RP Vyas, M Hayes, NI Kurniawan & LN Bayo ‘Selected developments in human rights and democratisation
during 2018: Could it have been worse? Mixed messages around democracy and human rights in the Asia
Pacific’ (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal 337-353 https://doi.org/20.500.11825/1572
Selected developments in human rights and 
democratisation during 2018: Could it have 
been worse? Mixed messages around 
democracy and human rights in the Asia 
Pacific 
Ravi Prakash Vyas,* Mike Hayes,** Nanang Indra 
Kurniawan*** and Longgina Novadona Bayo****
Abstract: During 2018 the downward slide in human rights and democracy
across the Asia Pacific region was slowed down, but not reversed. Many of the
concerns gripping the region, such as the treatment of the Rohingya by the
Myanmar state, the violence of the Duterte regime in the Philippines, and
China’s cavalier attitude towards rights, remained shocking but did not worsen.
In a few areas human rights or democracy improved. One shining light is the
Malaysian election where the heavily corrupt governing party, which had been
in power since Malaysia’s independence, was voted out. Even though the party
controlled the media, manipulated the electoral system, and used a campaign of
misinformation during the election, Malaysians bravely voted for a more
democratic future. Across the region concerns have been raised about China’s
increasing economic, political and military influence, but at the same time
others have praised the development it has enabled. Global trends, such as the
#metoo movement, the global conference on climate change, and the Global
Migration Compact have had an impact on the region, but not enough to declare
the region to be positively embracing these developments. All these factors show
that there is a mixed response to human rights and democracy: The existence of
serious violations and disturbing trends means that the region remains in an
epoch where authoritarianism holds sway. The actions of these governments are
open to condemnation by civil society and the possibility of a change in opinion
about these actions. However, there is little evidence that this will happen in the
near future. 
Key words: human rights; democratisation; Asia Pacific; Rohingya; Duterte
regime; human rights in China; authoritarianism
* BA LLB (Hons) (GGSIPU, India) MHRD (The University of Sydney, Australia);
Assistant Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Kathmandu School of Law,
Nepal; Project Coordinator of the APMA Programme under the Global Campus of
Human Rights; rpvyas@ksl.edu.np 
** PhD (Wollongong University); Programme Director of the APMA programme; Lecturer,
Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University.
*** PhD (Melbourne University); Lecturer, Department of Politics and Government
Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
**** MA (Universitas Gadjah Mada); Lecturer, Department of Politics and Government
Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, novabayo@ugm.ac.id
338                                                                                                 (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal
1 Key issues 
1.1 The Rohingya crisis 
For the past four years the Rohingya crisis has continued to constitute one
of the most significant systematic human rights violations in the region.
Historically, there has been tension between the Myanmar state and the
Rohingya minority living in Rakhine state in Western Myanmar, which is
one of hundreds of ethnic, minority and indigenous groups in Myanmar.
The Rohingyas have always lived in this area, although they share ethnic
and religious similarities with neighbouring Bangladesh, and there has
been a history of migration between Bangladesh and Rakhine state.
Rohingyas face discrimination and threats of expulsion primarily from
Buddhist Nationalists because of being Muslim. The military also has
targeted this minority as a way of empowering the programme of
‘Burmanisation’, a policy to ensure that Myanmar’s Buddhist, Bamar1
majority maintains dominance (Burlie 2008). 
Since the campaign of ethnic cleansing started in 2017, more than
730 000 Rohingya have been forced across the border to Bangladesh,
escaping persecutions, killings, enforced disappearances, sexual violence
and starvation. According to Human Rights Watch (2018a), the
government did not allow independent investigators to access the conflict
area and also punished local journalists for reporting on military abuses.
Amnesty International (2018a) also stated that evidence demonstrates that
the violence in Myanmar forms part of a well-planned, systematic attack by
state forces. For most people fleeing ethnic cleansing Bangladesh is the
destination, with over one million refugees currently in the country,
although some move on, with populations of Rohingya in Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia and Indonesia. While the exodus of Rohingya has slowed down
from its peak in 2017, Rohingya in the Rakhine state continue to flee.
Many find the conditions of their internment camps in Myanmar
unliveable. The camps, apparently constructed to ensure the safety of the
Rohingyas, do not provide basic living conditions. 
The United Nations (UN) initiated a three-person2 fact-finding mission
on Myanmar in March 2017. Their report, released in September 2018,
called for the prosecution of five leading military figures, calling their
actions ‘ethnic cleansing’ occurring with ‘genocide intent’.3 The report
detailed war crimes, crimes against humanity and systematic rape. With
support from the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres,4 the UN
Human Rights Council formed the UN Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on Myanmar to investigate violations and collect evidence
resulting from the findings of the first mission. Throughout this process
the Myanmar government has denied all accusations, claiming that the
1 Bamar (sometimes spelt Burman) are the largest ethnicity in Myanmar, making up
approximately 68% of the population, and living along the Ayeyarwadi river and in
cities such as Yangon and Mandalay. 
2 The members were: Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia (who previous sat on bodies
investigating Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and war crimes in Sri Lanka), Ms. Radhika
Coomaraswamy from Sri Lanka (who previously was the special rapporteur for violence
against women), and Chris Sidoti from Australia (who was once on the Chair of the
Australian Human Rights Commission). 
3 See the fact finding report Para 84-87 (Human Rights Council 2018). 
4 See in particular Secretary General (2018) 
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report did not reflect the reality on the ground. Aung San Suu Kyi, once
seen as the hero of the democratic movement and a leading figure in the
human rights movement, faced criticism from the international
community, first for her failure to act, and later for her complicity in the
denial of the atrocities. Her name has been removed from various awards
and is no longer praised in civil society (Goldberg 2018). Facebook was
widely criticised as the platform used to spread hate speech among the
Buddhist Nationalists and supporters of the ethnic cleansing. As it is one
of the few social media platforms to have Burmese script, it is extremely
popular in Myanmar, and for many was their introduction to the internet.
However, this group of early internet users had little experience in social
media, and may not have had the skills to identify the many false claims
made on this platform (Mozur 2018; BBC trending 2008). By the end of
2018 little had been achieved to address the situation. Myanmar claimed
that it was willing to take back refugees, and around 2 000 people were
reported to have returned, but this number is low given the one million
refugees in neighbouring countries. UN investigations continue, but it is
unlikely that the Myanmar military generals will face trial, as Security
Council members such as China indicated that they do not support an
International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation. These questions of
accountability of the generals will be addressed in 2019.
1.2 China’s influence in the region 
China’s influence regarding human rights in the region is threefold. China
influences the human rights standards in countries it supports either
politically or economically; it influences human rights processes at UN
bodies by promoting its own views on human rights, and it influences how
human rights violations are reported in its own country. These will be
discussed in turn. First, China’s economic and social development has for
some enabled development, expanded economies, and increased
opportunities for trade. China has replaced the often-disliked
interventionist economic policies of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) with less restrictive access to loans. Furthermore,
the large-scale infrastructure plan of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
expected to boost the economy of lesser-developed countries, such as
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Laos PDR. On the other hand, critics are
concerned that China’s economic influence been accompanied by
territorial expansion, particularly its claim over large parts of the South
China Sea (which has been rejected by the Tribunal for the Convention of
the Law of the Sea). The economic expansion may also influence politics
in the region, for example by propping up undemocratic states or creating
a ‘new form of colonialism’ as stated by Malaysian leader Mahathir
Mohamed (ABC 2018). For South Asia, it is asked whether Chinese
diplomacy on human rights affects the adoption of the internationally-
accepted rights in the South Asian countries. 
Second, at the UN China has in the past few years been developing its
own theory of human rights. This was elaborated at the recent Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) review of China in November 2018, where China
explained its new ‘concept and theoretical system of human rights with
Chinese characteristics’ which is the title of a section in the State Under
Review report to the UPR process (Worden 2018; Sinopysis 2018). This
occurs alongside rising concerns about China’s practice of interfering in
UN human rights activities, to the extent that a Human Rights Watch
340                                                                                                 (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal
report notes that the ‘Chinese delegation’s actions have been described as
marred by bullying, harassment, and interference’ (HRW 2018: 43). The
Chinese ‘characteristics’ of human rights are the emphasis given to the
right to development over civil and political rights, alongside the emphasis
put on ‘national characteristics’, meaning that the state’s interpretation of
rights has priority over the universal interpretation. This ‘theory’ of human
rights harks back to the Asian Values debate prominent in the 1990s,
where leaders such as Singapore’s Lee Quan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir
Mohammed espoused the view that Asian countries should comply with a
different set of human rights, where duties to the community outweigh
individual freedoms, and rights only come with obedience to authority.
These views were widely rejected, particularly after the 1997 economic
crisis which showed that the basis of development over rights relied purely
on people’s willingness to remain quiet while the economy grew; once
there was an economic downturn people demanded participation in
politics and held their leaders to account – what should have been very
un-Asian values. The key elements of Asian Values have returned in
China’s version of human rights. 
Third, China has to defend its human rights record at home with
revelations about the Uyghur re-education camps, first by Human Rights
Watch in September 2017 (HRW 2017), but later noted in numerous news
and diplomatic reports during 2018. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) has had unrest and seen separatist movements from the
Uyghur ethnic minority. As a response the Chinese government has
accused Uyghurs of terrorism and being an ‘evil cult’. This has resulted in
police harassment, torture, arbitrary detention and imprisonment (HRW
2019a). A ‘De-Extremification Regulation’ has been enacted in the
Autonomous Region, prohibiting a wide range of behaviours labelled
‘extremist’, such as spreading ‘extremist thought’, denigrating or refusing
to watch public radio and television programmes, wearing burkas, having
an ‘abnormal’ beard, resisting national policies, and reading publications
containing ‘extremist content’ (Amnesty International 2018b). While it is
difficult to determine the exact size and function of the camps, they are
estimated to have between 100 000 and three million detainees, although
the BBC reports around one million detainees (BBC 2018; Stewart 2019),
and they are for the function of ‘re-education’, especially by using the
thoughts of Chinese leaders such as Xi Jingpin, swearing allegiance to
China, and undergo self-criticism (Jiang 2018). However, people are
mostly detained arbitrarily, with males targeted and families separated.
China has denied any violations and claims that the camps are used for
education to change potential terrorists’ views and prepare them for re-
entry into the community. 
Another area of concern is China’s control and use of technology. China
continues to block social media sites such as Facebook (and its
applications of Instagram and WhatsApp), but promotes the use of its own
social media platforms, although there are questions about the privacy on
these platforms. China has been widely criticised for its implementation of
cybersecurity law which became effective in June 2018, making it
obligatory for internet companies operating in China to censor users’
content, and collecting a wide range of personal information through the
WeChat which is by far the dominant messaging service (Amnesty
International 2018b). China’s use of data for surveillance over its
population, and its export of this technology to other countries raise
MIXED MESSAGES AROUND DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC                    341
concern. Chinese authorities also continue to harass and detain journalists
who cover issues of human rights.
1.3 Ethnic and religious extremism
There are a number of hotspots of ethnic and religious extremism across
the region. One of the largest is the government response to the Uyghurs
in Xingjiang province in China, as noted above. In India, according to the
US Commission for International Religious Freedom report, ‘in 2018
religious freedom conditions in India continued a downward trend’
(USCIRF 2019). The trend may be linked to the rise in Hindu nationalism,
or what the report calls ‘the growth of exclusionary extremist narratives’
(USCIRF 2019). The government has engaged in attacks against religious
minorities by directly or indirectly conducting abuses, killings and
abductions, often for supposed ‘forced conversions’. There have been cow
protection mobs attacking Muslim diary, leather and beef businesses. In
neighbouring Bangladesh, armed groups have targeted Shi’a Muslims.
Blasphemy laws that carry the death penalty are used against minority
groups in Pakistan. In several countries of Southeast Asia the protection of
freedom of religion is also characterised by direct and indirect
contributions to the violence by the state. Myanmar has the on-going
conflict and abuse by security forces of the Rohingya Muslims, and
religious minorities in Vietnam face widespread discrimination. Under
such conditions, members of religious minorities were vulnerable and
subjected to continuous attacks. 
Indonesia specifically has witnessed infringements of freedom of
religion through three interrelated activities: the tolerance of hate-speech;
claims of blasphemy; and the destruction of places of worship. At least 22
people experienced prosecution under the blasphemy law since Widodo
took power in 2014 (Pearson 2018). Aside from the case of Ahok – an
ethnic Chinese, Christian former governor of Indonesia’s capital who is a
well-known victim of this law – numerous other cases have emerged. In
August 2018 an ethnic Chinese, Buddhist woman, Meliana, was found
guilty of blasphemy and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment by a
North Sumatran court when she complained of the speaker volume of
adhan (or the Islamic call to prayer) from a nearby mosque being too loud.
The case sparked tension between Buddhists and Muslims in the region,
triggering a riot that resulted in the burning down of Meliana’s house,
several Vihara (Buddhist monasteries) and Chinese temples. Some national
leaders opposed her prosecution, but others who were well-represented by
Zainut Tauhid Sa’adi (Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Indonesian
Ulama in Jakarta) argued that Meliana used sarcastic words with a
ridiculous tone which can be regarded as blasphemy towards Islam. 
The case of Meliana demonstrates how minor or personal disputes can
rapidly escalate due to the politicisation of religion, resulting in a
dangerous fault line between minority and majority social groups. The
confrontation was energised by (and resulted in) hoax and provocative
messages spreading on social media. According to Suryadinata (2018),
ethnic-religious friction between Muslims and non-Muslims, also between
Chinese and non-Chinese, persists through the long-lasting social and
economic gap between the two. While Muslims blamed the non-Muslims
for growing wealthier at their expense, the Chinese and other non-
Muslims remain unaware of the Muslim’s deep-rooted antipathy towards
342                                                                                                 (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal
them. As the tensions persist, there are no initiatives for reliable channels
for communication or negotiation between the groups. In December 2018
local communities in Purbayan Village Yogyakarta, where the majority of
residents are Muslims, cut off and destroyed the cross-shaped headstone
on a Christian grave in a public cemetery, arguing that the religious
symbol was not allowed in the village. Claiming community consensus,
local people stated that the dead can be buried without any Christian
symbol and that that should be done at the edge of the cemetery, insisting
that the centre would in the future be for Muslims only. While religious
pluralism is acknowledged, it is not substantially embraced by local
communities. 
According to Human Rights Watch the Widodo government has failed
to realise support for human rights into substantive and meaningful policy
initiatives to address religious intolerance (HRW 2019b). An earlier Wahid
Foundation report from a 2016 survey noted that numerous cases of
violations against religious freedoms were also actively carried out by non-
state actors (Wahid Foundation 2017). Religious minorities continued to
experience intimidation from government-affiliated institutions and also
faced various types of threats of violence from Muslim extremist groups,
specifically the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). The Asia-Pacific Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect stated that the most compelling risk in
Indonesia was the potential of communal violence between religious
minorities and the majority Muslim population (APCR2P 2018). However,
the government tends to rely on short-term solutions rather than
confronting a deeper, on-going low-level sectarian violence that divides
Indonesia. 
1.4 #metoo in the region 
For many countries in the world the #metoo movement led to the fall of
celebrities and the increased concern about women’s safety from
harassment and sexual violence. The response in the Asia Pacific was more
muted. China’s #metoo movement gained momentum as prominent
academics, journalists and activists were accused on social media of sexual
misconduct (Repnikova & Zhou 2018). The movement, as most social
movements in China, had to proceed with caution; feminist leaders of a
similar movement only three years before were detained before being
released on bail, all for claiming an end to sexual harassment (Zheng
2017). China is now considering introducing measures to tackle sexual
harassment in the workplace through a draft civil code, which is set to be
completed by the end of 2020 (Nathani 2018). However, in neighbouring
Japan there were far fewer success stories. This is not because women are
better protected, as the scandal over entrance to the top medical college
shows that sexism is institutionally ingrained in even the most prominent
social institutions. The Tokyo Medical University admitted that for over a
decade it had manipulated women’s scores to prevent them from gaining
entrance, which was soon followed by admissions to two other
universities. Experts had suspected that this was the case as only about 30
per cent of enrolments were for women, a number that had curiously not
changed even though more women were taking the examinations. The
excuses given reflect the deeply-ingrained patriarchal attitude of the
education officials: Women were more likely to leave to have families, or
because women matured earlier it was making the examination unfair for
the less biologically-developed males (Haynes 2018). A similar issue is
MIXED MESSAGES AROUND DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC                    343
found in Myanmar, where the entrance score for medical college depends
on gender: Women applicants must score higher marks (Soe 2014). 
The #metoo movement did have knock-on effects throughout the
region with women in South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and India
initiating social movements, although with limited impact. Each of these
countries faces a deeply-entrenched male culture of control. This is
obvious in the Philippines where the leader, President Rodrigo Duterte, is
known for his sexist comments including rape jokes, cat-calling, and
supporting violence against women. In Thailand the military junta
oversees a government with the lowest participation of female politicians
in the Southeast Asian region, and whose leader is known for sexist
comments, including his statement that gender equality will lead to social
deterioration and that a women’s main purpose is giving birth (Coconuts
2016). India has done little to reduce the widespread violence against
women, with a Thomson Reuters Foundation 2018 survey ranking it the
most dangerous place in the world for women. Apart from women there
has been few developments in rights on sexuality and gender identity. By
the end of 2018 only Australia and New Zealand recognised same-sex
marriage (although Taiwan was to recognise this right in early 2019). The
Chinese government continues to disregard lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights, as was made evident by its appeal
against the decision in April of the court of first instance ruling that the
government’s refusal to extend work benefits to the same-sex husband of a
civil servant was discrimination based on sexual orientation. A later
decision by the Court of Appeal, which ruled that the Immigration
Department’s refusal to grant a dependant visa to a same-sex civil partner
of a foreign professional on a work visa was discriminatory, was also
upheld (Amnesty International 2018). 
1.5 Indigenous rights
Indigenous people in most parts of the world have been facing systemic
discrimination and exclusion from economic and political power. This can
be seen from complex threats to their survival such as land dispossession,
oppression, as well appropriation of collective resources and knowledge
(Bengwayan 2003). Even though there are various global efforts to
overcome these discriminatory practices, oppression and marginalisation
still occur. There is a lack of participation in decision making, and
recognition of indigenous rights throughout the region. The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and
other international laws make available standards for indigenous people in
Asia Pacific to demand national governments to recognise their rights to
land and respect for their cultures and ways of life. The instruments
provide a basis for legal protection for indigenous people and their land
from global capitalism (Radcliffe 2019). However, as shown by cases in
Asia Pacific, indigenous people struggle to enforce these rights on
governments. It has been noted that the instruments often ‘fit quite
comfortably with – and was perhaps even facilitated by – neoliberal
development models’ (Engle 2011). In the Asia Pacific this situation is
worsening with the expansion of state developmental projects and
investments which demand large areas of land. In Indonesia the state has
partially recognised indigenous rights to land, but only in a commercial
sense with the establishment of tenured security to induce higher
investments by connecting and integrating various extra-legal (or
344                                                                                                 (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal
informal) property systems with a formal legal property system. Between
2016 and 2018 Indonesia’s central government handed over customary
forests to 18 indigenous communities, and then launched the Complete
Systematic Land Registration Programme, to formally register all land in
Indonesia by 2025. Yet, the concern is that instead of protecting
indigenous land, the formal registration opens this land up to be bought
and sold, which may lead to indigenous lands being disposed from its
indigenous owners. 
In other parts of Asia indigenous people are threatened by the state
seeking to expand direct control over land. In September 2018 an
amendment to the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin (VFV) Lands Management
Law was passed in Myanmar. According to this amendment, all people on
VFV land have to apply for a permit by March 2019. Approximately one-
thirds of land in Myanmar is regarded by the state as being vacant, fallow
or virgin land, with most of this land being located in ethnic states. Civil
society organisations in Myanmar see this law as problematic as it ignores
the fact that many indigenous people have been using these ‘vacant’ lands
under their traditional laws. 
A 2018 report by UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples shows the increased use of physical violence and criminalisation
against indigenous peoples (OHCHR 2018), practices that also take place
in India and the Philippines. According to the report, there is
criminalisation of indigenous leaders and community members who voice
opposition to projects related to extractive industries, agri-business,
infrastructure, hydro-electric dams and logging. This process often leads to
‘the prohibition of indigenous traditional livelihoods and the arrest,
detention, forced eviction and violations of other human rights of
indigenous peoples’ (OHCR 2018: 2). In the Philippines, for instance, one
of the most prominent figures in the global movement for indigenous
rights, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, is included on a list of suspected terrorists
by the government (Jacobson 2018). Recently, conservation projects have
contributed to the worsening of indigenous human rights and many
indigenous communities in Asia who rely on forests for their livelihood
opposed conservation projects because the projects may convert their
ancestral forests into protected areas. This can be seen, for instance, from
the resistance of the Karen group in Tanintharyi Region, Myanmar, against
the government’s plan to establish a national park in their area in early
2018. The local communities say that the conservation plan would make it
illegal for them to use forests within the designated area of the national
park for their livelihood (Mon 2018). As the UN report states, ‘indigenous
people’s ways of life and subsistence are deemed illegal or incompatible
with conservation policies’ (OHCR 2018: 2).
2 Democratisation
2.1 National elections: Malaysia
The victory of the opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition party in the
Malaysia national election held in May was a brief moment of hope for
democracy and human rights in the region. The incumbent Barisan
Nasional (BN) coalition had held power in various forms since Malaysia’s
independence in 1955. More recently its leader, Prime Minister Najib
MIXED MESSAGES AROUND DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC                    345
Razak, has been questioned for corruption mainly involving the state
sovereign wealth fund, 1MBD. The details of the corruption emerged in
the previous years, with between $4 to 5 billion taken from the 1MBD
fund, and Razak himself having been found with $600 million in his
personal bank account. Investigations into this fund were started in several
countries, including the United States, Singapore and Switzerland.
Regardless of these irregularities there was no investigation in Malaysia,
and members of parliament, including the Attorney-General, who raised
concerns were dismissed or replaced. Efforts were made to keep this news
from the Malaysian public, with a compliant national media not reporting
on this story, and critical news media was closed, censored or banned. In
the run-up to the elections attempts were made to gerrymander the results
with the BN having smaller seats, and the opposition PH party voters
corralled into seats sometimes twice as large as the average BN seat (Leong
& Rodzi 2018). Further complaints were lodged about the overseas votes
not being counted, ballot stuffing, vote buying, and the delay of the
election results. Nevertheless, the opposition party won its first election. 
While this presents much hope for democracy in the region, there are
caveats. The opposition party won in part because it has Mohammed
Mahathir as its leader, giving a safe choice for conservative Muslim voters
not to vote for BN for the first time. Mahathir is an architect of the one-
party dominant system during his over 20 years as leader of the BN.
Further, he cannot be claimed as a defender of rights and democracy
because of his well-known socially-conservative values and opposition to
human rights. This is seen in subsequent actions regarding human rights
in Malaysia since the election. Soon after the election there were moves to
ratify human rights treaties, with the government initially saying it would
ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Rome Statute. However, both these
moves have been halted, primarily because of a campaign of
misinformation by the ousted political parties. Malaysia currently has
policies that give preference to ethnic Malays in some areas of education,
land ownership, and business that were threatened to be taken away if
ICERD was ratified. Most of the claims about ICERD were untrue, but the
effective social media campaign, street protests, and support from pro-
Malay and Islamic groups were too effective and the ruling party pulled
out of signing ICERD by late 2018, and had withdrawn from agreeing to
join the ICC by early 2019.
2.2 Other elections across the region: Bangladesh, Maldives, Cambodia 
and Timor Leste
A disturbing trend in the region is the manipulation of the election process
by authoritarian regimes as they attempt to maintain power through unfair
elections. The cases of the Bangladesh and Maldives national elections
demonstrate this. Bangladesh completed its eleventh general election in
December 2018, where Sheikh Hasina from Awami League was elected
Prime Minister, but under questionable circumstances. Her chief rival,
Khaleda Zia, leader of Bangladesh National Party (BNP), was barred from
contesting the elections because of a corruption conviction and the
opposition alliance, the Jatiya Oikya Front (National Unity Front) was
successful in securing only eight of the 300 seats up for election. The chief
of Bangladesh Election Commission denied any irregularities during the
election, although reports tell another story. The election soon turned
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hostile with security forces arresting and intimidating opposition figures
and dissenting voices. Members and supporters of opposition parties were
arrested, killed or disappeared with reports indicating the involvement of
the ruling party in some of these incidents. The motorcade of opposition
politician Dr Kamal Hossain was attacked, and between 9 and 12
December, 47 incidents of violence were reported in which eight people
were killed and 560 were injured (OHCHR 2018). Although the right to
vote and a free press are essential to democracy, these were not evident
during the Bangladesh election. The replacement of the Information
Communication Technology Act by the Digital Security Act (DSA) in
October created restrictions on freedom of expression and prohibited
investigative journalism that could have prevented rigging during the
election. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)5 was tasked with monitoring
social media for ‘anti-state propaganda, rumours, fake news, and
provocations’ (HRW 2018c). The presence of election observers is
important to ensure transparency. While they may not be able to stop the
rigging of elections, they can point out existing irregularities. The
Bangladesh government did not issue accreditations or visas within the
timeframe necessary to conduct a credible international monitoring
mission. Only seven of the 22 election non-governmental organisation
(NGO) groups were approved to conduct domestic election observation
(US Department of State 2018). The largest Asian independent election
observing body ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Elections) terminated
its decision to participate as observer because of significant delays in the
accreditation approval by the Bangladesh Election Commission and visa
approvals by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ANFREL 2018a). The 2018
elections marked the second lowest number of observers in two decades. 
The 2018 Maldivian election took place among uncertainty and an
unstable political landscape in the country, although there was 89,22 per
cent voter turnout. Elections should give people a choice among
candidates from various backgrounds, but this failed to materialise in the
2018 Maldivian election. In the run-up to the election, all opposition
leaders were incarcerated through trials characterised as irregular and were
barred from contesting in the election. This created obstacles to conduct
fair and impartial elections since opposition candidates and parties did not
have equal space and opportunity to access public facilities to organise
their campaigns and political activities (Transparency Maldives 2019).
ANFREL concluded that although the pre-election environment was
systematically set up to favour the outgoing President, the issues observed
on election day itself were not serious enough to impact the outcome of
the election and called for an orderly transfer of power (ANFREL 2018b).
The joint opposition candidate, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, defeated then
President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom by a wide margin in September
2018, but the outgoing President then attempted to sabotage the transfer
of power. The outgoing President announced a state of emergency,
suspending constitutional protections, banning public assemblies, and
granting security forces sweeping powers to arrest and detain (HRW
2018d). These two examples of failed elections demonstrate the fragility of
democracy in the region as entrenched interests attempt to maintain their
power through manipulated election results. 
5 The RAB is a paramilitary force implicated in serious human rights violations including
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
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National elections in several countries in Asia Pacific during 2018 show
the strengthening of two phenomena: political violence and identity
politics. In Cambodia political violence was intense during the election.
The Cambodian government under Prime Minister Hun Sen arrested the
leader of the main opposition party (Cambodia National Rescue Party/
CNRP) and dissolved it. Several political activists and the journalists who
criticised Hun Sen were targeted for arrest and kidnapping. The
government was also accused of involvement in four extra-judicial killings
of activist and opposition members who challenged Hun Sen’s leadership.
This situation created fear and pressure among the Cambodian voters
during the election. Without a genuine opposition, Cambodians were
forced to vote for the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). A HRW
report details the extensive and systemic support of the military and police
officers to mobilise votes for CPP in the election (HRW 2018b). As a
result, CPP won all 125 National Assembly seats. 
Another election in the Asia Pacific region took place in Timor Leste in
2018. Timor Leste conducted two elections within a year because the
minority government of the 2017 election collapsed as the opposition
thwarted the government’s new budget proposal. In 2017 the Fretilin Party
led by Prime Minister Alkatiri narrowly won a 0,2 per cent victory against
the CNRT (National Congress for Timor Reconstruction), a party led by
Xanana Gusmao. Timor Leste President Francisco ‘Lu Olo’ Guterres
dissolved parliament in early 2018 and demanded another election.
Xanana Gusmao's opposition coalition won the election. Even though the
election was peaceful, there were cases of violence. Supporters of the
Fretilin were in conflict with supporters of the AMP coalition party with
18 people injured and several vehicles burnt in violence in Baucau.
3 Update on regional bodies
3.1 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Responses from ASEAN towards numerous crises and human rights
violations in the region represent a weak and unreliable conflict resolution
mechanism, known as ‘constructive engagement’. While the responsible
body in ASEAN, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights (AICHR) was established in 2009, and is known to have strong
human rights advocates sitting as commissioners, it has yet to adopt
significant and meaningful measures to solve the human rights crises
throughout the region. There was a slight change in 2018 when ASEAN
undertook its first activities: a visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh by an
ASEAN delegation, and its humanitarian body, ASEAN humanitarian
Assistance (AHA) was called upon to assist in repatriation. However, these
measures were weak in comparison to the stronger response of individual
members, most notably Malaysia and Indonesia (Tani 2018). This also
reflected actions of AICHR, namely, strong responses from the Indonesian
and Malaysia representatives, but no statements from the body itself. As in
previous years, the norms of ‘ASEAN way’ have hampered the possibilities
of member states to respond to human rights issues as the non-
interference principle, which is rooted in the traditional concept of
sovereignty, is not suitable to the current international and regional
context, where AICHR has been active in working on the rights of persons
with disabilities, and its thematic studies on legal aid, women affected by
348                                                                                                 (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal
natural disasters and juvenile justice. Studies and high-level meetings
covered issues such as business and human rights, rights to water, and
freedom of expression in the information age (AICHR 2018). AICHR also
works alongside the Women and Children’s Commission (ACWC) and the
ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers. While the ACWC remains an
active body, the Committee on Migrant Workers, with only annual
meetings, and quite divided support, has achieved little in its work over
the past decade. 
3.2 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the
regional body for India and its neighbours, has not established a regional
human rights mechanism. The principle of non-interference and the
exclusion of contentious issues found in article 2 of the SAARC Charter is
one reason why this has not been done. The lack of unanimity on the part
of the SAARC nations to hold an already-deferred SAARC summit exhibits
the lack of urgency by this body to address critical issues surrounding
South Asia. SAARC last met in 2014, and is next scheduled to meet in
2020, after the 2016 meeting was boycotted by India and four other
nations. While there have been meetings of SAARC administrative bodies,
there have been no activities around human rights. However, SAARC is
slightly more active in the field of terrorism, which has long been of
crucial importance in the region given that South Asia has been the hub of
Islamist extremism. Terrorism in South Asia by radical Muslims has
replaced insurgencies as the primary security concern, and this occurs in
the context of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. For more than 20
years SAARC has been known to work on peace keeping, border security
and law enforcement issues since it adopted a Regional Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism that called for cooperation among its member
states on extradition, evidence sharing, and other information exchanges.
A SAARC Terrorists Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) was also
established for monitoring the Convention. However, sensitivities
challenge the co-operation. Although experts in the region agree that
trans-border terrorism and organised crime cannot be controlled without
regional co-operation, it is difficult to get agreement within SAAC on such
a sensitive matter. For example, Maoist insurgents now operating across
the region share many features with the Indian Maoist insurgents, the
Naxalites. However, Maoists in Nepal sit in government while those still
active in Central Indian tribal hills are called terrorists by the Indian Prime
Minister and are ‘the biggest threat to national security’.
3.3 Pacific Island Forum
The Pacific Island Forum is dominated by issues of climate change and
development, and there is no body dedicated to human rights. However,
on its agenda are activities on domestic violence and gender equality. The
Pacific Islands nations are some of the last to ratify CEDAW, mainly
because of misbeliefs around abortion and same-sex marriage, but also
because of strong opposition from Christian religious groups who are
politically strong in the region (WUNRN 2016). Many Pacific Island
political and legal systems favour males, with Tonga, for instance,
allocating a plot of land to all males over the age of 16, without any similar
benefit for women (WUNRN 2016). Human rights are part of the PIF
foreign policy, with its interest in human rights in West Papua a concern
MIXED MESSAGES AROUND DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC                    349
noted in the Communiqué resulting from the forty-ninth forum of the PIF
in Nauru in September 2018. This is the only time human rights were
mentioned in the 2018 Forum. 
4 United Nations update 
A number of core human rights conventions were ratified across the Asia
Pacific. Fiji ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Cultural, Economic
and Social Rights (ICESCR), and the Marshall Islands ratified ICESCR and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). While this demonstrates advancements
towards the universal acceptance of human rights, two sub-regions of the
Asia Pacific lag behind the rest of the world as far as treaty ratification is
concerned: Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. For Southeast Asia, the
response is mixed with some countries with a near total ratification record,
but Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei DS have ratified only two or three core
treaties. Across the 14 Pacific Island countries, only one, the Marshall
Islands, has ratified more than 10 conventions including optional
protocols, and four have ratified fewer than four conventions. A notable
event was the protests in Malaysia on the ratification of the ICERD treaty,
detailed above in part 3.1. In South Asia many human rights treaties
relevant to the region remain non-ratified. Although Nepal sends many
migrant workers abroad, it is yet to ratify the Migrant Workers
Convention. Bangladesh with systematic problems with enforced
disappearances and ‘fake encounters’ is yet to ratify the Convention for
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, while Bhutan,
which is praised in the world community for its environment-friendly
policy (and being the only carbon-negative country) still has not ratified
ICCPR or ICESCR. 
During 2018 there were periodic reviews for China, Bangladesh and
Malaysia. The Chinese review was noted for its politicisation, with pro-
China countries taking up much of the review time (Worden 2018), and
the Chinese delegation rejecting criticisms as ‘politically driven’ (Kuo
2018). China supported 207 out of 284 recommendations (although it
must be remembered that many recommending states were politically
allied to China). The Bangladesh government accepted 167 of the 251
recommendations, although it refused to accept recommendations on the
death penalty, LGBT rights and the ratification of treaties (Dhaka Tribune
2018; FIDH 2018). For the Asia Pacific the other significant events at the
UN for the Asia Pacific were the findings of the fact-finding mission in
Myanmar (described in part 1.1). 
A number of important actions at the UN level occurred in 2018 in
relation to migration and climate change. The Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was accepted on 10 December
(Human Rights Day), and plans to implement the Paris Agreement on
climate change (COP 24) were made in Poland on 15 December. The
GCM did not receive universal support with five states voting against, and
12 abstaining (mainly from Europe), although the resolution passed with
164 states agreeing to the document. The trend is for governments to
oppose migration, with some European states taking strong anti-
immigration stances. It should be noted that from the Asia Pacific only
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North Korea and Afghanistan did not vote. All countries supported the
COP 24 document, but many important and difficult issues were left out of
the agreement because of a lack of agreement between the participants
(Carbon Brief 2018). Similarly, many states are not strongly committed to
counter climate change and unwilling to make financial and policy
commitments to reducing carbon emissions. In the Asia Pacific region
there is strong support for countering climate change, with the Pacific
Islands leading the advocacy. As the Pacific Small Island Developing States
declared in their Statement before COP 24 (COP 23 Fiji 2018): 
We firmly believe that the COP24 … is a pivotal moment in human history.
The world must take heed of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Special Report on the impacts of global warming … and take
dramatic and urgent steps to decarbonise the global economy and assist those
at the frontline of climate change impacts. Our future is at stake. 
Even China was noted to have changed its position from recalcitrance to
support of combating climate change (Hartzell 2019). It is somewhat
reassuring that in these two important areas there is a support across the
Asia Pacific. However, similar widespread support for human rights and
democratisation is yet to be found. The region is willing to invest in
problems that it sees as immediate and relevant, but not yet to put in place
a longer-term infrastructure of human rights and the rule of law. The
systemic problems of reduced political freedoms and discrimination are yet
to be solved. While the year 2018 did not see the plummeting of rights
that occurred in 2016 and 2017, there were no major reversals of human
rights standards. Matters have not worsened, but they have also not
improved. 
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