NATO’s Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation in the Humanitarian Setting: The comprehensive protection of conflict affected populations.

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Abstract

In an international system where state’s actions are judged principally for their lawfulness, the perpetual inability of the international community to comprehensively address the causes and consequences of violent political conflict leads to a situation in which the human rights of individuals are frequently violated. This study focuses on the working relationship of NATO and its civilian partners as part of a comprehensive approach in conflict environments. It balances empirical evidence and theoretical discussion from two of the principle stakeholders in the humanitarian setting during violent political conflict; namely international civilian organisations and military forces. By addressing pragmatic issues on the ground as well as the long term strategic outlook of those actors involved, this paper provides various recommendations on the future conduct of civil-military cooperation in order to provide an environment in which individuals can not only survive but also thrive.
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CAAP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach Action Plan</td>
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<td>CCOE</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COMPASS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>EU CPCC</td>
<td>European Union Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>EU CMPD</td>
<td>European Union Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>FRIS</td>
<td>Funding, Recruitment, Information and Support</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Command</td>
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<td>JWP</td>
<td>Joint Warfare Publication</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Service</td>
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<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>MAHE</td>
<td>Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MCRM</td>
<td>Military Capability Request Mechanism</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Military Outreach</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stability Force</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers</td>
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<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Stability and Reconstruction</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>4GW</td>
<td>Fourth Generation Warfare</td>
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SECTION 1: THEORETICAL APPROACH

“It is easier to make war than peace.”
George Clemenceau, Speech on Peace, 1919.

1.1 Introduction

Although humanitarianism has been inextricably linked to war since its inception, which is commonly agreed to have been in the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the discussion around the subject has intensified over the past twenty years. This intensification has no correlation to an increase of violent conflict; in fact, the number of violent conflicts has decreased since 1990.1 Farrell and Schmitt (2012) go even further, stating that, “armed conflict since 1990 has become less lethal for civilians.”2 Bearing this in mind, it seems contradictory that NATO, an alliance formed in 1949 and one of today’s most influential powers in the international community, only staged its first military intervention in 1992 in response to mass human rights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Farrell and Schmitt (2012) suggest that it was due to globalisation and therefore the greater, “international awareness rather than [the] prevalence,” of conflict.3 Although an increase in international awareness cannot be seen to go hand in hand with the neoteric advance of the human rights movement, the increasing need for, primarily western, states to respond can.

One key theme ever present in the discussion of international intervention in violent political conflict is the issue of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The runners’ analogy is often used to describe the popularly perceived views of differing roles in civil-military cooperation during conflict. The military is seen as a sprinter whilst civil society is seen as an endurance runner. Military capacity is focused on the short-term, it reaches the line first but only goes a short distance whereas civil society has a further reaching capacity but takes longer to achieve its goals. Nevertheless Slim’s (1996) assertion that, “militarism and

1 Themner and Wallensteen, 2013, p. 1.
humanitarianism have represented two sides of the same coin – humankind’s inability to manage conflict peacefully,” still rings true today.4

This paradox leads to the question posed in this paper: would greater levels of cooperation between civil and military actors hinder or enhance human rights protection during political conflict? Although hypothetical, its answer is an integral part of the discussion on CIMIC and provides an evaluation of the current state of human rights protection by civil and military actors. It will principally address whether or not improvements need to be made to human rights protection mechanisms during CIMIC operations. If not, then it will provide a justification of the existing system, allowing it to be implemented by other organisations and institutions, therefore spreading wider human rights protection in increasingly volatile environments. If there are improvements that need to be made this paper will provide pragmatic solutions; having already analysed potential methods of improvement whilst also assessing the operational effectiveness of protection mechanisms. In either case, the monitoring and evaluation process undertaken in this study of current human rights protection in civil-military cooperation is key to effective and comprehensive protection of human rights at a local level. The aim of this thesis is to address the differences between the two sets of actors so that, working together, they can more efficiently protect individual’s human rights during violent political conflict. Therefore this analysis will take in to account not only the role of CIMIC in the short-term military response but will also focus on the passing of responsibility from security forces in the short-term to civil society actors in the long-term.

In an attempt to simplify the chosen research question in a logical manner, this study is divided into three corresponding sections. The framework for this analysis follows the basic principles of firstly studying the theoretical concepts of the subject, before conducting a problem analysis for specific unresolved issues and finally presenting recommendations for the maintenance and improvement of current practice. More specifically, the first section provides a contextualisation of CIMIC, addressing what it is, the reasons why it is important, where it is employed, how it is employed and when it is employed. In doing so, it provides an

extensive analysis of the theories and concepts surrounding the topic in the context of humanitarianism from a liberal-realist historical perspective. It goes on to attempt to justify the position taken by this paper, which itself is an important consideration for the wider academic discussion on the issue. The second section addresses specific problems in the current co-operational practice, ranging from traditional roles to new co-operative mechanisms. It also highlights those existing mechanisms that work well. In addition, it examines traditional issues and analyses the new mechanisms, both currently in use and those proposed, in order for recommendations on the future conduct of joint civil-military operations, which will be provided in the third section.

The benefits of a study of this kind are twofold, firstly for the benefit of military actors. Although as an analysis of NATO it provides an impartial evaluation of both their doctrine and practice over the last twenty years, it also makes a valuable contribution to the international security community by taking a lessons learned approach and providing guidelines for future best practice. The second group of beneficiaries are civilian actors who, alongside an honest appraisal of their actions and beliefs, are provided with an insight into the working methods of armed forces in humanitarian crisis and specifically some little known mechanisms that may lead to greater levels of cooperation in the future. As such greater explanation of what may seem simple concepts in military terms has been included in an attempt to overcome taxonomical barriers and to better integrate civil and military actors.

1.2 The Changing Character of War

In order to understand the reason for and role of CIMIC, it is first important to understand the context in which it is applied. As previously mentioned, humanitarianism is believed to have been identified as a concept after the Battle of Solferino and although humanitarianism can be a response to natural disasters, it is more often than not a response to politically constructed conflict. The causes of violent conflict were and still are inherently political; however the way in which war is carried out has developed over time. This development in war has occurred hand in hand with technological advances, which are often triggered by conflict itself. Examples include: the widespread use of gunpowder after the Mongol
conquests of Central Asia in the thirteenth century, mechanisation at the start of the twentieth century, the use of nuclear warfare in World War Two and more recently, cyber warfare. Due to the dynamic status of warfare armed forces need to be adaptable to, not only keep up with but also, predict and act upon those foreseen developments. For all the traditional perceptions of armed forces as conservative and old fashioned institutions, the environment in which they operate forces them to be adaptable, albeit if this adaptability is generally through learning from experience. Edmunds (2006) explains that primarily, “European armed forces have increasingly identified and taken on new roles in order to legitimate their institutional existence and budgetary demands.”

This asserts that due to the changing character of war many armed forces have been tasked with non-traditional military endeavours, such as CIMIC.

Another way in which war has changed incorporates the moral aspect of warfare. Gat (2001) for example, explains that, “historically, the crushing of an insurgency necessitated ruthless pressure on the civilian population, which liberal democracies have found increasingly unacceptable.” The development of human rights and the implied inherent dignity of all human beings as both a concept and a legal entity have evolved rapidly over the last 60 years or so. Although primarily a Western democratic concept, the inauguration of human rights in a legal form, through the UDHR in 1948, supported by its acceptance from the international community demonstrates the extent to which human rights dictates states’ foreign policy and the conduct of state security forces. Although some commentators may understate the importance of human rights, arguing that the UN had only fifty one members in 1948, forty eight of which voted in favour of the UDHR; by establishing themselves as an international norm they paved the way for further human rights law. The UN now has one hundred and ninety two members, greatly increasing the scope of human rights protection, conceptually and legally. In terms of a legal framework we can view the role of human rights protection during violent conflict in the same terms as *jus in bello* and the role of human rights as a reason for humanitarian intervention in the same terms as *jus ad bellum*, both of which arguably act as an extension of the Just War tradition. The concern in relation to

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6 Gat, 2001, p. 34.
human rights protection is that, as warfare takes on an ever more asymmetrical shape, different combatants have different views on the way enemy fighters and civilian bystanders should be treated, often regardless of any international customary law protecting their inherent human dignity. An analysis of any conflict from a Just War tradition perspective is also important as it allows an insight into the combatants motivation for fighting, which becomes invaluable during the peace building process.

This relatively recent change in warfare has been described by some commentators as a ‘fourth generation’ of warfare, commonly referred to as 4GW. This theory emphasises the military element of the comprehensive approach and argues that 4GW is an advanced form of insurgency that, “uses all available networks – political, economic, social, military – to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” One could argue that the use of CIMIC recognises a nontrinitarian view of warfare where there are a variety of actors, more than just the tri powers of the government, the army and the people offered by Clausewitz. By taking this position this paper recognises the failing power of states in the face of asymmetric conflict and therefore a weakening of the Westphalian system. The decreasing, but still overwhelmingly dominant, power of the state in the international arena grants more power to other actors, humanitarian organisations included. This theory also champions a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, supporting the need to resolve conflict on the political, economic, social and military levels. Regardless of whether this is a completely new phenomenon, warranting its own theory or rather just some of the key components of war that have been recurring in recent times as argued by Echevarria (2005), the need to explain and categorise recent changes in modern warfare is important to scholars because it shows that, as a subject area, war is a dynamic concept that evolves over time. This observation is consequential as it defines the context in which humanitarianism must place itself.

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9 Lind et al, 1994, p. 35.
10 Clausewitz, 1832.
1.3 Theoretical Considerations

Having identified the research question, which aims to assess whether or not greater levels of cooperation between civil and military actors would hinder or enhance human rights protection during political conflict, the limitations of this study need to be outlined. What follows is the justification for the stances taken by this paper in relation to key academic discussions that relate to the topic of civil-military cooperation and the protection of individuals in humanitarian assistance. This is through the definition of a conceptual framework followed throughout this study. The framework is made up of various key concepts that are integral to the formulation of both the question posed and the answers provided. These are: the overarching aim of protection of human rights, both in terms of theoretical and actual implementation; NATO’s CIMIC doctrine and its place within the comprehensive approach; and the operational effectiveness of CIMIC in achieving its aim of human rights protection. Clear contextualisation is key: without it the principle aim of adding to the understanding of human rights implementation mechanisms in civil-military cooperation is impossible. The definition of these concepts is undertaken from a particular view. The methodology used in this paper will involve both a pragmatic and rights-based approach, focusing on the implementation of human rights protection. In order to achieve this, a historical perspective must be maintained when analysing conflicts past and present as well as previous case studies of CIMIC operations in order to fully appreciate the lesson learned from past operations. With this in mind what follows are the definitions of each concept as well as the justification for viewing these concepts in a given way.

The first concept is protection. Taken here to simply mean, “the action of protecting someone or something; the fact or condition of being protected.”\textsuperscript{11} However for the purposes of this thesis it is further sub-divided into two categories. The first is the protection of human rights, which are fundamentally, “rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language or any other status.”\textsuperscript{12} The importance of human rights was stressed by the former UN Secretary

\textsuperscript{11} OED, 2007.
\textsuperscript{12} OHCHR, 2012.
General Kofi Annan, who in his 2005 report asserted that, “human rights are as fundamental to the poor as to the rich, and their protection is as important to the security and prosperity of the developed world as it is to that of the developing world.”\textsuperscript{13} As an organisation that follows a UNSC mandate, NATO has a clear, if not quantitative, commitment to human rights. This is clearly set out in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) as one of the membership requirements, stating that NATO member states must, “demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights.”\textsuperscript{14} What form that commitment must take is not specified but its inclusion alone demonstrates an acknowledgement of the importance of human rights and a willingness to protect them by the member states of the alliance.

The second sub-category of protection takes the same basic definition; namely the state of being protected or the action of protecting, but relates it to the issue of actual implementation of protection versus the theory of protection. Actual implementation and theoretical implementation can be differentiated by a results based analysis, concretely this means that this thesis will bear in mind any short coming in what both civil and military doctrine says should happen and what actually happens on the ground. In relation to human security, Kaldor et al (2007) defines this concept as \textit{lexis versus praxis}. In line with their approach, this paper focuses on the latter. They defined this approach as, “what it means in terms of everyday actions, from policies to tactics on the ground.”\textsuperscript{15} This concept also justifies the pragmatic approach taken by this thesis rather than the theoretical and often idealistic approach. This distinction is vital because Fixdal and Smith (1998) acknowledge that humanitarian intervention is a platform to revisit the ever popular, “debate between idealism and realism.”\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the definition of pragmatic offered by Kennedy (2002) will be used. He states that, “pragmatic evaluation means specifying the benefits and harms that might attend human rights initiatives in particular cases, under specific conditions.”\textsuperscript{17} In this case humanitarian assistance is seen as a human rights initiative owing to their shared founding principles. The specific conditions alluded to here involve

\textsuperscript{13} Annan, 2005, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{14} NATO MAP, 1999, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{15} Kaldor et al, 2007, p. 273.
\textsuperscript{16} Fixdal and Smith, 1998, p. 284.
\textsuperscript{17} Kennedy, 2002, p. 102.
NATO intervention in humanitarian disasters, specifically in politically constructed violent conflict.

Military forces cannot guarantee human rights protection. Rather they can foster an environment in which it is possible for those affected individuals to exercise their human rights. On the other hand, humanitarian organisations can, depending on the situation, provide human rights protection through the non-military elements of a comprehensive approach. One example includes the success of EULEX in a post-conflict context after training over six thousand police officers for the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in a relatively short period of time in order to protect citizens through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).\textsuperscript{18} This can be expanded to include the work of EULEX in the judicial field, enforcing protection through the re-institutionalisation of the justice system. Another example has been the WFP’s provision of hot meals to conflict affected people in Libya as well as Libyan refugees in Tunisia and Egypt since the onset of the Libyan conflict in 2011. The provision of food security is another area in which civilian expertise is superior than that of the military forces and can complement other capabilities, both military and non-military. It could be argued that in both of these situations NATO forces had secured an environment in which the humanitarian organisations could operate, through KFOR in the former and through NATO’s maintenance of a no-fly zone as part of Operation Unified Protector. However in both situations, especially in Libya, there was still a substantial risk to the field staff of these organisations, further highlighting the greater capacity of humanitarian organisations to successfully provide some elements of security to conflict affected populations. When taken in isolation this suggests that military forces are and should be an accompanying force to civil organisations in order to improve efficiency by providing expertise in certain areas such as security and logistics, a position reflecting the fact that they are a vital, but not the principal, element of the humanitarian effort.

However, in terms of protecting conflict affected populations, military forces come into their own when the state and its civil organisations have collapsed. This is usually due to the environment created as a result of a stateless region, which typically implies: lawlessness, violence, and corruption; ultimately leading to human suffering. As the enforcing arms of

\textsuperscript{18} A 2006 report by PRIME acknowledges the KPS was 6,238 officers strong as of April 2005.
state power, military actors are well suited to restoring or upholding the law, controlling violence and quelling corruption. The security element is also supported by rapid response capabilities as highlighted in the CIMIC Field Handbook, focusing on short-term necessities such as civil administration, food and sanitation. This exemplifies the innate security capabilities of armed forces, as well as other protection capabilities, as effective methods of protecting conflict affected populations. However physical security is only one element of a comprehensive approach to human rights protection and, by itself, cannot guarantee sustainable protection for conflict affected populations.

1.4 A Comprehensive Approach

1.4.1 A Military Perspective

So why CIMIC? Cooperation between civil and military actors is mutually beneficial, not only for those two parties, but also for conflict affected populations. However, as Pugh (2001) explains, this relationship seems extremely paradoxical, “given that relief operations detract from the main purposes for which armed forces are maintained, it is significant that… military establishments took initiatives to institutionalise civil-military relations.” In order to gain a clearer insight into NATO practice in the area of civil-military cooperation the author of this paper visited JFC Brunssum in May 2014. This presented the opportunity for an in-depth study of all things CIMIC related by allowing the author to speak with NATO staff, military and civilian, who had a wide ranging and vast experience of CIMIC operations at all levels in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Personal perspectives were offered from a variety of people ranging from a Major who had undertaken three tours of Afghanistan, in all of which he was specifically tasked to CIMIC operations in PRTs; to the JFC Deputy Commander whose experience of civil-military cooperation encompassed NATO operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan; as well as NATO civilian staff with deep CIMIC experience.

During the visit to Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, which is the NATO Response Force (NRF) currently on standby, Brigadier General Vermeij (2014) reinforced the fact that, “no war can be won by purely military means.” Rather military power should be viewed

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21 Leadership of the NRF is rotated annually between JFC Brunssum in the Netherlands and JFC Naples in Italy.
as one possible tool available that can be used alongside others in order to achieve a desired goal. The sum of all these tools is referred to as the comprehensive approach and it requires the coordinated and mutually supportive use of various methods. With this in mind, the importance of civil-military cooperation becomes ever more important. McNerney (2006) brings our attention to an extract from the US Marine Corps’ draft Small Wars manual which notes:

“Military planners might choose to consider the initial conventional combat phase as the shaping phase, rather than the decisive phase... [If our political objectives can only be accomplished after a successful stability phase, then the stability phase is, de facto, the decisive phase.” 22

By recognising the need for a post-combat focus to operations, the manual shows an acceptance of the comprehensive approach to warfare which often follows the PMESII model, addressing the: political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and informational dimensions of war in order to achieve a desired end state. This systemic approach has been challenged by Arnold (2006), a Major in the U.S Army, who argues that the PMESII model can only be applied to state actors. He proposes the mnemonic FRIS (funding, recruitment, information and support) when dealing with non-state actors. This paper recognises the validity of this assertion but for the purposes of this study, in which the PMESII model is seen as a tool of the comprehensive approach rather than a stand-alone means of combating political opposition, this paper maintains that the PMESII model’s all-inclusive approach is an effective method for advancing comprehensive human rights protection in violent political conflict. Nevertheless, the adoption of either of these models is an acknowledgement of the changing character of war as well as a shift of paradigms in the way in which a state’s power is projected.

This shift reflects a move from kinetic operations to influence operations and, as a multidimensional approach, it is invaluable in complex situations; best demonstrated by the allied attempt to the ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach in Afghanistan. The complexity of the comprehensive approach is portrayed in the counterinsurgency (COIN) dynamics of the

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stability phase in Afghanistan. In line with the principles of the comprehensive approach, allied forces focused on three key pillars, known as a 3D approach, these were defence, diplomacy and development. Defence was innately pursued through NATO’s ISAF mission and the strong international military presence. Diplomacy was pursued through political support for Karzai’s government and against the former Taliban regime. Development was pursued through the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) whose primary task was to bridge the gap, “between Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the wider reconstruction and stabilisation process.” The use of a comprehensive approach does not negate the use of armed forces as a last resort, but rather stresses the combination of hard and soft power approaches to achieve the outcome desired by its proponents.

There is a difference between the comprehensive approach to warfare in general and the use of the same approach specifically in relation to CIMIC operations. The latter requires a consideration to be made at all levels; strategic, operational and tactical, as well as in all directorates within the continental staff system. The importance of CIMIC is further stressed by its inclusion as a separate directorate, however this paper argues that, in addition, consideration of civilian organisations must be taken into account in all directorates, not only J9. During this study, the author has focused on the role of inclusivity though a comprehensive approach in all matters of a civil-military nature, following the premise that all stakeholders must be included in a coordinated response to violent political conflict in order to protect human rights and that a comprehensive approach is the best way to achieve this aim. The paper assesses NATO’s approach to civil-military relations, interaction and cooperation, analysing the extent of its inclusivity or exclusivity.

1.4.1.1 Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) formed the basis of the civil-military interface in Afghanistan and thus warrant close examination considering the aims of this study. Originally an American concept, the use of PRTs was adopted throughout the Alliance. Under the guise

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23 See Annex I.
25 The continental staff system is based on the J-structure, denoting joint. It is divided into 9 directorates: J1 is personnel, J2 is intelligence, J3 is operations, J4 is logistics, J5 is planning, J6 is communication, J7 is training, J8 is resource management and J9 is CIMIC.
of NATO, PRTs were eventually installed into the regional command structures already in place and, as such, each differed slightly in line with its national approach. This led to difficulties in the coordination of the large groups of stakeholders which could often change from province to province; as well as to discrepancies in defining the overall mission of PRTs. McNerney (2006) explains that, after an initial period of soul searching, “the PRT mission began to coalesce around three basic objects: enhancing security, strengthening the reach of the Afghan central government, and facilitating reconstruction.”

Fittingly these three objectives directly equate to the three pillared approach of defence, diplomacy and development; and exemplify the successful integration of the comprehensive approach at the operational level.

Civil-military interaction arose in response to NATO’s failure to successfully interact with its civilian counterparts during the peace building process in Afghanistan. ISAF established a CIMIC centre in the area around Kabul in March 2003 in order to coordinate with civil society organisations. Tensions ran high as many humanitarian organisations felt any military presence in the country should focus explicitly on the security situation and that armed forces had no role in the development process; perhaps with the sole exception of providing armoured escorts in particularly volatile regions. Conversely the CIMIC staff involved in PRTs poured their energy into reconstruction projects with little form or link to place or people. This resulted in both actors working principally in isolation on similar projects and as a result pitted civil and military actors as competitors rather than colleagues. The humanitarian contention with PRTs was not founded on their disapproval of CIMIC projects, in fact CIMIC projects were approached in the same way as those conducted by humanitarian organisations. In order to show their similarities, an analysis of their project cycles, the NATO Project Approach and the ECHO Manual Project Cycle, revealed that they have different phases but ultimately go through a similar process. It was this duplication of roles that led to initial tension in civil-military relations in Afghanistan.

McNerney (2006) recognises that, “PRTs were born in an environment of change, so it is not surprising that their mission and structure evolved over time.” The key lesson learnt

27 Annex II shows these similarities.
28 McNerney, 2006, p. 36.
from this initial foray into the ‘humanitarian space’ was that, in the same way that military power must be viewed as a smaller, contributing element of the comprehensive approach, CIMIC must be viewed as only one element of Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). As such, two of the primary documents used in this study reflect this conceptual evolution. NATO’s CMI doctrine consists of two principle documents: MC 411/1 published in 2001 and MC 411/2 which was agreed through silent procedure\textsuperscript{29} on 25 March 2014. The former focuses on CIMIC capabilities and, at that time, effectively outlined NATO’s complete civil-military approach. The later introduces the concept of CMI, which it defines as:

“CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.”

The introduction of CMI is a bridging concept that consolidates CIMIC’s position as part of the comprehensive approach. CIMIC represents the tactical level capabilities available to a commander and, as such, forms an integral part of the broader CMI which also encompasses the strategic and operational elements requiring interaction between civil and military actors. MC 411/2 is only the latest evolution of CMI which was first identified during an internal Comprehensive Approach Stakeholder Meeting on 22/23 September 2010 in which NATO defined CMI as:

“Civil Military Interaction is the general term for the overarching process of military and civilian actors engaging at various levels (strategic, operational, tactical), covering the whole spectrum of interactions in today’s challenges, complex emergencies, and operations.”

This shift away from a project focus is reflected in the CIMIC Field Handbook, which states that, “projects are not a core function of CIMIC,” going on to define the differing potential outcomes of projects, explaining that some, “can serve as a significant contribution to force protection and will definitely improve the situation of the local population,” while others, “only benefit the contractor and damage the reputation of the military.” An accompanying quote on the same page from Lawrence of Arabia perfectly embodies this

\textsuperscript{29} The traditional state approval method in NATO. A document is approved unless a NATO member state ‘breaks silence’.
revised approach, stating that, “it is better to let themselves do it imperfectly, than do it yourselves perfectly. It is their country, their way and our time is short.”\textsuperscript{30} This rightly acts as a reminder to military commanders to prioritise a rapid and effective response over a timely and perfect one, whilst also stressing the importance of empowerment for the local population. A sentiment that supports the role of armed forces as an effective short-term response in the stabilisation process.

1.4.1.2 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The principal concept to be explored is civil-military cooperation. A seemingly self-explanatory concept which, at the simplest level, consists of a joint civilian and military effort. The intent of this thesis however is to examine NATO’s approach to civil-military cooperation, therefore, for the purposes of this paper, NATO’s CIMIC doctrine will provide the framework for a civil-military co-operative platform. AJP-3.4.9, NATO’s most current CIMIC publication,\textsuperscript{31} defines CIMIC as:

\textit{“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”}

It is important to remember that NATO view CIMIC as just one, “military function that is an integral part of modern multidimensional operations.”\textsuperscript{32} Another important factor is that, as a tool, CIMIC is employed in order to support the force commander. This \textit{raison d’être} contends with the humanitarian aim of protecting human dignity as set out in the Humanitarian Charter\textsuperscript{33} and the subsequent problems that arise because of this will be examined in depth later on in this paper. When assessing this concept two further factors need to be taken into account. Firstly CIMIC needs to be approached pragmatically in the same way as human rights protection, with an assessment of whether the theoretical approach is transformed into actual results on the ground. Secondly CIMIC also needs to be examined from a historical perspective, first finding then applying any lessons learnt. In terms of

\textsuperscript{30} CCOE, 2012, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{31} NATO AJP-3.4.9, 2013, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{32} NATO AJP-3.4.9, 2013, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{33} Sphere Project Handbook, 2011.
finding previous examples of civil-military cooperation in practice, NATO’s response to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan has led to a rich seam of experience in the Alliance as well as for civil society organisations.

A further important consideration to the definition of CIMIC is the classification in AJP-3.4.9 of three pillars of CIMIC. These are formulated as: civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment, and support to the force. All three are considered when military commanders select civilian organisations as partners. In fundamental terms this consideration poses three questions from a military perspective: can we or have we already successfully cooperated with this particular organisation? What is the added value for the civil environment, and thus, reflects well on us? And what is the added value to the military effort? This underlines the thought process which attempts to decipher the potential benefits of CIMIC from a purely military point of view as well as highlighting the priorities of CIMIC capabilities to military commanders. The importance of this thought process arises in suitable civilian partner selection for military actors and must be taken into account when making recommendations later in this study.

The next concept to be examined is operational effectiveness, taken here to mean the precedent of the mission above all else. NATO defines the mission as, “the task of the command and its purpose.” In military terms the mission comes before all else however, despite traditional views to the contrary, NATO commanders must take into account human rights protection whilst planning military operations at any level. In fact it can be argued that all NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) have placed the protection of human rights as the desired outcome of the mission. Military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo can be seen as the international community’s response to mass human rights violations. Which, in reference to the latter, Henkin (1999) describes as, “widely welcomed.” The international community’s condemnation of human rights violations, however, is not a blanket justification of military intervention and can lead to clashes of idealism and realism, embodied in popular protest of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was subject to widespread allegations of

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35 Reitjens, 2008, provides a comprehensive list of partner selection criteria for the Dutch PRTs, pp. 188-189.
capitalist motivations. Furthermore it could be argued that the fervent rise and use of the human rights movement to justify military intervention favours dominant western states and because western states have often led on the principle of humanitarian intervention, it is possible that they can influence NATO from within.

Regardless of the motivation for participation, this study focuses on practice within the humanitarian field. In this setting there are military-led and military-run humanitarian assistance protects and training missions that enable other states government forces to better protect the security and liberty of their people. As well as military-led and military-run projects that directly benefit the local conflict affected population. In these cases, it is imperative that potentially negative elements of the comprehensive approach, such as civil-military cooperation, do not detract from the overall mission of fundamental human rights protection, often portrayed in the guise of human security. Previous PSOs have shown that CIMIC and human rights protection can both be effectively incorporated into the same mission. An example of this included Operation Essential Harvest during which NATO forces implemented the disarmament of the ethnic Albanian insurgents in Macedonia. However in order to develop a truly comprehensive approach to human rights protection through CIMIC, an analysis of the affect the additional factor of civil-military cooperation has upon operational effectiveness, should be made. As such, in line with its pragmatic approach, this paper aims to address the feasibility of the coordinated protection of human rights through CIMIC whilst maintaining operational effectiveness in the completion of the mission.

Whilst the above concepts form the basic framework for the analysis of NATO’s approach to CIMIC and human rights protection, there are other factors that also need to be taken into consideration. One important factor to consider is the level at which human rights protection is offered. In the military context of conflict there are three levels of warfare: the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In layman’s terms the strategic level is the concern of the highest military commanders; its civilian counterparts would be high ranking officials and leaders of civilian organisations, such as the UN Secretary General, the president of the ICRC or leaders of NGOs. The operational level concerns the theatre command; the civilian equivalent would be an international organisation’s (IO) country director or leaders of local NGOs. The tactical level is usually the focus of sub-theatre commands, equated in the civilian world to encompass sub regional offices and individual projects on the ground, often referred
to as, ‘in the field’. The focus of this thesis will primarily be on the results achieved at a local level as the principle focus of any human rights protection must ultimately aim to guard the individuals and communities affected at the grassroots level. That having been said, all three levels are interrelated and mutually supportive. The actions taken at one level will influence those that must be taken at another, this was underlined by the incumbent UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon who, in his remarks of 20th November 2007 to the UNSC debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, stated that, “And that, ultimately, is where the Council’s words must have the most meaning – on the ground, in support of the affected civilians who need protection from the shocking indignities of armed conflict.” 38 As such, human rights protection mechanisms shall be assessed on their performance at the tactical level but suggested solutions may incorporate the strategic or operational levels in the hope that the affects will filter down through the hierarchy of command.

1.4.1.3 Relations and Cooperation

In order to examine the theoretical background of CIMIC, it is important to make a distinction between civil-military relations and CIMIC. The term civil-military relations refers to the relationship between a society, usually in the form of a state and that society or states’ armed forces and consists of a largely philosophical discussion of roles and responsibilities. Civil-military cooperation on the other hand describes the combined effort of civil society actors and the military in specified tasks. There are differing schools of thought on civil-military relations. The question posed is whether or not these can be or indeed should be adapted to the functional cooperation of civil and military actors? Theories of civil-military relations argue how to ensure the coexistence of both actors whilst maintaining a liberal democracy. If this doctrine were to be followed, theories of civil-military cooperation would argue how to best ensure the existence of military and civil actors whilst maintaining an effective and efficient response to a humanitarian crisis. This paper argues that the two classical theories on civil-military relations, which are arguably held in the highest regard by civil-military scholars, can be adapted to the issue of civil-military cooperation; these are Huntington’s (1957) Institutional theory and Janowitz’s (1960) Convergence theory. Any adaptation must keep the core principles of the original theory but be contextualised in its

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new setting. As such the adaptation of institutional theory in CIMIC focuses on the professionalisation of civil and military actors in isolation, whereas the adaptation of convergence theory focuses on the military’s acceptance of civil expertise and vice versa. As with any working relationship, both adaptations require the willingness of civil and military actors to cooperate.

Due to the inherent politicisation of armed forces, their insistence to “branch out” into the humanitarian field could be viewed through Huntingdon’s institutional theory as a consequence of the political make-up of western societies as liberal democracies who perceive a moral obligation to an imagined international community. This theory emphasises the political element of the comprehensive approach. The inclusion of J9, a CIMIC directorate, shows the institutionalisation of CIMIC and, in line with Huntingdon’s (1957) institutional theory, the professionalisation of the subject area in military circles. At a theoretical level, its inclusion nullifies Nielsen’s (2012) argument that, “too narrow a focus on expertise for the former [military aspects] at the expense of expertise for the latter [civil aspects] could create a military ill-suited to achieving the country’s political purposes.”

However realities of war within the past decade, specifically in Iraq, have highlighted difficulties in finding the correct balance in a post conflict environment and will continue to be an extremely important topic in light of the ISAF withdrawal from combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014. The armed forces project focus in Afghanistan pre-2006 shows the failure of Huntingdon’s institutional theory through the over-institutionalisation of traditional non-military capabilities that, with hindsight, are now left to specialised civilian experts. This approach has realigned itself with Janowitz’s convergence theory in which military and civilian actors are separate institutions but both accept the expertise of the other in certain areas. The resulting challenge of assessing these areas of expertise will be addressed later in this paper.

1.4.2 The Humanitarian Perspective

The use of a comprehensive approach to human rights protection forms an integral dimension of this study. But a comprehensive approach involves more than the definition given by Zapolskis (2012) who simply defines it as, “the integration of civilian and military

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A comprehensive approach should use all available capabilities, both civilian and military, in order to protect all rights inherent of human beings in a comprehensive multi-sectorial approach. That is to say that the civilian and military elements must work in harmony as well as with the other aspects of PMESII. As briefly discussed military operations must take into account human rights under the aegis of international humanitarian law and may even focus on human rights protection as the intent of the mission, however this is usually conducted under the guise of human security. Furthermore, with the changing character of war, some scholars argue that human security has developed from a state-centric concept to a people focussed one. Human rights, whether as a stand-alone concept or as part of the broader spectrum of human security, allow not only the right to life for an individual, but also grant the means in which those individuals can live their life. In the context of this paper, a comprehensive approach means the protection of all human rights, as outlined in the International Bill of Human Rights. The recognition of human security as a broader but not weaker concept is vital, and is often misunderstood with the perception that human security implies only the ‘so called’ first generation rights. The challenge is ensuring that individuals also have access to the means to live a reasonable life, something that is empowered by second generation rights. This challenge of association of rights is easily demonstrable by monitoring the contentious issue regarding of the use of drones. In reference to the protection of human rights one would be forgiven for automatically assuming that this statement implies the protection of the right to life from armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but could equally mean the protection of the right to privacy from UAVs used for reconnaissance purposes.

1.4.2.1 Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Development

The context in which CIMIC is applicable must be defined in order to clearly set out the perimeters of this study. NATO themselves differentiate between different scenarios in which CIMIC should be available to the force commander. Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE) in the opinion of NATO refers exclusively to, “disaster relief operation [s] or other civil emergency,” which is, “unconnected to any NATO military operation.”

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40 Zapolskis, 2012, p. 15.
42 CCOE, 2012, p. 44.
the contrary, this paper is of the opinion that humanitarian assistance covers a much broader spectrum and, more often than not, with a recognised evolution in the waging of war, encompasses military operations. CMI is still needed in violent conflict and, although often perceived as a job for humanitarian development, humanitarian assistance is arguably still desirable in the context of prolonged conflict. A contemporary example of which is the ongoing Syrian conflict where brutality and inter-communal violence have continued to intensify. The conflict in Syria is now entering its third year and whilst it is much longer than the traditional three to six month period in which humanitarian assistance usually takes precedence, it is arguably an instance in which humanitarian assistance is required rather than the implementation of any development projects. This is due to the constant stream of refugees migrating towards refugee camps who are in need of the fundamental necessities of water, shelter and food. As such, this paper prefers the WHO’s chosen definition taken from ReliefWeb, which defines humanitarian assistance as, “aid that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population.”

The traditionally defined concepts of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development are differentiated in terms of timescale. A rough figure for which would calculate humanitarian assistance taking the dominant role in the short-term, ideally from the onset of a disaster up to 6 months, with humanitarian development taking over responsibility in the mid to long-term, anywhere from 6 months to 3 years. After which the initial problem hopefully will have been resolved. This long-established view has two major downfalls in the modern context. Firstly, as briefly discussed, prolonged conflicts and disasters are common and any attempt to fit them into a predetermined timeframe is ultimately in vain. The inability of all stakeholders to effectively resolve the initial problem or reason for conflict as well as a failure to stem the spread of hostilities are the principal reasons for this. Although the setting of a generic timeframe is only a framework and does allow some flexibility, the appreciation for timescales needs to be situation dependent and highly flexible in order for it to be in anyway relevant. Secondly, as a short-term response to a violent political conflict, humanitarian assistance organisations are operating in the same environment as military forces. This can evidently lead to conflicting actions which detract from the task of aiding the primary beneficiaries. This issue exemplifies the undoubted importance of maintaining an

43 ReliefWeb, 2008, p. 31.
effective and functioning interface for CMI. Due to the difficulty of identifying the point at which the traditional short-term assistance ends and the traditional long-term development process begins, the author relates to both as part of the humanitarian setting. This terminology refers to the overall period in which it is possible for CMI to occur and allows for situations that do not fit into the traditionally defined scenarios, such as prolonged conflicts.

The CIMIC Field Handbook brings the three core humanitarian principles to the attention of military commanders, extolling the importance of humanity, neutrality and impartiality for humanitarian organisations.\textsuperscript{44} These core principles are rightly adhered to by humanitarian organisations and as such need to be acknowledged and understood by military personnel. Alongside this there are four protection principles as set out by the Sphere Handbook, these are: to avoid exposing people to further harm as a result of your actions; to ensure people’s access to impartial assistance – in proportion to need and without discrimination; to protect people from physical and psychological harm arising from violence and coercion; and to assist people to claim their rights, access available remedies and recover from the effects of abuse.\textsuperscript{45} These four protection principles outline the types of projects conducted by humanitarian organisations, whereas the core principles outline the way in which the projects should be conducted.

\textbf{1.4.2.2 Human rights vs. Human security}

This paper believes that protection of human rights within the international system is justifiably the most important goal in periods of conflict. Unfortunately, as a comparative measuring stick, there is no tangible method of ensuring human rights protection is not only upheld, but put above all else by all warring parties. The current trend in overcoming this introduces the concept of human security, which Axworthy (2001) describes as the advancement of, “human rights, good governance and democracy.”\textsuperscript{46} As a much broader concept, human security includes human rights protection as its foremost component, but also implies that good governance and democracy are indispensable accompaniments to its

\textsuperscript{44} CCOE, 2012, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{45} The Sphere Project Handbook, 2011, pp. 20-23.

\textsuperscript{46} Axworthy, 2001, p. 22.
successful implementation. Some commentators may argue that, as a concept, human security drifts away from the core principles of the human rights movement; however this paper argues that both are guided by the same founding principles of universality, humanity and inherent dignity, and that both, within the field of humanitarian assistance, place the alleviation of human suffering as their principle aim. This aim is more achievable when focusing on human security as its larger spectrum, in turn, allows a greater potential for successful human rights protection. Furthermore there can be no doubt to the importance of human security because it is the security basis that allows for further assistance, without which there would be no hope for sustainable development. The reason for highlighting the discrepancy between the two concepts is an attempt to improve the quality of life of individual’s at the most basic level. However it is not the argument of whether one concept should be used over another which is important, rather how the selection of one over the other will affect the primary beneficiaries, namely individuals in situations of violent political conflict. As such, this paper argues that security, humanitarian assistance and development should be viewed as building blocks; with security as a foundation, humanitarian assistance as the first building block and development as the second building block; maintaining that sustainable conflict resolution needs to be built from the ground up.

Even though the definition of human security is extremely broad, it still aims to achieve the same the goal. Unfortunately neither human security nor human rights are particularly measurable. Measurability becomes important when assessing accountability, a key principle for both civilian and military actors, the importance of which is highlighted by NATO CIMIC doctrine which explicitly refers to the Sphere Project, which is a Quality and Accountability Initiative. Although some scholars may argue human rights are measurable due to their legal nature, this study focuses on the guiding principles of inherent human dignity and equality, counter-arguing that in a realist international system states are only encouraged to partake in the westernised model of morals and values and there is no effective enforcement mechanism forcing states to follow what are essentially western liberal-democratic rules. The ideological battle ingrained within the human rights movement equates to the acceptance of what are commonly termed, first and second generation rights or civil and political rights as opposed to economic, social and cultural rights embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and

47 NATO AJP-3.4.9, 2013, pp. 6-8.
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) respectively. Alkire (2003) argues undeniably that, “the rift between types of rights went deep and reflected ideological priorities,” in the post-Cold War arena. However she goes on to argue that human security goes on to, “re-introduce the indivisibility of different kinds of human rights.”48 In this way, this paper allows for the provision of both generations of human rights by focusing on the concept of human security.

Contrary to this, there is scope for the argument that the conceptual understanding of human security that has been prevalent since the end of the Cold War has hindered the development of human rights protection. Even though human security and human rights are based on the same principles, some scholars may argue that by allowing the use of human security, the international community has fallen into a trap of creating more complexity in an already complicated conflict environment. Therefore what, at first, is seemingly comprehensive in reality is extremely vague which, in turn, leads to a predicament that unwittingly reinforces the ambiguity of state’s motivation for their actions. However this paper countermands that this phenomenon relates solely to motivations for intervention and not to conduct during stability operations, effectively rendering the argument mute in relation to the specificity of this study.

Human rights protection undoubtedly requires a rights-based approach to civil-military cooperation. Therefore a legal framework from which to examine the policy and actions of NATO whilst interacting with various civil society actors is important. The question then arises of to which standard human rights protection should be measured. Numerous frameworks are available for this task, however given NATO’s affiliation with the UNSC and the fact that it was founded on the principles of the UN,49 it is logical for this thesis to focus on the International Bill of Human Rights, comprised of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR and the ICESCR. That having been said, this paper will not address specific individual rights per se, but instead focus on the principles of the International Bill of Human Rights. This is firstly to avoid being distracted by the legality of actions taken during conflict, something that is already regulated by international law.


humanitarian law and secondly, due to the complex variety of rights, to aid the comprehensive approach to rights inherent to human dignity on an all-inclusive level.

It is important to note that this paper recognises the human rights movement within the international community as the result of a constructivist approach to international relations. Guzzini (2000) describes two common misconceptions when studying constructivism, namely its inability to predict trends and that it is a form of voluntarism. He identifies the international system as, “a system whose rules are made and reproduced by human practices.” This supports the argument that the human rights movement follows an orientalist approach. However, in this sense, when compared with the concept of human security, western principles are further enhanced due to the additional concepts of democratisation and good governance as highlighted by Axworthy (2001). These are inescapable accompaniments to military involvement in a humanitarian setting and must be key considerations in any civilian organisations stakeholder analysis.

1.5 Further Contextualisation

When analysing the concept of CIMIC various considerations need to be made. One is that for the purpose of this study CIMIC forces are always present in a conflict zone as part of an occupying force. This has wide ranging consequences for all the stakeholders involved in the peace-building process, from issues of politicisation or the endorsement of controversial ideologies to the guiding principles of the reconstruction process. In reference to the latter, Benvenest (1993) suggests that there needs to be an occupational framework from which the stakeholders can launch a coordinated response, explaining that, “as hostilities subside, and security interests can permit, the occupant could be expected to restore civil and political rights. Under such circumstances, the human rights document might well serve as guidance for re-establishing civil and political rights.” This suggestion further stresses the importance of defining each stage of a humanitarian response, specifically the military-led, short-term response and the civilian-led, long-term developmental programme, whilst introducing a solid contingency plan in the overlapping handover period.

When discussing the civil actors within civil-military cooperation the local population are often marginalised, making way for international actors. Although these international actors

50 Guzzini, 2000, p. 155.
can speak on behalf of the local population, due to their international nature, a cultural consideration needs to be made in terms of acceptance and whilst humanitarian assistance can be viewed as an orientalist prerogative, it is equally important to consider humanitarian assistance from an occidentalist approach and to question the local populations levels of acceptance of aid from the West. This effectively constitutes a cultural awareness assessment and, at a practical level for military actors, warrants liaison with civil actors who usually have been in country for a long time before military intervention begins and therefore enjoy a greater cultural awareness.

Equally another factor to be considered is the type of conflict in which the role of CIMIC in human rights protection will be analysed. Traditionally classification of conflict severity relates to the level of intensity. In their annual report, *The Conflict Barometer*, the Heidelberg Institute differentiates between violent and non-violent conflicts on a sliding scale from low intensity conflicts to high intensity conflicts. The level of violence determines the classification of the conflict, running from dispute, through non-violent crisis, violent crisis and limited war, to war, correspondingly qualified from 1 to 5.51 The Heidelberg Institute has used this method of classification since first publishing the reports in English in 2002. Before then the reports were published in German, beginning in 1992 and only had four levels of conflict intensity: ‘latente konflikte, krisen, ernste krisen and krieg,’ translated as latent conflicts, mostly non-violent conflicts, violent crisis and war. The classification of a conflict by degrees of violence is interesting because the majority of political conflicts in which NATO has been involved for a period of at least twelve months in the past twenty years have been classified with an intensity level of at least 3 during the year in which, or at least for one of the years in which NATO was involved in the conflict. In 1994 Bosnia was classified as 4, ‘Krieg’, in 1999 Kosovo was also classified as 4, ‘Krieg’, in 2001 Macedonia was 3, ‘Ernste Krise’, in 2003 Afghanistan was classified as 4, limited war. Ironically it was NATO’s assistance in toppling the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 which lasted only 6 months but the conflict was classified as having an intensity level of 5, war. The caveat and reason for using ‘majority’ is that this list excludes counter piracy operations, consultancy or training missions, such as Operation Ocean Shield off the Horn of Africa and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. By focussing on violent conflicts this thesis makes the assumption that there

51 HIIK, 2013, p. 9.
is a correlation between the level of violence and the number of human rights violations. However it is important to remember this is not always the case, especially when including second generation rights. In order to comprehensively protect the human rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, further study of all conflicts in which NATO are involved, violent and non-violent as well other types of mission that are not covered by the Heidelberg Institute, such as anti-piracy and training mission, should be undertaken. Furthermore it is important to note that this paper focuses on political conflicts and not natural disasters, therefore certain NATO missions in humanitarian assistance will not be included in this analysis, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan, both of which occurred in 2005. In order to concretely summarise this, the principle type of conflict to be studied in this paper is what the UN classifies as a complex emergency. These are typically of a political nature and manifest themselves due to a number of reasons, a comprehensive list of which is provided by Moore (1999) and includes, “the end of the Cold War, the outbreak of previously inhibited ethnic hostility, weapons proliferation, the advancement of information technology, the erosion of inviolate sovereignty, the stubbornness of under development, and the snail’s pace of development.” In short, cases of international intervention in the form of PSOs.

1.6 Literature Review

1.6.1 Primary Sources

A variety of sources have been used to assess to what extent practical improvements can be made to civil-military cooperation in order to protect human rights. Unsurprisingly this includes primary sources, namely publications, from both civilian and military institutions and therefore consideration must be taken of context, purpose and perspective. Regarding military matters, the majority of publications are NATO doctrine, however sometimes analysis of member states governmental doctrine and publications has been undertaken. In these cases national publications primarily come from the USA or the UK for a number of reasons: firstly both have a seat on the UNSC, secondly they are among the highest spending

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NATO member states, and thirdly, due to the accessibility of publications from a language perspective.

The most prominent pieces of NATO doctrine used were NATO's two policy papers on CIMIC, MC 411/1 and MC 411/2; NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept; and AJP-3.4.9, NATO’s CIMIC doctrine. Complementing these was the CIMIC Field Handbook published by the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE). As the name suggests a strategic concept addresses the alliances enduring purpose and the nature of its security tasks at the strategic level. NATO has developed seven strategic concepts since 1949, the latest was in 2010, with its predecessor being published in 1999. Strategic concepts are developed in response to the contemporary security environment, but as with any retrospective policy planning, they are reactive rather than proactive. For example, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept was developed during the Kosovo conflict and drew heavily upon the atrocities in the early to mid-1990’s in Bosnia and Rwanda, and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept similarly draws upon the lessons learnt in Afghanistan. The importance of NATO’s Strategic Concept is not only political but transfers down to the operational and tactical level as, “it is the key NATO defence planning document… [and] is subsequently transformed into real capabilities.” Although this process shows that NATO is accounting for the developments in the ever changing security environment and is evolving its strategic concept accordingly, it highlights a lag time between situational evaluation and response implementation. This is demonstrated by the evolution of NATO’s CIMIC doctrine which began in 2003 and came about in response to the revised Strategic Concept of 1999.

SHAPE developed NATO’s civil-military cooperation doctrine in the form of AJP-9, which was introduced in 2003. Due to a change in responsibilities, SHAPE relinquished responsibility of CIMIC to the NATO affiliated think tank CCOE in 2008, which immediately looked to, “streamline its content reflecting all of the needs of the dramatically changed operational environment.” This was undertaken between October 2008 and September 2011 when two Study Drafts of AJP-9 were successively circulated and commented on. As of February 2013, after ratification by NATO member states, the AJP-3.4.9(A) Allied Joint

55 CCOE, 2011.
Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation Edition A version 1 was widely disseminated. Due to the prolonged development of AJP-3.4.9, encompassing the evolution of two strategic concepts, CIMIC Doctrine is at the forefront of civil-military cooperation. It draws on nearly twenty years’ experience of NATO forces working alongside civilian organisations at all levels in countries as diverse as Bosnia and Afghanistan and provides a pragmatic approach to civil-military cooperation at an operational level. However, it is important to remember that its publication is fourteen years after its original conception, and one year before the planned withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan, where the intervening period has been filled with stop-gap solutions, such as the use of PRTs and, therefore, the implementation of AJP-3.4.9 cannot be effectively evaluated anytime soon. This inability to evaluate consequentially affects the ability to learn and adapt CIMIC doctrine for improvement from a lessons learnt approach, which consequentially furthers the negative reinforcement of military institutions as retrospect rather prospective organisations in truth as well as in popular perception.

The primary doctrinal source for the tactical level approach to CIMIC operations is the CCOE’s CIMIC Field Handbook. As a field handbook it provides a quick reference guide for military commanders at the operational level as well as for soldiers at the tactical level of CIMIC operations. As a primary source, it provides an insight into the current operational practice of military actors. Although theoretically relevant, its success also cannot be fully examined as it was only published in 2012, taking a lessons learned approach from the post 2006 operational environment in Afghanistan. However, this does provide us with an opportunity to study the what the CCOE has identified as the key lessons to be learnt.

Regarding civil society, the primary sources include reports and publications from a range of international organisations encompassing the UN, the ICRC and HRW. Needless to say there are a wide range of UN agencies, but one of the primary UN agencies consulted in this study was IASC which covers a much wider mandate than the focus of this paper, namely by including humanitarian crisis induced by both human and natural causes. However, by including humanitarian crisis as a result of violent political conflict, its policies regulate the actions and standards of the civil society actors who must cooperate with the military. Therefore the publication of a joint paper *The Protection of Human Rights in Humanitarian Crisis* by OHCHR and UNHCR, in consultation with IASC, in May 2013, which highlighted...
the on-going difficulties of human rights protection despite the, “several steps taken to position the protection of persons from violations of international norms,” in recent years, contributed to the formulation of this paper. Another highly consulted document during the realisation of this study was the Sphere Project Handbook, a guidebook containing the humanitarian charter and the minimum standards in humanitarian response. An internationally recognised document, it is widely adhered to by both civil and military actors, specifically being referenced in AJP-3.4.9.

The author’s visit to JFC Brunssum also gave an extra added value to the research element of this study. Whilst civil society organisations are often emphatic in their criticism of military actors, and thus, well documented; military attitudes to their civilian colleagues, although obvious to those in the know, are not documented. The empirical evidence provided by these military actors creates a complimentary counterpart to the theoretical discussion on the topic.

1.6.2 Secondary Sources

As well as primary sources, a rich seam of secondary literature has been written on human rights protection during conflict and civil-military cooperation as separate entities. Humanitarianism is a vast subject area and many scholars cover the need to protect those unable to protect themselves in times of violent conflict. However, humanitarianism in a professional sense is a relatively new concept, beginning in the early 90s in response to intense media coverage of mass atrocities throughout the world. As such, the main focus of this paper has been on academic discussion since the professionalisation of humanitarian assistance with the one exception of literature regarding the guiding principles of the movement which predate the latest evolution of humanitarianism; typically formulated through the UDHR as adopted in 1948. Similarly, civil-military cooperation is also a recently developed concept which rides on the back of professionalisation in the humanitarian field. In this field, the author has made a distinction between literature that discusses the situation pre 2006 and that which focuses on the adjustments made post 2006. This distinction

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57 NATO AJP-3.4.9, 2013, 6-8.
acknowledges Rietjens view that CIMIC has, “evolved over time,” and is still a dynamic process.\textsuperscript{58}

Unfortunately little has been written concerning a joint civil-military effort to protect human security during conflict. This lack of literature evidently reflects a lack of a combined civil-military approach on the ground and negatively reinforces the polarised efforts of both actors. Because of this the secondary literature used to support this study has been taken from the two seemingly separate fields of humanitarianism and civil-military cooperation and considerable effort has gone into deciphering concurring themes. An example of this is McNerney’s (2006) excellent appraisal of PRTs beginning in OEF and onwards into the first stages of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan which alludes to, but never explicitly mentions, human rights protection.

\textsuperscript{58} Rietjens, 2008, p. 174.
SECTION 2: PROBLEM ANALYSIS

“enim silent leges inter arma.”

Cicero, Pro Milone, 11.

2.1 Values and Traditions

Before recommendations can be made on possible solutions to problems regarding the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of civil-military cooperation, an analysis of the problems must be made. The causes of which originate from inherent differences in both ideology and practice. This is supported by Gourlay (2000) who, when explaining the relationship between civilian and military actors, states that, “this was always clearly defined and limited by their distinct roles.”59 The principle problems to be analysed in this section are: leadership, responsibilities, working cultures and perceptions. This section will set out the traditional problems, past and present, as well as providing an overview of the current situation surrounding all aspects of CMI.

2.2 Leadership

Issues of leadership directly correlate to command structures and hierarchies of given organisations. In this regard the differences between civil and military organisations are vast; Franke (2006) goes so far as to describe them as, “polar opposites.”60 Military institutions follow vertical command structures, which demand commands to flow from top to bottom and allow little room for discussion, whereas organisations in the civilian sector follow horizontal command structures. There are benefits and weaknesses to both; military command structures are more efficient than their civilian counterparts, relying on subordinates to react quickly to commands issued by superiors within the overall command structure. This efficiency can also be the greatest disadvantage to this type of system as it surmises that the person in command will make the correct decision. Horizontal command structures overcome this challenge by allowing discussion within the team to determine the correct response, however this takes more time. The biggest obstacle occurs in finding

60 Franke, 2006, p. 15.
harmony between the two actors in complex humanitarian emergencies, enabling the correct response to be implemented both as quickly and as efficiently as possible.

A second issue arises when considering the question of leadership in civil-military cooperation, namely that of politicisation. Gourlay (2000) explains that this negatively influences civil-military relations because when the, “military is perceived as a party to a conflict, civil-military relationships become strained and civilian humanitarians distance themselves from the military.”

Politicisation is a key consideration for humanitarian organisations and thus, ways of alleviating this fear should be in the minds of military commanders. This sentiment is portrayed through the core humanitarian principle of neutrality, which the ICRC defines as:

“In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.”

That having been said, differing humanitarian organisations decipher neutrality in different ways, with some enjoying and benefiting from close working relationships with military forces whilst maintaining their neutrality and others pointedly refusing any association with armed forces. One of the latter is Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) who, in 2004, “suspended its operations in Afghanistan after having worked in the country for over 24 years.” MSF claimed the reasons for this withdrawal were, “the proliferation of PRTs, which it argued had curtailed the ‘humanitarian space’ within which MSF and other humanitarian organisations operate.”

Regardless of the details of the matter, it is imperative that all stakeholders work together in an all-inclusive approach in order to ensure that the best possible solution is found for conflict affected populations. By not engaging with an organisation that has twenty four years of in-country experience this approach is somewhat hampered. Blame can be apportioned to all parties but a future remedy to this situation could lie in granting leadership of certain CIMIC tasks to organisations that are reluctant to cooperate, who by having more responsibility may feel empowered to contribute in a coordinated approach. Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations need to be open to negotiation with military actors. The argument of no-contact with any kind of political actors completely ignores the guiding principle of the

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61 Gourlay, 2000, p. 35.
comprehensive approach, which will ultimately fail to provide sustainable protection to affected populations. Furthermore, key IOs, such as the ICRC, have proven that neutrality can be maintained whilst following an all-inclusive model.

Discovering and implementing the correct response for conflict affected populations requires strong leadership, which was a subject of contention before the UN cluster approach was introduced in 2005. Strategic leadership was pre-assigned to selected organisations by UN mandate. This occurred in the cases of NATO’s operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. However questions of leadership at the operational level were largely left unresolved. IASC’s implementation of the global cluster leader approach in 2005 clarifies leadership in situations of humanitarian emergency according to various sectors. This approach has a number of benefits. One advantage is that the efficiency of humanitarian response is improved, this relates to Sphere Core Standard Two. Firstly, it allows all humanitarian actors, civilian and military, to know which organisation will take the lead during a given disaster. Secondly, the relevant cluster leader can take prior action to ensure it is prepared to cope with any potential emergencies that could arise within its area of responsibility. Another advantage to the cluster leader approach is that it ensures accountability in line with Sphere’s position as a Quality and Accountability Initiative. Perhaps the most important advantage to the global cluster leader approach is the lack of military institutions. This could reinforce the opinion that humanitarian response should be civilian led. An opinion extolled by Franke (2006) who clearly asserts that, “effective CIMIC should be civilian-led.” This issue of leadership also relates to the inherent politicisation of military actors and the unwillingness of humanitarian organisations to cooperate for fear of losing their impartiality. This fear is manifested in past experiences in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan where, “most PRTs… are currently military-led.” Pugh (2001) agrees highlighting the, “non-statist orientation,” of civilian organisations as the reason for this. However the lack of military actors within the Cluster approach should not be taken as a slight by armed forces. It reflects a growing sentiment that the international community needs to take responsibility for its actions; acts as an acknowledgement of the inherent politicisation of armed forces, which civilian actors should  

63 See Annex III: IASC Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the County Level.
64 Franke, 2006, p. 22.
65 Pugh, 2001, p. 132.
account for as part of their stakeholder analysis; and allows armed forces to work in cooperation with civilian actors whilst maintaining their autonomy.

Therefore, having assessed the problems of leadership in civil-military cooperation, the recommendation of this paper is that, in the short-term, CIMIC should be military led. This is a recommendation based on the armed forces premise for undertaking CIMIC tasks as a force multiplier. However it is arguably that the biggest challenge does not focus on whether CIMIC should be civilian or military led, rather that the acknowledgement and acceptance of given roles are more important than superfluous questions of leadership. It must be recognised that military actors view themselves as co-ordinators, a concept at odds at the strategic level with the adoption of the global cluster leader approach. In reference to the Afghanistan situation, McNerney (2006) notes that although, “civilians now play a larger role on the PRTs, they still lack adequate resources and too often play more of an advisory role.”66 This reflects the current situation in which military actors retain leadership but use the global cluster leader as the primary liaison organisation, that is to say, the first point of contact for military liaison officers. This is an already functioning system that supports the differentiation of a short-term military-led stabilisation phase, followed by a handover to the long-term civilian-led development phase, to be coordinated by the relevant global cluster leader.

2.3 Roles and Responsibilities

The issue of CIMIC leadership is inextricably linked to the roles and responsibilities of individual actors. This study also acknowledges that military leadership of CIMIC does not come without caveats. The short-term response required in humanitarian assistance is ideally suited to the capabilities possessed by military actors, which changes with the evolution from humanitarian assistance to humanitarian development as military capabilities quickly become inferior to those provided by civilian counterparts. As such, mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that an efficient handover of leadership and its attached responsibilities from the armed forces to civil society organisations underneath the relevant IO indicated in the global cluster leader approach. In this respect the importance of the role of humanitarians within the comprehensive approach is unquestionable. This is consequential in reference to issues of

66 McNerney, 2006, p. 43.
Weissman (2004) argues that due to the responsibilities of humanitarians within the comprehensive approach, their operational principle of impartiality “implies that [they] have relinquished the right to express opinions about the legitimacy of the war aims pursued by the belligerents.” This argument supports the aforementioned model so successfully used by the ICRC who view the military as a vital stakeholder in the peace building process, but who nevertheless acknowledge that the political orientation of occupying forces must be taken into account when analysing stakeholder’s motives.

Whilst not agreeing with Studer (2001) who believes that military forces should not be deployed in aid of humanitarian and that, “the greatest contribution that the military can make to humanitarian action is to restore order and security,” this paper recognises that security is the first contribution military forces can provide to humanitarian assistance as it is a prerequisite for the safety of humanitarian staff and local beneficiaries alike. However it is important to remember that security is just one capability military forces can offer to humanitarian organisations in complex emergencies. The afore mentioned project focus of PRTs in Afghanistan pre 2006 shows the ability of armed forces to provide humanitarian assistance to beneficiaries directly, however this study suggests humanitarian organisations and military forces should be mutually supportive and therefore, in the same way that humanitarian organisations can enhance the capabilities of military commanders, armed forces can enhance the capabilities of humanitarian organisations in a complimentary fashion. The challenge then comes in identifying the desirable military assets from the humanitarian perspective.

Security is undeniably the first and foremost capability available to humanitarians and has been provided at the operational level by wider military presence in conflict zones but also more specifically at the tactical level in the form of humanitarian convoy protection. This is a long practiced mode of CMI enshrined in the IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013). This study argues that there are two further military capabilities alongside security that are both, desirable to humanitarians, and that the armed forces can feasibly provide. These are logistical and technical expertise. Military logistical support to humanitarian assistance could range from the transportation of civilian

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<sup>67</sup> Weissman, 2004, p. 207.

<sup>68</sup> Studer, 2001, p. 375.
personnel to vital food packages, medicine to farming equipment in diverse environments that require transportation over land, air or sea. There are two possible ways of viewing such an arrangement. Either as a more efficient means of logistical support to the humanitarian effort, that provides good publicity for armed forces or a political and bureaucratical nightmare. This recommendation does not refer to the current military aid package offered by NATO to Ukraine but exclusively to the transportation of humanitarian goods to disaster-struck areas, where military logistical expertise in complex environments comes into its own.

It has been used in the past at a national level in response to natural disasters, for example, Britain’s provision of more 300 tonnes of food and aid supplies to the Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan on HMS Daring and HMS Illustrious. By giving logistical aid to humanitarians at an operational level, in this case international transportation, military forces gain valuable publicity albeit at a large financial cost and humanitarians gain free logistical support, but must inevitably weigh this against factors of politicisation. At a tactical level, for example the use of military logistical support in Afghanistan, the benefits would be magnified as the military logisticians would be able to protect the valuable supplies themselves rather than relying on additional armed convoys. Although a largely theoretical concept, perhaps the introduction of a pilot project introducing a Military Capability Request Mechanism (MCRM), through which humanitarian organisations can request the use of military transportation, could be advantageous to all parties.

The third area of expertise that could be provided by armed forces is loosely termed technical expertise but refers to engineering capabilities in the short-term humanitarian setting. Whilst civilian organisations can provide invaluable infrastructural support in the long-term development programme, the ability of military actors to do the same in often difficult and hostile environments could be beneficial to humanitarian organisations. This suggestion relates less to projects focused on school-building or improving farming methods, but rather the short-term necessities that are vital to conflict affected populations such as the provision of hospitals and water sanitation. Whilst this capability is offered to both humanitarian and development organisations on an ad hoc basis, it could also be offered through a MCRM that would formalise all the military capabilities that the armed forces could provide to civilian organisations. The inception of such a request mechanism for civilian organisations would clear up any irregularities over the potential capabilities and
benefits of cooperating with military forces and act as the civilian equivalent of NATO’s COMPASS Programme in the area of logistics and engineering, the details of which will be discussed later in this paper. The security element would continue to act as a separate stand-alone capability that does not need to be requested due to the political nature of armed intervention.

Another factor not to be ignored in the discussion of whether or not greater integration of civilian and military components would increase the comprehensive protection of human rights is the vast amount of literature that suggests methods of improvement. The suggestion of methods of improvement in itself shows a need for change in civil-military cooperation; the fact that most suggestions aim to increase civil-military integration shows that the major part of the academic community agrees that civil and military actors are still working in isolation and the efficiency of protection can still be furthered. Franke (2006) suggests a variety of measures, many of which have been implemented since. One such case relates to the suggestion that civil and military actors should, “develop a joint understanding of their roles and functions… before and during operational deployments.” A logical request given the increasing frequency and need for civil-military cooperation in challenging and complex environments.

The unequivocal importance of predefined roles and the responsibilities that those roles entail is outlined in JFC Brunssum’s Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (CAAP) which was published in 2014 and highlights a need to improve in certain areas within the comprehensive approach. In order to prepare both civilian and military actors for possible scenarios in which they must work side by side, pre-deployment training exercises that involve greater levels of CMI are vital. This can be done through the better coordination of training and CIMIC activities. Incorporating civilian actors into military training exercises gives both parties the opportunity to adjust to each other in a safe and controlled environment as well as allowing a working relationship to be built up. This is important as past practice has shown that civilian and military actors often only begin to liaise with one another at the onset of a crisis, automatically lowering the levels of an efficient response as it takes time to

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build trust in what is not only a complex emergency but also essentially a multicultural environment, owing to the distinct working cultures of both sets of actors.

The forefront exercise of this kind is Exercise Viking, run by the Swedish government, a non NATO state. It has been an annual event since its inception in 1999 and revolves around a fictitious scenario based upon a combined civilian and military Peace Support Operation (PSO). Its participants come from a wide variety of international and national armed forces as well as many key IOs in the humanitarian field, including: WFP, ECHO, EU CPCC, EU CMPD, UNDPKO, UNHCR and UNOCHA amongst others. Whilst both impressive and extremely encouraging this training tool has two potential flaws. Firstly the absence of NGOs and smaller organisations is not ideal but is understandable due to the vast number of civil society organisations and it is therefore impractical to expect all of them to be represented. However the capabilities and expertise of the involved civil society organisations must be considered in order to present a task force that has all the necessary requirements for the specific crisis. Secondly the omission of the local population during the exercise could lead to problems on the ground during operations and act as an obstacle to the empowerment of the local population, ultimately increasing insecurity for the armed forces and damaging the sustainable post-conflict development of the region. This is a difficult issue to remedy as the cultures, languages, and needs of the local populations evidently change according to the conflict zone. Nevertheless, in order to ensure empowerment of the local population, mechanisms that allow those actors involved in the simulation to build an appreciation of possible factors that would affect different people in a variety of potential scenarios need to be in place. This could include extensive briefs by local area experts, participation of persons from pre-identified potential problem areas or the introduction of a generic local population empowerment framework that allows flexibility in enhancing the needs of specific peoples in specific conditions. Admittedly these recommendations are easier said than done, but the primary aim of highlighting these issues is to put the empowerment of local populations in conflict resolution on the international agenda as they are both not only the primary beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance but also primary stakeholders in the sustainability of any resolution to the conflict.

In recent years, NATO has organised similar exercises however due to the nature of the scenarios used there has been less of a focus on CIMIC, for NATO’s Exercise Steadfast Jazz
in 2013 was built around an article 5 scenario, that is the allied protection mechanism that responds to outside aggression towards one or more member states with a collective defence policy. In 2015 however, NATO’s Exercise Trident Junction will be built around a traditional peacekeeping scenario and therefore will require greater levels of civil-military cooperation. The importance of joint pre-deployment training is highlighted by McNerney (2006) who cites the differences between US-led PRTs and UK-led PRTs. In the former, “civilians deployed in an ad hoc manner, with only a few meetings at the Pentagon,” and thus had no opportunity to develop working relationships with their military colleagues. Where as in the latter civilians and soldiers, “trained and deployed together and understood that their mission was to support both military and civilian objectives.”70

2.4 Perception and Association

During the author’s research trip to JFC Brunssum, Air Marshal Stacey, the Deputy Commander highlighted two main challenges to CMI. The first was the need to challenge perceptions, whilst remembering that this works both ways. In the most general of terms, military actors perceive the humanitarian workers to be disillusioned liberal do-gooders whilst civilian actors perceive soldiers as misguided heartless killers. This conclusion was echoed by Mockatis (2004) in the Kosovar case who explains that, “reconciling differing perceptions [is the] biggest challenge in bridging the gap between humanitarian and military actors in complex emergencies.”71 The second main challenge was the armed forces overly retentive approach to security. This is characterised by the lack of willingness of the military to share information. Whilst being impractical for an efficient working relationship with partner organisations, it also reinforces the civilian perception of military institutions as unscrupulous, suggesting that military actors have something to hide.

With these two principal issues in mind, this paper suggests that transparency would be the most effective method of trust building between civil and military actors who often regard one another with suspicion. “The tensions between secrecy and transparency,” are not a new issue and occurred during NATO’s mission in Kosovo as highlighted by Minear et al

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71 Mockatis, 2004, p. 28.
A key element in combatting this is information sharing, a process by which civil and military actors can work together to the advantage of both parties. At the tactical level, it is essential in order to de-conflict Areas of Operations (AO) within a conflict zone. Due to the prioritisation of military resources, their intelligence gathering capabilities allow a relatively effective overview of civilian actions within an AO, often with detailed accounts of specific projects. This contrasts with the information gathering capabilities of civil actors who often have a general overview but obviously do not have access to the movement patterns of military forces. Aside from the inherent security risk for military forces this is due to a lack of access to similar equipment or difficulties in staffing requirements. The sharing of information in this regard has benefits for both parties. It is important for civil actors to liaise with military forces within an AO in order to avoid any security risks that might result from the presence of armed forces. Whilst it is equally important for military actors to liaise with civil society actors within an AO because, as part of a comprehensive approach, civilian input can provide a fresh perspective on issues that arise and specific expertise in overcoming those issues, effectively supporting the force by complementing existing military capabilities.

The willingness of civilian organisations to cooperate with military forces is effected by the level of association. Many humanitarians are reluctant to officially cooperate with the military but often do so, unofficially, at a local level. The local, or tactical, level at which CMI occurs is referred to by Rietjens (2008) as the civil-military interface; the management of which is the primary task of CIMIC. At the tactical level, this relates to the liaison element, usually coordinated by a military Liaison Officer (LO) who acts as the interface between humanitarian organisations and armed forces. Paul (2009) describes the German approach to liaison from military to civilian actors, in which an LO, “only accompanied by an interpreter,” interacts with all applicable stakeholders, including: “representatives of the provincial government, provincial council, Afghan forces and police as well as the media, with mayors, mullahs and elders or the representatives of UNAMA as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations.”

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72 Minear et al, 2000, p. 63.
At the strategic and operational level, NATO already has a mechanism to enhance information sharing but is widely unknown accept to a few larger IOs who have a close working relationship with the military such as the ICRC. It is called the ‘clearing house’ process and allows the author of a NATO classified document to personally edit any information that is deemed sensitive out of his or her text. The document then becomes unclassified and can be distributed. Whilst the presence of such a mechanism shows a willingness to cooperate with civil society organisations, in practice it is an inefficient system. If NATO classified documents are not publicly available, then it becomes difficult for civil actors to request the declassification of document they do not know exists. This process is only viable for civil actors who already work closely with the military or who have contributed to documents and reports that have later been classified, such as those few IOs who have desks in military headquarters. Even then the ‘clearing house’ process requires the author of the document to personally edit the text which is not always feasible or takes a long time to do so, due to the multinational nature of the alliance.

The need for an information sharing platform is undoubtable. This paper’s recommendation for overcoming this issue of transparency is the creation of an online information sharing portal in which both military and selected civilian actors can store and access sensitive information in a secure environment. This solution is not absolute but is a workable improvement on the current system, allowing the participation of a larger range of civil actors as well as increasing the amount of information that military actors can disseminate to humanitarian organisations. This type of system would require a secure online platform, possibly in which military commanders and leaders of trusted civilian actors had passwords, thereby restricting access for purposes of security. The inclusion of trusted civilian actors would only include those IOs who already have a strong working relationship with the armed forces and is an acceptable limitation as long as there is the option of including further organisations at a later date, after the prerequisites of such a platform have been met. This is where suitable civilian partner selection becomes imperative and should follow the pillars of CIMIC as outlined in AJP-3.4.9, which distinguishes: civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment, and support to the force. Another necessary limitation to this system would be the ability of military actors to censor those documents that are uploaded to the portal through a ‘gatekeeper’ process, only allowing those documents that the armed forces deem to
be necessary to civil society organisations. This is not a previously unheard of concept and, in NATO’s case, has been widely discussed. The primary issue is a technical one. For reasons of security, NATO computers and their intranet system function as a stand-alone system and cannot be accessed from outside, therefore limiting potential civilian involvement.

Another functioning example of CMI is NATO’s Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) Programme which aims to provide, “national civilian specialists,” who are, “deployable for short, medium and long-term assignments,” and who are experts in the, “political, reconstruction and stabilisation and media fields.” This mechanism, that is already in use, shows that NATO have recognised the advantages presented by using civilian expertise in subject fields that are related to, but not traditionally covered by, the military. It also shows a willingness from civil society, on an individual basis, to cooperate with military actors in order to better protect conflict affected populations. However, during the author’s visit to JFC Brunssum, J9 CIMIC staff highlighted two practical issues with the COMPASS Programme. The first was the unavailability of experts to participate in medium and long-term assignments and the second was the length of time taken to process the requests, which often meant that NATO staff did not use the programme knowing that any request made would be futile due to the time limitations imposed upon them. The network of civilian experts consisted of a group of nearly 400 people. By increasing the database in terms of numbers there would be a higher chance of finding an expert who is able to commit to any given assignment. By increasing the database in terms of subject areas NATO military commanders would have a larger array of capabilities available to them. Flavin (2004) explains the complexities of civil-military operations, noting that it deals with issues such as, “claims, environmental law, fiscal responsibilities, human rights, security assistance, intelligence, the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, international agreements and information operations.” By expanding the database to include these types of subject areas, military commanders would be better equipped to deal with the complex situations in which they must operate. Alongside this expansion, it must be noted that the administrative process of requesting civilian experts should be re-evaluated and improved appropriately.

75 NATO, 2014.
The issue of politicisation also occurs in relation to issues of association. It has been pointed out that the willingness of civilian organisations to cooperate is inextricably linked to the degree of involvement of military actors in combat. This would therefore imply that the more violent a conflict the less likely humanitarian organisations would be to work alongside armed forces if one assumes that degree of military involvement increases in correlation with the level of violence. Parepa (2012) notes that this is, “in order to avoid any violation of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which must be observed during humanitarian assistance operations according to OCHA.”

The challenge, from a military perspective, is to engage and cooperate with civilian organisations regardless of the bellicosity of the conflict. In order to do this, military commanders need to allay any fears humanitarian organisations may have; this is best achieved through the building up of close working relationships with transparency and accountability, in short, an outcome that is desirable but difficult to achieve. The recommendation of this paper is for military forces to continue investing time and effort in this endeavour in the hope that, over time, it will filter down to all humanitarian organisation and not all those few that have built strong working relationships with NATO. Current NATO relationship-building tools, in relation to the humanitarian sector, at the operational level include: the instalment of IO desks in NATO headquarters, the inclusion of humanitarian organisations in pre-deployment training and Military Outreach (MO) programmes that aim to de-codify the roles and working culture of armed forces. At the tactical level it includes the collation of contacts within the humanitarian sector into a contact matrix and the low level networking of LOs in this area. The importance of the work of LOs at a tactical level is such that an almost universal plea from scholars on the topic of CIMIC asks military forces in Afghanistan to increase the length of operational tours from six to twelve months for CIMIC staff in order to be able to build trust with civil society organisations and the local populace.

Ankersen (2008) argues that, at the tactical and operational levels, CIMIC activities can be, “conceived of as a part of a larger effort to conduct Information Operations,” and that by both gathering and disseminating information through CIMIC activities, the military,

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77 Parepa, 2012, p. 27.
“commanders shape their environment.” Whilst recognising the usefulness of this method of Information Operations, this paper is of the opinion that this use of CIMIC is just one among the many benefits of CIMIC activities aside from directly aiding beneficiaries in need of assistance. Another by-product of CIMIC activities is that they challenge traditional misconceptions about military forces, showing a ‘friendly face’ to the local populace. This idea was championed in Afghanistan through the ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach and has benefits at all levels. By challenging traditional perceptions on the tactical and operational levels, military forces attempt to deflect potential violent reprisals from locals by providing services such as protection as well as infrastructure, in the form of schools and hospitals. On a strategic level, using CIMIC activities to challenge preconceived ideas moves away from civil-military cooperation and towards civil-military relations in society, but the acknowledgement of the potential advantage CIMIC can offer to military commanders is vital if it is to function effectively at the lower levels of implementation.

2.5 Working Cultures

One of the biggest challenges to combat traditional perceptions is the de-alienation of contrasting cultures within the humanitarian setting. The most striking contrast undoubtedly exists between the military and civilian organisations. The contrast is exacerbated by the use of specific language. This phenomenon is commonly linked to armed forces who often converse in so-called “TLA’s” or Three Letter Acronyms. This paper itself is a good example of such a practice, with the vast majority of acronyms used in the attached List of Abbreviations are military terms. In fact, there has been a conscious effort to avoid superfluous military terminology except where required. The simplest example of which is by not using the abbreviation “iot” which, in military circles, signifies “in order to.” The use of acronyms became standardised in order to improve efficiency when conveying complex messages in difficult situations. The use of specific terms is an important factor in building up an individual’s identity and many soldiers subconsciously use military speak to reinforce their societal positions. This is understandable as language has long been a defining element in the justification of us and them. The problem arises when civilian actors feel alienated due to the overuse of these military-specific terms during CMI. Combine this with the

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80 Even in Ancient Greece, Herodotus 8.144 defined all Greeks as, “sharing the same blood and language.”
perception of armed forces; as well as the rigorous security checks they must face, usually whilst their military counterpart watches before passing through unchecked; and the often serious demeanour of military personnel. Therefore it is unsurprising that civilian staff can be intimidated, something that could adversely affect joint civil-military ventures in the future. It is imperative that military commanders seize the initiative and do everything within their power to ease any fears future civilian partners may have; this could include visiting humanitarian organisations on their own premises, speaking in a familiar manner or even adopting humanitarian specific terms from the civilian field. This sentiment is encapsulated in the CIMIC Field Handbook which reminds commanders to, “be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary.”\textsuperscript{81} Inversely, civilian actors have shown a willingness to adapt through a militarisation of their language with both the adoption of some military terms and through the need to convey complex messages in difficult situations. This is demonstrated by the voice procedure used by civilian organisations in the field, such as the ICRC, which sounds similar to the military approach.

The traditional perception of the working culture in the armed forces is principally a negative one, of old generals stuck in their ways and any personal initiative being punished if it is not compatible with the current way of doing things. Apart from being untrue, it highlights the enormity of the challenge ahead in challenging traditional misconceptions between the civilian and military fields. One example that destroys this myth and shows that civilian and military working cultures are not completely alien was the culmination of Exercise Viking in 2014. Two NATO headquarters were invited to attend: NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and NATO JFC Brunssum. The latter has organised a brief on the lessons learned from Exercise Viking during the Commanders Conceptual Discussion (CCD) in June 2014 in order to maximise the learning potential from the exercise. This method of back briefing is important even if it does not provide military leaders with first-hand experience of joint civil-military operations. It is important to highlight potential issues during civil-military cooperation and underline its importance which is the first step to ensuring that CIMIC becomes a key consideration for all military commanders.

\textsuperscript{81} CCOE, 2012, p. 42.
Differences in working cultures may become more apparent when the nature of the work conducted by both civilian and military actors is analysed. As previously noted, Flavin (2004) explains the complexities of civil-military operations, noting that it deals with issues such as, “claims, environmental law, fiscal responsibilities, human rights, security assistance, intelligence, the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, international agreements and information operations.” He goes on to explain that, due to a lack of sufficient training in these areas, “commanders are understandably conservative in their approach in a desire to do the right thing and this can lead to micromanagement.”

This conflicts with the military concept of mission command, the principle of command follow by NATO forces. Mission command is essentially a theory of leadership in which a commander details a desired outcome to a subordinate, who must use his/her initiative in order to solve the problem as efficiently as possible. Colonel Watters (2002) outlines, “four enduring tenets,” of mission command, which are, “timely decision-making, the importance of understanding a superior commanders intention, a clear responsibility to fulfil that intention, and an ability on the part of the subordinate to meet the superior commanders remit.”

Both the broadening and deepening of the training for military commanders would make those commanders feel better equipped to deal with the wide range of issues involved in multinational and multi-sector operations. Again the provision of joint pre-deployment training would give military commanders invaluable training-ground experience and expose them to the pressures of such operations in a tightly controlled environment.

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SECTION 3: RECOMMENDATIONS

“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war; not upon those who wait to adapt after they occur.”


3.1 The Perpetual Importance of Civil-Military Interaction

This section will focus on the future of CMI in general and specifically on CIMIC operations, arguing that greater levels of CIMIC can enhance comprehensive human rights protection during violent political conflict. As the leading proponent of the comprehensive approach, NATO has, and continues to, pursue an all-inclusive approach to conflict resolution. In this way, the Alliance acts as the primary stakeholder in the evolution of current best practice within the field of CMI. This section will explain the importance of CMI for the protection of human rights; summarise the recommendations put forward by the paper, focussing on their operational effectiveness; and suggest what the future may hold, not only for NATO CIMIC operations, but for the institutionalisation of civil-military cooperation within the international community.

As already explained, armed forces and humanitarian organisations are the primary stakeholders in humanitarian assistance. They both also represent important elements of the comprehensive approach, namely the military aspect and the social aspect of PMESII. The nature of conflict means that these actors are, often involuntarily, forced into situations in which cooperation is a necessity. Although not all military operations focus on humanitarian assistance, when they do, civil society and military actors have the shared aim of alleviating human suffering. There is, therefore, an implied moral responsibility from both actors in the humanitarian setting to cooperate as efficiently as possible in an attempt to protect individual’s human rights regardless of the political reasons for doing so. The issues that negatively impact this vital working relationship stem from a multitude of sources, but only by addressing them in a comprehensive and coherent fashion, can they be resolved. In order to facilitate Janowitz’s envisaged situation of convergence between military and civil society, all actors must be incentivised, with a focus on the greater added value rather than on the possible risk. The recommendations of this paper are an attempt to do this and, as a result,
allow all primary stakeholders to fulfil the comprehensive protection of human rights during violent political conflict.

Incentivising CIMIC through an added value approach focuses on civilian and military capabilities that are often mutually supportive and can be combined to achieve some otherwise impossible tasks. One of the most desirable civilian capabilities is specific subject area expertise. These experts are particularly sought after by military commanders as they can complement existing military capabilities, further enhancing them or filling a void in military capabilities, thereby plugging a vital gap in the potential resources available to military commanders. Civilian expertise is not only provided to armed forces on an individual basis through the COMPASS programme, but also by working in partnership with certain organisations. An example of this occurs in minefield clearance, an obvious military capability that is conducted more efficiently by civilian counterparts such as the Halo Trust, whose day in day out exposure to mine clearance makes them much more efficient than their military counterparts who have comparatively little exposure to such tasks. Rietjens (2008) highlights the willingness of the Halo Trust to cooperate with the Dutch PRTs at the tactical level, stating that they, “made frequent use of the information on ammunition and explosives.” The willingness of both actors in this situation is an encouraging example of how CIMIC can function to protect non-combatants, specifically against un-exploded ordinance.

3.2 Summary of Recommendations

The recommendations of this paper can be grouped accordingly: improvement of existing capabilities or introduction of new capabilities; as well as tactical, operational or strategic level adjustments. The improvement of existing capabilities includes: the cutting of red tape in the ‘clearing house’ process; the expansion of the COMPASS Programme to other areas of expertise; and increasing the frequency and specificity of joint pre-deployment training exercises. The introduction of new capabilities relates to the creation of a pilot MCRM, that allows civilian organisations to request logistical and engineering expertise from military actors; as well as a secure intranet platform that allows key civilian partners to access information that is deemed suitable by the military. Recommendations at the tactical and

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84 Rietjens, 2008, p. 186.
operational levels include: actors becoming more culturally aware; transparency, primarily through information sharing; and by giving responsibility to actors that are otherwise unwilling to cooperate. Strategic level recommendations include: the differentiation of the military-led short-term response and the civilian-led long-term solution; as well as an all-encompassing strategy from all stakeholders to challenge traditional perceptions.

These recommendations need to be formally evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness and feasibility in order to prioritise potential areas of improvement. This process plays a key part in distinguishing between any discrepancies in lexis and praxis and ensuring that the recommendations are both pragmatic and realistic. As such, this paper suggests practical recommendations which can all be labelled under protection mechanisms, whether cutting the red tape of existing mechanisms such as the COMPASS Programme to allow efficient integration of civilian expertise, the specification of pre-deployment training to focus on CIMIC operations, or the introduction of an institutionalised military support request mechanism to compliment the humanitarian organisation’s existing capabilities.

Unfortunately many of the recommendations this paper would like to propose are not pragmatic. Although theoretically viable, they would rely upon the adoption of a different perspective from both civil and military actors. Whilst acknowledging that the harmonious functioning of CMI at all levels is a requirement, this paper proposes recommendations in the short-term, in the expectation that they will contribute to the eventual harmonisation of all stakeholders in the long-term. A few of recommendations deemed viable are expanded upon below.

This study reiterates that security is, without doubt, the first and foremost desirable asset that military forces can provide to humanitarian assistance. Wolfgram (2008) argues that:

“[The] core conclusion from the Kosovo case is that Western democracies, if they are serious about improving humanitarian conditions, should withhold intervention or the promise of intervention unless they are willing to make serious sacrifices in terms of the lives of their own troops and substantial financial resources.”

This echoes Clemenceau’s sentiment that, “it is easier to make war than peace,” and reminds us that there is a large cost to international intervention for the protection of human rights,

and not only a financial one. Therefore, before committing to military intervention, political leaders need to ensure a comprehensive approach is followed, and whilst it is impossible to guarantee success, political leaders must be prepared for the inevitable cost of their actions abroad, whilst doing everything within their power to minimise these risks. The security element of a military presence in the humanitarian setting is a continuous and stand-alone capability which can be combined with invaluable expertise on logistical and technical issues which, in the opinion of this paper, could compliment civilian capabilities upon request in the civilian-led reconstruction phase; this phase effectively comes after a transition period from the military-led stability phase as recommended by McNerney (2006). So far this paper has followed the assumption that the security provided by the military is an inherent capability. In order to prove the armed forces suitability to leading the short-term stability phase this paper highlights NATO’s Rapid Civil Administration Situation Assessment.\(^{86}\) This checklist forms part of the CIMIC Field Handbook and allows a military commander to make a rapid appraisal of the civil administrative situation focusing on police, emergency services, law and order, orders and customs and local authorities. All of which play an important role in the provision of vital services, to which individuals are legally obliged. The CIMIC Field Handbook includes further rapid assessment forms on food sources and consumption; health; agricultural production; education; energy resources; sanitation and water sources; transportation; labour forces; and public communications. The inclusion of these rights-based checklists shows the military’s capability and willingness to assess a situation on a localised basis, with the assumed intention of resolving any issues that are identified.

This study has further highlighted a need to distinguish between two phases of humanitarian assistance during instances of international intervention in violent political conflicts. This paper is of the same opinion as Pugh (2001) that, “although state military forces can help improve the environment for human rights, it is not their job to empower groups whose voices are ignored or suppressed.”\(^{87}\) That having been said, the above mentioned areas of expertise are examples of ways in which armed forces can enhance the capabilities of humanitarian organisations in their effort to protect individuals. This is certainly not a wasted activity, as it is widely agreed that humanitarian assistance and

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\(^{86}\) See Annex IV: NATO’s Rapid Civil Administration Situation Assessment.

\(^{87}\) Pugh, 2001, p. 131.
development conducted or supported by military forces reduce hostilities towards soldiers and, as such, can be viewed as a method of force protection.

In order to conclude the recommendations of this study we must return to the analogy used at the beginning of this paper; that of the runner. McNerney (2006) suggests that S&R (Stability and Reconstruction), “should be viewed as the intersection of military-led stability operations and civilian-led reconstruction activities.” With this in mind, this paper asserts that CIMIC plays the part of a sprinter and as a military-led component; it should primarily provide a secure platform, whilst doing everything in its power to enhance the capabilities of the humanitarian organisations. The extension of logistical and technical support to humanitarian organisations alongside the inherent security capabilities of military actors would be one way to achieve this. This is the phase of military-led stability operations. The humanitarian community plays the part of the endurance runner and at the start of the race it should support the sprinter, primarily through specific area expertise, whilst keeping an eye on the transition period in which the proverbial baton is passed to humanitarian development organisations to rebuild the conflict zone and empower its population. This is the civilian-led reconstruction phase. It is important to remember that the comprehensive approach is a team event and neither sprinter nor endurance runner can win alone.

Another proponent of this view is Parepa (2013), who rightly distinguishes two dimensions of a comprehensive approach to CMI, those being the strategic level and the tactical level. This paper argues that the operational and tactical levels should be grouped together and at these levels there should not be greater levels of cooperation but rather the current level of cooperation should be more efficient. In business terms civil-military cooperation should be seen as a strategic alliance, not a joint venture and by proceeding in this way at the operational and tactical levels this paper proposes support for Huntingdon’s institutional theory. Parkhe (1993) defines a strategic alliance as:

“voluntary interfirm cooperative agreements, often characterised by inherent instability arising from uncertainty regarding a partner’s future behaviour and the absence of a higher authority to ensure compliance. This self-governance feature greatly complicates such relationships, since mutual cooperation, although desirable, is not automatic; the self-interest

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88 McNerney, 2006, p. 34.
This distinction is imperative as each party maintains its autonomy and increases its capability. Parkhe’s definition highlights many of the issues of CIMIC that have been discussed in this paper but ultimately acknowledges the benefits to be gained as greater than the risk it poses. The strategic level, however, must be approached both separately and differently, following an approach that resonates more with Janowitz’s convergence theory. Human rights protection has become an international obligation, legally through *jus cogens*, but also morally. As an international issue it needs to be addressed by the international community with a comprehensive approach that is all-inclusive. NATO is a self-proclaimed political and military alliance, so when approaching the role of NATO within the international community it is undeniably an important actor but does not provide the all elements of the mandatory comprehensive approach. As such this paper argues that human rights protection should be a joint venture between all actors, in this case states and the affected local populations as well as NGOs and IOs. The development of international human rights law sets the precedence for this.

### 3.3 The Future of Civil-Military Cooperation

After reading this paper some scholars may argue that by focusing on NATO’s interaction with humanitarian organisations, this paper has limited itself due to the specificity of the topic. On the contrary, the use of NATO’s approach as a focal point principally justifies the invaluableness of the comprehensive approach, of which NATO is an ubiquitous advocate. As already acknowledged, the premise to the assertions in this paper is the unequalled ability of the comprehensive approach to resolve any issue, something which may not be universally viable from a purely military or political perspective. The beauty of the comprehensive approach is the flexibility of the various interdependent and mutually supportive elements as recorded in the mnemonic PMESII. The hope is that by bringing unresolved issues of CMI back into the political sphere through academic discussion, the plight of individual’s rights in violent political conflict can be further disseminated, reinforcing the need for a strong working relationship between civil and military actors as part as a comprehensive approach to

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conflict resolution. By choosing to focus on NATO’s approach to CIMIC, this paper acknowledges its forefront position as a proponent of the comprehensive approach and CMI; and hopes that the convergence of civil and military actors will out-grow the alliance and expand into the practice of other states.

This study highlights the importance of civil-military interaction and cooperation as part of the comprehensive approach, the findings of which are significant in order to improve current practice in that area. In the future this could be achieved by logically deriving the future character and appearance of CIMIC and, corresponding to a constructionist approach, reconstructing CIMIC in the most efficient form as judged by the lessons learnt up till now. Guzzini (2000) acknowledges that, “reflexivity is… the central component of constructivism,” and therefore, it is theoretically plausible to predict the future application and success of CIMIC activities from a constructionist point of view.90 This ability to predict human actions and their consequences requires the correct interpretation of events and the ability to deduct likely international responses. However this paper argues that the social construction of CIMIC would be difficult, if not impossible, owing to the reactive rather than proactive nature of military institutions, where any update of military doctrine is, in essence, retrospective, reinforcing the adage that it is easier to act our way into a better way of thinking rather than think our way into a better way of acting. This paper, therefore, champions the use of CIMIC to allow leaders, both civilian and military, to shape their environment, through a limited form of constructionism; arguing that perhaps the most valuable lesson to take from the study of CIMIC from this point of view, is the nature of cause and effect that is inherent to any relationship and is even apparent in CMI. Even if you cannot construct a reality you can undoubtedly affect your environment. By acting in a certain manner it is logical to assume that others will react to your behaviour in a consequential manner. On the most basic of levels this could equate to a military LO, for example, interacting in an open and friendly manner with their civilian counterpart, who would, in turn, be more willing to cooperate. This approach is not exclusive to the tactical level and is transferable to the strategic and operational levels. As a consideration for both military and civilian actors, this approach would allow its proponent to positively affect their

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90 Guzzini, 2000, p. 155.
environment, adding an element of control and making any partner organisations more cooperative in relation to their overall goals.

However, in reference to PRTs, McNerney (2006) concedes that, “a little confusion, however, is preferable to rigid guidelines that might eliminate the flexibility that makes the PRTs adaptable and, therefore, well-suited to an S&R environment.”91 This assessment of PRTs can be applied to CIMIC in general. The nature of the two actors precludes the smooth-running of joint civil-military operations; however the need for both actors to be adaptable and flexible in their approaches is a situational prerequisite. The ability to be both flexible and adaptable coupled with a degree of anticipation would allow for an efficient working relationship. The key to maintaining flexibility and adaptability is the ability of the actors to foresee the actions of the other partner organisation and to be able to predict their probable course of action. This would allow both actors to essentially second guess the actions of the other and act or adjust accordingly. The findings of this study also stress the invaluableness of familiarisation in the working relationships of military forces and humanitarian organisations in this sense. Only by fully understanding their colleagues can these diverse institutions competently anticipate and, consequentially, react efficiently to their actions.

Ultimately when laws fall silent during times of war there needs to be a coordinated humanitarian response in order to protect those individuals who cannot protect themselves and alleviate their suffering. The ReliefWeb definition of humanitarian coordination is, “an approach based on the belief that a coherent response to an emergency will maximise its benefits and minimises potential pitfalls.”92 This paper stresses the importance of a comprehensive approach as part of any coherent response and reiterates the vital role played by CIMIC as part of a comprehensive approach. Only by striving to improve CMI and continuing to iron out the issues of efficiency can CIMIC realise its potential as a force multiplier for both civil and military actors. The consequential effects of which will filter down to increase the level of protection available to conflict affected populations in the long run.

21,142 words.

91 McNerney, 2006, p. 44.
92 ReliefWeb, 2008, p. 32.
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ANNEX I: COIN Dynamics in Afghanistan during the Stability Phase. (Taken from: CCOE’s CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012, Annex 1.)
ANNEX II: Similarities between the NATO Project Approach and the ECHO Manual Project Cycle.

(A) NATO Project Approach. (Taken from: CCOE’s CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012, p. IV-3-2.)

1. Requirement: Ensure the project is requested!*
2. Assessment: Ensure the project is in support of the Commander’s mission!
3. Screening: Ensure there is a need and no duplication of effort! Do no harm.
4. Acceptance: Follow the Local Ownership Principle!*
5. Execution: Ensure local involvement!
6. Completion: Ensure there are no additional hidden commitments and the project will be maintained and sustained!
7. Transition: Make sure the project has a local face!

* Preferably as part of a program
* The principle of Local Ownership describes the perception and acceptance of the local population regarding the project.
* During the execution phase we will always control the ongoing process, like as costs, local involvement, timings, etc.
(B) ECHO Manual Project Cycle. (Taken from: ECHO’s Manual for Project Cycle Management, 2005, p. 1.)
ANNEX III: IASC Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level. (Taken from: IASC’s Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level, 2012, p. 1.)
ANNEX IV: NATO Rapid Civil Administration Situation Assessment. (Taken from: CCOE’s CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012, Annex 12.)

## Annex 12 Rapid Civil Administration Situation Assessment

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### LAW AND ORDER

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**ACTION TAKEN**

**REMARKS and RECOMMENDATIONS**