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The Necessity of a Holistic Peace Building Approach for Effective Conflict Transformation

A Case Study of the Republic of Colombia: An Opportunity to Break the Conflict Cycle

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This research is dedicated to my beautiful and loving mother, without whose constant support, incredible resilience, and fearless strength I would not be half the person I am today. Thank you for being you, and always encouraging me to be the best version of myself.

*And to Danny Lucas, not a day has gone by without thinking of you.
February 17, 1996 - December 4, 2018*

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEV	La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición	Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition
CSIVI	Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso, Verificación e Implementación	Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Final Agreement
CNGS	La Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad	Commission on National Security Guarantees
DDR		Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
ECTRS	Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación	Training and Reincorporation Territorial Zone
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional	National Liberation Army
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación	Popular Liberation Army
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
JEP	La Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz	Special Jurisdiction for Peace
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abri	19th of April Movement
PAM	---	Peace Accord Matrix
PAO	Plan de Acción Oportuna de Prevención y Protección	Timely Action Plan
PDET	Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial	Development Programs with a Territorial Focus
PEP	Permiso Especial de Permanencia	Special Residence Permit
PISDA	Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos	Comprehensive Substitution and Alternative Development Plans
PMI	Plan Marco de Implementación	Framework for the Plan of Implementation
PNIS	Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito	Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes
RRI	Reforma Rural Integra	Comprehensive Rural Reform
SIIPO	Sistema Integrado de Información para el Posconflicto	Comprehensive System for Post Conflict Information
SISEP	Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política	Comprehensive Security System of the Exercise of Politics
UBPD	Unidad Especial para la Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas en el contexto y en razón del conflicto armado	Special Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the context of the armed conflict
UNDP	---	United Nations Development Programme
UEI	Unidad Especial de Investigación	Special Investigation Unit
ZOMAC	Zonas más Afectadas por el Conflicto Armado	Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict

ABSTRACT

The myriad of obstacles surrounding the post-conflict scenario poses a risk of potentially entering a conflict trap. Engaging in a multidimensional conflict transformation process seeks to address the underlying sources of incompatibility between actors in a non-violent way through the incorporation of constructive dialogue that promotes security, political cooperation, state capacity, and implementation of the peace agreement. Too often, only some of these components are applied, yet research falls short in explaining how these gaps can be utilized in a beneficial way. By applying this framework to the case-study of the Republic of Colombia, this research will evaluate the impact of holistic peace building in negating the relapse of violence. Expanding on this comprehensive understanding, the author argues that by identifying the weak links in the implementation efforts, Colombia is in a position to break the conflict cycle and allow for a peaceful future to become a reality.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The question of how to end a seemingly perpetual cycle of violence fueled by decades of successive political polarization and socioeconomic destitution has long been at the forefront of peace and conflict debates. Due to the fact that nations that have endured a prior internal conflict are at an increased susceptibility to entering a *conflict trap*, makes it essential to understand the relationship between a holistic approach to peace building and conflict transformation in establishing a sustainable future.¹ In the case of Colombia, the peace agreement that was formalized in 2016 offers an opportunity to finally adequately confront the elements that have continuously been sources of devastating incompatibility. The fragile nature of peace efforts rely heavily on the amalgamation of invested actors at all levels for effective progress to be maintained. Particularly, for Colombia, this remains a persistent challenge and serves as a largely influential factor in the residual weariness and security gaps seen today.

Concepts such as *peace building* and *conflict transformation* offer both theoretical and empirical frameworks to help analyze the on-going situation and assist policy-makers in the stabilization of a nation in such a fragile state.² Arguably, by applying these concepts the likelihood of reoccurrence can be significantly reduced through an inclusive and on-going constructive dialogue. When considering the level of effectiveness, one must take into account obstacles in implementation processes and the variable capacity limitations that will inevitably arise. In this case, the complete eradication of conflict is not the goal, but rather establishing non-violent ways of approaching this dimension of human relationships.

It is important to acknowledge that there is no one formula that will be applicable to all post-conflict scenarios due to the fact that priorities will shift depending on the specific particularities present.³ In spite of this, there are four distinguishable dimensions of peace building that this research will use as the foundation for a holistic approach because of their respective distinctions that are profoundly intertwined with each other. First, the reinforcement of state security and incorporation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (hereinafter DDR) plan for the former combatants.⁴ This dimension aims to restore safety, increase protection of the population, and has typically be one of the first initiatives to takes place.⁵ Next, building state capacities and encouraging the legitimacy of the state attempts to restore national institutions while focusing on the role of political cooperation in the peace process.⁶ The third dimension hones in on the importance of the ability of invested actors and policy-makers to stabilize socioeconomic inequalities through a strategic and sustainable development plan that suits the needs of the

¹Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (Washington DC, US: World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2003) p.4

² Network on Development Evaluation and Network on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation, OECD, *Factsheet 2008: 'Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities'* (OECD-DAC: 2008) <<https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39289596.pdf>> [March 10, 2019] (p.2)

³ Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Assistant Secretary General for Peace Building Support, UN Peace building Support Office, *'UN Peace building: an Orientation'* (UN Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010) <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf> [March 13, 2019] (p.12)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

population adequately.⁷ Finally, this research will consider the importance of timing in relation to both the negotiation process and of the implementation of peace efforts.⁸

Purpose and Central Research Question

In particular, the purpose of this research is to assess how a holistic approach to peace building can be utilized as a mechanism to increase the effectivity of conflict transformation and, in turn, aid in avoiding a relapse of violence. Presuming that one of the primary objectives when undertaking peace efforts is to lower the possibility of reoccurrence, considerations as to how this relationship may identify prognosticating factors of a conflict cycle can be built upon. A comprehensive understanding of the themes of conflict and conflict cycles is fundamental for this rationale and will serve as an opportunity to deepen the knowledge of the relevance to sustainable peace.

Motivation and Relevancy

The motivation of the present research is to elaborate on the necessity of a multi-dimensional, transitional approach to permanently negate the use of violence as a response to incompatible dimensions of human interaction. The specific post-conflict scenario in Colombia is relevant because of their incorporation of a multitude of peace building stipulations within their historic peace agreement, as well as their partial implementation status. Considering the resistance of the current administration to adhere to the agreement and persistent violence seen today, the future stability is at stake.

Structure: Methodology and Scope

The structure of this research is shaped in such a way to first introduce the research, its objectives, and limitations, as well as expand on the purpose of the main research question, methodological approach, and rationale.

Subsequently, in the second chapter, the theories and conceptualization of peace building and conflict transformation will be further explained in such a way to adequately understand the goals and significance, respectively. Through the discussion of theories of researchers such as John Paul Lederach and Johan Galtung the relationship between conflict, violence, and peace will be understood. Further, by evaluating the four dimensions of peace building individually, the theoretical framework will be broken down in a way that will assist in acquiring a comprehensive understanding of what conditions are necessary for fruitful peace building initiatives. The four elements that will guide the analysis of the conceptual framework will be : security (DDR)⁹, governance and compliance of the state¹⁰, development and national capacities¹¹, and timing of

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Arnim Langer, Graham K. Brown, *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace building* (Oxford: Oxford Press August 2016), p.10

⁹ For the purpose of this research, security is defined as: the freedom from violence and coercion.

For more see: Dirk Salmons in 'Security: An Absolute Prerequisite' in *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges* ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (London, Lynne Ripener Publishers, 2005) 19-43 (p.19)

¹⁰ Network on Development Evaluation and Network on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation, *Factsheet 2008: 'Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities'* p.2

¹¹ Development in this instance will consider the steps of the United Nations Development Group. For more see: United Nations Development Group *'Conducting a Conflict and Development Analysis'* (UNDG 2016) <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/UNDP_CDA-Report_v1.3-final-opt-low.pdf> [April 1, 2019] p.11

negotiations and implementation processes.¹² The rationale is due to their relation to the process of undertaking a transitional approach to peace. In order for these efforts to be most successful, it is argued that they must be applied concurrently. A mixed research approach, including relevant scholarly literatures and secondary sources of research on this area, will help in the understanding of the elements that may create the opportunity for peace building efforts to be most effective while simultaneously identifying the limitations and obstacles.

The third chapter will present the case study of Colombia from past to present. The theoretical findings from chapter two will be further tested by undertaking a case-study approach. This methodology will allow for a more detailed identification of sources of the conflict in this particular instance. The focus on Colombia's historic struggle with insurgency, political polarization and instability, and socioeconomic inequality, will be useful for recognizing that these are still seen today, and identified key elements that may potentially create a suitable environment for a conflict cycle. Due to the limitations of this research, the historical context will begin with the 20th century civil war, La Violencia.

An analytical approach in chapter four will take a critical look at the effectiveness of peace building in Colombia and how the country is implementing the efforts through their 2016 peace agreement. Using reports produced by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA)¹³, which both FARC and the Colombian government included in the final agreement as being a technical observer on the status of implementation, we will examine how specific methods are working or not. In doing so, we will be able to see to what degree the Colombian situation offers guidance on the general process of peace building.¹⁴ Through a final evaluation and discussion of the results of the case study, suggestions as to the development-peace dilemma will be given.

Using a bricolage approach, this research will attempt to go beyond cause-and-effect thinking and consider several components that are relevant in the consideration of the role of peace building efforts. However, it is equally important to acknowledge the limitations of this research. The concepts of analysis are complex terms that often lack common definitions, which poses a challenge in itself. Additionally, since many of the agreement components are meant to be long-term goals, the measuring and numerical evaluation further limits the benefits of short-term monitoring, which is only possible within the thesis.

In 2009, Former Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon noted that, "The first two years after the end of a conflict offer a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peace building efforts".¹⁵ Approaching the three year mark since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement, the future stability of Colombia is at stake. For this reason, this research will aim to understand how to maximize the long-term effectiveness of peace building efforts in such a way that will reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence.

¹² Arnim Langer, Graham K. Brown, *Building Sustainable Peace*, p.10

¹³ hereinafter, the Kroc Institute

¹⁴ The reports used during this research are the most up to date versions available. The charts presented in the analysis were manually translated by the author. At times, the author shifts between the English and Spanish reports, only when the data remained the same. The agreement components are listed in English and Spanish as a result.

¹⁵ United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, '*Report of the Secretary-General on the Peace building Fund: Peace building in the aftermath of conflict*,' A/63/881-S/2009/304 (2009) <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a4c6c3b2.html>> [March 12, 2019] (p.3)

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE TO PEACE BUILDING

When deconstructing the theoretical framework of peace building it is crucial to understand the why there is a *necessity* for peace efforts to be multi-dimensional practices that are applied holistically. In this respect, obstacles arise due to the fact that many of the terms involved in peace research often have different definitions and interpretations as they evolve to suit the dynamic nature of human interaction. Throughout this research, the theory presented by John Paul Lederach that conflict is “a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships”¹⁶ will be used to underline the inevitable occurrence of conflict within a society. For the purpose of this research, we do not find it practical to frame conflict as a negative occurrence, but rather choose to embrace conflict as a means of unlocking an opportunity for positive change through the use of constructive dialogue.¹⁷

Through this theoretical lens, there is a very fine structure that can easily be dismantled when violence becomes prominent in a society. It is fundamental for the purpose of this research to differentiate between violence and conflict, however. In this regard, violence, though it is likely to follow many conflict scenarios and may seem necessary as a response to social frustrations, is not considered to be inevitable nor a positive dimension of human interaction in any case. Similarly, the devastating and long-term consequences when considering the occurrence of violent conflict in a society is undeniable. It is with this in mind that we highlight the importance of refining the knowledge of peace building to effectively address the sources of conflict. Beyond this, it is essential to recognize the criteria that allow for peace building initiatives to be most fruitful so as to lower the possibility of reoccurrence. Notably, peace building as both a concept and a practice is one that has evolved greatly over time as research has expanded in an effort to create sustainable mechanisms that are adept to the dynamic needs of human relationships. Though the grievances of societies may vary from conflict to conflict, it is useful to understand the implications within the respective framework in an effort to establish a basis for the concept as a practice.

By considering the theoretical nature of conflict, we will establish an understanding of how a transformational approach integrates constructive dialogue into the way that a society functions at all levels to avoid violence. It is equally important to develop a well-rounded understanding of the sources of conflict that may lead to the emergence of violence in order to adequately create a strategy address these grievances. Using this information, we will elaborate on how the selected theorists approach peace building in such a way that is applicable to the practices undertaken by the United Nations. Last, this chapter will expand on the relationship between the chosen four pillars used to uphold a holistic approach in peace building and the possibility of reoccurrence.

¹⁶ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear articulation of the guiding principles by a pioneer in the field* (New York, USA: Good Books Publishing, 2014) p. 1

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 14

1. Theoretical Frameworks of Conflict and Peace Building

For the purpose of this research, the selected theories are used to give a foundational understanding to the conceptualization of conflict, violence, and peace building, respectively. As such, Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist considered to be a pioneer of peace research, first introduced the concept of peace building in his innovative work, “*Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peace building*”¹⁸. This article has become extremely important in the way that peace building is approached today because of the way that it framed [*peace building*] as a long-term endeavor that should be structured in a way that promotes sustainable peace by the state through the identification and addressing of ‘root causes’(or sources of conflict).¹⁹ Throughout the present research, we will place an emphasis on this sort of perspective when evaluating post-conflict efforts.

However, prior to his conceptualization of peace building, Galtung began his work by explaining the theory of conflicts through definitions and the identification of various dimensions and formations seen in conflict in his 1958 piece, “*Theories of Conflict*”. According to him, conflict will mainly ensue in response to incompatibility between actors and their basic human needs²⁰, and violence is seen as more natural than peace due to scarcity frustrations.²¹ An important distinction, however, is made by Galtung, when identifying the source of scarcity in these scenarios. Galtung notes that politics are typically the main determinant of resources and developmental plans, which, in turn, creates a possibility for inequality in the distribution of power.²²

1.1.1. Typologies of Violence

Later, in 1969 Johan Galtung’s paper “*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*,” he presented his theory on the different typologies of violence.²³ This framework breaks down and separates the three forms of violence that can be used to identify the elements that create the environment for a cycle of violence to be present.²⁴




FIGURE 1

¹⁸ Johan Galtung, *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*, (Copenhagen: Ejlers Publishing, 1976) p. 297

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 303

²⁰ Basic human needs, for the purpose of this research, will be used to describe the elements necessary to maintain human life and health. We base this notion off Maslow’s hierarchy of needs which encompasses the variety of elements such as: biological, physiological, safety, love, belongingness, and esteem needs. We acknowledge the fact that there are different variations and priorities of needs based off culture, religion, and other reasons. However, due to the limitations of this research and the complex nature of the concept, we will recognize the potentially subjective nature of the terminology. For more see: Abraham Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation* (Psychological Review, 2000) p. 351

²¹ Ibid, p. 301

²² Johan Galtung, *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*, p. 301

²³ Johan Galtung, *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*, (Oslo, Sage Publications: International Peace Research Institute: Journal of Peace Research, 1969) p. 170

²⁴ Ibid, p. 170

The three main typologies noted by Galtung are as follow: **Direct Violence:** Represents behaviors that are committed by an actor that serve to threaten a life or limit one's ability to meet basic survival needs. Direct violence is the most visible of the three because it occurs physically and/or verbally. Next, **Structural Violence:** Also referred to as 'social injustice' represents the systematic ways in which inequality or injustice are tied into the structure of a society. This includes instances where some portion of the public is denied equal access to opportunities, good, or services that may make it difficult to fulfill basic human needs. In this form, there is less of a clear distinction as to who the actor(s) may be because of the fact that it is more deeply embedded within the institutions. **Cultural Violence:** This represents the ways in which a culture legitimizes social norms that create an environment where direct and structural violence seem more acceptable. Unlike the previous two forms of violence, cultural violence is considered to be a 'foundational principle for extended conflict' because of its ability to be reproduced across generations, further creating the argument that these beliefs are rational and absolute.²⁵

These three forms of violence are seen to be interrelated and often more than one may be present in a society dealing with violent conflict. Based on Galtung's theory, peace is not seen as the total absence of conflict, but rather the absence of destructive violence and the ability to view conflict in a constructive manner.²⁶ Further, by merging the different theories by Galtung, one can make the argument that through the classification of types of violence, the possibility to identify root causes becomes easier, ergo allowing for the construction of a development plan that prioritizes long term, self-sustainable peace to be more practical.

1.1.2. A Transformational Approach to Conflict

Notably, John Paul Lederach is often accredited for his inventive work that enhanced research related to the establishment of sustainable peace mechanisms by bringing attention to the manner in which conflict is approached. Lederach builds on Galtung's theory (of sources of conflict) and in his work has brought attention to the need for a more comprehensive application of peace building efforts. In his theory, he claims that peace building should be understood to be more than just 'post-accord reconstruction' and in order to be most effective should be dynamic in its conceptualization and implementation by incorporating an expansive, multi-faceted approach, in which it is not just used as a response to violence. On the contrary, Lederach argues that peace building should include a range of efforts that may both *precede* and *proceed* peace agreements, by looking beyond the immediate situation and considering the patterns, context, and using this to create a strategic peace plan.²⁷ In this regard, in Lederach's work, he states the importance of incorporating a 'transformational approach' when considering possible options for a conflict at any stage.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid, p. 171

²⁶ Ibid, pp. 182,183

²⁷ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 7

²⁸ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, p. 2

Lederach has presented the metaphor of conflict transformation being a human that is on a journey. He separates the body into four sections: the head, heart, hands, and legs.²⁹ Through this process, the head is seen as the conceptual view of conflict, or the way that we think and ‘prepare to approach conflict’.³⁰ In this sense, he states that there are two terms in particular in to keep in mind: *envision and respond*.³¹ Using this, one can see the transformational approach is built upon the understanding that conflict can be envisioned positively in such a way that it may create space for constructive growth, but needs the willingness to act as well as the capacity to maximize on this opportunity in order to effectively create constructive change.³² Likewise, the heart is seen to be the center of emotion and conflict transformation. Lederach states that in order for conflict to have the most potential in creating positive growth, it needs to address even the least visible incompatible dimensions of relationships, as opposed to just the most immediately recognizable aspects.³³ Next, the hands in this metaphor are used to consider the actual practices that are set into place. In particular, by considering the importance of the specific processes that peace building incorporates, more creative attempts to improve relationships can be made.³⁴ Finally, the legs and feet are used to represent another form of action.³⁵ Lederach states that they can be used to represent the way in which the heartbeat translates into physical response. In this manner, it can be believed that conflict transformation will only be able to sustain positive change if it is actually able to react and respond to real life needs and realistic struggles.³⁶

By considering conflict transformation as this metaphor of the body one can see the ways in which various dimensions are interrelated when striving to address conflict in a way that directly reduces the presence violence, while simultaneously ensuring that there is an increase in justice, equality, and mutual respect in human relationships.

Recalling the numerous theories presented by Galtung and Lederach, a few conclusions can be presumed. First, one can discern that conflict is an inherent part of the dynamic ways in which humans interact and should be understood to be inevitable, rather than perceived as a negative occurrence. Further, conflict can be described as a situation in which there is incompatibility between actors and their basic human needs. Violence, in this regard, is not seen as desirable, with repercussions that will outweigh its benefits and leave long-term consequences for the parties directly and indirectly involved. Through the conflict transformation point of view, by addressing the grievances within a society, scarcity frustrations can be directly reduced and, likewise, reduce the potential of violence.³⁷

To say that societies should not have conflict is difficult to rationalize when taking into account the dynamic nature of human relationships. However, throughout this research, we maintain the belief that through conflict transformation, holistic peace building efforts can be utilized to address the root causes of incompatibility, ergo allowing for conflict to serve as a

²⁹ Ibid, p. 9

³⁰ Ibid, p. 2

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, p. 10

³³ Ibid, p. 11

³⁴ Ibid, p. 12

³⁵ Ibid, p. 13

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, p. 13

mechanism to enable positive change. In this sense, peace building as a concept is used to promote the use of on-going constructive dialogue that emphasizes the inclusion of actors at all levels.

2. Peace Building in the United Nations

Since the creation of the United Nations, they have played significant role in helping to reduce the severity of conflict in numerous scenarios internationally. While it is evident that peace building has been researched, theorized, and conceptualized for over 30 years by scholars such as Lederach and Galtung, it was not until 1992 when Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "*An Agenda for Peace*" was published that the terminology of 'post-conflict peace building' was legitimately introduced into the United Nations framework.³⁸ Initially, and even to this day, this concept is used intertwined within the multi-dimensional framework of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping operations. Importantly, when we are referring to these peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations, it is essential to differentiate between the pre- and post-Cold War missions that have been undertaken.

2.1. Traditional Peacekeeping

In past times, the United Nations utilized what are now labeled as 'traditional' forms of peacekeeping. When they first began being implemented, the main priority was to retain some level of security during a time when Cold War rivalries were hindering the ability for the Security Council to function properly. In this regard, they were deploying unarmed (as well as lightly armed) military forces that were to patrol buffer zones of interstate conflicts, monitor ceasefire agreements, and separating warring forces.³⁹ While they were deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, they were to remain impartial, not use force (unless for self-defense), and only be present with the consent of the parties.⁴⁰ Overall, their main roles were to monitor, report, and establish some confidence building roles through primarily observational tasks that rarely would include in the political peace process.⁴¹

2.2. Post-Cold War Peace Building

Further, in "An Agenda for Peace," the concept peace building is aimed at "rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; and in the largest sense, to address the

³⁸ Peace building was defined as: "An action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." For more, see: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping (A/47/277-S/24111)*, (New York, U.S.: Office of Conference Services, United Nations, 1992) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1478328/files/DPI_1247-EN.pdf> [March 20, 2019] (p.11)

³⁹ Anke Hoeffler, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, Sarah von Billerbeck, *Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding*, World Development Report: Background Paper, (World Bank, 2011) <http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/289~v~Post-Conflict_Recovery_and_Peacebuilding.pdf> [March 21, 2019] (p. 13)

⁴⁰ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression* (San Francisco, US. October 24, 1945) <<https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>> [March 21, 2019]

⁴¹ Anke Hoeffler, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, Sarah von Billerbeck, *Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding*, p. 13

deepest causes of conflict.”⁴² Considering this definition, one may note that the UN was in the early stages of incorporating the theoretical understandings presented by researchers, such as Galtung and Lederach. There was a common understanding that without acknowledging the deepest roots of conflict, long term peace could not be promised in any form. Soon after, in the year 1995, the previously mentioned definitions were expanded upon in such a way to address conflict in all of its phases, as opposed to just reserving peace building for the more typical post conflict scenario.⁴³

The 2000 Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (otherwise identified as the Brahimi Report) called for a radical reevaluation of the whole framework, and redefined the term peace building as, “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”⁴⁴ In this definition, there was distinguishable emphasis placed on the importance of ensuring that the peace building process was incorporated into the institutions at the core and used as the fundamental building blocks for (re)structuring a society. In 2007, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee described the conceptual basis for peace building as:

*“[Peace building] involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”*⁴⁵

This comprehensive approach to peace building helps elaborate on the importance of recognizing violent conflict as a unique scenario, incorporating the belief that national ownership is key to reconciliation, so that national actors may be able to resolve their own conflicts before violence overtakes the state.⁴⁶ Further, the 2009 Secretary General Peace Building Report identified the five recurring areas: safety and security; political processes; provision of basic services; restoration of core government functions; and economic revitalization.⁴⁷ Acknowledging that the concept of peace building has undertaken some crucial expansions, in this research when we discuss the peacekeeping and peace building operations being implemented by the United Nations today, we will be referring to their post-Cold War mechanisms that have evolved to operate more dynamically.

⁴² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (A/47/277-S/24111), p. 8

⁴³ United Nations Secretary General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations* (A/50/6-S/1995/1) (New York, US. United Nations, General Assembly Security Council, 1995) <<https://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-60.htm>> [March 22, 2019] (p.12)

⁴⁴ United Nations Secretary General, General Assembly Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305-S/2000/809) (New York, US. United Nations, 2000) <<https://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf>> [March 22, 2019] (p. 3 para. 13)

⁴⁵ Decision of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (2007)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ United Nations Secretary General, General Assembly Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict* (A/63/881-S/2009/304) (New York, US. United Nations, 2009) <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a4c6c3b2.html>> [March 21, 2019] (p. 6 para. 17)

Now, we can see peace building as being implemented through a broad set of measures that aim to address the core issues that influence the ability for a nation to function to its full potential. These measures are directed at: 1) Reducing the likelihood of occurrence and reoccurrence of conflict through actions that 2) strengthen national capacities at all of their levels for conflict management, and 3) further lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.⁴⁸ Notably, as the concept itself has evolved, its role has become more distinct, which makes the necessity for properly organized institutions to support these initiatives fundamental. In this regard, Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested the creation of institutions that would devise country specific peace-building strategies in 2004.⁴⁹ This led to the creation of the Peace Building Commission⁵⁰, Peace Building Support Office⁵¹, and Peace Building Fund.⁵² These institutions help coordinate the various roles that UN agencies have to mobilize in order to maximize efficiency and engagement while it is provided.

3. Comprehensive Understanding of the Four Dimensions of Peace Building

Thus far, this research has taken note of how the concepts incorporated in peace research have evolved over time due to the growing necessity for adaptive measures in response to the increase in violent conflicts occurring around the world. Though there has been a vast amount of progress in some aspects of this field, a persistent challenge is the prioritization and implementation of holistic strategies that are country-specific, enable national ownership, and promote sustainable justice and equality on all fronts. Though the unique nature of conflict complicates the process of strategic development plans, there are a few essential dimensions that have been proven to rely on one another, time and time again. With this in mind, we will build on the relationships that have been recognized by the international community as being intertwined on the road to a peaceful future.

3.1. Security: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The notion that security should be valued as human right at the crux of any dynamic post conflict transformation process is used as the belief underlying the value of the research presented in this section. This is based on the understanding that the successful disarmament, demobilization,

⁴⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, (New York, US. United Nations, 2008)

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf> [March 19, 2019] (p.18)

⁴⁹ United Nations Secretary General, General Assembly *Security Council, Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility* (A/59/565) (New York, US. United Nations, 2004) <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/gaA.59.565_En.pdf> [March 25, 2019] (p.3)

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.3 para. 14

⁵¹ Ibid, p.62 para. 230

⁵² The Peacebuilding Fund was established through resolution A/RES/60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645. For more, see: <http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/>

and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants⁵³ should be deeply interwoven into the ongoing process of establishing peace.⁵⁴

It is important to note, however, that DDR is not a viable substitute for a properly negotiated peace process, nor can it reach its maximum potential when a part of a flawed peace process. Likewise, the peace process cannot be truly established without tackling the challenge of regaining security. For this reason, it is essential to understand the conditions that allow for DDR to be most fruitful, as well as identify the circumstances that pose challenges when pursuing this process, so as to prevent reoccurrence of violence. At the core, when putting forth efforts to establish progressive development in a post-conflict scenario, a major dilemma arises regarding the element of retaining security to some degree.⁵⁵ This step is vital because if there is still a remaining preeminent threat to security, the likelihood of having invested stakeholders is, in turn, reduced significantly.⁵⁶ Because of this, it is necessary for this research to focus on the importance of security as it has an innate ability to create a sense of stability and hope, following the notion that without this common sense of hope there is nothing pushing for engagement in a mutually beneficial future where justice is valued.⁵⁷

3.1.1. Understanding the DDR Elements

According to the United Nations Resource Centre Operational Guide of 2014⁵⁸, the three key components of DDR are defined as:

- **Disarmament:** The act of collecting, documenting, controlling, and proper disposal of all arms, ammunition, explosives, and forms of weapons carried by both combatants and civilians. This step may also include the development of responsible arms management initiatives.⁵⁹
- **Demobilization:** This step focuses on the formal and regulated discharge of active combatants from the armed group they are a part of. This is typically achieved in two steps. First, includes the grouping of individual members into transitory centers as well as the mass movement of troops into encampments. The second is aimed at the reinsertion⁶⁰ process seen in support packages.⁶¹

⁵³ For the purpose of this research, the term combatant will be applied using the United Nations's definition: a member of a national army or an irregular military; actively participating in military activities and hostilities; involved in recruiting or training military personnel; holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; arrived at a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes. For more, please see: United Nations, *Operational Guide: To the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* <<http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>> (p.24)

⁵⁴ Dirk Salmons, *Security: An Absolute Prerequisite*, p.19

⁵⁵ Gerd Junne and Willemijm Verkoren, *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges* (London: Lynne Ripener Publishers, 2005) p.11

⁵⁶ Dirk Salmons, *Security: An Absolute Prerequisite*, p.23

⁵⁷ Dirk Salmons, *Security: An Absolute Prerequisite*, p. 20

⁵⁸ United Nations, *Operational Guide: To the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* (United Nations, 2014) <<http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>> [March 1, 2019] (p.25)

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ In this context, reinsertion will be described as distinct from the long term process of reintegration to this. Reinsertion is defined by the UN Operational Guide as the transitional assistance used to help cover the essential human needs. For more, please see: United Nations, *Operational Guide: To the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* <<http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>> (p.33)

⁶¹ United Nations, *Operational Guide: To the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*, p.25

- **Reintegration:** Described as the long-term process in which former combatants are reestablished as members of civil society and gain proper employment (as well as sustainable income). Simply, it encompasses the socioeconomic initiatives set forth by the local communities through the role of general development for a country. This step often works hand-in-hand with long-term external help.⁶²

3.1.2. *Security: A Touch Stone for Peace*

Scholar in post conflict development studies, Dirk Salomons, notes that the successful DDR of former combatants represents “the touchstone, the moment of truth for any peace building process.”⁶³ He argues that the moment in which combatants agree to release their arms, they confront the reality that they are now vulnerable and often feel an increased sense of fear. The former combatants, in this case, are giving up their livelihoods, support networks, and a lifestyle that they have likely become accustomed to. The belief that the advantage of choosing peace will reasonably outweigh a future of violence is pivotal during this practice because it is a critical moment for establishing stable security.⁶⁴ Once this feeling of fear is dissipated, the cycle of instability can continue to be broken down through the increased involvement from inhabitants looking to also increase safety.

In order to effectively tackle the irregular elements of conflict transformation, Salomons identifies the importance of having DDR integrated within five interlinked points that are used as a part of a larger overarching transformational system. They are as follows:⁶⁵

- **Political:** Incorporating the ongoing dialogues that extend beyond the initial peace negotiation or agreement. In this process the integration of former combatants and creation of new, dynamic power structure is focused on.
- **Military/technical:** The use of peacekeeping mechanisms to follow the traction following a ceasefire and the enablement of disarming to prevent conflict from being reestablished.
- **Security:** Hones in on the importance of utilizing this increased sense of safety and relief from violence related to disarmament and reduction in arms trade.
- **Humanitarian:** The manner in which the intervention process considers the well-being of former combats equally as well as the vulnerable groups within combatants. This incorporates the youth soldiers, female and particularly mother soldiers, those who are physically disabled, as well as chronically ill soldiers.
- **Socioeconomic:** Ensuring that the resources used for the ‘business of war’ can be linked to creating opportunities for the reintegration of former combatants.

Previous attempts at creating a system that aimed to reestablish peace were typically unorganized and poorly coordinated due to several reasons. Lack of funding, poor support from national and international groups, unstructured planning, and lack of research that would aid in

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Dirk Salomons, *Security: An Absolute Prerequisite*, p.19

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 24

understanding the most effective way of pursuing these processes are all challenges that can still be seen today. A particular hardship in this step is the fact that often times the international community will need to pay special attention to the future of the paramilitary, warlords, and former combatants who are emerging from this violent time and giving up their livelihoods.⁶⁶ If the future of the former combatants is not invested in properly, the possibility of them reverting back to violence is immediately increased.

3.2. Governance & National Compliance

This section will focus on the value of establishing a sound political structure when considering the reconstruction of a government sector in a post-conflict society. Further, we will evaluate the importance of national compliance due to its relevancy in this stabilization process. Using this information together, we will see how they are related not only to each other, but to the other dimensions focused on in previous and subsequent sections to further develop an understanding on how to maximize the potential of peace building efforts.

3.2.1. Establishing State Institutions

When assessing the role of peace building in the creation of a self-sustainable government, it must be noted that the concept of ‘nation-building’⁶⁷ often comes with many negative connotations.⁶⁸ In this context, even the use of the word ‘state’ is perceived as problematic for societies that have been oppressed by their governments.⁶⁹ As a result, in more recent years, there has been push to modify the western liberal peace models when focusing on nation-building in order to create a more inclusive, country-specific model that suits the particular conflict and its underlying sources of violence adequately. For this reason, it is important for external intervention, especially the foreign actors, to consider the level of fragility they will be encountering and understand that they need to prioritize their role to sympathize with the victims of the state. Similarly, the limitations of external intervention must be realized, because the term peace building cannot entirely encompass all of the complex tasks that must take place in order to establish (or reestablish) a fully functioning state.

Jose Luis Herrero, scholar and Head of the Council of Europe office in Moldova, has remarked that an important element in avoiding renewed violence in a society that is emerging from conflict is the implementation of democratic institutions.⁷⁰ Though in this research we find it necessary to acknowledge the limitations of *imposing* westernized points of view, we must also recognize its usefulness in particular scenarios. Equally important, when we speak of the role of external intervention, it is fundamental to acknowledge the duty to establish a sense of mutual accountability when creating a state building strategy.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Ibid, 30

⁶⁷ Nation-building will also be referred to as state-building interchangeably.

⁶⁸ Lakhdar Brahimi, Former Special Adviser of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, *State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries*, (Vienna, Austria: United Nations, 2007) <<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf>> [April 1, 2019] (p.5)

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Jose Luis Herrero *Building State Institutions* in *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges* ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijm Verkoren (London, Lynne Ripener Publishers, 2005) 43-59 (p.43)

⁷¹ Lakhdar Brahimi, *State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries*, p.5

A reoccurring theme that can be seen throughout all dimensions of peace building efforts is the fact that every conflict will require a country-specific perspective when being evaluated. This notion is consistent in this dimension as well. The national compliance goes hand-in-hand with their cooperation with external donor assistance. Likewise, the needs and wants of the local population need to be prioritized because there is a general understanding that the best interventions are those that leave a ‘light footprint’ in order to avoid the creation of parallel institutions, or dual systems, that undermine the local authorities.⁷² The key goal is to ensure that these institutions that are conceived, will be able to develop further and sustain themselves long-term after the international attention tapers down.

3.2.2. Necessity for Political Cooperation

Importantly, it is key to note that weak institutions that may be riddled with corruption, lack respect for human rights, do not have stable governance, or are inaccessible to its citizens are all potential underlying triggers of conflict and need to be adequately treated as such. In this regard, the concept of state building can be described as the process in which a nation tries to build (or rebuild) effective systems and institutions of government that value rule of law, support economic development, and respect human rights in order to prevent a relapse into violent conflict.⁷³ This is often intertwined with the DDR process in terms of including support for the transformation of armed groups and potentially integrating them not only back into society, but as members of a new government as well.

State building relies on the other dimensions of peace building due to its potential to either hinder or support the atmosphere in a post-conflict situation. Previously, there was a time in which state building was looked at to be the first major priority. Over time, this changed through the realization that when the government in place is part of the underlying problem, they may directly contradict the efforts by external actors.⁷⁴

For this reason, we consider compliance by the political actors in power equally important as governance. Without the support of the political leaders, any peace process will be fundamentally flawed and allow for reoccurrence to be highly likely. This notion can be supported by the theory previously mentioned by Johan Galtung. Earlier, it was noted that when there is a political party in power that is creating an inequality in the distribution of power and resources, developmental programs set forth will have a weak foundation. Similarly, when moving forward from a conflict scenario there needs to be a sense of inclusivity within the development strategy being implemented. This requires the inclusion of former combatants in future politics, acknowledging the inequalities of marginalized peoples, and addressing the needs of minority groups.⁷⁵

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 5

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.7

⁷⁵ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, 2009

3.3. Development & National Capacities

National capacity to implement sustainable development is a key element when making efforts to address the needs of a nation that has recently emerged from a violent conflict. Building on Lederach's theory that conflict has the ability to bring about positive change when addressing its most root causes, this dimension is fundamental in the post-conflict transformation of a state by linking the present issues with the concept of peace building through national planning processes. In this regard, sustainable development can be said to give different groups something to work on, together, as a society when attempting to rebuild and work through its past grievances. Importantly, there needs to be a stable national capacity to address, evaluate, and implement efforts focused on the developments at an economic, social, and environmental level.⁷⁶

Sustainable development places an emphasis on the importance to create a plausible national strategy that adequately addresses the core issues present so as to prevent a relapse into conflict.⁷⁷ Likewise, there is a necessity for there to be an element of security present in the society. We have understood that without security, the investment from stake-holders is likely to be decreased. Further, the timing of this developmental progress is precious because if there is not some sort of attempt to establish positive change, violence can and will reemerge. The theory that guides this belief in the importance of the consideration for a state's capacity for development is that a lack of development can be an important indicator for (re)insurgency.

3.3.1. Considerations for Approaches to National Development

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development notes five key elements that may be useful when creating a national development strategy that can potentially establish effective policies so as to lower the possibility of relapse into violent conflict.⁷⁸ These are:

- 1) Understanding the Conflict: Evaluating and noting the specific challenges present.⁷⁹ In this step, it is important to fully take into account the political economy of a post-conflict country.
- 2) Linking Sustainable Development and Peace Building: By engaging in the process of Addressing the needs identified in the evaluation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs through economic, socio-political, and environmental sustainability.⁸⁰
- 3) Managing Sustainable Development Processes in Post-Conflict Countries: It is important to note that there is no one single strategy that has been proven to achieve sustainable development. However, through the process of a nation balancing the aforementioned dimensions with the context specific elements present there is a belief that these efforts will

⁷⁶ United Nations, *Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies in Post-Conflict Countries*, (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable Development, 2011) <<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1039guidancenotes2.pdf>> [April 2, 2019] (p.2)

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.13

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p.14

⁸⁰ United Nations, *Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies in Post-Conflict Countries*, p.16

be manifested. Some key principles that this step is based on are: participation and inclusion, long-term thinking, and iteration and improvement.⁸¹

- 4) **Building Capacities for Sustainable Development in Post-Conflict Countries:** Though in this context capacities to facilitate development are typically low, there are also a slew of obstacles that are often overlooked in regard to the process of attaining sustainable development. Some of these challenges are: the initial capacity to collect, analyze, and integrate policy changes are often weak, weakened institutional linkages, the governance-development dilemma, etc. Building and empowering leadership can be a powerful tool for change.⁸²
- 5) **Sequencing and Prioritizing Policy Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries:** Acknowledging the importance of laying a foundation that has political will as well as legitimacy for complex reforms.⁸³

Through the realization of these obstacles and creation of strategic priorities that effectively focus on the country-specific goals, the aim is to establish a development plan that is self-sustainable in a long term future. This is essential because of the fact that the international community's interest in a post-conflict scenario will eventually wither down, it is vital for countries to have the capacity to facilitate positive change.

3.3.2. Distinguishing Sources of Conflict

Additionally, it is integral to the process of creating a strategic plan of action to address the unique causes of conflict so as to avoid the use of a redundant and potentially harmful set of development efforts. To this end, there are four distinguishable categories of underlying causes of violent conflict presented. These are⁸⁴:

- **External / International:** In this aspect, the root causes can be recognized as stemming from sources outside of the country being analyzed. It is possible that residual traces from the colonial rule have left social rifts that they have not been able to move past. This is not to say that the imprints that colonial power may have left are easy to work past; however, simply that by having experienced such a history there lies a possibility that different groups may be set up to some degree against each other by external interventions. Similarly, internal frictions stemming from competition for resources may be rooted in the process of globalization.
- **Characteristics of the state:** Here, tensions rise due to a state either being too strong or too weak to keep order within the nation. In this context, a weak state cannot facilitate efforts to protect or provide its inhabitants properly. This may cause citizens to turn to alternative forms of security such as subnational organizations (militia, gangs, guerrilla groups). On the other hand, if a state is too strong and considered to enforce oppressive policies, there will be a subsequent rise in resistance and separatist organizations.
- **Characteristics of Society:** This element incorporates the ways in which societies struggling with issues such as socioeconomic inequalities, ethnic clashes, and the overuse or unequal use

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Gerd Junne and Willemijm Verkoren, *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, p.7,8

of natural resources are at risk of violent conflict. It can be seen in a variety of situations worldwide that inequality of any kind that has existed for a prolonged period of time is a tremendous trigger for the onset of violence in a nation.

- **Individual Orientations:** Finally, the root sources of conflict may be seen as created in the heads of differing groups. In this scenario, groups with clashing opinions such as religion, politics, cultures, and views in general may distinguish themselves from one another creating a sense of incompatibility that allows for the emergence of violence as a result.

It is key to keep in mind that the root causes are not always going to be one or another. In most cases, there is a higher likelihood that there will be concurring elements present by the time that violence breaks out. An example scenario could be: previous colonial rule gave the capacity for a weak state to rise to power, in turn, this established weak state cannot properly resist the forces of globalization. In response, the increase in international competition creates tensions between different groups present in one society.⁸⁵

3.4. Importance of Timing for Negotiations and Implementation

Recalling Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 2009 Report on "Peace Building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict," he stated that the first two years after a country emerges from violent conflict are the most fundamental for the establishment of the foundational structure for sustainable peace.⁸⁶ The immediate time following the end of violent conflict is essential in establishing priorities such as basic security, peace dividends, confidence building measures, and strengthening national capacity. To this end, states that address their prioritized objectives early on are believed to increase the possibility for sustainable peace and maximize the effectiveness of peace building initiatives. On the other hand, during this window of time, the potential for relapse is high if the opportunity for change is not seized.

3.4.1. Timing of Implementation

Evidence published by the World Bank's World Development Report of 2011 can be used to support the importance of timing of implementation as a concept that is relevant to the reoccurrence of conflict. Notably, 90 percent of conflicts that occurred between 2000-2009 took place in countries that had previously experienced civil war; In addition, 50 percent of post conflict countries revert back to violent conflict in the first decade of peace.⁸⁷ Because of these facts, the belief that violent conflict is, in turn, the best predictor for future large scale violence, especially if the root causes of the initial conflict are not addressed in a timely manner that also feels adequate to a majority of the members of the effected population, should be acknowledged.

⁸⁵ Gerd Junne and Willemijm Verkoren, *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, p.5

⁸⁶ United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, p.1

⁸⁷ Barbara F. Walter, *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace*, World Development Report: Background Paper, (University of California, US, 2011) <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr%20background%20paper_walter_0.pdf> [March 28, 2019] (p.2)

The conceptualization of what exactly indicates that a nation can be identified as being in ‘post-conflict’ is crucial in the understanding of the pertinence of timing in relation to peace building methods. In this research, we maintain the belief that the ending of conflict is a dynamic procedure that includes more than just the signing of a peace agreement. Importantly, the presence of groups interested in prolonging conflict often will directly hinder the progress of establishing well-rounded and sustainable peace.

Because the process of achieving this sort of peace varies greatly on the elements present in a specific country, the UNDP identifies a number of peace milestones that can be indicators that a state is moving towards normalizing peace and development. These are: cessation of hostilities and violence, signing of political/peace agreements, DDR, refugee repatriation, establishing the foundations of a functioning state, initiating reconciliation and societal integration, and commencing economic recovery.⁸⁸

3.4.2. *Ripeness for Negotiations*

Founder of the International Peace and Security Institute (IPSI) and scholar in Conflict Management, Ira William Zartman has brought attention to the conceptualization of ‘Ripeness’ when considering timing and negotiation in conflict resolution.⁸⁹ This concept is based on the notion that there lies an equal level of importance in the timing of efforts for resolution when attempting to reach a peaceful settlement of disputes. He believes that it is fundamental that conflicting parties resolve their conflict only when they are *ready* to do as such, when the cost of war is no longer seen as beneficial or in other words, when they reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS).⁹⁰ In this regard, an MHS can be described as the moment in which the parties involved in conflict find themselves to be caught in the middle of a rivalry that is not leading to a victory for either side, and is in turn, arduous for the both of them leading to a desire to seek an alternative way out.⁹¹ In this sense, the theory of ripeness is not used to predict when a particular conflict will reach the point of becoming ripe, although in another sense, it can be used to predict what elements are necessary to indicate that the negotiations can be initiated in a productive manner.⁹²

4. Holistic Peace Building: A Multi-Dimensional Approach

Acknowledging the goal of peace building as being inclusive of processes with an aim to strengthen national capacities and security; create sustainable development strategies in a timely fashion; and promote measures to reduce the risk of lapse (or relapse) of conflict, one can presume that in order for these initiatives to be most fruitful, the proper harmonization of their implementation needs to take place. For this reason, it is essential to approach peace building in a

⁸⁸ United Nations, *Developing National Sustainable Development Strategies in Post-Conflict Countries*, p.16

⁸⁹ I. William Zartman, *The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments*, in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace process*, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (New York, US. Malgave Macmilan, 2003) 19-30 (p.20)

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p.21

⁹¹ *Ibid*.

⁹² *Ibid*.

holistic manner, as a method to utilize conflict as an opportunity for positive change. Equally important is the awareness that reoccurrence is much more likely once violent conflict has already occurred in a state.⁹³ However, this does not mean that relapse becomes inevitable. On the contrary, in post conflict scenarios, there is a possibility to see how a past conflict relates to the present grievances, as well as expand on how peace building can be used to stimulate positive growth by identifying potential triggers of relapse.

4.1. The Necessity of Practical Harmonization

Considering the intimate relationship that the various dimensions of peace building have to one another, the proper synchronization of their implementation is crucial for the foundation of conflict transformation. Though there are a variety of perspectives when considering national priorities, through harmonization, this multi-dimensional approach aims to not only address previous sources of conflict, but simultaneously establish a stable sense of security. In this sense, security and development go hand-in-hand when attempting to construct peace building strategies and development plans.⁹⁴ This is supported by the belief that without an end to the violence in sight, the peace process is flawed and unable to reach its full potential. In this regard, it is key that the actors present in the conflict are cooperative and ready for the transition to peace. If there remain incompatible groups that have the potential to bring about violence, there is a direct decrease in the belief that investment in peace processes will be fruitful. For this reason, the timing of the negotiation process is important to consider.

Additionally, there is a general belief that it is of utmost importance to begin assessing the national capacities for country-specific development as soon as there is any indication that the conflict may be coming to an end.⁹⁵ Timing, in this context, is critical because immediately following a conflict, the population is likely to have high emotions and low trust.⁹⁶ In these cases, there will be an expectation for change, that when if not met, creates a possibility for relapse.⁹⁷ This then brings the role of establishing strategic development plans to the forefront of the peace process, since, in most societies, the government in power will be the main determinant of these procedures. Because of this, it is evident that in order to approach peace building holistically, the harmonization of the four pillars focused on thus far are integral to their success.

4.2. Peace Efforts and Reoccurrence of Civil War

Though one of the main goal's when implementing peace building initiatives is to avoid the reoccurrence of violent conflict, the unfortunate truth is that once a country has suffered from war, especially an internal war, the likelihood of relapse is significantly increased. In this regard,

⁹³ Barbara F. Walter, *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace*, p.3

⁹⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1*, [New York, US. UNGA, 2005]<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf>[April 3, 2019] (p. 2 para. 6)

⁹⁵ Arnim Langer, Graham K. Brown, *Building Sustainable Peace*, p. 11

⁹⁶ United Nations Secretary General, *Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, p. 4 para. 8

⁹⁷ Dirk Salmons, *Security: An Absolute Prerequisite*, p. 34

there is the potential for a nation to enter a ‘conflict trap’.⁹⁸ This cycle may occur for a variety of reasons, a flawed peace process being one of the major predictors.⁹⁹

Scholars in conflict and resolution, such as Barbara F. Walter, argue that the reoccurrence of violent conflict can be triggered by past conflicts only if met with political or economic incentives to take arms.¹⁰⁰ Through this perspective, there are several factors to consider when evaluating the reoccurrence of violence, some of which are: the demands of the rebel groups; remaining combat weariness; length of conflict; cost of conflict; the reconciliation of main grievances; geographic distribution of the combatants; and the mechanisms that influence the end of the original conflict.¹⁰¹ In saying this, how the conflict began, how it was fought, and how it ended are fundamental to the process of peace building.

In further studies, Walter has gone on to state the importance of good governance as the face of conflict transformation, arguing that a lack of commitment to peace is more likely to trigger reoccurrence than development, capacity, or previous conflicts.¹⁰² Throughout the presented research, we will consider this sort of perspective as valuable due to the fact that strong national institutions are necessary for development strategies. On the other hand, we also find it beneficial to understand the relationship between holistic peace building, that incorporates a multi-dimensional peace building approach (one of which being political compliance), when striving to reduce the risk of reoccurrence. The argumentation presented is that if there is a weak link in the foundation of the peace process, the subsequent steps cannot be sustainable and may undermine any success seen in other dimensions.

⁹⁸ Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, p.4

⁹⁹ John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, p. 59

¹⁰⁰ Barbara F. Walter, *Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War*, (California. US: Sage Publications, Journal of Peace Research, 2004) <http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/PS439G/readings/walter_2004.pdf> [April 3, 2019] (p. 372)

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 375

¹⁰² Barbara F. Walter, *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace*, p.4

III. CASE STUDY OF COLOMBIA

1. Background on Colombia and Internal Violence

Since World War II, internal conflict and civil war have killed about 16 million people worldwide.¹⁰³ This type of violence can be devastating for the respective country and is certain to leave long-term consequences for its inhabitants to process for many years to follow, even after the end of immediate conflict. Recalling the theories aforementioned by Lederach and Galtung that we have recognized as essential to the understanding of conflict, violence can be described as an avoidable and negative dimension that is likely to emerge due to tensions within a nation reaching a boiling point. In this regard, there are often interrelated and underlying sources of conflict that, if not adequately addressed during a peace process, can be the best predictors for recurrence.

In the case of Colombia, violent internal conflict has been a persistent threat to human security and their ability to stabilize as a state for decades. The complexity of this ferocious time of war creates an obstacle when attempting to address the multitude of dynamic particularities that took place, although the severity makes it equally important to address. According to a report published by the Colombian Historical Memory Group, between the years 1958 and 2012 there were 8.6 million direct or indirect victims of conflict. Notably, this includes approximately 47,000 people forcibly disappeared, 267,000 killed, more than 7 million internally displaced, and over 32,000 kidnapped by various organized groups.¹⁰⁴

In the forthcoming sections, we will elaborate on what elements were present in the state that created a suitable environment for guerrilla groups and internal war to become so chillingly profound. For the purpose of this research, it is fundamental to reach an understanding of the details that led up to violent conflict in order to establish an understanding that the previous sources of conflict that led to the emergence of guerrilla groups (and in turn, mass violence) can still be seen today.

By analyzing the historical context and leading up to the present day issues, this case-study will reveal the sources of conflict, present the evolution of violence, and discuss the peace process and final peace agreement. This will serve as a mechanism to understand the factors that influenced of the emergence of violence as well as recognize their relationship to one another. Further, by identifying the leading challenges seen in Colombia currently, we will take note of how many of the indicators that led to violence previously can still be seen today. This process will be essential in understanding why reoccurrence may be possible in this case.

1.1. Historical Context

Notably, Colombia has been recognized as a country that has long suffered from instability and internal violence. One of the first notable occurrences of such violence was the ten year long

¹⁰³ Anke Hoeffler, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, Sarah von Billerbeck, *Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding*, p.2

¹⁰⁴ Institute for Integrated Transitions, *The Colombian Peace Talks: Practical Lessons for Negotiators Worldwide*, (IFIT, 2018) <<https://www.ifit-transitions.org/files/documents/colombia-peace-talks-final-web.pdf/view>> [May 15, 2019] p.6

civil war from 1948 until 1958, *La Violencia* (The Violence), which killed an estimated 200,000 people.¹⁰⁵ This was a battle between the paramilitary forces of the Conservative and Liberal parties following the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a popular candidate for the 1949 election.¹⁰⁶ At the time, there was a switch in the political power dynamics within the country after the 1946 elections, in which conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez assumed office.¹⁰⁷

Previously, the Colombian Liberal party was dominant for sixteen years, creating the space for tensions to reach a tipping point during the unexpected political transition. Quickly began the difficult uphill battle to protect the distribution of socioeconomic rights, in particular for liberals and landowners residing rural Colombia, under the new Conservative reign.¹⁰⁸ As a response to the growing social tensions, Gaitán led a popular social movement in demand for Ospina's government to face the primary issues seen in the nation.¹⁰⁹ The political presence of Gaitán provided a source of comfort and security for the common civilians of Colombia. His initiatives included education, health, urban development and housing, making him appealing to the Liberal masses.¹¹⁰ In response to these increasing provocations, President Ospina resorted to police enforcement of Conservative privileges in rural areas, only making the socioeconomic disparity significantly worse.¹¹¹

1.1.1. *La Violencia*

On April 9, 1948, in Colombia's capital, Bogotá, Gaitán was assassinated in broad daylight, triggering the partial collapse of the institutional structure and the state as whole.¹¹² Between 1948 and 1958, *La Violencia* took the lives of more than 200,000 Colombians.¹¹³ Taking these events into consideration, theorists argue that there were several identifiable predictors in relation to the outburst of chaos. Different theorists differ in identifying the true root causes of this conflict; Although it can be rationalized that the elements present were intertwined and intensified by each other. Economic motivations by the political parties in power can be said to have worsened the already present rifts between social groups, while the lack of equality in the socioeconomic dimension was growing rapidly, creating increased fear and mistrust. Though this was not the first occurrence of its kind, it is significant in Colombia's history with internal violence because it reinforces the notion that when there is no capacity for constructive dialogue in a society, conflict between incompatible parties creates space for violence.

As a result of Gaitán's assassination, during the 1949 election, the Liberal party did not present a candidate; Therefore allowing for the Conservative rule to continue.¹¹⁴ President

¹⁰⁵ World Peace Foundation, *Colombia: La Violencia*, (World Peace Foundation: 2016) <<https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/colombia-la-violencia-2/>> [April 12, 2019]

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Norman A. Bailey, *La Violencia in Colombia*, in *Journal of Inter-American Studies* Vol. 9 No. 4 (New York, US, Cambridge University Press, 1967) p.561

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.564

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Phil Gunson, Andrew Thompson, and Greg Chamberlain, *The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of South America*, (London: Routledge, 1989) p.34

¹¹³ World Peace Foundation, *Colombia: La Violencia*

¹¹⁴ Phil Gunson, Andrew Thompson, and Greg Chamberlain, *The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of South America*, p.34

Laureano Gómez's (1950-1953) attempts to introduce a fascist state immensely intensified the issues at hand between opposing political parties and their sympathizers. Just a year after assuming power his declining health required that he allow Roberto Urdaneta Arbaláez to become acting president in 1951; However, when Gómez tried to resume his presidency in 1953 a coup d'état was put in place in an attempt to end the violence that was taking place throughout Colombia.¹¹⁵ Leader of the coup d'état, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed presidency thereafter from 1953-1957.¹¹⁶ Contrary to his promises to stimulate the economy, there was a sudden fall in coffee prices in 1957 that allowed for Colombia's foreign debt to rise to \$350,000,000. Further, factors such as Rojas' dictatorship style and resistance in giving up power led to the military junta assumption of power of 1957.

1.1.2. The National Front (Frente Nacional)

In response to Rojas' populist style and as a method to reach a compromise between opposing parties, Liberal and Conservative party elites signed a power-sharing agreement against the regime, which began the National Front (Frente Nacional).¹¹⁷ This coalition was established by Alberto Lleras Camargo, representing the Liberals, and Laureano Gómez, leader of the Conservative Party, in the Declaration of Sitges in 1957.¹¹⁸ The purpose of this arrangement was to provide an alternation between the two parties in power, aiming to have an equal share of ministerial and other government posts, as well as equal representation on all executive and legislative bodies.¹¹⁹ Though the National Front managed to officially end La Violencia, they did not adequately address the underlying sources of conflict, mainly the issue of unequal land distribution, allowing for violence to continue in rural areas.¹²⁰

It is important to note that in this scenario, the sequence of events that took place in Colombia surrounding their socioeconomic inequality and political instability can be identified as root causes of incompatibility that fed off one another creating patterns of violence. Though the nation was considered to be one of the more stable and developed in Latin America in prior decades, their inability to promote intersectional socioeconomic equality or establish political durability proved to create intense tensions within the different groups in their society. When we consider some of the theories presented previously, we can see that there are various indicators that violence had become inevitable.

1.2 Guerrilla Groups and the National Reaction

As a reaction to the lack of human security¹²¹ provided by the state, during the 1960s

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.126

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.192

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Roderick T.Groves, *The Colombian National Front and Administrative Reform*, (Northern Illinois University: Sage Publications, 1974) p.317

¹²⁰ Alfredo Molano, *The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History*, (NACLA, 2007) <<https://nacla.org/article/evolution-farc-guerrilla-group%27s-long-history>>[April 23, 2019]

¹²¹ Human security can be defined in various ways, however for the purpose of this research we will use the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report's definition of human security which recognizes the scope of global security as including threats in seven areas: economy, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. For more,

several self-sufficient enclaves such as: the Independent Republics, Marquetalia Republic, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC), and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) emerged as a way for those seeking to break through the rigid political environment to attempt to gain acknowledgment.¹²² These groups can be traced to have been created during *La Violencia*, though they grew significantly in power as time passed without any socioeconomic progression.¹²³

During this time, the worsening economy was at a near standstill and increasing social tensions created a clear division among Colombians during the 1962 election, in which only about half of the eligible population took part. During the presidency of Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966), in congruence with the political unrest, devaluation of the peso, wage increases among unionized workers, and rampant inflations, the influence of the marxist guerrilla groups became dangerously unavoidable, especially that of FARC.¹²⁴

1.2.1. *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC)*

Over time, FARC established a centralized hierarchical structure, military code, political program, general staff, and training school. The militia group was able to flourish during a time of intense class turmoil due to the severe inequality taking place primarily concerning land distribution and wealth in rural areas.¹²⁵ The National Front was interested predominantly in helping large landowners through investing and using peasant land for their own gain. By heavily subsidizing large-scale industrial farmers and violently pushing out the small landholders, by the year 1969 there were approximately 400,000 families who had lost their land who were suffering from malnutrition and lack of basic medical care.¹²⁶

The increasing levels of inequality gave FARC additional momentum, allowing them to become a legitimate military organization over time. FARC quickly gained power in numbers and transformed from a movement of about 500 to a small army of 3,000 between the years of 1970 and 1982, with their main priorities being to focus on the injustices that were being undertaken by the government such as unemployment and alternative crop development.¹²⁷ Initially, FARC was seen as a peasant uprising; Though by the early 1980s they officially added the title of “the people’s army” to their name, establishing themselves as the FARC-EP.¹²⁸ By this point, the status of the rural farmers living in areas that were being controlled by the government was becoming desperate, leading to the eventual embrace of illicit crop cultivation.¹²⁹ This became a pivotal moment for the guerrilla force because, although they originally disapproved of the growth of coca, they acknowledged that a ban would weaken their support system and possibly cause the farmers they

see: United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1994*, (New York, US: UNDP, 1994) <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf> [March 13, 2019]

¹²² Maria del Pilar López-Urbe and Fabio Sanchez Torres, *On the agrarian origins of civil conflict in Colombia*, (Stanford University: Latin American and Caribbean Centre, 2018) <<http://www.lse.ac.uk/lacc/publications/PDFs/Sanchez-LopezUrbe-OriginOfConflict-03-12-2017.pdf>> [April 5, 2019] p.9

¹²³ Ibid.,p.8

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.9

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Gary Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, (New York, US: Zed Books Ltd, 2011) p.11

¹²⁸ Ibid.,p.12

¹²⁹ Ibid.

were representing to turn their backs. Consequently, this major shift in FARC's strategy created a 'coca boom,' the major influx of income by taxing drug production that gave them the opportunity to further establish themselves as a powerful force.

As of today, FARC remains one of the largest, and richest guerrilla groups to have ever existed. The fact that such a powerful organization was able to grow in the fashion that it did is supported by the notion that when the government in power is either not capable nor genuinely invested in the overall security and equality of all of its citizens, social frustrations will become unbearable. To this end, based on the theories previously presented, the violence that broke out was not necessarily inevitable until it was met with consistent oppression of marginalized groups.

1.2.2. A Flawed Attempt at Negotiating for Peace: 'Democratic Security' Approach

When considering the evolution of the peace negotiations that eventually brought the decades of internal violence to an end, it should be noted that the presence of several different guerrilla groups posed a unique challenge for the government to find a way to consolidate the numerous priorities. The Colombian government attempted to establish peace agreements steadily over several decades, while bursts of violence continued to run rampant in the state. By the 1980s the Colombian government had managed to reach peace agreements with M19, the EPL, and the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL).¹³⁰ As an effort to try to restructure the way that the government was functioning as well as increase human security, the former combatants were demobilized, given amnesty, and reintegrated both into civil society and the political system.¹³¹ Further, they were invited to participate in the constitutive assembly process of 1991 in which a new Colombian Constitution was formulated.¹³² This peace negotiation came to a halt just the next year due to violent attacks and the inability to come to an agreement on particular details of a ceasefire agreement.¹³³

Over the following twenty years, the next notable peace negotiation came to fruition; However, the angle in which the government chose to take was different from previous strategies. Between the years 2003 and 2005 over 37,000 combatants were demobilized.¹³⁴ The Colombian Government attempted to utilize the Peace and Justice Law, in an effort to give ex-combatants who acknowledged their crimes reduced prison sentences, yet the overwhelming amount of cases that were presented created a capacity dilemma in further processing these crimes.¹³⁵

This left FARC-EP and the ELN as the only active armed guerrilla groups present in the state. By 2010, as a result of failed attempts at establishing a peace agreement, public faith was low when former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez came into office.¹³⁶ At this time, the conflict reached a seemingly significant turning point as the government was able to strengthen its security institutions and regain control of the country's territories.¹³⁷ During Uribe's presidency, the

¹³⁰ Institute for Integrated Transitions, *The Colombian Peace Talks*, p.6

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid. p.6

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid, p.7

¹³⁷ Ibid.

creation of the ‘Democratic Security’ policy was presented as a mechanism to reestablish civil order and protect the nation’s inhabitants from violent actors within a framework of rights under the rule of law.¹³⁸ Through this discourse, the aim was to combat terrorists at all costs, as opposed to recognizing the political and socioeconomic sources of frustrations that may have led to their emergence. While on one hand this administration was able to weaken FARC-EP, the policy enabled a series of human rights violations which further lowered the ability for civil society members to feel protected by their own state.

Notwithstanding, though the Democratic Security Policy was fundamentally hypocritical in its implementation, it was able to weaken FARC-EP to the point of creating an opportunity to enter a fourth peace negotiation process which, in 2012, led to the General Agreement (Acuerdo General).¹³⁹ This agreement was the key moment for establishing the future structure, agenda, and rules that would follow in the Havana talks.

1.4. Havana Talks and the Formal Agreement

The peace dialogues that took place between the delegations of the Colombian Government and FARC-EP were split into two phases. Led by former vice president Humberto de la Calle and Iván Márquez (FARC-EP) as chief negotiators, these negotiations began in Oslo, Norway, before moving to Havana, Cuba permanently.

The first took place from February 23 until August 26, 2012, and was a comprehensive exploratory phase undergone through a series of private meetings in which a six-point negotiating agenda and procedural framework was created that the second phase, and formal final agreement, would be built upon. On September 2, the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera, hereinafter the peace agreement, or final agreement) was publicly announced with President Santos’ statement that “past mistakes will not be repeated.”¹⁴⁰

The signing of the General Agreement was momentous for creating the possibility for the final peace agreement between FARC-EP and the Colombian government after several failed attempts. Through the incorporation of six specific thematic items that had historically hindered the peace process from fully advancing, the components included sought to recognize that previous approaches stemmed from a centralist perspective and were fundamentally flawed due a variety of reasons, mainly the lack of protection of victim’s right to non-reoccurrence.¹⁴¹ This launched the beginning of the second phase of the Havana Talks in which the six thematic items agreed upon in phase one were to be negotiated, namely¹⁴²:

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ President Santos Speech on the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera) September 2012

¹⁴¹ Institute for Integrated Transitions, *The Colombian Peace Talks*, p.19

¹⁴² Franciso Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia: The Role of Philanthropy in Building a Shared Future*, (Colombia: Asociación de Fundaciones Empresariales, AFE, 2017) p.11

1. *Comprehensive rural reform/Reforma Rural Integral* (May 26, 2013): includes the implementation of reforms related to land access, rights, public good provision, and improve the living conditions of the rural Colombians who were most affected by the decades of armed conflict.
2. *Political participation/Participación Política* (November 6, 2013): refers to the attempt to enrich the political environment through the reinforcement of civil society participation so as to strengthen the overall governance.
3. *Solutions for the issue of illicit drugs/Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas* (May 16, 2014): describes the methods of addressing the production, taxation, and cultivation of illicit drugs, with a particular focus on the coca crops due to their link to organized crime.
4. *Victims and transitional justice/Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del Conflicto* (December 15, 2015): this component was handled with particular care because of its fragility and serious complexity. Through the inclusion of victim hearings, historical research commission, and the creation of a gender subcommittee after a year and half of negotiations an agreement was reached as to how to address the reparations for victims through transitional justice initiatives.
5. *Conditions for the end of conflict/Fin del Conflicto* (June 23, 2016): addresses the conditions necessary to establish a ceasefire and disarmament agreement between the state and FARC in order to increase security and reintegration of the FARC.
6. *Implementation and verification of agreements/Mecanismos de Seguimiento y Verificación* (August 24, 2016): finally, this element of the agenda extended its reach to incorporate the mechanisms for the effective implementation, verification, monitoring, and promotion of the final agreement which marked the official end of the negotiations.

These meetings consisted of delegations from both sides and applied the borrowed principle¹⁴³ of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”¹⁴⁴ Though this principle added a layer of complexity to the process, it further fostered a sense of fundamental mutual trust through the use of confidence building measures such as: an informal ceasefire, release of child combatants, liberation of prisoners, and demining programs.¹⁴⁵ Notably, the choice of the government to opt to begin the negotiations without a formal bilateral ceasefire was unique to this process; However, it was believed that the talks would be expedited since human lives depended on it.¹⁴⁶ Further, this peace process was unique from previous attempts because it was the most specific in its priority of building stable and lasting peace through the recognition of the six-point thematic agenda that established a precise end goal, that being *‘the end of conflict’*, and the formal bilateral ceasefire.¹⁴⁷ In order to foster a sense of transformation in the nation, the government focused on ‘territorial peace’ by the promotion of citizen participation, social reconciliation and trust building mechanisms, as well as by strengthening the local capacities where it was lacking the most.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ This principle was borrowed from the Northern Ireland ‘Good Friday Agreement’ signed April 10, 1998

¹⁴⁴ Institute for Integrated Transitions, *The Colombian Peace Talks*, p.7

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p.8

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.9

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.10

¹⁴⁸ Franciso Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia*, p.11

1.4.1. Referendum Rejection and Revisions: A Divided Society

As the peace negotiations came to a conclusion, a plebiscite to ratify the deal on October 2, 2016, was narrowly rejected by the population as 50.2% of voters did not support the proposed agreement.¹⁴⁹ Though it was by a slight percentage, this was a significant reminder of the intense divisions between rural and urban areas of the country. Subsequently, revisions had to be made including the involvement of the voters that had opposed, as a way to establish a dialogue with civil society. By considering the more than 500 recommendations that were proposed, on November 12, 2016, both sides announced that they had reached a new accord that was more inclusive of the voters who rejected the initial proposal.¹⁵⁰ This revision held over 50 significant updates, yet was still met with discouragement from the opposition who claimed that the changes were not significant enough.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, in an attempt to regain legitimacy and hasten the implementation of the newly revised deal, the government of former President Santos chose to pass the accord through congress in a “fast track” mechanism, as opposed to holding another plebiscite, meaning that it would be effective immediately.¹⁵² In this process, his coalition used their majority of congress to endorse the agreement, while the opposition refused. Though the Constitutional Court approved the validity of the agreement, the deep rooted controversial nature of it was exemplified in the 2018 Congressional and Presidential elections.

Despite its controversiality, the *Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace* signed by both FARC and the national government of former President Santos as a formal end to the armed conflict.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the key changes that the new peace agreement integrated were: “Zonas Veredales”, which are areas in which the FARC-EP combatants were to be relocated as a demobilization procedure; The commitment from FARC-EP to make a full inventory disclosure of their land, property, weapons and any other forms of financial resources as a means to provide reparations for victims; An increased emphasis on the importance of transitional justice through the creation of a special peace jurisdiction and tribunal; Recognition of the issue of property rights in regard to the use of expropriation mechanisms; Finally, the inclusion of the Special Peace Jurisdiction in the Colombian Constitutional Bloc.¹⁵⁴

1.4.2. Role of the International Community

The role of the international community in the process of formalizing the peace agreement was essential in its creation and finalization, as underlined by the Security Council of the United Nations in resolution A/RES/2261.¹⁵⁵ Importantly, according to former President Santos, without the aid of the international community serving as facilitators, guarantors, and third party observer states throughout the drafting process, the peace agreement may not have been possible.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.6

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Institute for Integrated Transitions, *The Colombian Peace Talks*, p. 25

¹⁵² Francisco Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia*, p. 12

¹⁵³ Peace Agreement, Colombian State and FARC-EP, *Final Agreement to the End of the Armed Conflict and Building Stable and Lasting Peace*, 2016 <<http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf>>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p.186

¹⁵⁵ United Nations, A/RES/2261, 2016 <<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2261>> [March 20, 2019]

¹⁵⁶ Peace Agreement, Colombian State and FARC-EP, *Final Agreement*, p.4

Acting as guarantors, Cuba and Norway aided in the stabilization process by increasing credibility and building mutual trust, as well as by providing formal meeting venues for that talks and negotiations to take place. Further, Norway's involvement in the determining of zones that had been contaminated by weapons and explosives of the civil war was useful as a measure to increase national security. Additionally, serving as observer states, the governments of Chile and Venezuela provided necessary support throughout the negotiations and final agreement. Further, through their unanimous agreement in A/RES/2261, the UN also played an important role by supporting the peace talks.¹⁵⁷ Extending beyond the negotiations, the UN committed to monitor the compliance of the final agreement and its verification as part of the final agreement section 6.3. "International verification component of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (*CMPVI*) (*Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo Final, CSIVI*)"¹⁵⁸

This section highlights the importance of the international community, indicating that their role should be to verify the progress and status of implementation, to take note of where the shortcomings arise, as well as recognize opportunities for improvement so as to strengthen the implementation of the agreement.¹⁵⁹ In this context, the countries that were a part of the peace negotiation process as observers and guarantors are to request reports on the progress of implementation in respect of the use and investment of public resources for the respective agreement.

Further, section 6.3.2. '*Composition of the verification mechanism and functions*' of the peace agreement recognizes the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA) as having a key role in the verification mechanism by providing vital support in the gathering, analysis, and preparation of implementation informations for a public pronouncement. In this regard, the Kroc Institute provides technical observation so as to develop the assessment and monitoring model of the CMPVI.¹⁶⁰

2. Contemporary Elements: Colliding Crises, A Cycle of Violence

On June 26, 2017, FARC-EP concluded the disarmament process by handing in all but a very small number of individual weapons to the United Nations as per the peace agreement signed the year prior. The 7,132 weapons that were collected signified the end of the most violent insurgency between the Colombian government and their largest guerrilla group in history, FARC-EP.

Though this was a great feat for the nation in the sense that it established a crucial ceasefire and formal peace agreement, other armed groups remain a threat and continue to cause devastation in the rural parts of Colombia where the production and trade of drugs such as marijuana and cocaine

¹⁵⁷ United Nations, A/RES/2261, 2016

¹⁵⁸ Peace Agreement, Colombian State and FARC-EP, *Final Agreement*, p.225

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p.223

¹⁶⁰ Peace Agreement, Colombian State and FARC-EP, *Final Agreement*, p. 223

have become increasingly prominent.¹⁶¹ Importantly, in a 2016 report from the Colombian Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) indicated that the ELN and AGC were seeking to gain control over previous FARC territories.¹⁶²

By taking a look at the interrelated current day elements seen such as: lack of political cooperation; remaining violent guerrilla groups; socioeconomic frustrations; high populations of internally displaced people; and the recent influx of refugees and immigrants from Venezuela, this section will focus on the contemporary issues visible that may create a suitable environment for a cycle of violence to take place during this fragile transitional period for Colombia.

2.1. A Look at the Modern Day Status

2.1.1. Persistence of Violence and Political Instability

In the days immediately following the signing of the final peace agreement, a dramatic spike in violence was a chilling reminder that change was not going to take place instantaneously. Between November 17 and 26, 2016, there were nine assassination attempts directed at civil society leaders and human rights defenders in particular.¹⁶³ Further, as Colombia approaches the three year mark of the formal peace accord, an estimated 500 activists, community leaders, and at least 130 demobilized FARC-EP members have been killed, with an additional 210,000 people displaced since what was hoped to be the end of devastating atrocities.¹⁶⁴ Prior to being in office, current President Iván Duque, during his time a senator, helped lead the “Vote No” initiative which led to the rejection of the initial peace agenda.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, by appointing fellow “No” campaign leaders into the institutions responsible for protecting and implementing the peace agreement, public faith again is being tested due to progression on the commitments included in the agreement reaching a near standstill.¹⁶⁶

The years following the end of a violent conflict have been proven to be some of the most crucial for the creation of strong state institutions that enable and promote sustainable peace to progress; However in light of resistance from the current government, according to a recent Gallup poll, 55 percent of Colombians believe that the government will not adequately follow through

“Today doesn't end the existence of the FARC, it ends our armed struggle... Farewell to arms, farewell to war, welcome to peace.”

—— Rodrigo Londono, FARC's top commander, who goes by his nom de guerre Timochenko

¹⁶¹ Manuela Nilsson, *Building Peace Amidst Violence: An Analysis of Colombia's Policies to Address Security and Development Challenges*, (Iberoamericana – Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 2018) <<https://www.iberoamericana.se/articles/10.16993/iberoamericana.411/>> (33-44)[April 2, 2019] p. 34

¹⁶² Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018, <<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/colombia>> [May 2, 2019]

¹⁶³ Nicholas Gray, *Colombia's Peace Deal Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming?* (New York, US. New York Times, 2019) <<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal.html>> [June 2, 2019]

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Fabio Andres Diaz, *Violence climbs in Colombia as president chips away at landmark peace deal with FARC guerrillas*, (The Conversation, 2019) <<https://theconversation.com/violence-climbs-in-colombia-as-president-chips-away-at-landmark-peace-deal-with-farc-guerrillas-115112>> [June 10, 2019]

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

with their commitments to the peace process and 62 percent fear that FARC will reemerge as a violent group.¹⁶⁷ Unfortunately, these fears are not misguided. In 2018 murders rose 3%, including that of 226 Afro-Colombian community leaders, activists, and peasant organizers who have vocally defended the peace deal.¹⁶⁸ Further giving reason to believe that peace is not certain, an approximate 1,700 former guerrillas have returned to arms, presumably going alternative militant groups.¹⁶⁹ A bombing by the ELN guerrilla group in February of 2019 similarly serves as an indicator that domestic terrorism is still a threat. As a response to the surge of violence, Colombia's armed forces have gotten more violent with their attacks on civilians and demobilized FARC members.

Although President Duque has received formal requests from the international community and FARC to adhere to the 2016 peace deal, his continuous refusal to cooperate and persistence that the accord is too lenient on former combatants, does not provide a source of hope.¹⁷⁰ FARC has also called on the people of Colombia to mobilize and defend peace. The inability for the government in power to stabilize and secure the basic human security of its citizens has historically proven to directly increase violent conflict, which leads many to believe that the climate in Colombia is reaching a dangerous tipping point as the agreement continuous to be dismantled.

2.2. Venezuela Refugee Crisis: The Recent Mass Influx of Refugees and Immigrants

Further complicating the continuous struggle seen in Colombia in their journey to stable and secure peace, the recent mass influx of Venezuelan refugees and immigrants seeking to gain access to basic goods and services poses an additional area of concern. Facing devastating political repression, life threatening shortages of food and medicine, lack of social services, and a toppled over economy, about ten percent of the population is estimated to have fled the country, with over 1 million relocating to Colombia, and thousands more entering on an every day basis.¹⁷¹

With an estimated 7.7 million remaining IDPs in Colombia, resources are wearing thin as the necessity for strong institutions that promote durable policies for the protection the various humanitarian needs becomes increasingly crucial for stable peace. Further, the risk of violence is heightened with social services being shifted from the Colombian population attempting to recover from the devastating internal war to the incoming Venezuelan peoples seeking asylum.

¹⁶⁷ Gallup Poll, #130 Colombia May 2019, <<https://imgcdn.larepublica.co/cms/2019/05/17085310/031800190000-GALLUP-POLL-130.pdf>> [June 2, 2019] p.19

¹⁶⁸ Fabio Andres Diaz, *Violence climbs in Colombia as president chips away at landmark peace deal with FARC guerrillas*, 2019

¹⁶⁹ Alicia Liliana Méndez, *Tras 5 años a la baja, homicidios subieron en el 2018*, (Colombia, El Tiempo, 2019) <<https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/indice-de-homicidios-crece-en-colombia-en-el-2018-313930>> [March 26, 2019]

¹⁷⁰ Fabio Andres Diaz, *Violence climbs in Colombia as president chips away at landmark peace deal with FARC guerrillas*, 2019

¹⁷¹ Melanie Teff and Daphne Panayotatos, *Crisis Colliding: The Mass Influx of Venezuelans Into the Dangerous Fragility of Post-Peace Agreement Colombia*, (Refugees International Field Report, 2019) <<https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/1/10/crisis-colliding-the-mass-influx-of-venezuelans-into-the-dangerous-fragility-of-post-peace-agreement-colombia>> [March 24, 2019] p.7

2.2.1. Quito Processes and Cartagena Declaration

In September 2018, regional governments in Latin America met in Quito, Ecuador to discuss the steps to follow as a response to Venezuela's refugee and migrant crisis. Through the adoption of the *Declaration of Quito on Human Mobility of Venezuelan Citizens in the Region* ("Quito I"), a foundation was built in order to create a more organized response between the regional actors involved.¹⁷² This included the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

In November, "Quito II" a regional Plan of Action, was set out that incorporated the prioritization of the creation of policies that regulated the protection of social and economic rights of Venezuelan immigrants. However, this process and its implementation varies from state to state and relies on the good will of regional governments.¹⁷³ The ad hoc nature of this process has led to significant challenges for Venezuelan immigrants as well as Colombia in particular. As countries adjust their entry requirements, or announce deadlines, shifts in migration are directly impacted. This was seen at least twice in 2018 when Ecuador and Peru created policies that led to mass movement through Colombia in an effort to reach the respective borders before the deadlines.¹⁷⁴



FIGURE 2: *Venezuela migration nears 'Mediterranean crisis point'*, BBC, 2018

Without the harmonization of policies that are implemented, these shifts will continue to lead to chaotic waves of migration that directly impact Colombia as their borders are seeing more than double the usual numbers.

An additional obstacle seen is the nature of the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol¹⁷⁵ and their definition of

¹⁷² Declaración de Quito Sobre Movilidad Humana de Ciudadanos Venezolanos en la Region, 2018, <<https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/declaracion-de-quito-sobre-movilidad-humana-de-ciudadanos-venezolanos-en-la-region/>> [April 16, 2019]

¹⁷³ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana, el Gobierno de Ecuador, *The II International Meeting of Quito concludes with the signing of the Action Plan on Human Mobility of Venezuelan citizens in the region*, 2018 <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/plan_de_accion_de_quito.pdf> [March 9, 2019]

¹⁷⁴ Melanie Teff and Daphne Panayotatos, *Crisis Colliding*, p.8

¹⁷⁵ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 1951 <<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>> [May 12, 2019]

what a refugee incorporates. The 1951 Refugee Convention identifies a refugee as a person with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”¹⁷⁶ Due to this definition, Venezuelans that are fleeing due to socioeconomic oppression, may not be protected under this narrow view. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expands on who is recognized as a refugee by incorporating those individuals who have “fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights, or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”¹⁷⁷ Despite the fact that many of the regional governments aforementioned have included the declaration in their legislation, resistance persists and threatens the protection of those seeking asylum outside of Venezuela.

2.2.1. Reality of Colombian Policies

A series of policies have been created in Colombia in an attempt to acknowledge the problematic nature of having such a vast amount of immigrants without legal status by former president Santos and continues to be undertaken by the current government of President Duque. Notably, in 2017 Colombia introduced temporary residence permits, PEPS, (Permiso Especial de Permanencia) that grant access to basic social services such as health, education, and employment for up to 90 days at a time, and are renewable for up to two years.¹⁷⁸ This policy was meant to be a generous attempt to establish a method that ensures the necessary resources for life are available for Venezuelan immigrants. However, confusion surrounding the process of receiving coverage, as well the nature of the rights protected has resulted in gaps in the access to essential resources. Additionally, limitations in the registration process pose an obstacle for promoting the full protection of the incoming population. It must be noted, as well, that though Colombia may be undertaking initiatives that promote inclusivity, they do not necessarily have the resources to fund such policies adequately. Similarly, the fact that the government has yet to properly address the past grievances and needs of their own population creates a sense of rivalry and competition among those in need of resources.

¹⁷⁶ UNHCR, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*

¹⁷⁷ Organization of American States, *Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama*, 1984, <https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf> [May 12, 2019]

¹⁷⁸ Migración Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Comunicado de prensa No. 41*, “Cancillería y Migración Colombia anuncian resolución para regularizar venezolanos en Colombia, 2017

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF PEACE BUILDING IN THE COLOMBIAN CONTEXT

Incompatibility is arguably a natural part of the dynamic ways in which humans interact. However, ensuring there are non-violent ways to approach this incompatibility is essential for the stability of a nation. Thus far, in this research we have established a foundational understanding for what the concept of peace building encompasses, both in theory and in practice. We have built on notions that theorize conflict, violence, and peace, as well as identified elements that can be seen in societies and recognized as sources of conflict. In doing so, we have acknowledged that peace building is a tool that can be utilized in a conflict scenario, both preceding and proceeding the signing of a peace agreement. By placing an emphasis on the idea that peace building must be holistic and integrated into the ways that human relationships function at all levels through constructive dialogue, we have also asserted the role of [*peace building*] in effectively eradicating the necessity for violence to (re)emerge in the face of incompatibility.

Based on the theories that have structured this research, elements such as: lack of political commitment to the peace process; the requests of rebel groups not being adequately addressed; combat weariness; the geographic location of the organized groups, incomplete reconciliation from past grievances; and the actual manner in which the conflict ended are all potential triggers of the reoccurrence of conflict, particularly for a state that has experienced civil war. Similarly, since for the purpose of this research the four pillars of holistic peace building are considered essential in the success of conflict transformation, an analysis of the contrast between the agreed upon goals and the actual implementation status in the Colombian State will create an understanding of where the weak links are that may presage the possibility of a *conflict trap*. Arguably, by addressing these problematic areas, a previous war may offer guidance in impeding reoccurrence.

1. Implementation of Peace Building Efforts Through the Peace Agreement

Considering the significance of the years immediately following the formal end of a conflict, in the forthcoming sections this research will consider reports and documents produced by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), which both FARC and the Colombian government included in the final agreement as being a technical observer on the status of implementation. Below, a chart produced by the Kroc Institute presents the level of implementation of each of the six thematic items on the final agreement agenda after the first two full years of implementation.¹⁷⁹ There are two points to contemplate upon while undertaking the analysis. First, the fact that the agreement covers all four dimensions of the holistic peace building framework in some way. Notably, security, governance, development, and implementation are all included. Even so, it is evident that implementation efforts are profoundly unbalanced. By looking at each item of the agenda respectively, in subsequent sections, we will

¹⁷⁹ For more, see: Iniciativa Barómetro, Matriz de Acuerdos de Paz, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia* (Informe 3, University of Notre Dame and Bogotá, Colombia, 2019) <https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/321729/190523_informe_3_final_final.pdf> [May 10, 2019]

break down the themes and sub themes¹⁸⁰ within each of the six agenda items so as to identify the degree that initial goal is being addressed and the significance of the gaps present for the future stability of Colombia.




FIGURE 3: Status of Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

1.1. Comprehensive Rural Reform/Reforma Rural Integral

1.1.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

The comprehensive rural reform (hereinafter RRI, as in the Spanish *reforma rural integral*) was agreed upon May 26, 2013, and is first item on the agenda due to its pertinence to the armed conflict itself.¹⁸¹ It is believed to be one of the most necessary elements to address in order to reconcile the underlying injustices in Colombia that can arguably be identified as major triggers for violence.¹⁸² The RRI component seeks to establish a solid foundation for the transformation of rural Colombia, ensure the rural population has equal access to resources for their health and well-being, as well as contribute to guarantee non-repetition of the conflict.¹⁸³ Initially, RRI was thought to be the first step toward a new Colombian countryside. This process was said to prioritize the access and use of land through the creation of a Land Fund, mass tilting processes for small and medium sized property, new mechanisms to resolve agrarian disputes, environmental protection, and other stipulations that focused a territorial based approach through infrastructural and social development. The health, economic stability, safety, and equality of the rural population was to be protected.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Due to limitations of this research, we will not be able to cover all 578 stipulations that are incorporated into the agreement. However, we will narrow down the gaps in implementation as narrowly as the sub themes allow in order to have a better understanding of what patterns are taking place.

¹⁸¹ Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p.19

¹⁸² Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p.19

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement*, (Report 2, University of Notre Dame and Bogotá, Colombia, 2018) <https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/288008/180830_english_policy_report_2.pdf> [May 10, 2019] p.17




FIGURE 4: Comprehensive Rural Reform

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

Notwithstanding, the evidence proves that RRI has been one of the least implemented pillars, as seen in the Figure 3; with less than 2 percent implementation of the 104 stipulations thus far. RRI encompasses three main themes: access and use of land, development programs with a territorial-based focus, and national plans for comprehensive rural reform.

1.1.2. Over Promised, Under Prioritized?

The level of implementation of the RRI element is central to establishing and reconciling past grievances that have taken place in Colombia. In this component, the major objectives are set out to treat the root sources of frustrations that have created a continuous cycle of marginalization and socioeconomic inequality and must be acknowledged as a priority in the process of transitioning towards peace. Notably, the goals and commitments that are set out in this dimension are extensive and may potentially require as much as 85 percent of the resources necessary for the final agreement.¹⁸⁵ This fact in itself shows a fundamental flaw in the planning of RRI. In order for sustainable development to be fruitful, it must be aware of the capacity limitations present in a nation.

The creation of the Land Fund by Decree Law 902 of 2017¹⁸⁶ as well as a Law 1849 of 2017 (Property Confiscation Code) were established as a way to increase small farmer land ownership and return land to victims. However, only small progress is being made in this regard. Less than ten percent of the of the 4 million hectares of land that are to be disbursed by 2028 have even been received as of 2019.¹⁸⁷ Though the level of implementation of many of the stipulations

¹⁸⁵ Contraloría General de la República, *Segundo informe al Congreso sobre la ejecución de los recursos y cumplimiento de las metas del componente para la paz del Plan Plurianual de Inversiones, 1 de enero 2017 a 30 de marzo de 2018* <Bogotá D.C., Colombia, 2018><<https://www.contraloria.gov.co/documents/20181/787219/Segundo+informe+al+Congreso+sobre+la+ejecuci%C3%B3n+de+los+recursos+y+cumplimiento+de+las+metas+del+componente+para+la+paz+del+Plan+Plurianual+de+Inversiones+1+de+enero+de+2017+a+30+de+marzo+de+2018.pdf/6af3e981-05e3-44b0-8d3d-c334edbc60c6>> [April 23, 2019] (p. 21)

¹⁸⁶ Decree Law 902 of 2017, “By means of which measures are adopted to facilitate the implementation of the Comprehensive Rural Reform contemplated in the Final Accord regarding land use, specifically the procedure for access and formalization of land and the Land Fund,”

¹⁸⁷ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia: Urgent Need to Adhere to the Spirit of the Accord*, (Latin American Working Group, Washington, D.C, US, 2019)<<https://www.lawg.org/wp-content/uploads/Colombia-Peace-Memo-March-2019.pdf>> [April 10, 2019] (p.6)

has increased from the 18 month mark and the 24 month mark, the fact that President Duque and his administration do not support the agreement to the extent that it extends to raises a concern for the populations that rely on this accord to restore their rights to their land since many of the stipulations have only gone as far as minimal implementation.¹⁸⁸

Senator María Fernanda da Cabal has introduced a bill as of September 2018 to reform law 1448 of 2011 (the Victims Law) which would directly undermine the process of land restitution.¹⁸⁹ The Victims Law was created as a means to promise to return land to displaced persons; However, the changes that Senator Fernanda da Cabal seeks to implement would increase the rights of ‘secondary occupants’, meaning that persons or business currently using the land who oppose the restitution now have more protection.¹⁹⁰

Further, gaps arise in the understanding of processes between PDETs and national participatory planning processes, as the legal and institutional measures are slow to progress, though they are outlined in the COPNES 3932 Document.¹⁹¹ The PDETs were created in the hopes of establishing a sense of community participation in the process of constructing local development plans, yet lack of established plans for how they will be implemented in the future creates a sense of insecurity moving forward.¹⁹² Though as of 2019 the Colombian government signed the last of the PDETs, without a formal next step, this can only go far. Considering the pace that Colombia is taking in implementing and protecting the rights of the rural population does not give much hope to the populations that rely on this change for a positive future. It is clear that the objectives set out in the RRI component are not ones that can be implemented over night, although the fact that these are recognized as being some of the most fundamental points that must be noted because of its importance in establishing a peaceful future for Colombia.

1.2. Political participation/Participación Política

1.2.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

Political Participation, the second item on the agreement agenda, incorporates measures to enhance democratic participation and establish guarantees for opposing political groups and individuals. This item was signed and agreed upon on November 6, 2013. This agenda item refers to the attempt to enrich the political environment through the reinforcement of civil society participation so as to strengthen the overall governance.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ National Council for Economic and Social Policy, *Guidelines for the articulation of the Framework Plan for the Implementation of the Final Agreement with the instruments for planning, programming and monitoring public policies of the national and territorial order, Document CONPES 3932*, (Bogotá, 2018)

¹⁹² Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.6

¹⁹³ Ibid.




FIGURE 5: Political Participation

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

The three themes of this point are: rights and security guarantees for the opposition and for political participation, democratic mechanisms for citizen participation, and measures to promote greater participation in national, regional, and local politics of all sectors, including the most vulnerable populations.¹⁹⁴ Together, these themes encompass 94 stipulations, of which Figure 5 shows only 13 percent have been completed, a bit of an increase from the 10 percent, 6 months prior.¹⁹⁵

Rights and Security Guarantees for the Opposition and for Political Participation includes two sub themes, guarantee for political opposition and security guarantees and protection for the exercise of politics (social leaders and human rights defenders) with 12 overall stipulations.¹⁹⁶ Of these 12, only two have been fully implemented in the guarantees for political opposition, with much less implementation in the latter.¹⁹⁷ This is particularly worrisome when considering the consistent lack of security surrounding human rights defenders and social leaders in recent years; Although, the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office was strengthened with Decree 2124 of December 2017, and issued 71 early warnings as of March 2018, underlying gaps still remain.¹⁹⁸

1.2.2. Lack of Protection of Human Rights Defenders

Thus far, out of the six agreed upon agenda items, the *Political Participation* element has been the least implemented, with nearly half not being initiated at all. Though there is a challenge in the evaluation of this item due to the potential long-term nature of some of the stipulations, there are equally many short-term elements that have not been thoroughly prioritized. Colombia has advanced mostly in areas relating to the establishment of the Dialogue Commission in which civil society members have sent proposals and guidelines for the citizen participation law and

¹⁹⁴ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 25

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.32

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 26

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p.44

guarantees of social protest; However, without the incorporation of such policies into laws and governmental regulations, these cannot be considered fully sound efforts yet due to the fact that they remain poorly coordinated.¹⁹⁹ In this sense, it is important to incorporate political systems that are inclusive of women and more diverse social groups as a mechanism to avoid the possibility of persistent polarization in the future.

A very clear gap that raises concern is the lack of security surrounding human rights defenders, social leaders, and journalists. The inadequate protection is significant in creating an environment in which society members feel free to voice their opinions. According to the Colombian Ombudsman's Office there was a 27 percent increase in murder of social leaders, with 15 being killed just in January 2019, and over 80 percent of these killings taking place in the territories beyond the prioritized 160 municipalities, such as: Chocó, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo, Cataqueá, Nariño, Antioquia, and Norte de Santander.²⁰⁰ This obstacle further shows the ways in which priorities remain in the urban areas, leaving the historically war ridden rural areas to continuously struggle for peace.

While President Duque has signed the Action Plan for the Protection of Social and Community Leaders, Human Rights Defenders, and Journalists (hereinafter PAO), this plan has not reached the level of implementation necessary to fully achieve safety for these social leaders. Human rights organizations have expressed concern about the lack of coordination with active social leaders and human rights defenders in the creation of this strategy and emphasize that the best way to actually keep them safe would be through the implementation of the notions included in the peace accord itself.²⁰¹

1.3. Solutions for the issue of illicit drugs/Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas

1.3.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

Colombia's peace agreement has the unique incorporation of the '*Solutions for the Issue of Illicit Drugs*' component due to its relevance in the conflict and violence in the state. This item of the peace agreement reached an agreement on May 16, 2014, and describes the methods of addressing the production, taxation, and cultivation of illicit drugs, with a particular focus on the coca crops due to their link to organized crime.²⁰² Consisting of three main themes and of a total of 66 stipulations, less than two percent have been completed as of November 2018, seen in Figure 6 below. This aligns with the amount of implementation in the RRI sector, two dimensions that go hand-in-hand since the issue of illicit crop cultivation is primarily focused in the rural areas.

¹⁹⁹ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 33

²⁰⁰ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.2

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.




FIGURE 6: Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

Substitution Program for Crops for Illicit Purposes encompasses two major sub themes: Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops of Illicit Use (hereinafter PNIS) and Comprehensive Program Substitution and Alternative Development Plans (hereinafter PISDA) which contain 35 stipulations together, most of which are at a minimum level of initiation, and only one has been fully completed in the PNIS area. Through the PNIS, over 34,767 hectares of coca have been voluntarily eradicated by almost 100,00 families, showing a steady growth and a stable compliance rate of over 90 percent throughout 56 different municipalities in 14 departments of Colombia. Further, over 1,000 crop harvesters have been registered for alternative job training programs.²⁰³ It is also important to note the 1,065 families that have entered the ‘Formalize Land Program,’ which legalizes family farms that agree to no longer cultivate illicit crops although they may be in areas of high concentration.²⁰⁴ These areas of success should be acknowledged although most of their stipulations have not exceeded past minimum implementation. The numbers show that there is an effort being made by the rural population in hopes of establishing some level of positive change, which should ideally be met with national compliance of their commitments as well.

1.3.2. A Need for Sustainable Substitutions

It is evident that the challenge of eradicating coca in Colombia will not be an easy task. This process will be a long-term endeavor that requires consistent implementation from all sides. Evidence shows that the rural population and FARC have both made efforts to lower the amount of coca cultivation; However the spike that occurred in 2017 (reaching about 171,000 hectares) created an opportunity for international pressure to influence the status of sustainable progress. As a response to the increasing pressure for action, President Duque stated that his administration will eradicate 100,000 illicit crops in 2019.²⁰⁵ While this may seem commendable, his plan includes the potential use of military and police force and of aerial fumigation with glyphosate (dependent

²⁰³ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p. 7

²⁰⁴ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 45

²⁰⁵ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.7

on the Constitutional Court decision of legality) — which was banned in 2015 given its effect on the environment and public health.²⁰⁶ If this were to be the case, eradicating the crops will take precedent over the health and well-being of those who are residing in the rural areas of Colombia, which is the subject of concern for many of the inhabitants.

When considering other countries who have faced a similar issue, the case of Bolivia may offer some hope as for strategy efforts. Notably, Bolivia was able to reduce the cultivation of coca (registering a 34 percent net drop in production from 2010-2014).²⁰⁷ In this case, they are using a cooperative reduction program that allows the registered coca farmers to only cultivate 1,600-2,500 square meters of coca, and compliance is assured through monitoring systems, a registry of growers, and implementation of a systematic database.²⁰⁸ As a result, their violence and conflict surrounding the farming of coca was directly reduced. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) representative in Bolivia, the key to this level of success is “through dialogue, participation of coca growers’ unions, and a policy based on respect for human rights.”²⁰⁹ This further confirms the fact that efforts to forcibly eradicate coca would not be a fruitful route for Colombia to follow. One of the major gaps that would likely show improvement in the implantation status would include the creation of new substitution crops for farmers to cultivate.

Particularly, a gap that overlaps with both the problem of illicit crops, security, and the political dimension can be seen in the fact that 63 community leaders working on the voluntary eradication strategy were murdered since the peace agreement, as well as numerous families participating in the crop substitution program.²¹⁰ Further, recalling the fact that the rural reform and the cultivation of illegal crops go hand-in-hand, it would be beneficial for Colombia to effectively establish more clearly coordinated systems between national and territorial levels so as to create a flow of dialogue between all levels. These elements have been seen to directly effect the advancement of social, economic, and environmental rights, which have been the source of much of the violence in Colombia.

1.4. Victims and transitional justice/Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del Conflict:

1.4.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

The fourth item agreed upon was *Victims of the Conflict and Transitional Justice*, this component was handled with particular care because of its fragility and serious complexity. Through the inclusion of victim hearings, historical research commission, and the creation of a gender subcommittee, after a year and half of negotiations an agreement was reached as to how to address the reparations for victims through transitional justice initiatives and was agreed on December 15, 2015.²¹¹ This particularly sensitive component acknowledges the rights of victims to the greatest extent in an effort to ensure accountability for the way the conflict may have affected the lives of the population.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.7

²⁰⁷ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 50

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.7

²¹¹ Franciso Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia*, p. 11




FIGURE 7: Victims and Transitional Justice

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

This component consists of four major themes: Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition, with a total of 90 stipulations. Figure 7 (below) shows that almost half of these stipulations have not yet been minimally initiated, although when this component was being discussed in the Havana Talks, the voices of the victims were included as being a major priority.²¹² The peace agreement, in particular, includes an unprecedented amount of victim centered provisions, especially in the context of transitional justice.

Importantly the theme *'Truth: Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Non-Repetition,'* includes sub themes: truth, coexistence, and non-repetition commission (hereinafter CEV); and special unit for the search of disappeared people (hereinafter UBPD) consisting of 28 total of stipulations. Most of them have not been implemented yet, though this aligns with many other peace accords in terms of progression pace, according to the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) provided by the Kroc Institute.²¹³ The creation and activation of the CEV and UBPD are considered positive steps for progress as legislative and administrative efforts began with Decree 589 of 2017.²¹⁴ *'Justice: Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Non-Repetition'* consists of 38 total stipulations, with 17 not being initiated, ten being minimally initiated, six intermediately initiated and five have reached completion as of November 2018.²¹⁵

1.4.2. Progress Amidst Political Contention

Considering the unique and comprehensive ways that the peace agreement incorporated the voices of victims fostered a sense of hope when it was being negotiated, however, as with most other of the agreement goals, it falls short of fulfillment in practice due to a lack of coordination and cooperation from a multi-level perspective. Lack of prioritization of the transitional justice system by the Duque Administration poses a risk for the future progress of this crucial agenda component. The final agreement called for the establishment of a system that focused on transitional justice and due process, based on the clarification and punishment of those main actors

²¹² Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 58

²¹³ For more see: Kroc Institute, Peace Accord Matrix, Barometer Initiative <<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer>>

²¹⁴ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 54

²¹⁵ Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p. 136

responsible for the crimes involved and surrounding the armed conflict. Three core bodies were established to focus on the victims' rights in this regard; JEP, CEV, and UPBD. Notably, these entities made operational headway quickly, comparative to other peace agreements, and in August 2018 the Colombian Constitutional Court approved the statute of JEP.²¹⁶ This statute was useful in clarifying points relating to prison times and its expansion to include the sexual crimes against minors that were committed during the conflict.²¹⁷

Notwithstanding, as time progresses, the future status of such initiatives remains uncertain. Financial shortages for the comprehensive transitional justice system severely hinders their ability to conduct fieldwork where it is needed the most, predominantly in rural areas.²¹⁸ In February 2019 JEP had expressed concerns about the lack of resources allocated for the implementation of the peace agreement, yet were not met with much support from the National Development Planning Department.²¹⁹ These shortages have effected the ability for JEP to function to its full ability, causing it to reduce its presence in former conflict zones by half, disproportionately effecting the victims in rural areas.²²⁰ Similarly, budget cuts of up to 40 percent pose a major threat to the progress of CEV and their ability to reach territories that need it the most. Additionally, in March 2019, President Duque objected the Constitutional Court ruling that provided JEP necessary legal backing for their decisions.²²¹ This decision was controversial among opposing sectors of the Colombian population. The population that was in favor of the peace agreement urged the President to approve the law so that JEP could carry out their work in a timely manner, while the opposition claimed that this would not be convenient for the country.²²²

Although major obstacles cause persistent challenges for JEP, this does not diminish the accomplishments made thus far. According to the UN Verification Mission in Colombia over 13,000 people have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of JEP as of October 2018.²²³ Similarly, CEV and UPBD have announced plans to undertake significant steps in the search for truth regardless of budget cuts.²²⁴ When the peace agreement was being negotiated, the topic of prioritizing victims' rights was at the forefront of the conversation, however it is clear that in the practical implementation of these initiatives, resistance from the current administration allows for a cycle of polarization to continue.²²⁵

²¹⁶ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p. 4

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.4

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 6

²²⁰ Ibid, p.5

²²¹ Ibid, p.4

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ On June 27, 2019, a Secretary General Report on the Verification Mission in Colombia was released that includes an update on the situation regarding the CEV. As of June 2019, the first of the series of 'non-repetition' debates was initiated. This debate was orientated around the violence that has been inflicted on social leaders, human rights defenders, and journalists. Further, the CEV has announced that an agreement has been made to begin a dialogue with FARC-EP to contribute to their work. For more, see: UN Secretary General Report, *United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia S/2019/530*, (United Nations Security Council, 2019) <<https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1918521.pdf>> [June 29, 2019]

²²⁵ On June 27, 2019, a Secretary General Report on the Verification Mission in Colombia was released that includes an update on the situation regarding JEP. In particular, it is important to note that as of June 2019, the statutory law of JEP was enacted, granting a solid legal framework and autonomy. For more, please see: UN Secretary General Report, *United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia S/2019/530*, (United Nations Security Council, 2019) <<https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1918521.pdf>> [June 29, 2019]

1.5. Conditions for the end of conflict/Fin del Conflicto:

1.5.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

Conditions for the End of Conflict, the central aim of the Havana Talks, addresses the conditions necessary to establish a bilateral ceasefire and disarmament agreement between the state and FARC in order to increase security and reintegration of the FARC, and was agreed upon on June 23, 2016.²²⁶ The four themes of this agenda item focus on areas ensuring security, the laying down of arms, the reincorporation of FARC members, and comprehensive action against land mines. As seen in Figure 3 and 7, this is one of the most fully implemented items, much of which was in a timely manner following the signing of the agreement. Of the 140 stipulations, 112 have begun being implemented, at the two year mark.²²⁷




FIGURE 8: Conditions for the End of Conflict

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

The first theme ‘*Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and End to Hostilities and Laying Down of Arms*’ consists of 35 stipulations, most of which have been fully completed. Accomplishments such as the implementation of the Cantonment Zones for the housing of former combatants during the disarmament phase, and the laying down of arms were more successful and rapid than most other peace processes to date. In the progression of this component during and after the agreement, the participation and compliance of FARC is crucial to acknowledge.

Next, the ‘*Reincorporation of the FARC into Civilian Life (economically, socially, and politically)*’ has 39 total stipulations, with some positive areas of progression. First, the Constitutional Reform 03 of 2017 that provided FARC with legal status to establish themselves as a political party marked an important shift.²²⁸ As of July 2018, FARC began their official tenure in Congress. However, less progress has been made in areas regarding the social and economic reintegration of FARC members.

Following, the theme ‘*Comprehensive Action Against Land Mines*’ has two stipulations, one at the minimum level and one at the intermediate level. To this extent, there has been a level of success in the demining programs, with more land being cleared in the first 18 months of

²²⁶ Franciso Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia*, p. 11

²²⁷ Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p. 72

²²⁸ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 37

implementation than in the past decade.²²⁹ This progress is reflective of the former combatants commitment to the cleaning and decontamination of the territory, which may further be used as a catalyst for the reincorporation and reconciliation process. Finally, the ‘Security’ component contains seven sub themes: national political pact, national commission on security guarantees (hereinafter CNGS), special investigation unit (UEI), comprehensive security system for the exercise of politics (SISEP), security and protection program for the territories, supervision of private security and surveillance services, and prevention and fights against corruption consisting of 64 total stipulations. Eight percent of these 64 have been implemented fully, 16 percent are intermediately implemented, while the remaining are either minimally implemented or not at all implemented thus far.²³⁰ Decree Laws 154, 989, and 895 have established the institutions CNGS, UEI, and SISEP, respectively, as of 2017.²³¹

1.5.2. Unbalanced Progress, a Source of Weariness

Evidently, the results of the implementation of this theme are the most unbalanced. Notably, many of the stipulations regarding the ceasefire and the laying down of arms have been much more successful than other peace agreements, with implementation reaching its goals quickly despite lack of proper utilities. The creation of a Tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MMV) coordinated the collection of almost 9,000 weapons as well as the final destruction of 750 caches of weapons and explosives.²³²

At the same time, the social and economic reincorporation programs have progressed much slower. This step is absolutely fundamental to the consistent progression and promotion of peace for the future of Colombia. There is a lack of commitment to implementation of the Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces (ETCRs), although they made initial progress in the predatory measures.²³³ More than half of the ETCRs, the zones where FARC released their arms, have been noted by the UN Mission to Colombia, as having less than satisfactory conditions, and six were deemed unsatisfactory.²³⁴ Additionally, these ETCRs, as well as the monthly allowance that the former combatants are dependent on, will only be supported until August 2019. No formal next step has been announced by the National Reintegration Council in regards to the upcoming steps to follow.²³⁵ In this regard, there is a need for more acceleration in the policies set out to integrate former combatants. Further threatening the status of security among the Colombian population is the lack of protection of former FARC members. As noted in Chapter III, the Case Study of Colombia, at least 85 former combatants have been murdered since the peace agreement. This point alone can be identified as a major trigger for the reemergence of violence. Considering the fragile status of the nation, the cooperation from FARC is not being met with the same level of compliance and should be a focal point.

²²⁹ Ibid, p. 38

²³⁰ Ibid, p. 40

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Kroc Institute, *Tercer Informe sobre el Estado de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia*, p.66

²³³ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 34

²³⁴ UN Secretary General Report, *United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia*, p. 5

²³⁵ Andres Fernández Aponte, *Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia*, p.3

1.6. Implementation and verification of agreements/Mecanismos de Seguimiento y Verificación

1.6.1. Agreement Goal and Implementation in Practice

The sixth, and final, component of the peace agreement is *Implementation, Verification Mechanisms, and Endorsement of Agreements*, which was finalized on August 24, 2016. This item extends its scope to incorporate the mechanisms for the effective implementation, verification, monitoring, and promotion of the final agreement which marked the official end of the negotiations.²³⁶ This component further establishes the Colombian peace agreement as unique due to its particularly comprehensive set of strategies for the verification and monitoring of the agreement. By considering Figure 3 and 8 it is visible that this is the most implemented of the six agenda items with more than half being fully implemented.




FIGURE 9: Implementation and Verification of Agreements

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame (USA), 2018

This component consists of 9 sub themes: Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI) the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI); Measures for planning and financing of the accord; Normative implementation priorities; Ethnic Chapter; International Verification Component; Intergrated Information System for the Post-Conflict (SIIPO) and other measures for implementation; International Accompaniment for Implementation; and finally, Pedagogy and publicity of the Final Agreement; and Ratification and Implementation Initiation.

1.6.2. Need for Coordination

Some significant advancements have been established regarding many areas of focus in this component. Initiatives have been undertaken to establish institutions such as CSIVI, SIIPO, The Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic peoples, the Colombia in Peace Fund, Areas Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMAC). While it should be acknowledged that these are important successes, at the same time, many delays have emerged due to legislative measures and

²³⁶ Franciso Noguera, Juan David Ferreira Vargas, *Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia*, p. 11

lack of coordination of the respective financing plan. This plays a big role in the actual implementation process of the agreement, as research has shown that verification mechanisms are directly related to the rate of implementation. In particular, the CSIVI was fully operational until some recent changes in membership status halted its progress, though the government designated a special group of senior officials to meet in place of the missing members.²³⁷ According to the 18 month mark report produced by the Kroc Institute, the CSIVI would benefit from being modified in such a way to address the new political realities.²³⁸ The CSIVI must be prioritized, especially, because it secures the platform for constructive dialogue between representatives of FARC and the government to resolve incompatibilities and establish peaceful solutions for possible disputes.

Further, the SIPO was created by Decree 1829 of 2017, yet as of 2018 it was not fully operational.²³⁹ Progress will be necessary in this regard due to the role the SIPO will play in ensuring there is access of information on the implementation process and accountability.²⁴⁰ This is important for not only the Colombian population and the institutions that rely on these funds, but also for the international stake-holders who contribute significantly. Four major funds can be identified, of which include: the UN Multi-donor Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, and the Sustainable Colombia Fund-IDB, whose contributions are crucial to the Colombia in Peace Fund.²⁴¹ According to the Kroc Institute Report, which uses the Peace Accord Matrix, comparative experiences with peace efforts have proven that the most successful mechanism of conflict transformation and verification include a third party actor.²⁴² In this regard, Colombia would benefit greatly from adopting this sort of mechanism to strengthen the overall accord implementation.²⁴³

²³⁷ Kroc Institute, *State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement: Report 2*, p. 62

²³⁸ Ibid, p.67

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 64

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid, p.65

²⁴² Ibid, p.67

²⁴³ Ibid.

V. FINAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION: A Conflict Trap or the Opportunity for Transformation?

Conflict, when embraced as an opportunity to stimulate constructive dialogue through a transformational approach, seeks to address the incompatible elements that contribute to social frustrations. Considering this, a holistic approach that incorporates a multi-dimensional framework of peace building is fundamental in preventing the emergence of destructive violence. For this reason, the present research has considered the four dimensions of: security (DDR); governance and national compliance; development and state capacities; and the importance of timing for negotiations and implementation as being the pillars that sustain a holistic peace process. These dimensions have been broken down in such a way to understand their roles respectively, as well as to see the ways in which they are deeply intertwined with each other. By gaining a comprehensive understanding of how the four dimensions must be genuinely fulfilled in order to achieve sustainable peace, this research has likewise acknowledged the notion that if one of these elements is not incorporated, the whole framework is therefore weakened.

Applying this holistic approach to the active peace agreement in Colombia suggests that there are numerous areas of concern regarding their implementation progress thus far. In particular, recalling the notion that countries that have experienced a previous civil war are often prone to recidivism, the necessity for a transformational approach to avoid a conflict trap is imperative. Evidently, elements such as cycles of political instability and socioeconomic inequality can be distinguished as having led to the incompatibility between the actors in their society. Ergo, this intense polarization created a suitable environment for violent guerrilla groups to emerge in response to the injustices taking place, predominantly in the rural and historically neglected areas of Colombia. Over the following several decades, peace negotiations were attempted, yet a lack of compliance, residual mistrust, and capacity limitations did not allow for them to be fruitful. In this regard, it is essential to consider the flaws of prior attempts at peace when evaluating the implementation of the current agreement because past mistakes may offer an opportunity to assess the source of instability and attempt to address them adequately moving forward.

Notably, *how* a conflict reaches the point of concluding may very well prognosticate how the peace process will advance. Because of this, it is important to take into consideration the 'Democratic Security Approach' Colombia used as a method of weakening FARC-EP into entering the Havana Talks. Arguably, this security first approach focused primarily on the militant aspect of the violence and allowed for the underlying sources of conflict to linger. Nevertheless, during the peace talks the inclusion of FARC-EP and the strategic choice to not establish a formal ceasefire was an attempt to increase mutual trust, an essential part of any peace agreement. The enthusiasm of the government and FARC-EP was met with a shocking referendum rejection. This was a clear sign of how intensely divided the population was. Further complicating the peace process, the fast track method of approval remains a contributing factor to the immense controversiality of the peace agreement, still evident today.

As this research has highlighted, the wide range of priorities to address in a post conflict scenario make the process of creating a strategic development plan particularly important. For

Colombia, the finalization of their peace agreement enabled a distinct opportunity for them to break the cycle of conflict and overcome the obstacles that had been a continual factor in their instability. Evident in their comprehensive list of stipulations, Colombia and FARC-EP were ambitious in their goal to extinguish the conflict permanently and reduce the risk of reoccurrence. When the peace agreement was announced, Former President Santos promised that, “Past mistakes will not be repeated.”²⁴⁴

Approaching the three year mark since the agreement was legitimized, there are several areas of concern regarding the future stability of Colombia. While progress is being made in some aspects and should not be overlooked, security concerns surrounding human rights defenders, social leaders, journalists, and demobilized FARC-EP members in the Caquetá, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Guaviare and Valle del Cauca Departments, remain extremely problematic. These areas, and the people who inhabit them, continue to be under prioritized and marginalized, as seen in the progress of the RRI and Political Participation sectors of the agreement.

The rise of armed groups in areas previously dominated by FARC-EP suggests there is a dire need to reinforce the capacity of public security forces in an effort to ensure inclusive protection. Additionally, the government should use this time, following the demobilization and disarmament of former combatants, to establish long-term reintegration programs with the aid of the National Reintegration Council. By doing so, there would be an increased sense of mutual trust which, in turn, would lower residual former combatant weariness. Likewise, the government must address the socioeconomic grievances that have, for so long, been leading factors in the cycle of violence.

A recurring flaw seen in Colombia’s implementation strategies can be seen as emerging from poorly coordinated policies that are hard to navigate. This challenge is visible in their policies created in response to the massive influx of Venezuelan refugees and immigrants. Addressing this issue is fundamental as limited resources shift from reconciling efforts to the needs of the incoming groups and individuals seeking aid. It is clear that the role of the administration in power, namely President Duque, is central to the success of the peace agreement. Thus far, he has opposed various components of the accord which does not bode well for creating a sense of stabilization. His budget cuts and resistance can be seen as directly impacting the capacity for various institutions created as per the peace agreement. This continual polarization has the potential to create a conflict trap for Colombia. However, through the active inclusion of actors at all levels, these gaps can be filled.

As violence and socioeconomic instability are met with political uncertainty, the sustainability of Colombia’s peace agreement is being jeopardized. Though the agreement makes great promises of including a holistic approach to peace building, in practice this notion is falling short and creating reasonable concern. Now it is the time for Colombia and its inhabitants to decide: will the conflict cycle continue, or can conflict transformation allow for a peaceful future to become a reality? This research argues that by embracing a holistic approach to peace building can give Colombia the opportunity to finally break the conflict cycle.

²⁴⁴ President Santos Speech on the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera) September 2012

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