised meaning of the term crisis despite its extensive use and popularity³². However, to navigate through this patchwork, keeping mind our focus on international crisis, it is useful to study articulated definitions of a crisis.

2.2 *International Crisis*

A popular, condense, and widely accepted view of (international) crisis comes from Charles F. Herman, who identifies three characters that determine a situation to be categorised as a crisis: it “(1) threatens high – priority values .., (2) .. restricts amount of time in which response can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated”³³. Rather similar proposition was made previously by James A. Robinson with more stress on the decision making in his definition: "a situation of the greatest severity (the most crisis like) would be one in which the occasion for decision, arose from without the decisional unit, required a prompt decision, and involved very high stakes”³⁴. Besides those, a range of academics have proposed prior several different descriptions with various dimensions of crisis³⁵, among them two characters used by Herman: threat to high –

³⁰ (Dumont 2001)

³¹ (Milašinović and Kešetović 2008) p. 168.

³² (Robinson, Crisis 1968) p. 510 and (Milašinović and Kešetović 2008) p. 169.

³³ (Herman, Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations 1963) p. 64.

³⁴ (Robinson, The Concept of Crisis in Decision-Making 1962) p. 8.

³⁵ For some examples take look of following works: (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), (Nall 1956) pp. 10 – 11, (Form, et al. 1958) p. 12, (McClelland, The Acute International Crisis 1961) pp. 182 – 204.

priority values³⁶ and constraint on time usable for reaction³⁷. Also a few suggestions towards the third point, unexpectation or unanticipation, can be found from earlier literature³⁸ but in his later work Herman formulated this point slightly differently “... and (3) surprises the members of the decision - making unit by its occurrence ...”³⁹, which has produced some critics based on view that hardly any crisis, at least political one, comes as a surprise⁴⁰. Although Herman stated the same year that surprise character has lower occurrence and correlation with other two characters than those with each other⁴¹. In addition to this main basic view of a crisis by Robinson – Herman, there are two other characters commonly used when considered determining the existence an international crisis: high probability of war and uncertainty of circumstances.

While traces of the character of a probability of war can be seen already present in Herman’s work⁴², Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing brought it to be part of the definition of a crisis with connecting perception – view, not necessarily comprehension – to the high probability of war; a crisis is distinguishable by “the perception of a dangerously high probability of war”⁴³. Besides Michael Brecher offered a “high probability of involvement in military hostilities” as a “necessary and sufficient condition” of a crisis in his attempts to form a theory of international crisis behaviour⁴⁴ and later he replaced the surprise element with this same condition on his version of Hermann’s definition with more stress on perception⁴⁵. Moreover, Brecher introduced a concept of internal war as source or probable outcome of the crisis situation⁴⁶ and

³⁶ (H. D. Lasswell 1949) p. 23.

³⁷ (Hamblin 1958) p. 67.

³⁸ (Kutak 1938) p. 66 and (LaPierre 1938) p. 437.

³⁹ (Herman, International crisis as a situational variable 1969) p. 414.

⁴⁰ (Brecher, Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour: A Preliminary Report 1977) p. 42 and (Brecher, State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model 1979) p. 448.

⁴¹ (Herman, Crises in foreign policy: A simulation analysis 1969) p. 69.

⁴² (Herman, Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations 1963) p. 74.

⁴³ (Snyder and Diesing 1977) p. 6.

⁴⁴ (Brecher, Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour: A Preliminary Report 1977) pp. 43 – 44.

⁴⁵ (Brecher, State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model 1979) p. 448.

⁴⁶ (Brecher, Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour: A Preliminary Report 1977) pp. 48 – 49.

expressed “uncertainty” as a determining factor of a crisis which directs to “‘crisis – type’ decision – making”⁴⁷ along similar thoughts by Patrick Morgan a little earlier⁴⁸.

Evidently, large numbers of definitions, partially deviating - partially converging, exists currently in a pile of publications talking about a crisis, which complicates its use as an analytical tool⁴⁹. However, a good compilation of above-mentioned characters in a modern-day definition of international crisis is offered by Uriel Rosenthal, Michael Charles and Paul 't Hart: a crisis is observed as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which – under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances – necessitates making critical decisions”⁵⁰. A bit later Rosenthal and 't Hart specified that the notion of threat contains a high chance of war and decisions are “potentially irreversible”⁵¹. Interestingly, on the other hand, 't Hart brought up few years after the specification above, an additional view based on more sociological perspective which sees that “crises are linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions” and are connected to “discontinuities and disruptions of dominant conceptions of social and political order” leading to definition of a crisis as “a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimating the pre-existing sociopolitical order”⁵².

To conclude, for use of this thesis, it can be understood, in predominant thinking and outside reasonably specific definitions of different disciplines, that the general character of a crisis is when a situation has reached a critical point where it is turning towards something better or worse. An international crisis could be defined as a perception of a situation which threatens, including by the high probability of war, the

⁴⁷ (Brecher, *State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model* 1979) p. 454. In his work Brecher presents uncertainty as a defining term of his complexity – dimension of a crisis, where the term refers to adversaries, self, and others (notably allies), with respect to status, capability, intentions, reliability, scope of values threatened, range of alternatives for choice, and the constraints imposed by distance, time, and technology.

⁴⁸ (Morgan 1977) p. 22.

⁴⁹ (McClelland, *Crisis and Threat in the International Setting: Some Relational Concepts* 1975) p. 1 and (Milašinović and Kešetović 2008) p. 169 - 171.

⁵⁰ (Rosenthal, Charles and 't Hart (eds.), *Coping with crises: The management of disasters, riots and terrorism* 1989) p. 10.

⁵¹ (Rosenthal und 't Hart, *Experts and Decision Makers in Crisis Situations* 1991) p. 351.

⁵² ('t Hart 1993) p. 39.

fundamental values or structures in uncertain circumstances under limited time for needed reaction to restore order.

2.3 *The Management of a Crisis*

Visualise a scale: on one end the management of a normal life (situations with certainty and stability), and on the other end of the scale the management of a catastrophe (with rescue activities to minimise casualties and material damages)⁵³. The management of a crisis can be placed past the middle of this scale beside the management of a catastrophe, as the uncertainties are out of control and the high probability of catastrophe exist (in the international crisis sense this mean a war). Still, the situation is conceived manageable and the catastrophe preventable.

Whereas the actual activity of a management of a crisis can be seen started from the early the twentieth century with the US federal and state government's formal attempts to reduce the fire threat followed fires in the large cities on previous century⁵⁴, the management of a crisis regularised its presence in the academic sphere on later half of 20th century⁵⁵. Historically, the term of a crisis management have its roots in the political field and was introduced by Graham Allison 1971 in his book *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. The book projects the US government's handling of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 as the showcase model of crisis management, though this view has been challenged after opening of the US archives⁵⁶.

What comes to meaning of the term crisis management, it is not a surprise when the term crisis is lacking commonly accepted definition and various versions hover around that same applies to its management: a legion of crisis management definitions can be found. Likewise, while a crisis is nowadays a commonplace, the crisis management is a brand name for all kinds of activities focussed to dealing with a crisis, from prevention and preparation to mitigation and recovery⁵⁷. Nevertheless, to have a

⁵³ For more about this classification take look for example (Quarantelli 1987), p. 25.

⁵⁴ (Diamantes 2005) pp. 19, 23 – 24.

⁵⁵ (Milašinović and Kešetović 2008) p. 179.

⁵⁶ (National Security Archive 1992) Introduction.

⁵⁷ (Milašinović and Kešetović 2008) p. 179 – 180.

bit more specified meaning for analysis in this thesis, a few definitions should be examined.

In the first Snyder and Diesing defined meaning of the crisis management “the exercise of detailed control by the top leadership of the governments ... to minimize the chances that the crisis will burst out of control into war. ... to advance or protect their state’s interests, to win, or at least, to maximize gains or to minimize loses, and if possible to settle the issue in conflict so that it does not produce further crises”⁵⁸. Notable in this definition is that it involves inherently a negotiation process to prevent a war and involvement of state’s interests. In the second Christine Pearson and Judith Clair offer, based on review of prior research, their definitions of a crisis management and its effectiveness: “organizational crisis management is a systematic attempt by organizational members with external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do occur. Organizational crisis management effectiveness is evidenced when potential crises are averted or when key stakeholders believe that the success outcomes of short- and long-range impacts of crises outweigh the failure outcomes”⁵⁹. Important in this definition is that it accepts to have a crisis as long as the positive results of its effects exceed the negative results.

The third explanation, and a most recent one, comes from Arjen Boin and Paul ‘t Hart when they identify crisis management tasks to “minimize the damage, alleviate the pain, and restore order ... restore political confidence in the effectiveness of pre-existing policies and institutions” and an effectiveness: “effective crisis management is all about ... to defend core values and institutional commitments”⁶⁰. Noteworthy is to recognise the emphasis on the “social-political view of a crisis” which entails collective emotions, cognition, and activities, that reverse or correct the breakdown in shared meanings, social order, and trust in leadership⁶¹. Furthermore, Boin and ‘t Hart describe a crisis management as “a leadership issue” and see that crises threaten the “status quo” and create

⁵⁸ (Snyder and Diesing 1977) p. 207.

⁵⁹ (Pearson and Clair 1998) p. 61

⁶⁰ (Boin and ‘t Hart, *Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?* 2003) pp. 549, 551.

⁶¹ (‘t Hart 1993) p. 39, and (Pearson and Clair 1998) pp. 65 – 66.

“a window of opportunity” for reforms⁶², although the later view is shared by earlier researchers⁶³.

In these changes on the definitions, particularly on the last, one can observe a progress towards to the “risk society” as called by sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. Beck defines a risk, based on his theory of “reflexive modernization”, as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernisation and to its globalisation of doubt. They are politically reflexive”⁶⁴. Beck's theory and ideas were discussed and further developed by Giddens and he identifies a risk society as "a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk"⁶⁵. While both authors advance this phenomenon strongly from the perspective of modernity, there is difference regarding the notion of a risk. Whereas Beck concretises a risk as an intentional product with the purpose of controlling the consequences of other actions and the faster the tempo of modernisation, the greater the potential of a risk, leading need of ever-increasing measures to control the ever-increasing risks; Giddens considers risk as an end product, something that is produced by being preoccupied with a future and safety⁶⁶.

They derive greatly as well from the conception of reflexivity, a circular two-way relationship between cause and effect, which is considered to be articulated by the sociologist William Thomas, thus named as the “Thomas theorem”. Thomas concluded that subjective interpretation, personal “definition of the situation”, causes the action and it is unimportant if it is an objectively correct interpretation or not; “if men define things as real, they are real in their consequences” as Thomas put it, and moreover,

⁶² (Boin and 't Hart, *Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?* 2003) pp. 545.

⁶³ For example (Keeler 1993) pp. 477 – 480 and (Stern 2008) p. 69.

⁶⁴ (Beck 1992) p. 21. The original book was published as *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1986. There has been a proposition that Beck's theory of reflexive modernization could be compared to Habermas's notion of modernisation; for more details take look for example the introduction in (Beck 1992) pp. 1 - 8.

⁶⁵ (Giddens 1999) p. 3. For more details of discussion and development of the theory of reflexive modernization take a look for example the preface in (Beck 1992) pp. 9 – 16.

⁶⁶ (Hurst 2011)

slowly a whole lifestyle and the personality arises from a sequences of such definitions⁶⁷. This is essential as the crisis management studies propose that individuals play an important role in the crises and this “psychological view of crisis”, incorporating cognitive, psychoanalytic, and trauma perspectives⁶⁸, summarised well by Jürgen Habermas: “the crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it”⁶⁹, explain the not only decision makers individual but also their organisation’s actions⁷⁰.

To conclude, for use of this thesis, the crisis management could be defined as an assortment of processes or activities by decision makers seeking to predict, recognize, inspect, and determinate a possible crisis situation, intended or uncalculated, and set up special means to prevent a crisis or to handle and overcome it with minimum negative total consequences and return to a desired state as soon as possible.

2.4 *Crisis response*

A emerging trend in the crisis management studies in recent years has been to grasp other perspectives outside of its predominant “technical” standpoint, which refers to its problem solving feature as a management methods, guidelines, practises and routines as well as an executive machinery⁷¹. Focus has been shifted towards more social and political perceptions and largely to “policy” perspective⁷².

When moving on the scale from a normal life towards a catastrophe, the political stakes raise as well as the response requirements; an awareness and a tension relief is not only to “save lives and avoid material losses” but control the political stakes, prevent events passing to ever more challenging political stages. The crisis’ consequences, i.e. the income and safety aspects, among an ethnic and racial groups / social classes in the concerned community or society are always biased, which amplifies

⁶⁷ (Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl : With Cases and Standpoint for Behavior Analysis* 1923) pp. 42 – 43; (Thomas and Thomas, *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs*. 1928) p. 572.

⁶⁸ (Pearson and Clair 1998) p. 62.

⁶⁹ (Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*. Trans. by Thomas McCarthy 1975) p. 58.

⁷⁰ (Nystrom and Starbuck 1984) p. 64, and (’t Hart 1993) pp. 39 – 40.

⁷¹ (Pearson and Clair 1998) pp. 64 - 65.

⁷² (Olson 2008) p. 154.

the turn to a political issue when moving to the recovery and reconstruction phases where entirely new economical chances and developmental opportunities are offered⁷³. Not to mentioned political re-distributive results of the crisis itself⁷⁴.

Inside and among the crisis management actors existing politics as usual are not closing down during a crisis, particularly in a long-standing, slowly escalating or decreasing, crisis; the positions of political conflict, even bureaucratic disagreements, continue to exist⁷⁵. Thus, it is not possible detach the crisis management from powerful interests, political ideologies, personalities and institutional structures⁷⁶. On the contrary, crises regularly reveal the capabilities, characters, and priorities of authorities, governments, and regimes which are profoundly political⁷⁷. Different actors can try to utilise a crisis to gain support to protect the status quo or highlight their claims for change and reform. Hence, for involved actors, a crisis can express opportunity in addition to threat; yet both, perceived opportunity and threat, can be a source of stress⁷⁸.

In politics the cutting edge is the creation of a meaning: the construction of beliefs about the magnitude of problems, events, crises, policy changes, and leaders⁷⁹; “if there are no conflicts over meaning, the issue is not political, by definition” as expressed by political scientist Murray Edelman⁸⁰. This applies very well with a crisis, which entirely issue of perception, not a matter of fact, is dependent on peoples’ perceptions of the scale and importance of the problem occurred and conception that something extraordinary is happening⁸¹, and particularly, in international sense, an adequate amount of prominent individuals and groups must become aware of the significant changes in the situation⁸². Moreover, from the public view, the leaders have not only the duty to handle the situation but also explain it: what happened, why and

⁷³ *ibidem* pp. 157 – 158.

⁷⁴ (Stern 2008) p. 295.

⁷⁵ *ibidem* p. 293.

⁷⁶ (McConnell 2003) p. 409.

⁷⁷ (Olson 2008) p. 167.

⁷⁸ ('t Hart 1993) p. 40 and (Stern 2008) p. 293.

⁷⁹ The term leaders refers to the people in senior positions in governments and public organizations, political persons or career bureaucrats, not to tactical leaders at the operational level.

⁸⁰ (M. Edelman, *Political Language and Political Reality* 1985) pp. 10 - 12.

⁸¹ (McConnell 2003) pp. 393 – 394.

⁸² (Schorr 1987) pp. 125 – 127.

what will happen?⁸³, and those who can describe what the crisis is all about, possess the key to defining the correct strategies for solution⁸⁴. Thus, the central issue is by whom, how and why an event is perceived as a crisis.

With diverse theories about causation, right or wrong, different actors in politics are competing to influence which proposal is selected to “direct policy”, as well as “about the possibility of control and the assignment of responsibility”⁸⁵. When shaping the collective perceptions, various actors utilise framing⁸⁶ by using different languages, selected usage of data and reasoning, creating ‘discourse coalitions’ with likeminded groups as well as trying to rearrange more controlled rhythms and formats of communication, as losing the control of those would mean losing the control over the definition of the situation⁸⁷. Concerning the language, in the context of crisis, the rhetorical and judicial languages are used to describe the character of crisis, to point out the causes and to assign responsibilities; the rhetorical, strongly suggestive, language is used to create or reflect public and leaders concerns, starting from naming a situation as a “crisis”; the judicial language is used to identify the causation and responsibility for a crisis and to depoliticise and to defend the legitimacy of the actions by providing an “independent” way for defining the situation and assessing success and failure⁸⁸.

The perceptions of the situation, particularly concerning the perceived threat, can be polarised: a serious threat to one actor or a group, may be a central opportunity for other groups, “crisis victims” and actors⁸⁹, like to mass media companies⁹⁰. Furthermore, even with the faced threat, various actors can see opportunities associated to the situation⁹¹. This outlook comes from the observation that dramatic situations can assist to “break old patterns of thought and behavior” and as a result release “the

⁸³ (Olson 2008) p. 154.

⁸⁴ ('t Hart 1993) pp. 41 – 42.

⁸⁵ (Stone 1989) p. 283.

⁸⁶ Framing refers here to the social construction, a schema of interpretation that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events, of a social phenomenon by mass media sources or specific political or social movements or organisations.

⁸⁷ ('t Hart 1993) pp. 41 – 42.

⁸⁸ *ibidem* pp. 41 – 42.

⁸⁹ (Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin, *The Bureau-Politics of Crisis Management* 1991) p. 212.

⁹⁰ ('t Hart 1993) pp. 40.

⁹¹ (Stern 2008) p. 293.

possibilities for new approaches and ideas”⁹² and offer “an opportunity to be exploited”⁹³. This “window-opening process”, as expressed by John Keeler, provides opportunities for policy reforms, which are very time-consuming and difficult or even impossible in normal circumstances, by two ways: by “crisis mechanisms” which, while lacking a legal mandate and authorisation, utilises the temporary sense of urgency and fear for an unusual actions and, with or without, by “mandate mechanisms” which enlarges a mandate of accepted actions; and the needed conditions for this process can be created by influencing public perception of a situation⁹⁴.

While these “windows of opportunity” are temporal, the actors need to form their vision of future – maintain the status quo, improve it or create a new one – and to persuade public, media and decision makers to share their vision, which is distinctly relevant for the actors seeking reforms as they have to convince political environment that they have a plan and it is the only possible strategy for a new and stable future⁹⁵. The actors seeking reform trust Joseph Schumpeter’s version of “creative destruction”, “old structures must be destroyed before new ones can be implemented”, explaining their attempts to frame the crucial unforeseen events and the policy dilemmas to their definition of situation, relying on the core values and proven methods; seeing that the critical moment is not a point to look at new alternatives that could eventually sustain⁹⁶. Diverse actors are driven by the reality that when a situation is framed and politically accepted referring to ‘crisis’, the later actions are less influenced by the facts about other possibilities implied by the different alternatives⁹⁷.

At time a situation is commonly perceived as a crisis and has broken in to the international agenda, the governments and international organisations move to

⁹² (Luebbert 1991) p. 312.

⁹³ (Damgaard, Gerlich and Richardson 1989) p. 186.

⁹⁴ (Keeler 1993) pp. 434 – 440.

⁹⁵ (Boin, Kofman-Bos and Overdijk, *Crisis Simulations: Exploring Tomorrow’s Vulnerabilities and Threats* 2004) p. 385. and (’t Hart 1993) p. 40.

⁹⁶ (Boin and ’t Hart, *Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?* 2003) pp. 549. Creative destruction is a term, referring to the linked processes of the accumulation and annihilation of wealth under capitalism, originating on Marxist economic theory which was adapted and popularised by American economist Joseph Schumpeter as a theory of economic innovation and progress.

⁹⁷ (’t Hart 1993) pp. 41 – 42.

agenda management. On the basis that no international actor likes to handle very difficult problems unless it is required to or believes benefiting from doing so, basic features of its agenda management is try to restrain first demands for action, especially from some groups, following the urge for some form of action as a sign of its control of the crisis response and to formulate a simple, clear policy line combined with continuous management of the political agenda and public perceptions of its own handling of the crisis⁹⁸. This constant management of perceptions has a crucial significance for those actors who are endorsing a reform to keep up a political and emotional environment open to leapfrogging change and a lots of the conflict build in a crisis originates from the various actors efforts to enforce their definition of the situation on others⁹⁹. The agenda controlling is also critical as the organisations, tasked mainly for a crisis management, can deal only with a limited number of situations at the time, and crises are seen as risks to sift the power over of agenda away from generally dominant groups and leaders¹⁰⁰.

While a crisis is on the international agenda, the type of proposed response depends on different factors and Allan McConnell has offered a thorough listing of them: category of a crisis, nature and length of the threat, a time pressure, a level of secrecy needed, and internal as well as external aspects related to the crisis management actor¹⁰¹. According to McConnell, crises can be categorise to three classes: a “sudden” type of crisis will create lots of improvisation, ad hoc and regularly changing response models; a “creeping” crisis, develops gradually, often over many years and does not have sequence of dramatic events, is regularly unnoticed or dismissed in they early phases; a “chronic” crisis, may have “creeping” aspects and the occasional eruptions of unexpected events but is ongoing crisis with no obvious solution, response like to have routine measures “on the shelf”, to be used when necessary, based on learning from repeated problems¹⁰². The threat, the time pressure and the level of secrecy all affect to the rate of the centralisation of the response; the greater perceived threat, the higher

⁹⁸ (McConnell 2003) pp. 399 – 400.

⁹⁹ ('t Hart 1993) pp. 41 – 42.

¹⁰⁰ (Olson 2008) pp. 160 - 161.

¹⁰¹ (McConnell 2003) pp. 393 – 405.

¹⁰² *ibidem* pp. 393 – 395.

time pressure and the level of secrecy, the more centralised the response and decision making circles¹⁰³.

The internal aspects of the crisis management actor, in particular regarding to the states, for determining the crisis response are the political architecture, the dominant political ideas at that time and the particular philosophy each promotes, the institutional structures: particularly the history and configuration of departments, the scope of tried and tested crisis plans or lack of them, and the characters of decision makers¹⁰⁴. Likewise, the external aspects are media and public opinion with the feature of strong pressuring opinion creating equally strong pressures to centralise decision-making and accept responsibility, the lobby of different interest groups to shape the content of a crisis response, decentralisation of the governance which might cause separated responses, the supranational decision-making, i.e. the European Union (EU), and the influence by the wider international community¹⁰⁵.

All above mentioned factors influence to the proposed crisis response but also how a crisis is perceived, especially by the decision makers, who can be unsure of their analysis of the situation¹⁰⁶. In fact, besides efforts to stabilise the situation, there are seldom clearly stated objectives, some of them may also conflict and alter over time, actions may clearly violate a primary objective and nevertheless seen as a success¹⁰⁷. Another aspect is that crisis will draw quite definitely political interests by and into the region neighbouring the site of the crisis¹⁰⁸. However, despite asserted hesitance and stated problems any actor “that prides itself on crisis management is sure to find crises to manage, and crisis management is always available as a way to mobilize public support”¹⁰⁹ as Edelman puts it rather straight forward.

Once a crisis is on, it is expected by the public, that responsibilities, both for the crisis and of the crisis management, are clearly specified and articulated. This is

¹⁰³ *ibidem* p. 395.

¹⁰⁴ *ibidem* pp. 396 – 397.

¹⁰⁵ *ibidem* pp. 397 – 399.

¹⁰⁶ ('t Hart 1993) p. 40.

¹⁰⁷ (Stern 2008) p. 296.

¹⁰⁸ *ibidem* p. 293. This idea originates to (Oneal 1982) p. 309.

¹⁰⁹ (M. Edelman, *Political language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail* 1977) p. 47.

anticipated regardless of the reality that either of them is hardly ever a clear cut issue. Furthermore, when focusing of these responsibilities, there is a tendency to personalise them, trend stemming particularly from the Western legal and theological traditions, which is a way to express a aspiration to prevent such crisis in the future, relieve feelings of shock, fury and guiltiness as well as to feel that punishing “responsible” persons would serve as necessary remedial act¹¹⁰. The response to search and punish “responsible” persons is rationalised by preventing others from committing similar acts but is not primarily searching for the origins of the crisis¹¹¹.

The actors that are considered to be responsible of a crisis management, especially when the responsibility is personalised, face a political “blame – credit trade off“, as they are claiming credit and avoiding blame from the public of their course of action¹¹². In this “blame game” they use the impression management, with selective argumentation: choices between excuses and justifications; the policy strategies, with options of operating modes: choices between corrective and supportive actions; the agency strategies, with mixture of institutional setups: choices between direct control and delegation, to diminish or evade blame¹¹³. With modern complex and multidimensional crisis some blame is inevitable and the method to dissolve the blame is called “defensive risk management”, which covers the activities, by individual or organisation, focused on avoiding liability or blame, personal or institutional¹¹⁴. While using a defensive risk management method actors are over-careful concerning sharing information, which might lead to liability or blame, and about their responsibilities, regardless of the consequences across organisational borders, in order to have personal or institutional excuses or alibis against possible blame¹¹⁵, and this can have a negative impact to actors’ main function – crisis management.

¹¹⁰ (Drabeck and Quarantelli 1967) p. 12.

¹¹¹ *ibidem* p. 16.

¹¹² (Hood 2002) pp. 16 – 17.

¹¹³ *ibidem* pp. 16 – 17. Impression management is a goal-directed process, conscious or unconscious, trying to influence the perceptions of other people about a event, object or person by regulating and controlling information in communication. (Piwinger 2007), pp. 205 –207.

¹¹⁴ (Hood 2002) p. 32.

¹¹⁵ *ibidem* pp. 32 – 35.

To conclude, responding to a crisis is not only technical, problem solving issue nor plain administrative task but highly political, complicated and multidimensional endeavour. The centre of gravity lies on the perception of the situation and a crisis can be simultaneously serious risk and excellent opportunity even to same engaged actor or group. Challenges in the crisis management evolve from the type of a crisis and different perceptions of the situation but also from the nature and background of a crisis response and its actors.

2.5 Conclusion

Starting from the point that a crisis as a notion is widely used in astonishing contexts it is advisable to notice that it includes in its very basic form the possibility of the further development towards better or worse. When advancing further in the direction of international crisis the notion gets fuzzier, but still it can be found that the main characters are threat, uncertainty, rush for reaction and presence of probability of war. By the time one arrives at the crisis management is realised the notion is hazy and what is commonly visible is only a profile of it, technocrat approach which hides its political, opportunistic and multidimensional characters. Relevant is to notice its reactive nature, regional focus and created perceptions of the event itself and its “orchestrated” management which are subjective and in the worst case hindering its own work.

To find out the connection of the crisis management with the comprehensive approach and its purpose, the next chapter will look more closely how the crisis management is actualised.

3. STABILISATION

Stabilisation as a term which has been used more frequently in the last years in a crisis management context by the UN, regional organisations and various governments to describe different efforts to manage international crisis¹¹⁶. To examine the composition of these efforts could be started from short study of term stabilisation before more specific inspection its utilisation in crisis management field. This chapter compares the British and the US understanding of stabilisation for two reasons: firstly, these are the only nations, beside France, who have domestic capability to act globally, by military means, and secondly, they use same language, English, to express themselves¹¹⁷.

3.1 *The term Stabilisation*

The term stabilisation in the English language has two meanings: “to make or become stable or more stable” and “to put or keep (an aircraft, vessel, etc) in equilibrium by one or more special devices” or “the act of making something (as a vessel or aircraft) less likely to overturn”¹¹⁸. While the first meaning is similar in the British and American English, noteworthy is the difference in the second one, where the former is the British and the later American English meaning. The difference becomes significant when looking the broader notion of these meanings of a stabilisation: the first meaning is subordinate to normalisation and standardisation, “the imposition of standards or regulations” whereas on the second one, the American English meaning is subordinate to improvement, “the act of improving something”¹¹⁹.

The term stabilisation is used across the spectrum of human life: in medical, technical, economical, social and political context related to volatile issues, and mainly

¹¹⁶ (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah 2010) p. S278.

¹¹⁷ Considerable attention in this, as well as in the next, chapter is devoted to definitions and language used, since the language is a mechanism to use power and shows underlying comprehensions and ways of thinking. This notion was expressed very well by English author Charles Lutwidge Dodgson under the pseudonym Lewis Carroll in his book *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871), a follow-up to *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (1865): “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.”

¹¹⁸ (Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition 2009) and (Princeton University 2006)

¹¹⁹ (Princeton University 2005)

as a verb, use as a noun is rare. However, the antonym, destabilisation - making something less stable - is primarily used with connection to a government, country or economy.

In the context of the crisis management the term stabilisation is used in agendas concentrated on reducing or eliminating perceived threats and more recently in highlighted needs to integrate civilian and military, humanitarian and development as well as political action¹²⁰. Thus, “the notion of ‘stabilisation’ or stabilisation operations has emerged precisely because of the difficulty to categorize activities that fall into a grey zone in between military and civilian responsibilities”¹²¹. In order to see how this knot is tackled the definitions of stabilisation or stabilisation / stability operations by the United Kingdom (UK) and the US are worth to look at.

3.2 *Stabilisation / Stability Operations*

While the field of stabilisation / stability operations is flooded with diverse and wide-ranging definitions, doctrines, and delivery methods¹²² not only the UK and US militaries have invested substantial amount of resources to wrestle with these terminologies and definitions, but also increasingly the inter-agency units founded by those governments. The UK has formed the Stabilisation Unit and the US has the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation (S/CRS) which both are committed to actualising the “whole-of-government” or the so-called “3-D” (defence, diplomacy and development) approaches¹²³, created by the Canadian Government, in the stabilisation / stability operations.

The UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit defines stabilisation as: “The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to

¹²⁰ (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah 2010) p. S278.

¹²¹ (Baumann 2008) p. 71.

¹²² (Fielder 2011)

¹²³ (Blair and Fitz-Gerald, *Stabilisation and Stability Operations: A Literature Review* 2009) pp. 3 - 5. These approaches will be described and discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.

support preconditions for successful longer-term development.”¹²⁴ and “it is a summary term for the complex processes that have to be undertaken in countries experiencing, or emerging from, violent conflict to achieve peace and security and a political settlement that leads to legitimate government.”¹²⁵.

Notable in this definition is the simultaneously tasks to manage the security and support the development as well as the goal of a political settlement and legitimate government.

The British military doctrine, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, JDP 3-40, defines stabilization as:

“The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.”¹²⁶.

Important in this definition is the outlook that endorsing processes and structures will guide the political settlement and prepares for a development.

Nevertheless, the British military see the stabilisation as a purely political issue: “Stabilisation has explicitly political aims and is primarily a political activity. The military contribution is foremost an enabling one.”¹²⁷ They also state quite directly the intention of stabilisation: “Its ultimate purpose is to strengthen an existing political order, or to reshape it, to become more acceptable to that nation’s population and more consistent with the UK’s strategic interests. ... it may be a consequence of intervention for other reasons of national interest. For example, securing a vital resource or restoring

¹²⁴ (The UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit 2007) p. 1. The Stabilisation Unit, previously named the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), is jointly owned by the three “parent Departments”: the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defense (MOD). It provides specialist, targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer term development to take place. For more details look: www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk.

¹²⁵ (The UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit 2008) p. 2.

¹²⁶ (The Ministry of Defence (UK) 2009) p. xv.

¹²⁷ (The Ministry of Defence (UK) 2010) p. 1-1.

security to a region critical to the UK. It will therefore be a necessary and implicit act of most interventions ...”¹²⁸.

The US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation situates the stabilisation and reconstruction activities to “foreign countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife” and includes “tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major hostilities. Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems) ...”¹²⁹.

Noteworthy in this description is upholding a security with a democracy and a economic growth as well as the option to create new institutions and systems.

The US military used to call the stability operations officially “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) until June 2001 when a term “stability and support operations” was employed in Army doctrine and later same year Pentagon, under the Bush Administration, changed the expression of “peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance” to the ‘stability operations’; in 2003 the term MOOTW was replaced with “stability operations” in the US Army doctrine Field Manual (FM) 3-07 “Stability Operations and Support Operations”¹³⁰. The guidelines for the U.S. military actions in stability operations, harmonised with political and economic agencies, are

¹²⁸ (The Ministry of Defence (UK) 2009) p. xv.

¹²⁹ (Serafino 2009) pp. 4, 11. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation S/CRS was established in 2004 for the operational component of the State Department’s official reconstruction and stabilisation (R&S) activities to deal with transitions from conflict to stability, earlier many of the “stabilisation” activities were loosely regarded as “peacekeeping”. Its capabilities and procedures include planning mechanisms for stabilisation and reconstruction operations, interagency coordination structures and procedures as well as civilian personnel for the non-military tasks required. In 2008 S/CRS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched activities to establish and implement civilian response capabilities, the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), staff of 4,250 persons that are planned to be deployed prior to the military into crisis areas.

¹³⁰ (Guttier 2004) p. 1.

provided by FM 3-0 “Operations” with conjunction of FM 3-07 and FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency”¹³¹.

The latest version of doctrine FM 3-07 “Stability Operations” from 2008 defines the stability operations as:

“The Army’s approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict. This doctrine focuses on achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader “whole of government” approach as defined by the United States Government (USG)”¹³². Additional elaboration by the Army specifies that “Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” and “can be conducted in support of a host nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. ... help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance”¹³³.

Worth to note in these descriptions is a comprehensive role of stability operations including an occupation and creation of institutions. Other issues essential to recognise are the viewpoint of the indivisibility of military and civilian activities in the stability operations: while the stability operations are full spectrum operations - continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks – and cover various types of missions – i.e. combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, nation assistance, peace operations and population control –, the common element is the

¹³¹ (Fielder 2011) p. 30. The US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 “Operations” creates the Army’s grounding doctrine and provides general policy to carry out of full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals, like in the FM 3-07 doctrine which concentrates on explicitly stability operations management.

¹³² (Department of the Army October 2008) p. iv.

¹³³ (Department of The Army 2008) p. 3. The document interprets and clarifies the numerous guidelines relating stability operations and serves as an integrating mechanism for stability operations initiatives and forms the basis of Army policy for institutional decisions related to stability operations as well as the Army’s position to coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD), the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) community, and private sector organisations.

nature of military operations in civilian environments where the activities are conducted jointly and multiagency or are inheritably civil-military like “humanitarian or environmental assistance”¹³⁴ and the claim of participation and cooperation of interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental actors¹³⁵.

To conclude, there are some differences in the definitions of the stabilisation between the UK and the US as well as inside of those states among the civilian agencies and the military. The UK definitions are rather parallel; the military puts only just more emphasis on endorsement of processes and structures. The US definitions differentiate to some extent; the civilian side promotes democracy, the military includes occupation option and demands multiparty approach. The main difference between the UK and the US definitions is the UK’s goal of political settlement and the US’ opportunity to create new institutions.

3.3 *Conducting Stabilisation / Stability Operations*

In the context of international crisis management the handling of the situation can be phased on the scale starting from a crisis prevention phase, and when unsuccessful, following with a crisis, culminating to the war or armed conflict / military intervention phase, followed with a stabilisation, transition and peace consolidation / development phases which are often cyclical, nonlinear, parallel and overlapping ones¹³⁶. The views of the order and sequencing of these later phases varies among involved crisis management actors, including intra-organisational bodies,¹³⁷ which

¹³⁴ (Guttier 2004) p. 1.

¹³⁵ (Fielder 2011) p. 30.

¹³⁶ *ibidem* pp. 3 - 4, (de Coning, Time Phases in Crisis Management 2011) pp. 13, 14 and (Crisis Management Centre Finland; Senja Korhonen (eds.) 2009) pp. 38 – 43. Phases can be briefly described by their contributions: stabilisation phase provides humanitarian assistance, security - including protection of civilians - and environment for peace process that includes a political solution; transition phase provides the change from crisis conditions to peace conditions in different aspect; and consolidation phase provides long term recovery and development.

¹³⁷ This insight is based on presentations of different actors, i.e. humanitarian / development NGOs (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders (MSF), Finn Church Aid (FCA) and Welthungerhilfe), national foreign offices (Finland and Germany), the military (Finland, Germany and Norway), the UN (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)), the EU (European Union Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)), and academic researchers in A Dangerous liaison? Humanitarian action and Western foreign policy in the era of counter-insurgency and stabilisation - conference (organised by

along the aspect that each intervention has different features¹³⁸ underlines the difficulty to have a proper prescriptive model for the stabilisation / stability operations. Thus, each operation should be handled individually¹³⁹. However, for the analysis purposes in this thesis the notion of stabilisation / stability operation is understood to cover the whole path from the intervention to the solid peace.

There are at least five relevant aspects for consideration prior to conducting stabilisation / stability operation: an analysis of the situation, a international law and the situation, the end state and timetable, an institutional thinking and planning of the operation¹⁴⁰. For the analysis Michael Brecher has presented through list of the different dimensions of a crisis: “source or trigger mechanisms”, “gravity” (a hierarchy of threaded values), “complexity”, “intensity”, “duration”, “communication patterns”, “outcome”, “systemic context” as “the global and subsystem configuration”, “geographic context”, and the state(s) concern: “territorial size”, “population size”, “age or independent statehood”, “belief system”, “regime type” and “level of economic development” to name a few¹⁴¹.

For the legality consideration it should be noted that in the US military thinking stabilisation / stability operations can be conducted “with or without consent, from both the international and/or local communities” and “sometimes the legal mandate may not be met, but the moral mandate can demand action”¹⁴² and the rising use of private

Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders, 16 April 2011, Berlin) and in Integrated Crisis Management Course (organised by Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management, 05 – 10 June 2011, Tuusula, Finland). The Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was founded jointly by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland) in November 2008. The core tasks of the Centre of Expertise are to develop understanding on the comprehensiveness of, and coordination, in crisis management, both on national crisis management capacity building and preparedness, as well as crisis management and peace-building missions, and to create a clear framework for the already existing co-operation between these two institutions.

¹³⁸ (Ashdown 2008) p. 21.

¹³⁹ (Fielder 2011) p. 5.

¹⁴⁰ (Fielder 2011) pp. 6 – 9. The original conception is introduced by Rupert Smith in his book *Utility of Force—The Art of War in the Modern World*, London, UK: Penguin Books, 2006.

¹⁴¹ (Brecher, *Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behaviour: A Preliminary Report 1977*) pp. 48 – 51.

¹⁴² (Fielder 2011) pp. 3, 7. The US Army is subordinate to civilian authority, USG, supporting its foreign policy and according to Barry R. Posen the US has a policy of hegemony and difference between Democrats and Republicans is only whether the US should work through international institutions to

contractors in the operations that might induct some legal challenges¹⁴³. The end state consideration is highly critical as conduction of the operation needs contributions from different – military, humanitarian, political and economical – actors, which might not completely share the same vision of the end state¹⁴⁴, like “to achieve a democratic state operating to Western norms: open free trade, no internal or external safety or security threats”¹⁴⁵, and the timetable is relative to this as some of the conditions can be achieved faster than some others¹⁴⁶. The institutional thinking is closely connected with the planning consideration and both are essential since each actor has limitations conducting operation: the UN has a large mandate but no deployable military assets, NATO has those but no other agency support, the EU has the agencies, but the consensus among 27 member states has been difficult to reach¹⁴⁷ and the civilian actors are often less important in planning consideration resulting a cap in resources and training when the focus in a operation shifts to their area of expertise¹⁴⁸.

While the transition phase is the most significant and the most complex part of the stabilisation / stability operation¹⁴⁹, it is necessary to introduce this phase briefly even it mainly falls outside of the scope of this thesis. A list of six different types of transition can be found from the academic literature: “war to peace, power, societal, political - democratic, security, and economic”, although this is not the only accepted classification among scholars¹⁵⁰, it is considered as theoretical frame of interconnected parts of transition phase for this thesis. The “war to peace” transition gives broad framework for transition both in inter- and intrastate crisis covering issues from global to domestic levels and involving international and regional actors; the “power”

exercise and increase its power or work outside them. (Posen, Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony Summer 2003) p. 5 – 6 and (Posen, The Case for Restraint 2007) pp. 7 - 9.

¹⁴³ (Milazzo 2010)

¹⁴⁴ (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah 2010) pp. S277 – S278.

¹⁴⁵ (Fielder 2011) p. 9.

¹⁴⁶ (Moon Spring 2009) p. 115. In the article Bruce E. Moon presents his observation that “the average time required to transit the path from extreme autocracy to coherent, albeit precarious, democracy has been 50 years, and only two [nations] have managed this transition in fewer than 25 years”.

¹⁴⁷ After Lisbon Treaty 2010, decisions based on majority are new possible.

¹⁴⁸ (Fielder 2011) p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ (de Coning, Time Phases in Crisis Management 2011)

¹⁵⁰ (Armstrong and Chura-Beaver 2010) p. 14. The report offers good literature overview and more depth elaborations of the different types of transition, especially political and democratic as well as security transitions.

transition concerns the balance of power in the international and regional field and should be noted also on the intrastate transitions as it is not included to internal political and societal issues¹⁵¹.

The “societal” transition is changing relationships and communication rules among the people and groups by focussing on the humanitarian action as well as on the reconstruction and development of the civil society or institutions and community-oriented groups, which offer additional public services apart from the state; these social groups are important since they are capable to control or mobilize large crowds, able to fill the policy shortages and generate trust and models of reciprocity (social capital) over time as a secondary product of successful cooperation; the cultural know-how is a crucial component to produce effectively social capital as well as to ensure inclusion of local input, strong commitment and ownership, all supporting the societal transition¹⁵².

The “political - democratic” transition relates to the process to alter and/or (re)construct formal institutions of the state from the one regime type to another in different levels (political transition) and to the specific process of political and institutional liberalisation with a more standard end-state (democratic transition); while externally assisted or imposed political – democratic transition is based on the assumptions that any transition is towards democracy, the western political institutions can be rooted anywhere, a local population and elite agrees with the external assessments and desires for a reformation, and that reformation is in their plans, the scholarly differences has been whether the democratic reforms will succeed without prior strong institutions or the reforms helps put down the institutional foundations and whether the democratic transitions are the result of economic development and modernisation (modernisation thesis) or deliberate interactions among the political actors (political agent thesis), even some scholars have become to conclusion that emphasising a complete western type democracy is no longer realistic goal¹⁵³.

¹⁵¹ *ibidem* pp. 15 – 19.

¹⁵² *ibidem* pp. 19 - 20.

¹⁵³ *ibidem* pp. 21 – 31.

The “security” transition is a broad process to form the conditions of insecurity to the conditions of stability by creating a safe and secure environment, with legitimate local control over an effective security sector; the main concern in the efforts to stabilise the situation is the security which can be provided by the local internal, or with externally supported, security sector¹⁵⁴. The security sector has “an important and indispensable role in helping post-conflict societies secure a transition to a more productive and peaceful life”¹⁵⁵, but its reformation and reconstruction alone does not automatically lead to regime change or democratic stabilisation¹⁵⁶. The security transition is linked to the other transitions through a situational security which, when appropriate, provides one of the necessary conditions for the other transitions to take place and has especially strong connection to the democratic transition due to the closeness of political power and security institutions as well as those institutions’ capability to manage the possible problems caused by this particular transition; yet some empirical evidence shows that suggested reforms - free elections, accountability, transparency – does not inevitably lead to the greater civilian control, justice, and human rights protection, the security transition is necessary in reaching the overall war to peace transition¹⁵⁷.

The “economic” transition is dealing with the changes and dynamics of an economical conversion, usually from a mostly centrally controlled system to a more liberal, open, market-based economy, and the academic stances vary about the speed of the liberalisation between a shock therapy and a gradual transition; the externally planned transitions are typically a short-term ones focusing on economic growth and consumption, and the international organisations have different approaches, top-down or bottom up, on their economic and security programs; generally the economic

¹⁵⁴ *ibidem* pp. 31 – 32.

¹⁵⁵ (Ehrhart and Schnabel, *Post-conflict Societies and the Military: Recommendations for Security Sector Reform* 2005) p. 320.

¹⁵⁶ (Brzoska 2007) p. vi.

¹⁵⁷ (Armstrong and Chura-Beaver 2010) pp. 33 – 34.

transition is dependent on effective institutions and rule of law which can be offered by different type of regimes¹⁵⁸.

To conclude, the stabilisation / stability operations are in essence about transitions, consisted from the contextual and functional roles of different actors in stabilisation activities, and while the need for concrete strategies to addressed issues persists, the international organisations, multinational initiatives and co-operations, government agencies and the research institutes have developed their own sets of the concepts to tackle the concerns¹⁵⁹. These holistic approaches can be placed under common catchword, comprehensive approach¹⁶⁰.

3.4 Conclusion

Definitions of stabilisation / stability operations vary slightly depending on the national and institutional (civil / military) background; when comparing the UK and the US, the determinative factor is the national background. A commonality is endorsement of standards through transition; a difference is the US' more definite description of them, democracy and new institutions.

The views of different actors in the stabilisation / stability operations vary concerning the order and sequencing of the stabilisation, transition and peace consolidation / development phases which are often cyclical, nonlinear, parallel and overlapping, but commonly is agreed that priority is to provide security and ensure rule of law.

The approaches to carry out the stabilisation can be labelled under the general name of a comprehensive approach covering different definitions of stances in stabilisation activities.

Some of these approaches will be studied in the next chapter in order to get more knowledge about what these approaches are for.

¹⁵⁸ ibidem pp. 38 – 40.

¹⁵⁹ ibidem p. 42.

¹⁶⁰ (Fielder 2011) p. 5.

4. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The field of implementation of international crisis management in the stabilisation context is flooded with diverse approaches to reach stability and peace, fuzzy notions already to begin with, and the whole field suffers a lack of conceptual clarity; however, the term comprehensive approach (CA) is commonly used to accommodate these different methods¹⁶¹.

This chapter will go through and describe, in brief, following approaches, as considered to be most relevant ones for the purpose of this thesis: the “whole of government (WGA)¹⁶²”, “3-D or 3D (Defence, Development and Diplomacy)”, “counterinsurgency (COIN)”, “multinational experiment (MNE)”, “comprehensive approach by NATO”, “comprehensive approach by the EU”, “comprehensive approach by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” and the “integrated approach by the UN”. The aforementioned approaches are state and multistate centred, as they are the main actors and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sphere is included in their concepts. The above listed presentation order was chosen for two reasons: an amount of states and actors incorporated in the approach increases starting from the first; and the institutions general capabilities and experiences determine the approach and action how they react and respond to crisis situations¹⁶³.

4.1 *Whole of government approach*

From the puritanical point of view the whole of government approach is a national effort to promote coherent and efficient operating principle across a state apparatus by cooperation and integrated action; “...approach underpins the whole-of-government process whereby agencies are encouraged to work together across organisational barriers to achieve Government objectives. ... this means undertaking negotiations with the view to achieving the best outcome from a whole-of-government perspective rather than the best outcome for individual agencies. It is expected that agencies will communicate openly with one another, and with central agencies, to

¹⁶¹ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 9.

¹⁶² Another abbreviation used for this approach in the literature is WOG.

¹⁶³ (James and Wooten 2005) pp. 141 – 142, 147 – 148.

achieve the best outcome ...”¹⁶⁴. However, its implementation can involve outsider actors, and the approach is used in a wide range of government activities, including education, employment, health, housing, and infrastructure¹⁶⁵.

Noteworthy is that the whole government approach is not particularly directed to the government objectives outside of its national borders and, in this “pure” sense of it, the term WGA is hardly ever used in the context of crisis management where it is commonly applied as a synonym for the 3D approach.

4.2 3D (Defence, Development and Diplomacy) approach

The 3-D or 3D¹⁶⁶ (Defence, Development and Diplomacy) approach is seen originated to Canada where the government describes these three aspects as the state’s main foreign policy instruments, or instruments of national power / interests; the approach denotes reciprocal departmental cooperation between the departments of national defence, international development and foreign affairs to manage international threats, direct to the state or indirect to its interests overseas¹⁶⁷. This approach was applied along Canada by the UK and the US¹⁶⁸ followed later by other countries with national variations¹⁶⁹, which could originate from the national political and organisational cultures, international relationships and official alliances (i.e. EU,

¹⁶⁴ (Australian Government 2010) p. 7.

¹⁶⁵ (Commonwealth of Australia 2004) pp. 4, 9.

¹⁶⁶ The British rule is to use a hyphen in 3-D, the American is not. However, the later is used throughout this thesis, as most common form in the literature, except in direct quotations that use the former one.

¹⁶⁷ (Fitz-Gerald 2004) pp. 14, 22; (Manwaring 2006) pp. 2 - 3. In Canada the departments are called: National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

¹⁶⁸ (Fitz-Gerald 2004) pp. 13 – 17. In the UK it is called “Joined-up Government” approach involving the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; in the US the approach was labelled as “Defense, Diplomacy and Development” strategy engaging the Department of Defence (DoD) and Department of State (DoS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is not a government level function, and it is working under DoS.

¹⁶⁹ *ibidem* p. 7, (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) pp. 18 – 19.

NATO)¹⁷⁰. Worth to note about the national variations is the US' view to use those "instruments of national power" to realise its "strategic objectives"¹⁷¹.

From its original form the 3D approach has been expanding not only to include other governmental and public functions (sometimes the WGA term is used to describe this) but other sectors, private and civil society, inside of a nation (this is also called the "whole of nation approach") and outside of a nation (this is also called the "whole of system approach"); moreover, the term "comprehensive approach" is used frequently for the different variations of this wider form of 3D. These nested and parallel terms and meanings with the inconstant use of them complicate clear formulation of the 3D approach, but a general understanding is currently that the 3D approach points to the top-down coordination and integration of the national recourses - public, civil society and private – for most of the states and to some states including also the international dimension, for the later referring namely to the US' view¹⁷².

The question of the power balance, or leadership, between instruments – defence, development and diplomacy – of the 3D approach is that neither of them has a dominant role, at least when assessing situations nor planning actions, which should be done mutually¹⁷³. However, in practice there are national variations rising from differences in funding, manpower and material resource arrangements as well as departmental cultures and state of coherence within the line of thinking¹⁷⁴, and this has lead separate initiatives to gain more leverage, particular example being 3C (Coherent,

¹⁷⁰ (Friis and Rehman (eds.), *Nordic Approaches to Whole-of-Government – in Afghanistan and beyond, Security in Practice 6 2010*) p. 41.

¹⁷¹ (Rudd 2009) p. 77. The USG uses mathematical models to of measuring its use of the instruments of national power; the instruments are divided into four main categories: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) and the outcomes are measured in six main categories: political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII). The models are used to track the progress of interventions, including stability operations; noteworthy is that the PMESII does not automatically include environmental and destructive effects as well as that the models are multidimensional, meaning that overall positive progress allows deterioration on some of the areas. The theoretical base of these models is called Human Social Cultural Behavior Sciences (HSCB); for more details look for example (Hartley 2010).

¹⁷² (Department of the Army October 2008) pp. 1-4, 1-5; (Finney 2010) p.2; (Armstrong and Chura-Beaver 2010) pp. 45 – 47.

¹⁷³ (Finney 2010) p. 3.

¹⁷⁴ (Fitz-Gerald 2004) pp. 15 – 18.

Coordinated and Complementary) approach by development sector through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)¹⁷⁵. In some countries this dilemma is solved by creating separate inter-agency units to have the leading role, the Stabilisation Unit in the UK and S/CRS in the US; despite of this, the problem still exists¹⁷⁶.

In the context of crisis management the outlook of complexity and multidimensionality of current crisis, whose management requires a wide set of instruments available in and outside of a government, has directed to capitalise the 3D approach¹⁷⁷ to reach the strategic objectives by utilising particular assets hold by different actors¹⁷⁸.

4.3 Counterinsurgency approach

The counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency¹⁷⁹ approach initiates, as a written theory, to French experiences in the Algerian war¹⁸⁰. The theory suggests that

¹⁷⁵ (Werther-Pietsch and Roithner 2011) pp. 156 – 158. The 3C (Coherent, Coordinated and Complementary) approach is interested about orchestrated procedure by state institutions and non-governmental organisations, on national and international level, in the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian aid, human rights protection/promotion and crisis management. For more information take a look at (Feichtinger, Werther-Pietsch and Barnet (eds.) 2010).

¹⁷⁶ (Konishi and McClean April 2011) p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ (Manwaring 2006) p. 3.

¹⁷⁸ (Armstrong and Chura-Beaver 2010) p. 43.

¹⁷⁹ The British rule is to use a hyphen in counter-insurgency, the American is not. However, the later is used throughout this thesis, as most common form in the literature, except in direct quotations that use the former one.

¹⁸⁰ Often cited as an author of COIN principles, David Galula, a French officer, describes his encounters in the Algerian War, drawing conclusions also from his previous experiences from Greece and knowledge from Malaya as well as Philippines, presenting his theory on counterinsurgency warfare for “pacification” of Algeria in his book (Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* 2006, Originally published in 1963). He articulated his theory more detailed in his followed book (Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* 1964); prior to Galula’s books the Great Britain’s experiences in Kenya 1953 – 1955 were described by Frank Kitson in his book (Kitson, *Gangs and counter-gangs / with a foreword by George Erskine* 1960), where he tells his efforts to put down the Mau Mau revolt by the country’s largest tribe Kikuyu against British colonial administration. Kitson developed a method to counter insurgency by creating “pseudo gangs” to collect information and act with the measures designed to win the support of local population. Furthermore, British experiences in Malaya were expressed by Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson in his book (Thompson 1966), but despite British long history of “small wars” and counterinsurgency they did not see any reason, since “every situation is different”, to developed any specific doctrine for it prior to 1996, as noted by Gavin Bulloch in his article (Bulloch Summer 1996), unlikely the US Army which have had COIN doctrines since 1961 - Marine Corps – as a legacy of the Vietnam war. Since the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the COIN doctrines

countering insurgency is a combination of “military, political, psychological”¹⁸¹ and “economical”¹⁸² actions, with division 80 / 20 between the political and military ones¹⁸³, focusing on the local population¹⁸⁴ under the tight control of a sole authority¹⁸⁵. The insurgency is a “form of civil war” which is challenging the “ruling power” with the aim to overthrow the government and seize power¹⁸⁶. By the current COIN model the local government, or the “group of states or occupying powers”, can regain the “control”, not necessarily stability, by information based security, political and economic activities that should be balanced, progressive and accepted by local population aiming to “normality” and transfer of “consolidated” control to the “effective and legitimate institutions”¹⁸⁷. In the heart of the COIN model is to gain the population’s support and acceptance of government’s or authority’s legitimacy underlining its political dimension¹⁸⁸. This can be done by diminishing the support and acceptance of insurgency by influencing its cause(s) and / or increase the support and acceptance of the government by strengthening the state; the actions can be “direct or indirect”, a military or civilian and carried out by the military or civilian actors¹⁸⁹.

While the COIN model relies greatly on military, to the extent that it is type of warfare¹⁹⁰, there is not a solely military solution¹⁹¹ and integration with the civilian actors, including other governmental agencies and ministries (local, national, other nations’), international organisations (IOs), NGOs, private companies and other

were updated and revised, starting 2006, by the US Army and respectively by Australia, Canada, NATO and now also by British Army; even though some development work was done during the 90’s by the US and British Army, for more details look (Hoffman and Taw 1991).

¹⁸¹ (Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* 2006, Originally published in 1963) p. xvii.

¹⁸² (Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping* 1971) p. 7. After Kenya Kitson had experiences also from Northern Ireland and he presents a more general view of COIN in his book.

¹⁸³ (Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* 1964) p. 89.

¹⁸⁴ (Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958* 2006, Originally published in 1963) pp. 69 – 70.

¹⁸⁵ (Department of the US Army December 2006) P. 1-1.

¹⁸⁶ (Håvoll 2008) p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ (Kilcullen September 2006) pp. 4 – 6.

¹⁸⁸ (Håvoll 2008) p. 9; (Department of the US Army December 2006) p. 1-1.

¹⁸⁹ (Håvoll 2008) pp. 13 – 15. Galula defines the direct action as “approach consists of depriving the insurgent of any physical possibility of building up his movement” and the indirect action as “to deprive the insurgents of a good cause amounts to solving the country’s basic problems”; (Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* 1964) pp. 65, 67.

¹⁹⁰ (Department of the US Army December 2006) pp. ix, 1-1; (Manea 2011) pp. 2, 6.

¹⁹¹ (Kitson, *Bunch of Five* 1977) p. 283

organisations, is required¹⁹², in planning and in implementation¹⁹³. This integration, called “Unity of Effort” or “Unity of Purpose” in the military language, can be achieved through “Unity of Command” (unity of effort) and when not achievable by sharing a common vision and information, including the plans and intentions, (unity of purpose)¹⁹⁴.

The COIN approach is a top-down whole of nation and when applicable a whole of system type of approach from a military perspective and sometimes seen as synonym for a comprehensive approach by the US¹⁹⁵.

In the context of crisis management the COIN approach is for the situations where the present authority or government is contested and some type of war is ongoing in a particular geographic area. Worth mentioning is the difference between the British and the US COIN approaches: whereas the British Army doctrine places “political purpose” as the first principle before “unity of effort”, in the US Army doctrine “legitimacy” is the main objective, under principles for COIN, followed with “unity of effort” and “political factors”¹⁹⁶. Another remark is the colonial legacy of the COIN philosophy.

4.4 *Multinational experiment*

The multinational experiment (MNE) was started 2001 as the “Multinational Limited Objective Experiment” by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and is a series of the “Concept Development and Experimentation” campaign of USJFCOM to work with other nations and organisations in order to collect

¹⁹² (Department of the US Army December 2006) pp. 2-1, 2-2.

¹⁹³ (The UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit n.d.)

¹⁹⁴ (Håvoll 2008) pp. 15 – 16. The unity of command is the doctrinal method, alternative to unity of effort, applied by a single leader through a formal command and control system.

¹⁹⁵ (E. Edelman 2007) p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ (British Army September 2009) pp. 3-2 – 3-3; (Department of the US Army December 2006) pp. 1-20 – 1-22.

data, create international and interagency relationships and produce experience and solutions for the acute challenges and future enterprises¹⁹⁷.

The MNE has been testing the comprehensive approach within a coalition from 2006 by combining separate results of previous experiments and the experiences from field implementations¹⁹⁸. The MNE starts from the view that “international crisis management is increasingly complex and interdependent: no single agency, government or organisation is able to resolve a crisis without assistance of partners. Future interventions are likely to be multinational and interagency /multiagency in character, and require a multidimensional response involving a wide range of interlinked activities” and sees that this “multidimensional response” needs a “comprehensive approach”, which is a “cross-departmental strategic plan for crises – in which the military might not have the lead, but may be a first responder, creating the conditions for others to operate safely and effectively”¹⁹⁹. The MNE sees that a “common approach to crisis management” can come out when there are actors willing to act, from different reasons – concerned or affected by the actual or emerging crisis –, leading to creation of a coalition or acting through an “established alliance framework”; however, it also understands that “in operations of choice, rather than conflicts involving national survival, the level of influence/interest displayed by each nation [] is determined by a multitude of factors, and shapes their objectives”²⁰⁰.

The task to form a coalition – federation of entities, not a organic entity itself – especially within a comprehensive approach with various actors, is viewed challenging as the coalition needs to “share views and assessments of the (potential) crisis, and

¹⁹⁷ (US Joint Forces Command 2011) p. 1. The MNE series began with four nations - Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States - to study coalition military planning and has been growing throughout the series; MNE 6 had 18 nations and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plus four observer nations (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, and Japan). MNE 3 and 4 (2003 – 2006) focused on planning and operations in Afghanistan; MNE 5 and 6 (2006 – 2010) dealt with the comprehensive approach and whole-of-government efforts plus MNE 6 also developing coalition capabilities to respond to the activities of irregular enemies and other rebellious actors; current, MNE 7 (2010 – 2012), is working with the Global Commons – maritime, air, space and cyber –.

¹⁹⁸ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 16. In MNE the coalition is understood as an ad hoc or temporary grouping of nations and/or organisations united for a specific purpose / in a common cause.

¹⁹⁹ (MNE 6 October 2010) p. 29. The original source of the quote is (Lane 2006) p. 30.

²⁰⁰ *ibidem* pp. 29 – 30. The original source of the quote is (Lane 2006) p. 30.

reach consensus on interests, contributions, confirmation of unity, and demonstration of benefits”; thus, the coalition partners should “share incentive to benefit from participating in coalition activity” as well as “trust in each other and believe others commitment to the common issues or goals”²⁰¹. In the MNE’s coalition model the cohesion and coherence are in important role and while to reach coherence, the external dimension of coalition, a common cause - the coalition’s vision – is needed from the beginning, for cohesion, the internal dimension of coalition, the purpose of the coalition – the accomplishment of the mission – is not enough as “coalition partners – based on their national assessments, cultural background and political caveats – tend to interpret the purpose of a coalition in their own interest...”²⁰². The MNE’s framework is seen relevant from preventive interventions to stabilisation and reconstruction activities until to the transition time²⁰³.

The MNE comprehensive approach is whole of system type of approach trying to unite national and international actors’ efforts in a coalition context.

In the context of crisis management the MNE comprehensive approach is an attempt to harmonise diverse national concepts to have unified multinational response in form of coalition with a high military weight. Notable is its character for pre-crisis interventions.

4.5 *Comprehensive approach of the NATO*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, is a political and military alliance²⁰⁴. Therefore, to have complete picture of its comprehensive approach, it is needed to examine both, starting from political side.

²⁰¹ ibidem p. 30.

²⁰² ibidem pp. 31 – 32. The “coalition's vision” offers the long-term outlook for the coalition effort, based on consensus on commonly shared values and principles as a preconditions for combined action. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary Cohesion means “the act or state of sticking together tightly” - the internal dimension – and coherence means “integration of diverse elements” – the external dimension. (Merriam-Webster Incorporated n.d.)

²⁰³ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 16.

²⁰⁴ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2008) NATO is “an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2010) Preface.

The first hints towards NATO's comprehensive approach can be found from the Alliance Strategic Concept of 1999 where, under the heading "the Approach to Security in the 21st Century" was stated that "the Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension"²⁰⁵ and under the heading "Strategic Perspectives" was mentioned the "cooperation ... with other states" and "collaboration with other international organisations"²⁰⁶.

After the national initiatives and negotiations, the Riga Summit Declaration in 2006 stated that " ... today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors ... "²⁰⁷. However, it was stated that there is no need to build capacity deliberate for civilian purposes and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was invited to recommend procedures for cooperation with other actors in all levels, not only in planning and implementation²⁰⁸. Additional endorsement made in Riga Summit, the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), listed capabilities required in the future including the "ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be

²⁰⁵ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 1999) para. 25. NATO's first CM operation was 1995 in Yugoslavia. Nowadays crisis management is one of the NATO's main tasks with collective defence and cooperative security (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2010 (c)) para 4.

²⁰⁶ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 1999) *ibidem* para. 12.

²⁰⁷ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2007) p. 8. In March 2004 Denmark launched a national initiative, "the Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations", followed by a seminar in June 2005 where NATO, EU, UN member countries and nongovernmental organisations representatives discussed questions of principal understanding of CA and national considerations as well as lesson learned from completed operations; for more about the initiative look (Fischer and Christensen Summer 2005). In relation to this is the France's view that NATO should remain a "defence organisation of a military nature" centred on Europe's security opposing its development to a global organisation "on the fringes of military, humanitarian and police activities"; for more details look (Ortiz 2007) p. 3.

²⁰⁸ (Spilý 2011) Note: electronic copy of the article, no page numbers.

undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously”²⁰⁹.

In the Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008 endorsed the action plan for developing and implementing NATO’s contribution to CA, in areas like “planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors”, aiming to “improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction” and tasked NAC “to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned”²¹⁰.

The Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration 2009 repeat the Riga Summit Declaration by statement saying that “ ... today’s security challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, combining civil and military measures and coordination” but defined that “its effective implementation requires all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths and mandates” and showed appreciation to implementation of the Bucharest Summit Action Plan “to improve NATO’s own contribution to such a comprehensive approach, including through a more coherent application of its crisis management instruments and efforts to associate its military capabilities with civilian means” as well as to the progress which include the “NATO’s active promotion of dialogue with relevant players on operations; the development of a database of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation to advise NATO forces; and the involvement of selected international organisations, as appropriate, in NATO crisis management exercises”²¹¹.

The Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010 proclaim that “military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our

²⁰⁹ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2006) para 16/h.

²¹⁰ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2008) para 11.

²¹¹ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2009) para 18.

security” specifying that “both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments” and repeat the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration with the adding of autonomous decision-making by stating that CA’s “effective implementation requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy”²¹²

The Alliance Strategic Concept of 2010 presents NATO’s approach under the heading “Security through Crisis Management” by stating that it will, in the military side, “further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations” and in the civilian side “form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors; identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions”²¹³.

On the military side of NATO the concept of “Effect Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO) has been considered as a “military contribution to CA” and, indeed, the EBAO handbook from 2007 states that the “coherent and comprehensive application of various instruments of the Alliance combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately NATO end state”, but as NATO has not any

²¹² (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2010 (b)) para 8.

²¹³ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2010 (c)) para 25. Noteworthy is that NATO’s operations can be conducted outside of its borders by a “comprehensive political, civilian and military approach”, para 21.

own civilian capacity in its command those needed are entirely within the competences of the national states and international or national organisations²¹⁴.

NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, a grounding doctrine, from 2010 defines that “NATO’s engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management is focused at three levels:

a. At the political and strategic level, NATO concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors.

b. At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required.

c. At the theatre level, NATO force commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local authorities and other international actors in the execution of operations”,

and concerning the outcomes it declares that “political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives; however complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued. Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome ... requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both NATO and a broad range of multinational institutions, agencies and organizations ... Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome), and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose”²¹⁵.

To conclude, NATO’s comprehensive approach has developed towards expeditionary and (internally) inclusive top-down whole of system type approach with

²¹⁴ (Spilý 2011) Note: electronic copy of the article, no page numbers. The original source of the quote is (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2007). NATO does not have own armed forces either, most available forces remain under full national command and control until they are assigned to undertake collective tasks. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is designed to respond rapidly to various types of crisis around the globe; it can be deployed within five days, can support itself 30 days and stay longer when re-supplied. Parts of the NRF have been deployed 2005 to the US, after Hurricane Katrina, and to Pakistan, after earthquake.

²¹⁵ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2010 (a)) p. 2-11 – 2-12.

global reach and military centred delivery under firm command based on shared vision and values.

In the context of crisis management the comprehensive approach of NATO is selectively “comprehensive” single source effort to provide international crisis management services based on different compositions of willing nations and organisations contributions, thus with fluctuating concepts. Important to notice is that locals are mentioned only once, in a operational level as implementing actors.

4.6 *Comprehensive approach of the EU*

The European Union is an “economic and political partnership”²¹⁶ that offers of a wide range of civilian and military instruments for crisis management²¹⁷. For that reason, to study its comprehensive approach, it is essential to start from the political arrangements to provide those instruments.

EU member states have committed to the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) which includes the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that covers the EU’s civilian and military capabilities in “Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”²¹⁸. The first target to great the military capacity - the headline goal - also known as “Helsinki Headline Goal” was set up by the European Council in Helsinki December 1999, which required a “concerted and coordinated effort” from “all Member

²¹⁶ (European Commission 2009)

²¹⁷ (Gross 2008) p. 9.

²¹⁸ (European Union External Action Service 2008) The CSDP was before the Lisbon Treaty called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), despite the fact that the term never existed in the text of the Treaties. The ESDP was first announced in 1998 at the British-French summit in St. Malo, France, and formerly confirmed in June 1999. British’ view was on the building and projection of civilian crisis-management capacities, thereby avoiding the duplication with NATO, and France’s view was to develop a separate and autonomous military capacity capable of carrying out independent operations; for more details take look (Driver 2010) pp. 137 - 142. Notable, at the European Council in Cologne 1999, the EU leaders agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" as stated by the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) (European Union External Action Service 2010 (b)).

States”²¹⁹, following a process of Headline Goals (civilian Headline Goal 2008 and 2010; military Headline Goal 2010).

The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council 2003, highlights the EU’s uniqueness as a security actor by its “emphasis on multilateralism”, “the range of instruments at its disposal”, and “the comprehensive approach”²²⁰ and implied for the need to coordinate civilian and military instruments by stating that “the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: ... military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments”²²¹.

For the coordination of the military and civilian capabilities as well as “other instruments”, mainly meaning development instruments that are under the Commission, the Council created the concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), which is the “EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management”²²². CMCO is generally understood as a “culture of coordination” putting less weight on “detailed structures or procedures”; moreover, the “culture of coordination” needs to be embedded into EU’s crisis response “... at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the

²¹⁹ (Patten 2000) The military headline goal aims to guarantee the rapid availability of military resources and capabilities for crisis management operations from member states’ armed forces. The “Helsinki headline goal” set a target to create, by 2003, the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the force based on voluntary contributions from the member states -up to 60 000 soldiers - to be available for deployment to a crisis area max 6 000 km away within 60 days, where it could remain for at least a year. Its mission could include humanitarian rescue operations, the prevention of armed conflict, or full-scale intervention to separate fighting parties. The military headline goal 2010 set a target to create, by 2007, rapidly deployable Battlegroups, based on voluntary contributions from the member states, - around 1 500 soldiers / each - to be available for deployment to a crisis area max 6 000 km away within 5–10 days, where it could remain for at least a 30 days, extendable to 120 days, in same types of operations as ERRF. The civilian headline goal aims to guarantee that the member states can quickly provide a sufficient number of civilian experts for a wide range of civilian CSDP operations. The four priority areas of civilian action defined by the European Council in Feira (Portugal) June 2000 are police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. The experts concerned will be drawn from the police, the judiciary, general or specialised administration, health care, civil defence, etc. The civilian headline goal 2008 created the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept, a pool of 100 experts ready to be deployed within five days and able to stay in the field up to three months. The civilian headline goal 2010 follows up by creating concrete framework for civilian capability planning and development with setting capability targets including concepts, planning and conduct capabilities, equipment and training.

²²⁰ (Gross 2008) p. 12.

²²¹ (Council of the European Union 2003) p. 13.

²²² (Gross 2008) p. 11; (Council of the European Union 2003) p. 2; (Nagelhus Schia and Ulriksen 2007) p. 8.

operation ... This culture of co-ordination is based on continued co-operation and shared political objectives ... Working closely together is an essential element also during the "routine" phase of EU crisis management ... ²²³.

For the everyday coordination between the military and civilian actors in crisis management it was developed a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept, with the specific intend to facilitate and create the conditions for the coordination of and cooperation with national, international and non-governmental civilian actors; even though the concept is mostly concerned with coordination in the implementation level rather than an overall strategic concept of complete institutional cooperation²²⁴, it can be used across the entire range of potential crisis management operations, including crisis prevention²²⁵.

While EU's interest in multilateralism directs cooperation with other international organisations, including the UN, OSCE, NATO and the African Union, and to dialogue and cooperation with non-governmental organisations the culture of coordination refers primarily to coherence between member states and EU institutions. As a result, the EU's comprehensive approach is bottom-up whole of system type approach with global reach under (consensus) politic steering based on shared vision and values.

In the context of crisis management EU is building up its capabilities to its foreign policy instruments and while being largely dependent on NATO structures on the military side, it has concentrated mainly portraying itself as a credible civilian side actor²²⁶.

²²³ (Council of the European Union 2003) pp. 2 – 3.

²²⁴ (Gross 2008) p. 17 – 18. The NATO has similar concept at the theatre level.

²²⁵ (Republic of Austria (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs) 2005)

²²⁶ The military operations can be three types: "the first type will be operations in which European forces are involved within the framework of NATO. The second will be operations involving European forces and directed by them, but using the means and infrastructure of NATO. The third will be operations in which the European forces act alone" (Solana 2000). The military operations has been so far FYROM/CONCORDIA 2003 - used NATO assets and capabilities -, DRC/ARTEMIS 2003, EUFOR ALTHEA 2004 -> - EU lead -, EUFOR RD Congo 2006, EUFOR Tchad/RCA 2008 – 2009, EUNAVFOR Somalia 2008 ->, EUTM Somalia 2010 -> and EUFOR Libya 2011 ->; at the same time EU has / had 16 civilian operations in Europe, Africa and Asia (European Union External Action Service 2010 (a)).

4.7 *Comprehensive approach of the OSCE*

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, is the regional security organisation, which provides a “forum for political negotiations and decision-making” and has a “comprehensive approach” to security covering three elements of it: “politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects”²²⁷.

The origins of the OSCE’s comprehensive approach is in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its “Final Act” in Helsinki 1975, thus called as “Helsinki Final Act”, which include the idea of equal weight of the “protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental governance” and the “politico-military co-operation” for peace and security²²⁸. The approach was developed further in followed conferences in 1990, to include more economic cooperation based on market economy, wider human dimension with election-linked requirements, cooperation on non-military threats, like “illegal activities involving outside pressure, coercion or subversion undermining territorial integrity, terrorism and illicit narcotics trafficking”, and in 1991 to “support to an elected democratic government facing an attempted or actual overthrow, the protection of human rights during a state of emergency, and the democratic functioning and judicial control of law enforcement”²²⁹.

The decisions for the new crisis management instruments were taken in Helsinki 1992 and those include the establishment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), creating a framework for negotiated settlement or for the sending out of a “rapporteur or fact-finding mission” for the “political management” of a crisis situation, ability for peacekeeping operations - observer / monitor mission or larger forces - which can include civilian and/or military personnel to “supervise and maintain

²²⁷ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe n.d.) The OSCE, with 56 participating states, is the largest existing regional security organisation. Its area includes continental Europe, Russian territory extending eastward to the Pacific coast, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the United States and Canada; and it cooperates with Mediterranean and Asian partners.

²²⁸ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe June 2009) pp. 1 - 3, The Final Act was signed by 35 head of states / governments as the founding document of the organisation, CSCE, which was renamed OSCE in 1995.

²²⁹ *ibidem* pp. 4 – 6.

cease-fires, monitor troop withdrawals, support maintenance of law and order, and provide humanitarian and other forms of assistance”, and to set up a “court of conciliation and arbitration”²³⁰. The principle of cooperation was highlighted in 1994 by adopting the “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” that obligates participating states to cooperate in all aspects of security and even the “Lisbon Declaration” in 1996 restates that “the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve” it also states that any “state, organisation or alliance within the OSCE “ should not “have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence”²³¹.

The shaping of a “common and indivisible security space” and use of OSCE’s crisis management instruments were stressed in 1999 by acceptance of the “Charter for European Security” which also created Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) and expanded the ability to carry out police related activities²³². The “OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century” announced in Maastricht by Ministerial Council 2003, thus called as “Maastricht Strategy”, declare that OSCE’s ability address security and stability threats is based on “its multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security”²³³.

The OSCE’s decisions are not legally, but politically, binding and all participating states have to be a part of the decision-making processes and support the OSCE in its actions, meaning that all the aspects and dimensions of a conflict has to be considered and cooperation with other organisations outlined, which takes a lot of time, but offers a long term scope for crisis management²³⁴. The OSCE have a small scale

²³⁰ *ibidem* pp. 6 – 7.

²³¹ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 1996) p. 7.

²³² (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe June 2009) pp. 10 – 11. REACT is a pool of civilian experts available for deployment within two, four or eight weeks; their tasks include human rights monitoring as well as election organisation and monitoring.

²³³ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2003) p. 1.

²³⁴ (Crisis Management Initiative 2008) p. 15.

field presence based mainly on the contributions by the participating states and the organisation is concentrated to prevent the crises and their escalation, and to promote peace consolidation²³⁵.

The OSCE comprehensive approach is a cooperative and political negotiation model between state actors in certain geographic area covering different dimensions of security based on consensus decisions of actions.

In the context of crisis management OSCE comprehensive approach is an effort to solve political and interest differences of the states as a grounding reasons for crises through the negotiations involving all states having an interest in particular regional area. The comprehensiveness means both the states and the aspects of security. Notable is the thrust on preventive efforts and patience to find the political solution to conflicting interests.

4.8 *Integrated approach of the UN*

The United Nations is an international organization to preserve “international peace and security” and to promote “social progress, better living standards and human rights”; subsequently having different lines of activities – peace and security, development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, international law – with a wide structure - main bodies, specialized agencies, funds and programmes, and subsidiary bodies – which creates an ample and global system²³⁶.

For making the system more coherent, effective and efficient efforts to combine different sectors work has been developed in the UN; the “Delivering as One” concept for the partnership in the areas of “development, humanitarian assistance and the environment” and the “Integrated Missions” concept for integration in “political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects” at the UN peacekeeping operations²³⁷.

²³⁵ (United States Institute of Peace 2010) p. 3.

²³⁶ (The United Nations n.d.)

²³⁷ (The United Nations November 2006) p. 1; (The United Nations December 2005) para 4. The Delivering as One concept has “coordinated approach” which seeks coherence by coordinating

While the integrated missions concept was “primarily intended to clarify institutional relations and to facilitate communication and coordination” between the peacekeeping operation and other UN activities in the same geographic area, it was later refined to mean a process wide outlook, “there should be an effective strategic partnership ... that ensures that all components of the UN ... operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and close collaboration with other partners”, which led to the concept of “Integrated Approach”²³⁸. This Integrated Approach is the UN’s model of the “Comprehensive Approach”²³⁹ as the Delivering as One is covering only some parts of the UN activities, excluding peace and security, human rights and international law.

For its operations the UN has developed CIMIC concept, which might not be relevant any more in concept level as the coordination has been shifted to process level by Integrated Approach²⁴⁰, but can still be appropriate in practical and tactical level on the field²⁴¹. To have an idea of the views inside of the UN system about civil-military coordination the definitions from the UN military side and UN humanitarian side are presented. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) classifies the civil-military coordination as:

“the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives.”²⁴²

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) identifies the civil-military coordination as:

independent actions without integration them into a single, larger entity. The Integrated Missions concept has “integrated approach” which seeks coherence by the cohesive and concerted action by common understanding, systems and processes, for more information look (Friis and Jarmyr (eds.), Comprehensive Approach 2008) pp. 14 – 15.

²³⁸ (The United Nations December 2005) para 4.; (The United Nations 2008); (de Coning, The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach: DIIS report 2008:14 2008) p. 10.

²³⁹ *ibidem* p. 3. Broadly speaking, the Delivering as One is a “mindset” and the Integrated Approach is a “practical” method.

²⁴⁰ *ibidem* pp. 14 – 15.

²⁴¹ (de Coning, Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations 2007) p. 26.

²⁴² (The United Nations 2002) pp. 2 – 3.

“The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”²⁴³

While the UN military applies CIMIC with the civil actors inside the operation as well as with the other UN and external actors outside of the operation²⁴⁴ and some humanitarian actors like to separate the “crisis management” and the “humanitarian management”²⁴⁵ in addition to that humanitarian affairs is only one part of the UN system, even a big one, the Integrated Approach is perceived the most elevated form of comprehensive approach²⁴⁶.

The UN Integrated Approach is a bottom-up whole of government type of approach inside of the UN system and since the UN system is all inclusive it is also whole of system type of approach in global scale with loose political direction.

In the context of crisis management the UN main task, and the reason to exist, is to maintain “international peace and security” and its Integrated Approach is primarily focused to enhance its own internal work instead of including other actors with whom it might be working simultaneously across its activities. Worth mentioning is that the Western states are not more the main contributors for the UN peacekeeping missions²⁴⁷, in terms of (military) personnel and equipment, and tendency has been that the UN operations concentrate to geographical areas where there is less strategic interest of the

²⁴³ (The United Nations 2004) p. 5. The paper was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) and drafted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with members of the IASC, the UN’s Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the Advisory Panel of OCHA’s Military Civil Defence Unit (MCDU-AP), as well as academic reviewers and field representatives from a number of organisations.

²⁴⁴ (de Coning, The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach: DIIS report 2008:14 2008) p. 15.

²⁴⁵ (Nagelhus Schia and Ulriksen 2007) p.7. The claim for this separation is to make it able to distinguish actors who have a political role (development work) and the ones that have more neutral role (“traditional” humanitarian work), based on assumption that a population in a operation / mission area differentiates these two.

²⁴⁶ (Friis and Jarmyr (eds.), Comprehensive Approach 2008) p. 5; (Nagelhus Schia and Ulriksen 2007) p. 6; (de Coning, The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach: DIIS report 2008:14 2008) p. 32.

²⁴⁷ (Nagelhus Schia and Ulriksen 2007) p. 5.

Western countries²⁴⁸, namely sub-Saharan Africa where those countries have their own parallel military operations, i.e. France and the US.

4.9 Conclusion

The comprehensive approach is an “umbrella” term for different kinds of models to reach stability and peace in international environment. These models vary not only in width and depth also in methodology and ideology. There can be indentified three lines of approaches: the ones that are based on the WGA philosophy, 3D philosophy or “comprehensive security” philosophy.

The WGA philosophy is focused on coherent and efficient operating principle across a structure by cooperation and integrated action. From the models examined two - the COIN and the UN Integrated Approach - represented this philosophy and are WGA line models.

The 3D philosophy is focused to use available instruments as tools for political goals. From the models examined majority - various national models under the 3D and MNE approaches as well as the NATO’s and EU’s CA - represented this philosophy and are 3D line models.

The “comprehensive security” philosophy is focused on negotiated settlement of political differences using cooperative instruments to support the process. From the models examined only one - the OSCE’s CA - represented this philosophy and is the “comprehensive security” line model.

Concerning relations of these different lines, they are interconnected in the way that the 3D line models can use or try to use the WGA or the “comprehensive security” lines models as available instruments.

Common to these different lines is the political dimension, even though it is not such clear in WGA line, but it exist either the way that the approach is directly under political control, like COIN, or the objectives and goals are defined by political process,

²⁴⁸ (The United Nations n.d.)

like in the UN Integrated Approach. This suggests that the comprehensive approach, regardless of the model, is for reaching political goals.

5. CONCLUSION OF PART I

To wrap up the issues presented in previous chapters – crisis management, stabilisation and comprehensive approach - and to sum up the findings a separated conclusion is provided.

The crisis management concerning international crisis, as a crisis notion has wide use in different contexts, is unclear issue. Its principle functions – handle the crisis situation, prevent its deterioration as well as restore and rehabilitate it back to peaceful and stable condition – accommodate political, opportunistic and multidimensional characters. The crisis management's nature is reactive; it is regionally focused and has subjective perceptions of the event itself and its “orchestrated” management.

The current mainstream management paradigm in this field is stabilisation, which covers different efforts to manage international crisis, particularly when the military intervention has been conducted. These efforts vary slightly depending on the acting party, but common is endorsement of standards through transition and priority to provide security and ensure rule of law. The standards endorsed are ordinary in Western states, i.e. democracy and certain institutions with sets of values and morals.

The implementation of the stabilisation efforts is carried out through different models, which can be labelled under the general name of comprehensive approach. These models vary not only in width and depth but in methodology and ideology. Seven different models were examined and three lines of approaches were identified: the WGA line, the 3D line and the “comprehensive security” line; those lines are respectively based on the WGA philosophy, 3D philosophy or “comprehensive security” philosophy.

The WGA line models follow the WGA philosophy which is focused on coherent and efficient operating principle across a structure by cooperation and integrated action. From the models examined two - the COIN and the UN Integrated Approach - represented this philosophy. The 3D line models follow the 3D philosophy which is focused to use available instruments as tools for political goals. From the models examined majority – various national models under the 3D and MNE

approaches as well as the NATO's and EU'S CA – represented this philosophy. The “comprehensive security” line models follow the “comprehensive security” philosophy which is focused on negotiated settlement of political differences using cooperative instruments to support the process. From the models examined only one – the OSCE's CA – represented this philosophy. The lines of approaches are related as the 3D line models can use or try to use the WGA or the “comprehensive security” line models as available instruments.

The red thread through these issues – crisis management, stabilisation and comprehensive approach – is the political dimension, which means, in international crisis cases, the foreign policy. It can be summarised that the comprehensive approach in the crisis management context is to realise foreign policy goals.

PART II - CASE STUDY

6. AFGHANISTAN

To find out if findings from theoretical studies correspond to real life, one crisis situation was selected to provide factual evidence. The chosen crisis is Afghanistan which will be briefly examined in this part of the thesis as an illustration of the argument that the comprehensive approach is for realising foreign policy goals.

This chapter will look at the external dimension of the crisis to see how the comprehensive approach fits to that. At first very short historical glance is offered to give some perspective, but recent developments, including Soviet occupation 1979 – 1988 and Taleban rule 1996 – 2001, are left outside to be found from more specific sources. Next chapter will check the internal dimension in more limited area inside the country, Balkh province, and by the one organisational unit', Mazar-e-Sharif Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), model of CA.

6.1 *Political dynamics*²⁴⁹

The Afghanistan and the Afghans appeared to spoken language in 1747 when Pashtu tribal leader Ahmad Shah Durrani united strongly tribal based Pashtuns to one kingdom. At the greatest, in the early 19th century, Afghanistan's empire stretched from the current Iranian territory to northern India, including Delhi. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan shrank and turn into a buffer state between the interests of the British and Russian empires. Great Britain created a border between British India, later Pakistan, and Afghanistan by the Durand Line Agreement 1893 which divided ethnic Pashtun territories. The British controlled Afghanistan's foreign policy, and fought three Anglo-Afghan wars – 1839–42, 1878–80, and 1919 –, before Afghanistan regained independence over its foreign affairs in 1919.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ This section draws heavily on material from two sources: (Heimola, Niko, Ulkoasianministeriö, Amerikan ja Aasian osasto 2011) and (Levine 2010).

²⁵⁰ The Islam was introduced during the 7th century by the Arabs who entered to area, currently known as Afghanistan, from Persia. They slowly established their territory and began spreading eastwards introducing Islam and the language along with the culture. The Arabs could not spread Islam across the

Afghanistan is bordering with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which all have different interests in Afghanistan; other regional and global powers – India, Russia, and the US - are also showing their geostrategic interests along with some Islamic states, like Saudi Arabia²⁵¹, and the European states independently as well though the EU and to some extent through NATO²⁵². In order to grasp an overall picture of these interests brief observations are presented.

6.2 *Pakistan and India*

Pakistan - Afghan relations have been strained from the Pakistan's independence 1947. The United States has passed since the spring of 2009 a tripartite dialogue between the countries and also Turkey had convened meetings for the Afghan and Pakistani political leaders. However, contacts at administrative level and among civil society are still very limited. One of the reasons is that Afghanistan does not recognize the countries' border, Durand Line, and has made claims over parts of Pakistani territory²⁵³. While the vast majority of Pashtuns are living in Pakistan, in Afghanistan they form the historical political elite and Pakistan worries the recurrence of Pashtun nationalism within its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)²⁵⁴. From Pakistani's point, an Islamic government, concentrating on the religion as a uniting element instead of disruptive ethnic politics, is the solution to reduce Pashtun separatism²⁵⁵.

Another element is the India's growing presence in Afghanistan. Prior to the Taliban regime India and Afghanistan had very close relations²⁵⁶ and currently India has four consulates across the country and is one of Afghanistan's largest, and regionally the

entire Afghanistan; the southern and eastern part of Afghanistan remained intact until Turkish origin Muslims converted those areas by the 11th century.

²⁵¹ (Ehrhart and Roland, US/NATO counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: evaluating concepts and practices To be published) p. 22.

²⁵² Turkey did not come strongly up to this list during the research, even it can be considered as regional power which has interest in Afghanistan as well as it is a NATO member.

²⁵³ (Grare May 2010) p. 18.

²⁵⁴ FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in the northwest of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and almost exclusively inhabited by Sunni Muslim Pashtun tribes.

²⁵⁵ (Schofield 2008) p. 85.

²⁵⁶ (Bajoria July 2009) pp. 1 – 4.

largest, development financiers, providing \$1.3 milliard, even though it does not regularly offer such assistance nor in that scale²⁵⁷. India also sees great economic prospects in Afghanistan with a big consumer market and a access to the Central Asian energy sources²⁵⁸. Moreover, Pakistan was one of the few countries that recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, held it in its sphere of interest, and still considers that the Taliban groups should have a role in any upcoming Afghan government²⁵⁹, not tolerating a strong Afghan state or army if it collaborates with India²⁶⁰.

6.3 *Iran and China*

Iran and China are mainly following the development of the situation, even though China is concerned about possible spread of terrorism into their own territory. Iran is actively fighting against the Afghan drug economy at the border and it has been have exceptionally co-operating in Afghan anti-drug operations with the United States. However, Iran believes that US troops should leave Afghanistan and in the long term, Iran wishes to see a coalition government in Kabul which includes its Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek partners²⁶¹. Iran likes to guarantee that Afghanistan is not dependent from any foreign power, whether it is Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or the US²⁶². Iran has been energetic in reconstruction and rebuilding tasks and had spent over \$500 million for aid since 2001²⁶³.

China, which is an important trading partner as well as both regional and increasingly global superpower, enjoys considerable prestige in Afghanistan, and could influence its internal policy in many different ways when wishes. Its main concerns has been, so far, to preserve access to natural resources and improving security along its border. Although, China's interest in the country has grown last years and it has strengthened its economic presence, like with investments in the Aynak copper mine

²⁵⁷ (Lamont 2010) Web version, no page numbers.

²⁵⁸ (Bajoria July 2009) pp. 1 – 4; (The American Institute of Afghan Studies February 2009) p. 12.

²⁵⁹ (Fisher 24 August 2010) pp. 1 – 2.

²⁶⁰ (Bajoria July 2009) pp. 1 – 4.

²⁶¹ (Mann Leverett July 2010) Web version, no page numbers. The Hazara are a Persian-speaking Shia Muslims and the third largest ethnic group of Afghanistan, around 9 percent of the total population.

²⁶² (Weinbaum June 2006) p. 12.

²⁶³ (Behner March 2009) pp. 1 – 4.

and in various iron ore deposits with the bids for further mining contracts. Generally, Chinese companies have a central role in Afghanistan's mining sector, and they are continuously looking for new opportunities²⁶⁴. China supports Pakistan by providing goods and funds wanting to limit Indian influence and could stand a Taliban government in Afghanistan. China is not convinced that the NATO's operation will succeed and likes to keep the door open for Taleban²⁶⁵. Nevertheless, China remains indifferent of the potential structure of Afghan government, as long as it is stable.

6.4 Central Asia and Russia

There is modest Central Asian participation in Afghanistan and each state has their individual interests. Although, all are concerned of Taliban's reappearance and want to oppose the growing drug trade, but current situation permits them to maintain authoritarian rule and to delay any internal reforms²⁶⁶. Several infrastructure projects, like Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline (TAP), which could transport natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and to India, link Central Asia with Afghanistan. Yet, the bulk of these ventures are funded by other actors than the Central Asian states, like India or the World Bank²⁶⁷. Regional relations are also affected by the fact that the ethnic groups of neighbouring countries in Central Asia (Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen) and Pakistan (Pashtuns and Baluchs) are the largest proportions of the Afghanistan's population. In addition, Russia sees the Central Asian states within its sphere of influence, and wants to limit the US power on the area²⁶⁸. However, Russia, like the US, opposes any Taliban return to Afghanistan and decided to help train the Afghan army and special counternarcotics troops²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁴ (Farmer 2009) Web version, no page numbers.

²⁶⁵ (Pantucci 2010) pp. 21 – 27.

²⁶⁶ (The American Institute of Afghan Studies February 2009) pp. 14 – 15.

²⁶⁷ *ibidem* pp. 7, 12 – 13, 17.

²⁶⁸ (Weinbaum June 2006) p. 7; (Feigenbaum March 2009) pp. 1 – 4.

²⁶⁹ (Smith 2010) Web version, no page numbers.

6.5 *Saudi Arabia*

Saudi Arabia has supported Pakistan's activities in Afghanistan already from Soviet occupation time²⁷⁰ and likes to see an Islamic government in Afghanistan that contains parts of the Taliban. Saudi Arabia has hosted a range of informal ad hoc reconciliation talks, not only with various Afghan groups, but also between Afghan government and the Taliban, and, in addition, it has given at least \$500 million in direct foreign aid and reconstruction assistance²⁷¹.

6.6 *The US and the EU*

Afghanistan and Pakistan are the most important US foreign policy priorities and its yearly development assistance to Afghanistan is over three milliard dollars. The US costs for its operations in Afghanistan has been constantly rising and are estimated to reach \$120 milliard this year and it is providing over two thirds of ISAF forces²⁷². According to National Aeronautics and Space Administration' (NASA) reports Afghan soil has a major mineral deposits; including natural gas and oil reserves that have been found to be significantly higher than estimated. So far, the security situation has not allowed large-scale international businesses. The European Union - both the Commission and Member States - is a major aid donor and considers itself as an important security administrator in Afghanistan. The EU is committed to the long-term and comprehensive support for the Afghan government and civil society, for example in reconstruction, security sector and economic development. EU's financial support is about one third of all development assistance directed to Afghanistan and more than a quarter of the ISAF strength is from the EU countries. The Afghanistan donor countries agreed in Paris Conference 2008 to coordinate and harmonise the reconstruction commitments, but that has been proven to be a very challenging task; it is complicate because of the weakness of the Afghan Government and the individual donor countries'

²⁷⁰ (Ehrhart and Roland, US/NATO counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: evaluating concepts and practices To be published) pp. 22 – 23.

²⁷¹ (Boucek May 2010) pp. 46 – 47.

²⁷² (National Priorities Project 2011). The US costs have been, in milliard US dollars, 2006 - 19, 2007 - 36.2, 2008 - 43.5, 2009 - 59.5 and 2010 - 106,6; the amount of US troops have been, in thousand persons, 2006 - 20,4, 2007 - 23,7, 2008 - 30,1, 2009 - 68,0 and 2010 - 94,0. The ISAF mission has served as the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan since 2003.

interests, and in some cases, a disproportionately large bilateral political influence to the Afghan government's direction²⁷³.

6.7 *South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)*

Afghanistan was accepted to the SAARC in April 2007 and the other members in this friendship forum - concentrated on promotion of human rights, commercial, scientific and technological cooperation, fight against drug trafficking and environmental protection - are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka; the US and the EU have an observer status. SAARC is especially focused on development and poverty reduction.

6.8 *Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)*

The SCO is 2001 founded organisation - with the objective of promoting security cooperation - between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Iran and Pakistan have an observer status, which is not been granted to the US in spite of its multiple requests. Afghanistan participates to SCO's activities as part of the Afghanistan Contact Group (ACG), which was founded in November 2005 to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. SCO feels that the unstable situation in Afghanistan threatens the neighbouring countries belonging to SCO, and for this reason the cooperation with Afghanistan has to be deepened. Cooperation is focused on the economy and activities against terrorism and drugs. Many observers feel that the SCO's establishment was a effort to counterweight NATO's and US's operations²⁷⁴, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad has used the speeches SCO meetings to criticise the US actions. Even though many members have activities in Afghanistan, the SCO has not yet to produce a broad policy regarding the situation there and the differing agendas of China and Russia might prevent to reach agreement on that²⁷⁵.

²⁷³ (Heimola, Niko, Ulkoasianministeriö, Amerikan ja Aasian osasto 2011) p. 7.

²⁷⁴ (Feigenbaum March 2009) pp. 1 – 4.

²⁷⁵ (Levine 2010) p. 5.

6.9 *Afghanistan*

As Afghans own efforts to manage crisis in political level a large “Peace Jirga”²⁷⁶ was held in Kabul in June 2011 and the Peace Council - the High Peace Council (HPC) -, consisting of selected 70 influential Afghans, was established in the autumn 2010. The HPC’s purpose is to promote reconciliation with the present government and the rebels and its operations have started, with many challenges, and it has made a visit to Pakistan and following ones are planned to Turkey and Iran²⁷⁷.

6.10 *Summary*

To summarise, the regional actors are divided: Pakistan, and in some degree Saudi Arabia, supports the Taliban; India supports the current government and with Iran the ethnic minorities, which earlier made up the Northern Alliance. China, whose main concern is stability regardless the type of government, supports Pakistan’s plan also to delay India’s rise and growing regional influence. Russia and the Central Asian states are side with India and Iran. The US and the EU support openly the current government, but situation needs to be seen also in the context of over-all American foreign policy: the US’ larger goals – like strengthening the US economy by the binds with India and responding to a China’s rise – are more important in the long-run than the Afghan crisis²⁷⁸. The main issue is the historic rivalry between India and Pakistan. Although, the picture is more colourful as the Sunni-Shia division has also role to play since for some Pakistani and Saudi Arabian advocates Iranian influence is a major concern, and the Russian weight in the Central Asia cannot be neglected²⁷⁹.

6.11 *Conclusion*

The Afghanistan crisis is heavily political and it is maintained with a foreign support, from both sides²⁸⁰, and it is in the Western states foreign policy interests to

²⁷⁶ Jirga is a Pashto term for a decision making assembly of male elders.

²⁷⁷ (Heimola, Niko, Ulkoasianministeriö, Amerikan ja Aasian osasto 2011) p. 8.

²⁷⁸ (Levine 2010) p. 1.

²⁷⁹ (Weinbaum June 2006) pp. 17 – 19.

²⁸⁰ (Ehrhart and Roland, US/NATO counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: evaluating concepts and practices To be published) p. 26.

support the current government, which is done through “crisis management” and “stabilisation”.

7. BALKH PROVINCE²⁸¹

This chapter will check the internal dimension of Afghanistan crisis to see if this supports the argument that the CA is for realising foreign policy goals. The area of scrutiny is Balkh province, and the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT's model of the CA. First short background information about Balkh province is provided before going more details of politics, PRT and security. In the end a summary and conclusions are presented.

7.1 Background

Balkh Province, located northern Afghanistan bordering Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is one of the Afghanistan's five most important provinces - Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Kunduz, and Balkh – and regional centres. The governors of these provinces are normally seen to have the equal status with a government minister. The provincial centre, Mazar-e Sharif, is the Afghanistan's fourth largest city and a major trading hub. Because of its location and relative calm situation Balkh has collected the fourth-highest amount of revenue (behind Kabul, Herat, and Nangarhar), and nearly two-thirds of it comes from imports and exports taxes²⁸².

The population of Balkh Province, over 1,1million²⁸³, consists of multiple ethnicities, biggest groups been Uzbeks and Tajiks; Pashtuns are minority, but in three districts - Char Bolak, Chemtal, and parts of Balkh - they are the majority. The ancestors of current Pashtuns were given land and (forcibly) settled late 18th century by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan when attempting to strengthen Kabul's control over the area, previously held by Bukhara – Uzbek empire –, and removing problematic groups from the south.

Balkh's history has been full of turmoil with some more stable periods between, resent one from 2004, and the underlying sources, strongly ethnically related, still remain, at least partly and the settlement history being one of them; all of the political

²⁸¹ This chapter draws a lot from (Fishstein November 2010) and author's personal experience in the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT between 2008 and 2010 as well as background interviews of senior officers in the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT and regional ISAF Head Quarters level.

²⁸² (Fishstein November 2010) p. 11.

²⁸³ (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan n.d.)

groups, based mainly on ethnicity, are currently competing over the power and resources within the province, and while the government, with its Western allies, corresponds to one of the contestants²⁸⁴, major and persistent themes are changing coalitions and rivalry, with using the state apparatus for political and personal gain²⁸⁵.

7.2 *Politics*

The main political players in Balkh province are the Jumbish and Jamiat groups, associated respectively mainly with Uzbek and Tajik populations²⁸⁶. The tensions between Jumbish and Jamiat groups and their leaders General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Ustad Atta Mohammed Noor²⁸⁷ continued to be the source of insecurity in Balkh until late 2003 when the central government and ISAF intervene by establishing British led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)²⁸⁸ to Balkh. The PRT's mission was to extend the authority of the Afghan central government beyond Kabul, improve security by reducing violence, and promote reconstruction²⁸⁹. The central government's

²⁸⁴ (Fishstein November 2010) p. 16. President Hamid Karzai, Pashtu, is seen to represent the Pashtun groups. However, there continue to be major differences in perception, whether any particular ethnic group controls the national government.

²⁸⁵ *ibidem* p. 13.

²⁸⁶ Jumbish-e Milli Islami Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) is the political party considered principally an Uzbek movement and lead by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, notorious warlord who has fought with and against the Soviets during their occupation and later against Taleban in the Northern Alliance. Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) is the political party considered presenting ethnic Tajiks from northern and western Afghanistan and lead since 1968 by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president of Afghanistan, before and after Taliban, currently the head of Afghanistan National Front, the largest political opposition to Hamid Karzai's government.

²⁸⁷ General Ustad Atta Mohammed Noor, former deputy leader of Jumbish and a commander of Northern Alliance in the Balkh area, is representing currently Jamiat and was 2004 appointed as governor of Balkh Province by President Hamid Karzai.

²⁸⁸ A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is US originated short-term civil-military organisation designed to operate in half moderate conditions usually following open hostilities, intended to "improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation's legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services"; even more specific, the PRT concept is aiming to be an "integrated civil-military organization expanding the reach of the U.S. government (USG) and the wider international community assistance efforts from the environs of the capitol to the provincial level to the local community". (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2007) pp. 1 – 3. The PRT model has been the testing ground for new approaches to using reconstruction assistance to promote stability and different models has been used in Afghanistan. (Armstrong and Chura-Beaver 2010) pp. 45 – 46. For more information about various models of PRTs in Afghanistan can be found in (Eronen 2008). The Mazar-e-Sharif PRT was established in July; NATO took lead of ISAF operation in August 2003 and the PRT was transferred to ISAF in summer 2004; the PRT covers four provinces (Balkh, Samangan, Sar-e Pol and Jawzjan).

²⁸⁹ (Jakobsen 2005) p. 4; (Perito 2005) p. 2.

action was to move Dostum away by assigning him as the "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Afghan Armed Forces" and increase Atta's power by appointing him as the governor of Balkh.

7.3 Mazar-e-Sharif PRT

In March 2006 the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT was transferred from the British to the Swedish with Finland as supporting nation. Both of them had been part of the ISAF already several years and consider themselves as "peace-loving" and "non-political" nations being in Afghanistan to "help turn the difficult situation in the country into societal prosperity" by "supporting humanitarian assistance and protecting the civilian population"²⁹⁰. Their methods to conduct operations was based on their national CA approaches and the PRT was classified to symbolise the "British-Nordic" model in comparison to other PRT models used in Afghanistan²⁹¹. Sweden and Finland have national policy to divide the development aid and military activities; most of the development funds are directed through the central government²⁹². The PRT has focused on its own small scale projects to win community level support to help freedom of movement and promote force protection²⁹³. The level of the PRT development activities has raised tension with Governor Atta who has constantly and openly made negative comparisons with the US PRTs that spend much more money in local level. In general, the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT did not directly use lots of money and did not try to influence that much either which was more common in the US PRTs. However, ISAF, both in Afghanistan and regional level, was praising the Nordic PRT model and based

²⁹⁰ (Friis and Rehman (eds.), *Nordic Approaches to Whole-of-Government – in Afghanistan and beyond*, Security in Practice 6 2010) pp. 12, 29. Finland's mission is to promote democracy, human rights and gender equality around the world (Kannisto 2011) p. A2.

²⁹¹ (Eronen 2008) pp. 9 – 15, 20 – 23. Amount of the persons in the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT is around 750 including representatives of the USAID and the US State Department in its civilian staff.

²⁹² (Fishstein November 2010) p. 2. Almost all from the Swedish development aid to Afghanistan, \$60 million 2009, is put through the central government and 20 percent of that is assigned for Balkh, Jawzjan, Samangan, and Sar-e Pol through the "Northern Fund". The PRT had, 2009, a \$1,4 million annual allocation available for the north to support development projects, plus an additional \$1,4 million for private sector development. The total Finnish assistance to Afghanistan in 2009 was approximately \$15.2 million, from which 25 percent were targeted to the PRT area, and the PRT projects had direct allocation of \$695,000 (5 percent of the total).

²⁹³ The PRT, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are tools for gaining operational benefits, and are intended to be used in the field before, during, and after military operations.

on survey conducted among local population; ISAF was not regarded as a destabilising element²⁹⁴.

7.4 *Security*

The level of security stayed in moderate level, Governor Atta was respected as effective leader and problems, concentrated to Pashtun dominated districts, were created by mixture of criminal and political elements from various reasons – money, power, ideology, and religion – that cannot be addressed that much by development²⁹⁵. General view in Pashtun communities was that they were discriminated and often treated unfairly, by communities and the authorities, and left out of the government; while other groups saw Pashtun communities been more conservative and problems arising from the settlement history and the central government's pro-Pashtun favouritism; the PRT perceived that some Pashtun had ideological views, but largely they were just frustrated with the government²⁹⁶. Pashtun frustration was expressed through violence in the absence of political channels. Nevertheless, in country wide statistics, Balkh Province had the sixth-least reported attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in 2008²⁹⁷.

The situation changed 2009, in the run-up to presidential elections, president Karzai decided in his re-election campaign to bring Dostum back into region to help to gather the Uzbek votes and Atta decided to support Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the other candidate with mixed Tajik and Pashtun background, and the PRT deployed additional troops, including Special Forces, to support the elections. The security incidents fired up and level of security declined, probably because of the change on the PRT tactics, more aggressive actions and presence attracting insurgent activity, based on view that local acceptance is conditional on the lack of conflict, but also on rising political-ethnic tensions as Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah were linked correspondingly with

²⁹⁴ ibidem p. 21, 42. The PRT has traditionally had a more "kind" approach, already the British engage with the population a very different style than the US PRTs in the south and east.

²⁹⁵ ibidem p. 17, 20.

²⁹⁶ ibidem p. 20 – 21.

²⁹⁷ (The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office 2010) p. 11. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO, is independent NGO safety coordination project, funded by European Commission - Humanitarian Aid, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ANSO report was chosen to indicate the security level as ISAF reports are mainly concerning their own units and amount of incidents depend largely on the type and amount of operations conducted.

Pashtun and Tajik constituencies and there were rumours about Karzai's activity destabilise the situation in order to challenge Atta's authority²⁹⁸. Nonetheless, in 2009 statistics Balkh experienced four-fold increase in AOG attacks - from twenty-two to eighty-seven - and slide to position of the twelfth-least attacks and this trend continued 2010 with two-fold increase – from eighty-eight to hundred and eighty-two – to position of the fourteen-least attacks²⁹⁹.

Few other aspects needs to mention connected to above described development. Firstly, NATO formulated first time the objectives for its operation in Afghanistan 2008 – safe and secure environment, good governance, services for the citizens and border security – and all the activities started to align towards those objectives. Secondly, the US decided to increase its resources to Afghanistan 2009, including additional troops – around 30.000 – with the equipment as well as more funding to reconstruction efforts. Parts of those extra resources were also located to the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area including 5.000 soldiers with Apache - attack helicopters and heavy artillery. Finally, supporting Afghanistan central government means to rapid establishment of sole model based on Western form institutions, democratic system and market economy with values and morals carried by it.

7.5 *Summary*

In summary, the Swedish – Finnish “softer” image Provincial Reconstruction Team's primary objective was to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority and make the population like and support the Afghan government, in other words, to legitimise the Afghan government. The opposition to that can stem from various reasons which can be addressed only partly by development or military means, but the primary element is the political sphere where the PRT is seen by locals as an advocacy for particular type of society model and also as a one player among others.

²⁹⁸ (Fishstein November 2010) p. 17.

²⁹⁹ (The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office 2011) p. 12.

7.6 Conclusion

The PRT as a primary way to exercise CA, in the context of Balkh, was a political tool in two senses. Firstly, it was implementing the foreign policy goals of not only Sweden and Finland but also, or even more, other countries, mainly the leading country' - the US - goals, through the ISAF / NATO structure. Secondly, it was in Afghanistan's inner-politics, a tool of one group – the central government – to achieve its goals.

8. CONCLUSION OF PART II

To wrap up the issues presented in the previous chapters – Afghanistan and Balkh – and to sum up the findings a separated conclusion is provided.

The Afghanistan crisis is deeply political in global and regional level. The crisis is maintained with a foreign support and it is in the Western states foreign policy interests to support the current government. The support is done through “crisis management” and “stabilisation”.

In the stabilisation operation, carried out by CA, the principal way to exercise it is the PRT that, in the context of Balkh, is a political tool. It was implementing the foreign policy goals of not only responsible countries but also, or even more, other countries, mainly the leading country’ – the US – goals, through the ISAF / NATO structure.

The common thing in these issues – crisis management, stabilisation and comprehensive approach – in this practical case – Afghanistan – is the foreign policy element. It can be stated that the comprehensive approach in the Afghanistan context is used as a tool to realise foreign policy goals.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

To wrap up the issues presented in previous parts – both the theoretical study and case study – and to sum up the findings, a concluding comment is presented.

Crisis management concerning international crises is vague matter. Its principle functions – to handle the crisis situation, to prevent its deterioration, as well as to restore and rehabilitate it back to peaceful and stable condition – contain political, opportunistic and multidimensional characters.

International crises are managed, especially after a military intervention, by stabilisation, which contents varies slightly depending on the acting party, though common is endorsement of standards through transition and priority to provide security and ensure rule of law. The standards endorsed are general in Western states, i.e. democracy and certain institutions with sets of values and morals.

Different models to implement stabilisation fall under the general name of the comprehensive approach. These models vary a lot but common is the political core.

The topic to connect all these issues – crisis management, stabilisation and the comprehensive approach – on the theoretical level is foreign policy. The case study supported this finding in global, regional and national level of a crisis.

As a final conclusion, it can be clearly declared that the comprehensive approach in the crisis management context is a tool to realise foreign policy goals.

It is recommended that all the actors, both at an organisational and a personal level, recognise and admit this fact. Equally important is to find out what and whose particular foreign policy goals are realised by each comprehensive approach in a given crisis. Being aware of those it will be less problematic to make decisions between non-involvement, level of coexistence, cooperation or coordination of crisis management activities through each comprehensive approach, from an organisational perspective. Also from a personal perspective, it will be lighter to select proper channels, that are in conformity with personal views and identity, for own contribution.

Regarding the Afghanistan crisis, which arguably meets the theoretical definition of a crisis; it is hard to see any sustainable solution without significant reduction of outside involvement³⁰⁰, based on a politically comprehensive international agreement, and a truly Afghan decision of their future. This decision might not be satisfied by the Western norms and could lead to separation of the country, but most likely would be appropriate for the present state of Afghan society³⁰¹.

³⁰⁰ This view is also shared in the US' political debate (O'Hanlon 2011) p. 10A.

³⁰¹ The form of Democracy does not inevitably equals to its content. Cultural differences affect to peoples' understanding of the history and to their behaviour in the modern political and economical systems (Saarinen 2011) p. B6.

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