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Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation
in Latin America and the Caribbean

Challenges faced by the civilian personnel providing international humanitarian assistance deployed in post-Cold War United Nations peacekeeping missions

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Abstract

Once the Cold War came to a close, the essence of peacekeeping operations changed in terms of their function and composition. There was a dramatic increase in the number of operations undertaken worldwide and the function associated with traditional peacekeeping operations evolved into multiple tasks undertaken by an increasing number of civilian personnel. Since then, international civilian peacekeepers deployed in the field of UN peacekeeping operations began to face numerous challenges and threats that had an impact on their personal security and safety as well the execution of their tasks which were essential to deliver effective humanitarian assistance according to the specific mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions.

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

Since they began in 1948, the United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) have undergone many conceptual developments and practical changes throughout their history. Initially designed to monitor the cease-fire and to ensure the separation of the parties in a conflict, they became a multidimensional tool to build the conditions for a lasting and sustainable peace. In this sense, contemporary PKO are integrated by three components: civil, military and police and their mandates include political, humanitarian, human rights, rebuilding and gender issues.

The international strategies organised to address instability and armed conflicts are based on the deployment of personnel from the various United Nations divisions and agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to populations under threat. On the other hand, rebuilding and development activities, traditionally carried out in peaceful environments, have also become an integral part of the stabilisation efforts in contexts that are far from being safe (Bruderlein and Gassman, 2006).

Since its creation in 1945, the United Nations has emphasised, based on its purposes (UN, 1945), the unequivocal intention of maintaining international peace and security and of being a universal institution that promotes human rights and protects vulnerable populations from humanitarian disasters. In order to fulfil these purposes, the organisation deployed its components into conflicted or devastated regions to help governments to build or reform the social, political and economic structures of their states.

There is some consensus in the literature indicating that, during the first 50 years of its existence, the United Nations was protected by its flag and by the general perception that it was an impartial and benevolent actor when operating in international situations. The increase in deaths and injuries among personnel of the organisation in the early 90's due to malicious acts were considered by the organisation to be the result of the personnel being in the wrong place at the wrong time (UN, 2005). That is, when the United Nations was directly attacked, in general, these acts were interpreted as being isolated events. It would soon be proved that the nature of these attacks was, in fact, connected to emerging complexities of the new international order.

In this sense, starting from the end of the Cold War, a new security concept emerged. This new concept meant the recognition by the international community of new threats to peace such as internal conflicts or other domestic situations that go beyond the traditional clashes between states in which the PKO were involved. The scenario of these new threats to international peace and security, where the humanitarian personnel operates, is home to various parties in conflict, including local armed groups, which sometimes perceive humanitarian action as politically biased and operate accordingly to dissuade it.

Therefore, humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, core activities undertaken by the United Nations in the PKO, no longer guarantee the safety of its access in conflict situations. In this context, the humanitarian personnel deployed are exposed to situations of risk, which can be sometimes traumatic and threaten their safety and physical integrity. The latter, is added to the conditions of the work itself, charged with stress, incidental casualties, accidents, illnesses and injuries caused by structural conditions of danger inherent to a scenario of conflict or post-conflict.

In line with this diagnosis, the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself, Ban Ki-moon, at the annual ceremony which honours the fallen personnel in PKO stated that: *"the organisation is working tirelessly to improve the protection of its personnel all over the world. However, peacekeeping is dangerous in essence and the risks are growing"* (UN, 2013). He also highlights that while violent casualties are the most visible, they are not the only threat to which the personnel is exposed, since they also die due to diseases and car accidents in underdeveloped areas. Likewise, the latest report of the Secretary-General on the safety and security of the United Nations personnel stated that 97% of the 1793 UN workers who informed that they had suffered a serious security incident work in the field. The report also shows that the personnel deployed in high-risk areas are disproportionately exposed to significant incidents (UN, 2013).

On the other hand, these circumstances have a vital impact on humanitarian assistance itself. That is, in places where the personnel providing humanitarian assistance are attacked, the quality and quantity of aid is reduced, and its recipients suffer the direct consequences. It is, therefore, useful to think of a *safe humanitarian access* in terms of

enabling the access of affected civilians to the humanitarian aid they need as well as to give humanitarian actors the means to access people and territories (OCHA, 2011).

This multiplicity of changes translates into a vast production of academic literature in relation to PKO, especially as a result of their evolution. This literature addresses topics related to their nature, functioning, effectiveness, weaknesses and failures that arose during post-Cold War (Chopra, 1998; Dorn, Malthoff and Matthews, 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Leininger, 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2007; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013). Likewise, much of this literature was characterised by Johnstone as dominated by case studies (2005: 4). There are also publications referring to the most numerous components of the PKO, such as the blue helmets, which address issues related to health or to psychological and sociological consequences that they face in the field (Britt, Thomas and Adler, Amy, 2003). However, a less addressed dimension is that which takes into account the implications and challenges faced by civilian personnel providing international humanitarian assistance deployed in post-conflict scenarios and the impact they believe that this has on the implementation of the mandate of a mission.

The objective of this thesis is to identify the main challenges faced by the humanitarian personnel[1] deployed by the United Nations in peacekeeping missions during the post-Cold War and the impact this has on their lives and that of their colleagues, on the conditions under which they are deployed and on the execution of their assignments as required under the mandate of the mission. All of this taking into consideration the crucial importance that the physical and mental integrity of humanitarian personnel has on the functioning of the PKO.

With regards to the methodological approach, in addition to the review of the literature of specialised publications on the subject, the thesis used the triangulation of techniques combining the analysis of secondary sources (documents, doctrines, speeches, directives and resolutions of international organisations) with research on the field conducted between June and August 2014 whose aim was to carry out semi-structured interviews with humanitarian professionals involved or who had been involved in UN PKO. The thesis also includes information from personal exchanges via email with PKO colleagues as well

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[1] This thesis considers that the civilian personnel providing international humanitarian assistance deployed in PKO of the United Nations is any international civilian personnel, regardless of the rank, who executes any task related to humanitarian assistance and has been recruited and deployed in the field of a peace mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the United Nations.

as with those involved in pre-deployment PKO training. This material is extremely valuable as it complements the information obtained during the interviews. On the other hand, although the author of this thesis has participated in different PKO, there will be a permanent epistemological vigilance in order to avoid any problems of involvement (Guber, 1991).

With regard to the interviews, these were carried out with seven humanitarian assistance international civilian employees (*civilian peacekeepers*)[2] during the months of June, July and August 2014. The interviewees are from the following countries: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, South Korea, France and Pakistan. The PKO in which interviewees took part are those deployed in the following states: Afghanistan (UNAMA)[3], Ivory Coast (UNOCI), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Sudan (UNMIS), South Sudan (UNMISS), East Timor (UNMIT) and Central African Republic & Chad (MINURCAT). In the aforementioned PKO, interviewees served as officers of political, civil, human rights, electoral and logistics issues and also as special assistants of the DSRSG[4]. Most of the humanitarian personnel interviewed is currently deployed in the field and has participated in at least three PKO as international civilians (IC) and as international United Nations volunteers (UNV)[5].

Since the creation of the United Nations, 69 PKO have been deployed[6]. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) currently manages 16 PKO deployed on four continents and a special political mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The testimonies gathered in this research refer to eight of the 17 PKO currently managed by the DPKO, including the special political mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Testimonies regarding the East Timor PKO (UNMIT), closed in April 2012, and the PKO in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), closed in December 2010, will be also be taken into account.

Due to the significant lack of bibliographic material in Spanish regarding PKO , the original language of almost all of the above sources, including interviews, has been English and, to a lesser extent, French. However, to ensure a fluent reading in Spanish, we only used this

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[2] The anonymity of the interviewees will be guaranteed.
[3] Although UNAMA is not specifically a peacekeeping operation (but a special political mission deployed in Afghanistan and directed by the DPKO) when we refer to PKO, it will be included in this category.
[4] Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
[5] Most interviewees have served under both categories. The difference between UNV and IC has to do with the conditions of service and deployment and not with the nature of the tasks carried out in the field.
[6] See appendix I: PKO since the creation of the UN.

language to quote the mentioned sources, with the exception of very specific terminology[7] which is clarified in both languages with their corresponding translations.

When referring to peacekeeping operations (PKO), this paper will take into account peace missions which, based on a resolution of the UN Security Council, are deployed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the field of a given conflict region with the consent of all parties involved. The PKO[8] considered in this study are multidimensional and include the comprehensive recruitment and deployment of international military, police and civilian personnel[9]. However, this thesis will not address the differences between the PKO but will investigate aspects related to the humanitarian personnel deployed in the aforementioned PKO.

As for the structure of the thesis, the first chapter will address the essence of the PKO and their historical evolution, their functions, their organisational structure, changes in the nature of conflicts in which they operate, failures and subsequent independent internal reviews to cope with system malfunctions. This chapter will be vital to provide the framework of the context of the issues that humanitarian personnel face in the field. The second chapter will discuss in detail the main challenges faced by the actors deployed in PKO, combining not only the findings gathered from the existing literature but, most importantly from the testimonies obtained from fieldwork. This is followed by the final conclusions, bibliography and appendices.

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[7] The initials designating PKO are used as they have been published according to the official language set by the United Nations Security Council for each mission.
[8] PKO should not be confused with special political and peacebuilding missions (see appendix II).
[9] With the exception of UNAMA.

I

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Doctrine and evolution of peacekeeping operations

The main purpose established in the Charter of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security (UN, 1945). This primary responsibility is conferred to the Security Council of the UN which can adopt various measures including the establishment of peacekeeping operations (PKO)[10]. While PKO have not been explicitly incorporated into the founding document of the organisation, they are broadly based on the Charter of the United Nations as well as on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (UN, 2008).

PKO have been traditionally linked to chapter VI of the UN Charter (pacific settlement of disputes). However, this chapter has never been invoked by the Security Council when passing a resolution which authorises the deployment of a PKO. Nevertheless, the Security Council adopted the practice of citing chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) when the deployment of a PKO is authorised in volatile post-conflict areas where the state is unable to maintain security and public order (UN, 2008). Although the doctrine considers that to link PKO to a specific chapter of the Chart may be confusing, the United Nations, since its establishment, has tried to frame peacekeeping within the scope of the founding Charter of the organisation.

> *"While the term "peacekeeping" is not found in the United Nations Charter, Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, found a way to define it within the framework of the Charter, saying that peacekeeping falls under "Chapter VI and a half" of the Charter, somewhere between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully (outlined in Chapter VI), on the one hand, and more forceful, less "consent-based" action (Chapter VII), on the other"* (ONU, 2007).

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[10] See Appendix II: General information about peacekeeping operations.

The first basic principle traditionally governing PKO and, which remains in force today, is **the consent of the parties.** It requires a commitment by the parties to a political process as well as their acceptance of a PKO to support that process. This consent provides the PKO with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to implement its mandate. In the absence of such consent, a PKO would risk becoming a party to the conflict. In this sense, the PKO must work continuously to keep the consent of the parties while ensuring that the peace process is progressing well. On the other hand, if consent is given with resistance or under international pressure, it can be withdrawn in different ways when one party is not committed to the peace process. For example, a party which has consented to the deployment of a PKO may subsequently attempt to restrict the freedom of action of PKO, resulting in a *de facto* withdrawal of consent. However, the consent of the parties does not guarantee consent on a local basis, especially when there are internal divisions between the main parties. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterised by the presence of armed groups that are not under the control of any of the parties which have expressed their consent.

The second basic principle of the PKO is **impartiality**: They must implement their mandate without favouring or damaging any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity (ONU, 2000). PKO should be impartial in their dealings with the parties in conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate. Impartiality should not be an excuse for inaction when dealing with behaviour which clearly violates the peace process.

Finally, the third principle is the **non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate:** This principle has to do with the unstable nature of post-conflict scenarios where PKO are deployed. These contexts, characterised by the presence of armed groups that may undermine the peace process or which constitute a threat to the civilian population, should be dealt with "robust mandates".

Generally speaking, the United Nations considers that PKO are the most effective tool that the international community has to maintain international peace and security and that it is a technique which expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the construction of peace. However, the Capstone Doctrine (2008) indicates that the limits of the borders between PKO and other related activities, such as peacemaking and peacebuilding are undefined precisely because the former are not limited to the

performance of one sole activity. The following diagram shows the peace and security activities.

Diagram N.1 Spectrum of peace and security activities

That is, although, in principle, PKO are deployed to support the implementation of the ceasefire or peace agreements, they must also sometimes play an active role in all actions concerning the establishment of peace (peacemaking) and even in activities related to the construction of peace (peacebuilding). The Capstone Doctrine (2008), which established the new principles and guidelines for carrying out PKO, explains that peacekeeping is only one of the activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security. Within the spectrum of these activities we can find conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The doctrine clarifies that the following activities related to the maintenance of peace rarely occur in a linear or sequential way.

The aim of **conflict prevention** activities is to avoid disputes between the parties or that disagreement escalates into a violent conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the UN Secretary-General's "good offices," preventive deployment or confidence-building measures. **Peacemaking** measures are intended to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement by using procedures set out in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. **Peacekeeping** is a technique designed to keep the peace, however fragile, which includes assisting in implementing agreements achieved to keep the peace and supervising them or to guarantee the distribution of humanitarian aid. These require the presence of military or civilian personnel of the United Nations with the consent of the parties in conflict.

On the other hand, **peace enforcement** involves a range of measures derived from the authorisation of the Security Council. These actions are carried out under chapter VII of the UN Charter and include the use of armed forces to maintain or restore peace in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may use regional organisations or agencies to impose actions under its authority. Finally, the implementation of **peacebuilding** measures coincides with the end of the conflict and includes a range of measures intended to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict. Its purpose is to strengthen peace and promote understanding between former adversaries in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities. These measures include the celebration and monitoring of electoral processes, the rebuilding of infrastructures and institutions and the economic revival.

With the authorisation of the Security Council, the PKO may also use force on a tactical level, always to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the state is unable to provide security and maintain public order. Although the line between "robust" PKO and those of peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, the Capstone Doctrine (2008) states that there are important differences between the two: While robust PKO involve the use of force on a tactical level with the consent of the host authorities or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force on a strategic or international level. Robust mandates are established in PKO deployed in contexts often characterised by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian

population (ONU, 2008: 34). However, PKO only use force as a last resort, when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted.

In order to address post-Cold War PKO, it is important to go back to the origins of the organisation in 1945, when the aim of peacekeeping was to maintain the ceasefire and military were unarmed. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)[11] was established in 1948, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), [12] established in 1949, were the first two missions which were only in charge of observing and monitoring the field. The so-called traditional operations were designed after the Suez crisis in 1956. They were applied on numerous occasions, usually in areas where the use of force was not necessary and their main objectives were the negotiation and supervision of agreements between the parties, offering crucial support to political efforts to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. The first two missions which followed this pattern were the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)[13],deployed in 1956 to address the Suez crisis and the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC)[14] initiated in 1960. These two missions were the first with armed military components.

On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that throughout the period from 1948 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there were 18 PKO deployed. This fact gains value when significantly compared with the 35 PKO deployed in the immediate post-Cold War, that is to say, until the late 90s. This exponential growth of PKO is closely linked to the end of the stalemate in the Security Council[15] regarding the deployment of these operations, which takes place once the bipolar confrontation has concluded. The end of this ideological confrontation would enable the progressive deployment of PKO in areas where internal conflicts were in process. The increase in the number of civilians deployed in areas of intra-state conflict marked the beginning of deliberate attacks on humanitarian personnel which quickly led to the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the *1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated personnel*[16](Urios Moliner: 1999), given that the traditional *law of armed conflict* was inadequate to protect the

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[11] United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation.
[12] United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.
[13] First United Nations Emergency Force.
[14] By its French initials: Opération des Nations Unies au Congo.
[15] The United Nations Security Council is composed of five permanent members (China, United States, Great Britain and Russia) with the right of veto.
[16] United Nations Document A/RES/49/59 (1994).

humanitarian personnel in circumstances where the United Nations was not a party to a conflict (Greenwood, 1996: 186).

Until the end of the Cold War, the United Nations PKO mostly had traditional mandates for supervising ceasefire and had no direct responsibilities as regard peacebuilding. The entry strategy, that is to say, the sequence of events and decisions leading to the United Nations deployment was: a war, a ceasefire, an invitation to supervise compliance with the ceasefire and the deployment of observers or military units to do so, while they continue doing efforts to reach a political solution. The needs in terms of intelligence were also straightforward and risks for troops were relatively low, unlike those that will appear in PKO deployed in the post-Cold War. However, peacekeeping in its traditional form, which was more aimed at addressing the manifestations of conflicts than their causes, did not provide an exit strategy. Therefore, it was normal for peacebuilding associated with the operation to progress slowly.

1.1 The Brahimi Report and the lessons learnt

The United Nations has continued to adapt its doctrine on peacekeeping operations in consonance with their developments and in the light of changes in the international scenario and the emergence of different types of conflicts. Its doctrine is a result of the lessons learned from both operations that have been successfully completed and from those in which the intended objectives have not been achieved.

The academic material and specialised publications available on peacekeeping missions have increased over the last two decades. The end of the bipolar confrontation marks the turning point regarding the bibliographical production of a practice that was originally created to resolve conflicts between states and which later becomes the main tool of the international community to maintain peace once civil wars came to an end and to prevent other internal conflicts which might arise. It should be noted that during the first 50 years, this practice took place without following any guidelines or pre-established directives issued by the United Nations. However, the practice was based on the implementation of chapters VI and VII of the Charter.

It is from the end of the Cold War that the United Nations itself begins to produce a series of documents addressing the issue of peacekeeping missions, mainly in response to the

ineffectiveness of the same to stop the escalation of violence which led to the massacres[17] in Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda[18] (1994). Therefore, and since the United Nations was founded, as stated in the Charter, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (UN, 1945), the facts indicate that it repeatedly failed to rise to this challenge. The highly publicised dysfunction, paralysis and lack of political will of the United Nations to prevent the systematic violation of human rights in these scenarios led to the need to rethink the nature as well as to reformulate the running of the peacekeeping missions (Dorn, 1999).

In particular, several of these attempts to reformulate the practice of peacekeeping operations can be summarised in a document derived from the request by Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, to a group of independent experts chaired by the former Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakhdar Brahimi, to conduct a thorough review of the activities of the United Nations related to peace and security, with the aim of formulating a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations. The will of self-criticism established by the Report of the Panel of Independent Experts on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the *Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000) is unprecedented in the history of the organisation, an aspect that was highlighted by the experts themselves in their letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations where they emphasised that "*such degree of self-criticism is rare for any large organisation and particularly rare for the United Nations"* (UN, 2000).

The panel of experts was composed of individuals with expertise in various aspects of conflict prevention, peace keeping and peacebuilding in order to assess the shortcomings of that so questioned system in order to make their recommendations. The Brahimi Report contained 57 explicit recommendations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the General Assembly and Member States in general, designed to remedy a serious problem in terms of strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, planning and operational support as well as the use of modern information technology (UN, 2000).

The panel agreed that the consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence, already mentioned above, should continue to be the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. However, they warn that in the context of modern peacekeeping

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[17] Bosnia and Rwanda were two of the four events declared as genocides by international courts.
[18] In 1994 and in just 100 days, around 800,000 Rwandans were massacred in the face of the inaction of the United Nations. According to Leader (2000: 64) it was not that aid should resolve conflict and genocide, but that prevention of massive abuse of human rights required timely and effective political and military intervention.

operations related to intra-state or inter-state conflicts, local parties may manipulate the consent in a variety of ways. A party may give its consent to the presence of the United Nations merely to gain time to reorganise their forces and withdraw it when the peacekeeping operation no longer serves their purpose. It can also restrict freedom of movement of the members of the operation, adopt a policy of systematic violation of the provisions of an agreement or completely withdraw consent.

On this point, there are some recommendations which include: giving more power and political autonomy to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN; establishing impartial but not necessarily neutral mandates, especially if one of the parties in the conflict uses violence (thus lowering the risk of the organisation becoming inoperative or an accomplice of the aggressors); the need to obtain the consent of all parties involved in a conflict so that the United Nations can become involved to help the parties resolve it; that the PKO be part of a comprehensive strategy to help to resolve a conflict.

This strategy often includes elements of political, economic, developmental, institution-building, humanitarian affairs and human rights nature. The comprehensive strategy must take into account the regional dimension to ensure that the achievements in addressing the problems that contributed to a conflict are not undermined by problems in neighbouring countries. The Security Council and, especially its five permanent members, must agree on the objective of the operation and provide it with a clear mandate ensuring that the latter is achievable. This includes authorising the deployment of an adequate number of troops to implement the mandate of the mission and the provision of well-trained and equipped troops from Member States. The credibility and the ability of the mission to implement its mandate are usually determined from the start.

In this sense, it is essential to define a strategy for a rapid and effective deployment; to ensure that peace operations have enough funds to ensure rapid projects, known as *quick impact projects* that improve the living conditions of people in the affected areas; to create a working group for each mission, which combines the capacities for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, aid to refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.

One of the most important legacies of the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) that has had an impact on the current structure and functioning of the peacekeeping missions is the concept of an "integrated mission task force" formed by different components of the United Nations. This integration was conceived as a more solid platform to respond to these new hypotheses of conflicts that proliferated at the end of the Cold War.

1.2 The PKO mandate and the protection of civilians

At the beginning of July 2014, a court in The Hague, in a historic ruling, declared that the Netherlands were civilly liable for the death of 300 Muslims who, in July 1995, were in Srebrenica, an area protected by the Dutch blue helmets. According to press sources (*Le Monde*, 2014: Massacre de Srebrenica: les Pays-Bas jugés responsables de centaines de morts), judges considered that the Dutch blue helmets should *"have seriously taken into account the possibility that these men would die due to genocide and would have survived if they had kept them in the settlement".* This ruling illustrates the tenor of the consequences generated to date by the inaction[19] of the United Nations to stop preventable massacres. This is not, however, the only notorious case. In recent decades, the world witnessed armed conflicts marked by systematic violence and atrocities against civilians and waited for a response from the United Nations and, specifically, from the UN PKO to prevent or stop these crimes. The failure of PKO to provide security in crises such as that of Somalia and the protection of civilians in Bosnia and Rwanda brought the fundamental principles and abilities of the PKO to the edge of the abyss, highlighting the need for an urgent reform.

From then on, PKO mandates evolved from their traditional role of supervising the implementation of peace treaties to multidimensional operations including all activities related to peacebuilding such as the reconstruction of the capacities of the States and the monitoring of human rights. However, the fundamental nature of this evolution has to do with the explicit inclusion within the mandates of the Protection of Civilians (POC)[20] *under*

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[19] The UN Secretary-General spoke about the inaction of the United Nations in reference to the genocide in Rwanda in his speech to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva on April 7, 2004. http://www.un.org/spanish/events/rwanda/sg_message1.html.
[20] Protection of civilians.

imminent threat of physical violence. Thus, since 1999[21], the majority of UN PKO are deployed under this mandate.

According to the UN, the relationship between the protection of civilians and PKO mandates is crucial (UN, 2009: 3). First of all, the security and protection of civilians are essential for the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping missions. Moreover, wherever missions are deployed, the expectation of local populations is that they will provide assistance to people at risk. If the situation of armed conflict and the violation of human rights cannot be stopped and civilians are exposed to risks, efforts to maintain security and the rule of law are unsustainable.

Moreover, experience shows that PKO that are poorly prepared to deal with situations of large-scale violence targeting civilians will become stagnant or collapse. Finally, the United Nations considers that the protection of civilians in PKO is also crucial for the legitimacy of the entire system of the United Nations, since these operations are the most high-profile representation of the organisation and their actions have a worldwide impact on the latter.

The highest priority given to the protection of civilians in PKO mandates meant, since 2013, the implementation of measures unprecedented in the history of the organisation: to allow access to UN bases of thousands of civilians at risk of imminent violence in Southern Sudan[22] and the adoption of resolutions by the United Nations Security Council which included the use of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade to neutralise and disarm armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN, 2013). However, the Council clarified that this brigade was established exceptionally without setting a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed peacekeeping principles. The brigade would consist of three infantry battalions, one of artillery, one special force and a reconnaissance company, with headquarters in Goma, under the direct command of the of the MONUSCO Force Commander. The resolution adopted in March 2014 states that:

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[21] The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNASMIL) which was the origin of the language of "imminent threat", concludes an independent study which analyses the creation, interpretation and implementation of PKO mandates to protect civilians, promoted by the DPKO and the OCHA - Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN, 2009). According to this study, the Security Council originally used the phrase "protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" in the resolution which establishes the PKO UNASMIL - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UN, 1999: Resolution 1270).

[22] In the last 6 months, the UN provided access and shelter to more than 90,000 civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in ten of its bases in South Sudan.

"...Taking full account of the need to protect civilians[23] and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), in cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO, prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise these groups, and disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities…" (UN, 2014:8).

1.3 The PKO in the immediate post-Cold War period

Overall, the United Nations takes into account two different types of peacekeeping operations: traditional and complex or multidimensional ones. The main differences between them are the means deployed and the objectives, as well as the nature of the conflict in which they operate. The end of the Cold War and the conflicts which appeared in the early 90's changed the international scene, marking the transition between traditional peacekeeping operations and the complex or multidimensional ones which would arise after a deep reform within the system. To the traditional functions of these operations we must add other components such as the creation of structures and rebuilding, neither of which were contemplated in the previous model.

In this sense, the objectives of current PKO are no longer limited to peacekeeping and security, nor do they respond to the traditional military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces following wars between states. Today, they have become a complex model which incorporates several elements, military and civilian, which cooperate to establish peace in the dangerous scenario that follows civil wars in order to facilitate political processes; protect civilians; help with disarmament and the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; to support the organisation of elections; to protect and promote human rights and to help to restore the rule of law. The main difference between these operations and the traditional ones is that the situation they try to resolve has more

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[23] By March 2014 the number of IDPs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) amounted to more than 2.9 million people and more than 450,000 refugees from eastern DRC as a result of the activities of the different Congolese armed groups and foreigners operating in the region.

to do with an internal conflict or a series of internal conflicts than with one of an international nature. In addition, sometimes, the two parties to the conflict are not clearly identified, as is the case of a conflict between two states, but they involve a greater number of parties.

Most of the conflicts which occur nowadays are not between states but within them, and this characteristic established the new physiognomy of operations. In these contexts, it is not only necessary to put an end to the situation of armed conflict but also to create conditions for the restoration of basic institutions, to watch over the progress of the state in accordance with the rules of international and humanitarian law, to support the sustainable development of a minimum economic fabric and to provide humanitarian aid to the populations suffering the consequences of these situations. These new requirements shape the organisation, objectives and procedures of the current peacekeeping operations.

In the early stages of an operation, when clashes continue to develop, the main responsibility falls on the military component whose basic objectives are to obtain the cessation of armed actions in the area, to provide security to the population and aid agencies and to support actions of humanitarian assistance and disarmament. At this stage, the civil contingent assesses the needs for the development of institutions and the various processes of transition to democracy; they provide guidelines for the reconstruction of the political, economic and social fabric and establish mechanisms for assistance.

As the situation evolves, the military component reduces their combat abilities and increases the civil and administrative support. The civil component takes on the role of the actions aimed at reconstruction, political and social assistance and humanitarian aid. These missions are based on four pillars: security, reconstruction, political and democratic development and humanitarian assistance.

Peacekeeping operations[24] **currently deployed**[25]

- UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)
- UNOCI (UN Opération in Côte d'Ivoire)
- UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)
- MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti)
- UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)
- UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur)
- UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force)
- MONUSCO (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo)
- UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)
- UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei)
- MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)
- UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)
- UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)
- UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia
- MINUSMA (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali)
- MINUSCA (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Centrafricaine).

When a conflict is generated or exacerbated, the United Nations participates in a series of consultations to determine the best response of the international community. The phases that integrate the formation of a new peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN DPKO (UN, 2014) will be further detailed.

Technical field assessment

As soon as security conditions so permit, the General Secretariat normally sends a technical assessment mission into the country or territory where the deployment of a peacekeeping operation is foreseen. This mission analyses and evaluates the overall situation of security, politics and the armed forces as well as the humanitarian and human rights context in the field, and their implications in a possible operation. Based on the

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[24] Presented in the language in which they were created.
[25] For statistics regarding PKO currently deployed see appendix V.

conclusions and recommendations of the assessment mission, the Secretary-General issues a report to the Security Council. This report presents the different options for the correct establishment of a peacekeeping operation, including its scope and resources. The report also contains information on the financial implications and a preliminary estimate of the costs.

Security Council resolution

If the Security Council determines that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate option, it formally authorises the same by adopting a resolution. The resolution establishes the mandate and scope of the operation, and details the tasks that it will be responsible for implementing. After this, the budget and resources are submitted to the approval of the General Assembly.

Appointment of senior officials

The Secretary-General regularly appoints a Head of Mission (usually an official representative) to run the peacekeeping operation. The Head of Mission is responsible for informing the Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the Headquarters of the United Nations. The Secretary-General also appoints a Force Commander, a Police Commissioner and a team of high-level civilians. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are in charge of hiring civilian personnel for the operation.

Planning and deployment

The Head of Mission and the DPKO-DFS are jointly responsible for planning the political, military, operational and support (i.e., logistics and administration) aspects of the operation. The planning phase usually involves the establishment of a joint working group or an integrated workforce based at the headquarters, with the participation of all relevant departments, funds and programs of the United Nations. After the planning phase, the operation is deployed as quickly as possible, taking into account the security and political situation in the field. This often commences with an advance guard to establish the headquarters of the mission and to manage the gradual increase of the staff until all the components and regions required by the mandate are covered.

Peacekeepers

The United Nations does not have its own permanent army or police force, which means that it asks Member States to provide the military and police personnel required for each operation. This personnel wears the uniform of its country and is only identified as a member of the UN peace force by the blue helmet or beret with the insignia. The civilian personnel taking part in peacekeeping operations is composed of international civil servants, recruited and deployed by the Secretariat of the United Nations.

1.4 The emergency of multidimensional mandates

The nature of the mandates of peacekeeping operations was gradually adapted to the changing patterns of conflicts in order to deal effectively with the new threats to international peace and security. These mandates are the basis of the legal regime that allows the execution of this type of operations.

In order to restore international peace and security in the area where the mission was authorised to be deployed, it is necessary to establish the command under which these peacekeepers operate, the amount and composition of troops deployed, the budget and the length of stay. Moreover, the mandate mainly establishes a variety of activities appropriate to the specific context of the conflict. The following main activities form the basis for those carried out by multidimensional PKO:

Protection and promotion of Human Rights

Massive violations of human rights are both the cause and the consequence of modern conflicts. Therefore, addressing the issue of human rights became an integral part of most PKO, as stated in the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003). Depending on the mission, mandates can include tasks such as: the reporting of the violation of human rights and the prevention of future abuses; the investigation and verification of the violation of human rights that have occurred in the past; the promotion and protection of civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights; to take part in truth and reconciliation legal proceedings to promote a culture of accountability and to address impunity; to work to address aspects of human rights problems linked to the most modern conflicts, including mass movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, the increasing recruitment of child soldiers and sexual exploitation and the trafficking of women and children; to identify and integrate a

human rights perspective in programs aimed at disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and to provide direction, guidance and training in human rights for all components of the mission.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR)

The establishment of the DDR process is generally agreed and defined during a ceasefire, the end of hostilities or a comprehensive peace agreement. This provides the legitimate and binding political, operational and legal framework for the process. Disarmament and demobilisation, followed by the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, help to deal with post-conflict security problems by providing alternative ways for veterans to earn a living other than the military support networks on which they depended during the conflict, but are no longer relevant in peacetime. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can be initiated. Ex-combatants DDR is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims at dealing with post-conflict security problems resulting from veterans being left without a livelihood or other means of support, other than those of their former comrades, during the critical period of transition from conflict to peace and development.

Activities related to mining

The policy of the United Nations considers that the danger of landmines[26] is a concern of a humanitarian nature and should be addressed as such. The mine action is a program designed to recreate a safe environment conducive to normal life and development (UN, 2003). In many countries, unexploded mines, ammunition and explosives ordnance are a serious threat to personal safety. Mines destroy lives long after the conflicts have ended and deny access to land, water sources, schools and roads.

The mine category includes bombs, mortars, missiles or other ordnance that do not explode instantly but remain active and can kill if they are touched or moved. Nowadays, programs involving activities related to mines directly address problems associated with them, as well as with ammunition and unexploded ordnance and the "explosive remnants of war", which include unexploded or abandoned ammunition as well as weapons abandoned by the armed forces when they withdrew from the area.

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[26] These mainly refer to anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.

There are five groups of activities related to mines: the removal and destruction of mines and explosive remnants of war and the delimitation of the affected areas; education regarding the risk posed by mines so that people understand the hazards they face, identification of mines and UXO and to keep them away from all dangers; medical care and rehabilitation services for victims, including training and employment opportunities; the defence of a world free from the threat of mines and the promotion among countries which form part of international treaties and conventions to put an end to production, trade, shipping and use of mines and help to the destruction of stockpiles of mines situated in each country in accordance with international agreements such as the Landmine Ban Convention (1999).

Assistance in organising elections

The role of elections in a post-conflict situation is to replace violent conflicts aimed at exerting political power by other non-violent means. Elections are effective when the electoral process is widely accepted and perceived as fair by the population. Given that the former must be conducted according to international standards and good practice, the United Nations is perceived as an impartial actor which can ensure that elections are held freely and fairly.

Once the parties in conflict agree to a ceasefire, the peace agreement usually foresees elections, a fundamental step towards the establishment of a legitimate government. The United Nations PKO offers multiple forms of assistance for the electoral processes by providing security services, technical advice and logistical support. In several PKO, a free and fair election represents a crucial landmark to achieve the objectives of the mission, given that a credible election will have a strong influence over the course of the mission and its relationship with the government of the host country (UN 2003). At present, the United Nations normally assumes a supporting role in the assistance provided to the electoral administrative body of the country. Most of the PKO work is focused on providing technical assistance to those national authorities organising the elections.

Reform of the security sector and other activities related to the rule of law

The establishment of an effective police force and the structuring of the judiciary are essential to defend the rule of law and to build sustainable peace. The need for the PKO to work for the restoration of the rule of law by strengthening internal security and criminal justice structures has grown considerably in the recent years. The support that PKO

provide to promote the rule of law encompasses a wide range of activities carried out in areas such as civilian police, the judiciary and correctional centres. Security Council mandates for activities related to the rule of law in the PKO include the monitoring of national law enforcement organisations, the reform and restructuring of internal security structures such as civilian police, especially on a local level, and activities aimed at supporting the criminal justice system (UN, 2003).

Security Council mandates also reflect a number of thematic intersectoral tasks usually assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations under the following Security Council resolutions: On women, peace and security (SC, 2000: 1325); on children and armed conflicts (SC, 2005: 1612); on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts (SC, 2006: 1674, 1999: 1265, 2000: 1296).

2. The civilian personnel providing international humanitarian assistance and their training before going into the field

The ability to quickly adapt to another culture, hardworking and life conditions and a potential hostile and volatile environment are fundamental prerequisites for humanitarian personnel. In this sense, for an effective implementation of the mandate and thus for the success of the PKO, it is essential for the training of the personnel involved in the mission to be up to the challenges of each specific field.

In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) completed an evaluation of the training needs of peacekeeping missions. In this new strategic plan, the integrated training service (ITS) is responsible for developing training standards, policies and guidelines to train the personnel of peacekeeping missions. The ITS focuses on three stages for the training of peacekeeping operations:

Pre-deployment training: This is specific to each particular mission and takes place prior to the deployment of a DPKO-led mission. The training of the uniformed personnel that will be deployed in a UN PKO is carried out by Member States in their own countries. In the case of civilian personnel, the training is conducted at the UN base located in Brindisi, Italy; **induction training:** is aimed at both civilians and military and is carried out once the personnel have been deployed into PKO. Induction provides detailed instructions and information as to how to carry out the tasks in each particular mission; **on-going**

training[27]: are activities for both uniformed and civilian personnel during their assignment in a particular mission.

Moreover, and in addition to the scope of the United Nations, there is a considerable number of specialised training and research peace study centres (appendix II) dedicated to the training of civilians who are to work in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. The aim of these training centres is to prepare individuals interested in working in the field for deployment in post-conflict and in crisis areas as well to strengthen the capacities of humanitarian personnel already deployed. Training activities are taught by civilians and uniformed personnel with extensive experience in the field. The theoretical and practical nature and the contents of the core courses include different topics essential to work in the field in the different peace missions: project management; civil-military cooperation; awareness of the danger of mines; personal protection and security; personal care & first aid; stress management; trauma management; orientation with maps and compasses & radio communications; practice in 4 X 4 vehicles and exercises of complex simulations such as theft and kidnapping.

On the other hand, an offer of specialised courses on different fundamental themes necessary to operate in the context of crisis and post-conflict is available in the aforementioned centres: Women in armed conflicts; child protection; gender; human rights; electoral observation and assistance; rule of law; cultural awareness; conflict analysis; negotiation and mediation.

Also, since 2011 the European Commission (EC) funds training programs in specialised centres that prepare civilians about to be deployed or already deployed in crisis missions worldwide. The civilians who can participate in these training sessions are not only those belonging to the European Union (EU) but also the staff of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU). The range of courses is divided between pre-deployment, which are designed for specific missions and specialised courses on core activities which take place in the field.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, despite the available DPKO training, work in the field has revealed that humanitarian personnel sometimes perceives that they are not adequately prepared for the challenges that they are presented with once the mission has been deployed.

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[27] Training which takes place during the deployment of PKO.

II

THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. Security and protection

The different factors constituting the main challenges faced by humanitarian personnel in PKO were identified. In order to address these challenges, it is necessary to distinguish between personnel safety and personnel security. Personnel safety can be defined as accidents caused by non-violent circumstances such as natural events (earthquakes, avalanches), traffic accidents or diseases, injuries and deaths resulting from medical conditions not derived from violence or resulting from lax guidelines and procedures in the workplace. However, the term personnel security means the protection of the personnel and their equipment from actions of violence (Van Brabant, 2000: xiii).

It is important to clarify that these two factors are closely interrelated with the others and that it is sometimes difficult to separate them. In this sense, the nature of the security and safety of the personnel is often determined and affected by other factors such as their training for deployment in an area of conflict or post-conflict; compliance with safety and security regulations; infrastructure, accessibility, mobility and field volatility; the relationship with the authorities and other local actors; the competence of the very personnel deployed in PKO and the degree of effectiveness of the United Nations on aspects related to the management of PKO. According to the humanitarian personnel interviewed, the characteristics of these factors may increase or decrease vulnerability in the field.

Starting with the safety of the United Nations personnel, and from a purely technical viewpoint, the management of the security of UN agencies' personnel seems to be strategically important in defining the role of the United Nations in conflict situations, particularly in terms of its access to, and the protection of, vulnerable groups (Bruderlein and Gasman, 2006). According to these experts, the post-Cold War theory suggests that a central aspect of insecurity is not that conflicts have become much more violent, but rather that humanitarian personnel is becoming increasingly more exposed to risks in terms of

security in conflict zones. And, according to this theory, the increased exposure of personnel to risks in the field is closely related to changing operational objectives and methods: unclear mandates and the operational pressure to reach high risk areas are key causes of this growing insecurity. The authors emphasise that, despite the efforts of the United Nations and other international agencies to improve the protection and awareness of their personnel regarding safety, most of them are still poorly prepared to assess and manage risks in highly insecure environments.

Furthermore, the study refers to the sense of immunity that the personnel in the field have perceived for a long time, due to the mere fact of providing humanitarian assistance. This perception of immunity partly explained the negligence of the humanitarian personnel operating in the field, in terms of their own security. In this sense, statements such as those of the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, are in line with the aforementioned lax attitude of the personnel. As a matter of fact, one of these statements[28] was recorded one month before his death, when he lost his life together with 21 other colleagues in the attack on the UN offices in Iraq in 2003.

According to the report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel and Premises (2008), the attack on the Canal Hotel in Baghdad in August 19, 2003[29], the United Nations headquarters in Iraq, marked a turning point in the nature of threats faced by the organisation. The report said that although the United Nations had previously been the target of attacks, Baghdad introduced new tactics and new scales of violence which the organisation was not prepared for. The aim of the report was, in part, to try to examine the reasons why the organisation had become a target. In this regard, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan stated that:

> *"…The attack on the Canal Hotel was a really unique blow for us as an organisation. It brought us face to face with danger in a new and more intimidating form: the danger that we, servants of the United Nations, will no longer be victims simply by virtue of the times and places in which we are*

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[28] Sergio Vieira de Mello said that the security of the personnel rested significantly on the reputation of the United Nations and in its ability to demonstrate that they were in Iraq to serve the people.
[29] The attack cost the life of 22 people and left 150 people injured.

called upon to serve, but may have become in ourselves one of the main targets of political violence"[30].

Multiple investigations following the attack concluded that the safety management system of the United Nations had failed in its mission to provide adequate security for the personnel and installations of the organisation. According to the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, the elements that aggravated the exposure of humanitarian personnel to risks in conflict zones are: the increase of insecurity which implies the growing number of field PKO in fragmented or failed states[31]; the blurring of the distinction between civilians and combatants in conflict areas; the privatisation and fragmentation of armed forces and the increased availability of weapons; the globalisation of terrorist movements; the spreading of religious and fundamentalist ideologies, some of whose adherents openly oppose key UN tenets. These factors have substantially contributed to the deterioration of security conditions of UN personnel (UN, 2003: 19).

In response, the United Nations undertook a major restructuring of its security management system, which led to the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS)[32], as part of a comprehensive review of the United Nations security system. The main role of the DSS is to allow UN operations to continue while giving the highest priority to the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

Despite these efforts, four years later, the attack on the headquarters of the United Nations in Algiers[33] would not only prove that there were still very serious risks threatening the organisation but that, despite the implementation of all reasonable measures, UN personnel and installations would always be at risk anywhere in the world. Times had changed, and the UN flag itself, which had always protected its personnel, had become the target of attacks, partly due to the perception of different non-state armed groups that placed the security of all the organisation's personnel at risk (Bruderlein and Gassman, 2006). During his speech referring to the attack in Algiers, the Secretary-General of the

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[30] The speech pronounced during the commemoration of the first anniversary of the attack on the headquarters in Baghdad.
[31] The panel used the term *Failed States* to refer to what are now known as *Fragile States*. According to the OECD "a fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters (OECD, 2014: 16).
[32] Department of Safety and Security.
[33] Seventeen members of the United Nations personnel were killed when a car bomb destroyed the offices of the UNDP and damaged those of the UNHCR in December 2007.

organisation made a desperate call to insist on the clear diffusion of the universal values which are the essence of the United Nations:

> *"We need to better explain to the public and the media the role of the United Nations everywhere: why are we there, what we do, what we stand for and what we do not do. We must clearly state that we do not represent the interests of any group of nations over another. We must make it clear that our mission is to remove mines, build schools, manage clinics, promote the rule of law, and help to protect the environment and to protect human rights, I.e., to improve the lives of the men, women and children whom we serve[34]".*

However, despite the profound restructuring implemented *a posteriori* in the United Nations security system for the protection humanitarian personnel, threats, far from diminishing, began to multiply due to a variety of identified factors. In a recent report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that:

> *"United Nations personnel serve in an increasingly dangerous environment and encounter a variety of threats not previously encountered in the history of the Organisation. The current asymmetric nature of warfare, seen in suicide bombings, the use of improvised explosive devices and random mass shootings, has a direct impact on the personnel and on the operations of the United Nations. Direct attacks against the United Nations are a distressing phenomenon that has developed over the past decade and those attacks are becoming more intense and more sophisticated (...) the almost two-fold increase in the abduction of United Nations and humanitarian personnel in just the past six months is also a new and alarming trend"* (ONU, 2013: 18).

Table I shows United Nations statistics regarding the number of civilian personnel affected by security incidents. It is important to highlight that, although the information given in the said table reflects all United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's report on the safety and security of United Nations indicates that in 2010, 99 % of the 1,438 UN workers

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[34] Words directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Headquarters personnel on his return from Algiers, December 19, 2007.

who reported having suffered a serious security incident worked in the field (UN, 2011). The trend was confirmed two years later, considering that in 2012, of the 1,793 UN officials affected by significant security incidents, 97% were deployed in the field (UN, 2013).

Table I

Number of United Nations civilian personnel affected by security incidents in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012

Category of security incident	2009	2010	2011	2012
Loss of life as a result of acts of violence	31	5	26	20
Loss of life as a result of safety-related incidents	14	19	44	15
Injury as a result of acts of violence	110	68	145	112
Injury injured as a result of safety-related incidents	80	164	166	209
Abduction of personnel	22	12	21	31
Robbery of personnel	254	239	417	408
Residence break-in	26	35	20	31
Aggravated assault of personnel	72	64	31	44
Sexual assault of personnel	–	9	5	4
Burglary of residence of personnel	436	385	418	493
Intimidation of personnel	249	210	224	209
Harassment of personnel	29	17	46	52
Arrest and detention of personnel	163	211	195	165
Total	**1 486**	**1 438**	**1 759**	**1 793**

Source: United Nations General Assembly A/68/489

Along the same lines, figure I confirms that the humanitarian personnel deployed in the field represents nearly all of the affected population. On the other hand, figure II shows the personnel affected by significant security incidents comparing the United Nations with NGO implementing partners. There is a notable difference between the total amount of personnel affected in each of these categories.

Finally, figure III shows the statistics of the affected personnel according to sex. While this research does not include the total number of women deployed in the field in PKO, the

available statistics refer to all United Nations personnel, where women represent about 40% and approximately 37.5% of the personnel affected by serious security incidents. On the other hand, as shown in the above figure, female personnel were more affected by certain types of incidents. For example, women accounted for about 52% of all officials robbed and approximately 100% of the victims of sexual assault.

Figure I

Distribution between headquarters and field locations of personnel deployed and personnel affected by security incidents worldwide

Source: United Nations General Assembly A/68/489

Figure II

United Nations versus non-governmental organisations implementing partner personnel affected by significant security incidents (1 January 2012-30 June 2013)

Source: United Nations General Assembly A/68/489

Figure III

Female and male personnel affected by security incidents (2012)

Source: United Nations General Assembly A/68/489

The United Nations has been criticised for applying inflexible security processes, which means that the organisation sometimes avoided all risks while, on other occasions, it was accused of forcing personnel to take unnecessary risks. In response to these criticisms and on the understanding that the organisation should be able to achieve results in difficult circumstances in terms of security, the system of the organisation has developed a set of tools to better gauge these risks (UN, 2012). In this context, *the framework for the critical importance of programs* was created in recent years to determine the necessary level in specific activities in a given place and time. The critical level of importance is then used for the model of acceptable risk, in order to ensure that the United Nations personnel does not take unnecessary risks and that those remaining in the country work on the highest priority activities in accordance with the strategic results of the United Nations. This framework also allows country program directors to design programs and activities that take into account foreseeable, known and acceptable risks.

This improvement carried out by the organisation in its security management system[35] has its roots in the change of the approach to security management, moving from *when to get out* to *how to stay.* Therefore, one of the main challenges is the need to achieve a balance between security risks and programmatic imperatives, especially as regards activities in high-risk areas (UN, 2013). Thanks to this new approach, which is currently known as *stay and deliver*, the United Nations has been able to continue running decisive programs despite the serious security problems.

This is the context in which current PKO operate and security is clearly one of the essential factors to be taken into account bearing in mind that the physical and mental integrity of the humanitarian personnel is a crucial factor for the functioning of the PKO. Therefore, and to address threats in the field, the fundamental principle of the aforementioned security management system of the organisation is based on the fact that it is the government of the host country which has the primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and the people they are responsible for, as well as of the property belonging to the organisation[36]. This, together with the fact that almost all Member States of the United Nations are party to the Convention of the United Nations

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[35] The United Nations security management system comprises all UN organisations and external entities which have an agreement with the United Nations in terms of security management.
[36] Bruderlein and Gassman (2006) consider that there are no clear descriptions about the meaning of this responsibility in practical terms.

Security and associated personnel[37], means that they must take all the appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and its associated personnel, especially when they are deployed in their territory.

Despite these responsibilities, there are instances where security and protection are uncertain. Often, due to economic hardship or lack of qualified personnel, governments may not be able to provide the necessary protection when there is a partial or complete breakdown of law and order resulting in an increase of criminal activity. Concerning the role of the host government, a study by the OCHA (2012) also reveals that most aid agencies do not want the State to be directly responsible for providing security for humanitarian personnel, because this protection can paradoxically increase insecurity due to perceptions of bias regarding its action. It can also make it difficult to give an unbiased answer to the needs if access depends on the state armed police or military escorts. Finally, the study adds that within this protection framework, the humanitarian personnel could fall under the collateral risk of violence, such as coming under crossfire when accompanied by armed escorts.

Under these circumstances, it may be necessary for the United Nations to take further measures to improve the safety and security of its personnel. This is the case of scenarios in which PKO are deployed. To deal with these situations, the United Nations has a system of security planning and management aimed at establishing a coordinated approach for the protection of its personnel. The main mission of this system is to enable an efficient and effective management of the authorities of the United Nations while, at the same time, ensuring that the safety, security and well-being of its personnel is a top priority according to the circumstances of each region.

Therefore, each workstation in the field has a specific security plan that takes into account the political and geographical situation as well as other circumstances specific to the place where the PKO is deployed. The United Nations security management system uses five phases to classify the different levels of risk and insecurity, which require a number of specific mandatory measures to be implemented in terms of security procedures[38]. Phases can be implemented in chronological order or as the situation dictates as a result of rapid

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[37] United Nations document A/RES/49/59 (1994).
[38] Phase 1: Precautionary; Phase 2: Restricted movement; Phase 3: Relocation; Phase 4: Emergency operations; Phase 5: Evacuation. These phases are established by the UNDSS (United Nations Department of Safety and Security).

development of events. It is also important to note that part of a country may be in a different phase than the rest.

The primary security management tool at the place of destination is the Security and Contingency Plan, which should be established by the appointed security teams. This plan describes the different security measures to be adopted and the steps to be followed in case of serious crime events or major emergencies, such as hostilities, internal unrest or natural disasters. The purpose of a security plan is to detail the responsibilities of specific individuals, the actions to be carried out and the sequence to be followed by the humanitarian assistance personnel that is informed of these plans.

Particularly in PKO, the designated official (DO) is responsible for the security of humanitarian personnel and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is responsible before the Secretary-General for the security of all civilians working for all the organisations of the United Nations system throughout the designated area. The DO is supported by the Chief of Security Adviser (CSA), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Security Management Team (SMT) which oversees the security mechanisms in the country where the PKO is deployed.

While the safety and security of the personnel and premises depend heavily on the specific situation of each country, some key guidelines such as the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) were developed. These standards are established, implemented and monitored by the CSA and the DO (UN, 2008). The purpose of the MOSS is to establish a minimum standard of security measures in the field to improve the security of the personnel, reduce risks and enable the operations on the ground.

The *Field Security Handbook*[39] (ONU, 2006) establishes that MOSS is a fundamental policy for all United Nations operations to be carried out in the field. This was developed in response to the threats and risks faced by United Nations personnel to ensure that the minimum essential security procedures were established and the necessary facilities available to reduce this risk. The team in each particular country where the PKO is deployed must develop and implement a specific MOSS for each mission following the policies of MOSS as a starting point. The MOSS are connected to the phases declared by

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[39] Field Security Handbook of the United Nations.

the UNDSS. In this sense, if a phase change is declared, the MOSS must be adjusted as quickly as possible.

2. Challenges faced by civilian personnel providing international humanitarian assistance: a vision from the actors themselves

2.1 Training before going into the field

In the previous chapter, it was stated that the training of humanitarian personnel -whether it be pre-deployment or *in situ*- is an essential component in order to face multiple challenges in the field. Many of the testimonies gathered by this investigation revealed that they had received an appropriate training regarding safety and security in the field. However, not all of them stated that they felt prepared for an emergency. Moreover, most complained of the lack of information on the specific tasks to be performed according to the sector to which they were assigned, *"upon arrival, we received an induction week to the mission and we were told we would receive information specific to our sector once we were deployed in our sub-regional base, but it never happened",* said one respondent.

In addition, testimonies from several people indicated that they felt inadequately prepared for the place into which they were deployed, because they did not have specific information about the living conditions they would face in their respective regional bases, information that they often considered vital for their survival: "*we were not properly informed of the difficulties we would face... that we would not have a suitable place to live and that there would be no food... they should have warned us"* said one respondent. Another explained that the information provided did not correspond to the reality found at the base to which the interviewee was assigned, *"we were not properly informed... the water found in the base had passed its expiry date and there was no food".*

Finally, some respondents stated that, despite having received induction training conducted *in situ*, sometimes the ignorance of the rules persisted. Along these lines one interviewee[40] stated that "*at the beginning of the mission I did not respond to radio checks for four or five days... I knew it was compulsory to answer the base but did not know that if I lost the call, I could contact them later".*

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[40] This corresponds to the experience of a determined interviewee when deployed for the first time.

2.2 The observance of the rules of the organisation

To minimise the risks faced by humanitarian personnel it is crucial for them to strictly observe the security measures dictated by "those responsible for assessing the risks of a specific area." The United Nations emphasises the fact that all personnel of the organisation are responsible for their own security, regardless of the geographic location to which they are assigned and are also responsible for compliance with all policies and security procedures of the organisation (UN, 2006). These measures vary according to the phase declared in each PKO. For example, the personnel is responsible for timely processing the authorisation for travel and movement, for attending mandatory safety trainings, for being properly equipped according to the specific requirements of the deployment site (radios, satellite phones), for responding to the radio checks in the radio-room with the indicated frequency and for strictly respecting the curfew. In phase III of the UNDSS, it is mandatory to travel by convoy, with at least two drivers per vehicle and to have at all times a run-away bag[41] with a maximum weight of 15 kg ready for a possible evacuation.

Fieldwork demonstrates that security measures are not always observed by those who must comply with them. The culture of indifference among humanitarian personnel with regard to security measures (Bruderlein and Gassman, 2006: 75) is one of the factors that are present among interviewees: several of whom not only revealed the failure to strictly follow the rules of the organisation but that also, at times, ignored them completely. Some confessed their own negligence or laziness as regards the observance of certain measures. In this sense, one interviewee said "*I should have the 15 kg run-away bag ready for emergencies, but hey, the truth is that I didn't pack it*". On the other hand, another interviewee admitted to not having followed the precise security instructions in significantly dangerous contexts:

> *"That day Abdiján[42] ordered us to pass the night in the offices and my colleagues left because they wanted to go back home for dinner... moreover, we had to respect the curfew that had been established by the president from 19.00... but at 21.00 my colleagues were gone and I was left all alone*

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[41] The bag must contain essential items such as sufficient water and canned food to survive for a few days until the personnel can be evacuated. Faced with the possibility of this event, the personnel must also have several copies of their passport, making sure that all radios and mobiles as well as the tank of the vehicle are fully charged.

[42] Location of the UNOCI central headquarters.

in the office with the Jordanians[43] next to the base... but at midnight I decided to go... I did not want to sleep in the office alone".

2.3 Dilemmas regarding compliance with security regulations

The importance of the MOSS rules to operate according to those established by the authorities of the organisation has already been mentioned. However, this research reveals that strict compliance with the MOSS rules could mean the delay and even paralysis of a work agenda. Several respondents said that the dynamics required to fulfil certain tasks was in contradiction with certain safety rules:

"The biggest challenge I face here in Afghanistan is the fact that there are so many security restrictions that they are really affecting our work, we cannot leave the field as often as we would like... there are many restrictions on movement for security reasons ... for example, the security officer will tell you that you can only stay for four hours in the EMB[44] when in fact, you should be there all day... accessibility is a big issue when security is complicated, it really limits our work".

In this sense, the convoy rule, which requires at least two drivers per vehicle[45], according to interviewees, is very difficult to follow if other drivers are not available: "*I could not drive during working hours if a member of the local staff was not available to accompany me"* said one respondent, while another said *"only one person in our team had a driving license[46], so it was very difficult to move around".* This last statement reveals the difficulty to comply with certain safety procedures such as the rule of the two drivers, especially considering that the respondent was referring to a context of phase III of the UNDSS.

The processing of the necessary permits to be able to move in the field[47] can also become fraught with obstacles depending on whether the resources of the mission are electronic or

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[43] To refer to the blue helmets.
[44] Electoral Management Body.
[45] The convoy rule is applied depending on the phase declared in the PKO and taking into account the distance of the journey from the base.
[46] Driving UN vehicles is considered to be a privilege and PKO grants electronic driving licenses, essential to start up vehicles, to all personnel who, being authorised by their national driving licenses, pass the theoretical and practical examination of the UN to be entitled to drive their 4X4.
[47] There are two permits for the same trip: The first one is the MOP (movement of personnel), which must be processed and authorised by the immediate supervisor, after which security clearance can be obtained from the corresponding security personnel. Permits must be processed at least 48 hours before travelling and must contain detailed information about the dates, routes, vehicles and passengers.

manual, and according to the availability and speed of the officials responsible for processing permits. Several respondents expressed the difficulty of moving in the field with all the papers in order, often being forced to move without the support of these documents. The interviewees also emphasised the difficulty of attending last minute important meetings because the permits, which must be authorised by two people, must be sent at least 48 hours in advance. Therefore, the dynamics involving the fluctuations of an agenda of activities may be disrupted by mobility restrictions.

Convoys escorted by UN blue helmets[48]

2.4 Management problems and the impact of public opinion

Several interviewees have pointed to the management problems of the organisation in general and particularly to those related to personnel. The general perception is that the level of competence and integrity of the deployed personnel has a significant impact, not only on the physical integrity of the staff but also on the reputation of the organisation, which, in turn has an impact on the life and work of the personnel deployed in a PKO.

To attract and retain qualified personnel is crucial for the PKO to function. As declared by the United Nations Charter, securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity is one of the considerations to take into account when recruiting the staff (UN, 1945: Article 101). According to the organisation, being a humanitarian professional of the United Nations requires extraordinary professionalism, dedication and utmost moderation. Although the organisation considers that the vast majority of the women and men serving in United Nations PKO do, indeed, possess these rare qualities, it also recognises that

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[48] Source: photographic record of the author of the thesis, taken in January 2011.

recent experience has shown that the actions of a minority who do not possess such qualities can result in irreparable damage to the reputation of the mission and the United Nations, as a whole (ONU, 2008). One respondent highlighted the damage that actions of this minority can cause to the mission and its staff:

> *"Last year at a check-point they found weapons in a UN truck that was going to Torit and nobody could explain why these arms were there... that meant a big setback for the UN... there, they believed that the UN was giving weapons to the government's opponents... from then on, they began to examine absolutely everything when we had when we were on the move... before that, we used to have more of a green light for our movements".*

UN MILOBS[49] **with local authorities on a Check Point**[50]

To be specific, the very lives of humanitarian personnel may be in grave danger due to the recruitment of dysfunctional personnel. The fieldwork of this thesis revealed that almost all respondents referred to the incompetence of some officials of the organisation, giving examples of different situations and circumstances. One respondent reported that:

> *"We almost crashed in Khartoum due to a haboob*[51]*... the pilot decided to land in the storm and had to take off again in a crosswind... they were dismissed from the mission for this negligence... six months later that same crew died in a plane crash in the Congo*[52] *along with 35 other UN*

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[49] Military observers.
[50] Source: photographic record of the author of the thesis, taken in December 2011.
[51] Sandstorm.
[52] The crew was hired by MONUSCO after being fired by the UNMISS.

personnel... they hire someone with very few flight hours and those of us in the field, pay the consequences".

On the other hand, it is also crucial for the Secretary-General's maximum representatives to comply with the implementation of the Security Plan and ensure that all movement of humanitarian personnel is carried out according to the rules and procedures of the United Nations (UN 2006). However, some respondents reported events directly associated with the negligence of PKO authorities, who had authorised operations in areas that had been previously negatively evaluated by those responsible for security:

"Last year, a missile was launched at a helicopter and a convoy carrying humanitarian aid was ambushed, killing 37 people. So far, no one has claimed responsibility for these actions... the SRSG authorised something that security said could not be done... these are the rumours although there is nothing on paper... many people died in this mission due to poor communications... many deaths could have been avoided".

Integrity is another quality that the organisation takes into account when hiring its personnel. However, this is another of the points on which the interviewees stated that they felt uncomfortable about colleagues who, in some cases they suspected and in other cases they were sure that they did not meet this requirement. One respondent stated:

"Unlike international staff, local employees[53] did not rotate and this was problematic in terms of corruption, especially when projects involved money... this affected the relationship because that corruption significantly affected the work... and also several of them showed , although not openly, threatening attitudes and this frightened many members of the international personnel."

The problematic relationship with certain colleagues has been a prominent feature in this investigation. Several respondents expressed having difficulties to relate to colleagues who have a high degree of conflict with the environment. They also pointed directly to the

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[53] Employees hired locally by the PKO may constitute up to 75% of all civilians serving a mission.

shortcomings in the administrative system and how the United Nations manages personnel recruitment.

Helicopters and airplanes for the transport of UN personnel[54]

2.5 The instability in the field

In a post-conflict context in which PKO operate, hostilities do not end abruptly. On the contrary, the peace achieved is always fragile, clashes continue at a lower level and they are always likely to come to an escalation of violence which could return the situation to its initial status. Also, this latent threat could be exacerbated in circumstances of high political and social sensitivity such as electoral events, when violence could suddenly explode. Without going any further, two of the respondents were evacuated from their corresponding PKO because of the violence triggered after the results of the elections.

The fieldwork of this research has collected several testimonies that indicate the high instability of the field in the context of electoral events in four PKO deployed on three continents. One respondent emphasised the speed at which events unfold in these scenarios: *"ten minutes after the election results were announced on the radio, we had 500 people demonstrating at the entrance to our small UN base*[55]*. That day I was very scared."* Another interviewee commented that *"after the first round of elections, there were riots and acts of violence as a result of the version that there had been a fraud... the city was in flames... and we had to stay confined to the base for a week because of the violence."* The testimony of another interviewee also adds a reference to the unpredictable character of the situations they face in contexts of high sensitivity and instability such as electoral events:

"I was helping an NGO that was carrying out a campaign of electoral awareness among the people ... we were distributing posters, explaining to the people how to vote, when, suddenly, four huge, heavily armed, men descended from a latest model white 4x4 and ordered me to stop what we were doing... I refused and gave them the number of the DSRSG[56]... they then went as if nothing happened... they were some sort of "mafia" of the people".

It is also important to highlight the fact that such changeable and effervescent contexts are ideal for generating a climate of confusion and tension that can lead to violent riots. Any false argument or wrong or malicious interpretation of reality can initiate an escalation of violence in the interests of different groups striving to obtain power. On these lines, one interviewee described a confusing episode that became a major scandal and discredit for the mission:

"50 per cent of people thought that Gbagbo had won the election but that the United Nations and the international community had indicated Ouattara to be the winner... in the second round, Gbagbo won in my region with 86 per cent of the votes... I remember that the day after the results of the election, we suddenly saw a group of young people with machetes on our base and we got scared... then we found out that they had, in fact, been called by the Jordanians to work with machetes in the garden of the base... these young people, like the Jordanians were Muslims... and this episode was used by pro Gbagbo Christians, who detest pro Ouattara Muslims, to publish in every newspaper in the country that the UNOCI was arming and training young pro Ouattara Muslims on our base".

Finally, another testimony shows that in highly volatile environments, violence with devastating consequences can occur, both for the country and for the security of humanitarian personnel:

"When the referendum resulted in the independence of Timor, Indonesia showed its fury by destroying all the country's infrastructure... and we had to

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[56] Deputy of Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

evacuate... when I returned to Timor in 2000, the country was a plain, there was nothing left. They had destroyed everything established by the UN, they stole everything, burned everything, they had to rebuild the country from the scratch".

2.6 The reputation of PKO and their relationship with local actors

The previous section highlighted how sometimes, due to various circumstances and episodes, the reputation of the PKO is controversial and this not only affects the vulnerability of the personnel operating in the field but also has an impact on their relationship with different stakeholders such as the police and local inhabitants. Several interviewees described incidents of violence which they were subjected to by local security forces despite the full validity of the international legal instruments which protect them as staff of the United Nations. Respondents linked several of these acts of violence to the discredit sometimes suffered by the PKO. Other interviewees also attribute it to the characteristics of police officers themselves "*I was driving back to the base and suddenly a soldier came and started to hit my car".* Another one stated:

> *"... Me and my colleagues have noticed that they are losing respect... the police does not care whether or not you are part of the UN... a colleague was obliged to get out of the car and was hit and ended up badly wounded in the hospital... these people consume a lot of alcohol, they are armed and can shoot at you... they are illiterate people wearing uniforms... there are quite dangerous circumstances where they aggressively ask for your identification... they are very sadistic..."*

Finally, the respondents who participated in MINUSTAH made it clear that the reputation of the mission was seriously affected after local people associated the mission with the cholera epidemic. One of the testimonies pointed directly to the inability of the organisation to recognise the problem in time, and stressed that *"the outbreak began in October 2010, and MINUSTAH neither acted quickly nor acknowledged the issue... this brought much resentment from the local population towards the mission and its workers".*

National police posing with one of the UN blue helmets[57]

2.7 The ambiguity of the relationship between PKO and the authorities of the host country

The relationship with the authorities of the host country can vary from cooperation to a lack of understanding on crucial issues for the functioning of a mission. Humanitarian personnel are the first to suffer the consequences of the PKO relationship with the authorities of the country they are helping. As already mentioned, sometimes the same national authority that has allowed the establishment of a PKO in their country is the one which can later block a crucial process to advance in the efforts to achieve a lasting peace process. This can be reflected either by actions that hamper the normal performance of the affected personnel of the mission or by complete inaction in order to sabotage previously agreed processes.

This research has found testimonies that evidence these circumstances in processes of major political importance in the missions. In this sense, the lack of cooperation of the Khartoum government for the timely issue of visas for the humanitarian personnel responsible for providing technical assistance for the referendum of independence of Southern Sudan created serious operational problems in the field, to the extent that many positions to be covered were left vacant and a large number of deployed personnel had to be in charge of at least two positions. This episode can be interpreted in line with what the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) warned as regards the manipulation of consenting to the PKO by restricting the freedom of movement of members of the operation or through the systematic non-compliance with an agreement.

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[57] Source: photographic record of the author of the thesis, taken in January 2011.

In this sense and directly related to the delay in granting visas by the government staff, one respondent revealed: "*I arrived at the mission with a job position and, once there, I was told that, due to the lack of human resources, I would have to take two positions, that means two different terms of reference".* The situation of another respondent in the same context proved to be even a little more unusual: "*I was hired as training officer but when I arrived I was told that there were very few people in the field because they could not get visas for those who still had to come, and so that I had to work as logistic officer".*

Likewise, the unwillingness of the authorities of the host country to facilitate the establishment of PKO contingents can not only have an impact on the most essential aspects regarding the basic living conditions of the humanitarian personnel but also on their performance in implementing other tasks. One respondent explained that:

> *"The RSB (referendum support base) now called CSB (country support base) was one of the logistical challenges of the mission and still is. There are many factors that hinder their establishment, but that of having to negotiate with local authorities was a major obstacle, because the government always tries to get the most it can from the organisation; when choosing where to build we also had to negotiate with the locals, the challenges of sending material to remote locations by air is not cheap at all, generators, vehicles and all the infrastructure. Despite all the effort, many of our colleagues were living in extreme conditions: because we were not able to supply them with drinking water, they were without electricity due to the lack of fuel for generators and living in tents under extreme heat, with little food in the place..."*

Finally, in PKO established on the other side of the Atlantic, another interviewee highlighted the challenge that their relationship with local authorities represented to develop their work as a human rights officer:

> *"The Haitian government is an obstacle for its own development, it does not allow it to happen... for example, preventive arrests... the person in charge of the prison in Port-au-Prince is simply not willing to solve the problem...*

nor is willing to improve the situation of women in prison... that's not a problem which concerns the mission or the United Nations ... there's nothing you can do"

2.8 The infrastructure in the field and the problem of remote stations

Overall, and with exceptions such as the UNOCI in Ivory Coast[58] (OECD, 2006: 238), fragile or post-conflict scenarios where PKO operate are within the framework of very limited, destroyed or nonexistent infrastructure. The inexistence of power lines, water, sanitation, roads and highways are the toughest challenges to be faced in the field as regards operations. In particular, road conditions, or the lack thereof, not only hinder the implementation of the mandate but also put into evidence the main risk that humanitarian personnel face and is that which most complicates the execution of their tasks (UN, 2013: 6). Moreover, these circumstances result in the fact that the personnel experiences other problems related to health and access to food, or a combination of these factors: some respondents even reported having health problems due to inadequate food to which they had access during their period of service in the field.

The humanitarian personnel that operates in large geographical areas, such as the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) or the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) must face the additional challenge of carrying out most of their logistics by air using helicopters. The most problematic circumstances are suffered by those deployed in a mission in remote areas. The fact that they have to rely on the air transport, both for their movements and for the provision of essential items for daily life can be a frustrating experience, mainly due to two types of restrictions: budget, which extremely limits the availability of flights, and inclement weather, especially during the rainy season when most of the flights are cancelled, thereby further restricting the mobility of humanitarian assistance and contributing to the shortage of essential items such as food.

On this point, all those interviewed agreed that the difficulty of having access to food[59] was one of the main challenges, mainly due to problems of infrastructure, which had a significant impact on their daily lives, especially during the rainy season, which made it

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[58] Despite the civil war that took place in Ivory Coast, its infrastructure remained intact.
[59] It is assumed that in many cases, the PKO are deployed in areas of low economic development where food production is minimal and even the most basic food such as rice has to be imported.

more difficult in terms of logistics. However, it is important to clarify that respondents who participated in MINUSTAH pointed out that this PKO was one exception to this: Despite the serious problems of infrastructure in Haiti, especially in Port-au-Prince after the earthquake of 2010, all the testimonies stated that, even in remote areas of the mission, they did not experience any problems in accessing food. They even described a varied diet in terms of protein and other nutrients. This is one of the main reasons why respondents defined the MINUSTAH as a *five star mission.*

Regardless of the described operational problems, a significant risk associated with the fact of being deployed in a remote area dependent on helicopters occurs when there is a need to evacuate humanitarian personnel for health reasons. In this regard, one respondent stated *"there is no way to evacuate people at night, we do not have the equipment to fly in the dark... this place is like a dark tunnel, like all remote stations..."*

Notwithstanding the foregoing, on a sub-regional level there are movements that are carried out overland in order to execute certain tasks, such as the monitoring of projects, meeting with local partners, patrolling, delivery of humanitarian aid or any other task in accordance with the terms of reference of the staff. These movements are carried out despite the lack of roads or the deplorable state of the trails. Several of those interviewed said they required hours or even a day to go to and return from a particular location despite the fact that the distances were relatively short , sometimes not more than 35 km.

This logistical situation directly affects the most basic aspects of daily life. Along these lines one respondent said: *"We had serious problems... first: we had no water for showers or for the toilet or kitchen... we had to travel seven kilometres by car to fill water containers... the lack of water was something really difficult to deal with".* Another respondent also stated having neither adequate living facilities nor enough food, *"at the beginning I had to live in a hut and then in a tent... I had nothing to eat".* Those interviewed who were assigned in the most remote areas of deployment within a mission repeated the same testimonies. An aerial view of a base in a remote area can be observed in the image below.

Aerial view of a UN sub-regional base in a remote area[60]

2.9 The stress in the field and other daily factors with an impact on health

Entering a PKO generally implies a sudden and radical change in living conditions. Many humanitarian workers are from industrial cities where they enjoy what are considered to be the basic comforts of everyday life and suddenly go to a place where all those comforts disappear.

Additionally, one of the first factors associated with stress in a PKO is that almost all of these are non-family duty stations, which means that the staff is strongly discouraged to bring family members to the mission area. In this regard, the United Nations does not help the staff to obtain visas nor for the use of the organisation's transportation but, most importantly, it does not include the family of the staff in safety plans and possible evacuation in case of emergency. Therefore, staff should be prepared to be distanced from their family and loved ones for long periods of time, plus the fact that access to internet and phone networks can be very limited for a permanent contact with their country of origin.

The context of the humanitarian assistance work is inherently stressful. Humanitarian personnel carry out their tasks in complex scenarios where problems related to prolonged civil wars, extreme poverty, personal tragedies and natural disasters are constant. Regardless of their role, the staff works and lives in challenging or unpleasant conditions characterised by an overwhelming workload, chronic fatigue, exposure to endemic

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[60] Source: photographic record of the author of the thesis, taken in May 2012.

infections and extreme weather conditions. The threat generated by stress in the field is an inevitable challenge faced by the staff and represents a factor which cuts across the rest of the challenges.

All the interviewees consulted for this research said they had suffered health problems derived from the environmental conditions where they were deployed, especially malaria, an infection that was contracted by almost all respondents on many occasions. However, only two of those interviewed said they had been evacuated from the mission due to health problems: one of them because of a severe degree of cerebral malaria and the other due to a burn out. The variety of diseases and epidemics present in the environments where PKO are deployed are many and the stress generated by the permanent risk of contracting these diseases is inevitable. One of the witnesses detailed the cocktail of threats that have an impact on health and the risk that it implies on the lives of the staff:

> *"An Australian passed away... he died on the plane when he was being evacuated. He got falciparum malaria, which is the type of larva that goes to the brain and if you do not attack it immediately it becomes cerebral malaria... There is also the risk of contracting the sleeping sickness caused by the bite of the tsetse fly... They give you four tablets a year to protect you from the virus that provokes blindness... there are many poisonous snakes that represent a great danger... there is also cholera due to those internally displaced persons who are on the base, so we are administered vaccines... but the highest risk now is Ebola, many controls are carried out on people arriving from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Mali".*

Moreover, respondents also referred to the lack of privacy and personal space as a source of stress. This lack of personal space is very common especially in remote or high-risk areas where the personnel have to live in closed areas where United Nations containers coexist: some are used as offices and others as staff accommodation. Several interviewees indicated the stress caused by the lack of intimacy and privacy as one of the great challenges of everyday life during the mission: *"It is a real challenge to live and work in the same place... the same person working next to your desk, is the Head of Human Rights, and the same you see every night brushing their teeth... this privacy is very challenging".*

The degree of difficulty faced by humanitarian workers in the field and the consequences they must face vary according, not only to the particular mission, but also to the workstation where they are assigned within each mission. It is important to note that each specific context creates a number of sources of stress, which means that the risks suffered by the personnel also vary. Not only are there different workplaces within a PKO but also different types of humanitarian work and these involve different levels of stress.

The research puts greater emphasis on the circumstances of remote work stations or those that are more complex in terms of security. These differ from those which have more stability or from the PKO headquarters of the organisation where several of the challenges identified throughout this thesis are more attenuated. This does not mean that the humanitarian personnel working in the headquarters do not go through the situations of risk that are common to all personnel deployed (Antares, 2012: 8) but it is also true that certain basic aspects of daily life are better resolved here than in more remote workstations or those whose security is of a complex nature.

Containers for residential use in a UN sub-regional base [61]

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[61] Source: photographic record of the author of the thesis, taken in March 2011.

3 The protection of civilians: Is this a direct threat for the personnel providing humanitarian assistance?

As discussed in the previous chapter, the protection of civilians (POC) under imminent threat of physical violence is a central element in PKO mandates in the post-Cold War. This is partly as a result of one of the greatest lessons learned after the mentioned failures of the organisation to protect civilians in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 90's. However, the recent escalation of violence in some regions led to the review of PKO mandates giving the highest priority to the POC. This led to a more flexible way of protecting civilians. One interviewee talks about the effects of the recent implementation of these methods:

> *"It's the first time that the UN allows a huge number of people to enter our base... many people had to be buried here... imagine how you work with all the crosses at your side... there are now 10,000 people living on the base without latrines with the consequent risk of diseases and epidemics that this implies... giving them access to the base means we have feed them and give them water... and on top of that they tell you that the food is not good... people coming in stampede and finishing everything off is a latent risk... now they do not want to go because they have water, electricity here... in fact they cannot go... because if they leave, they will be killed."*

Given the recent nature of the implementation of this innovative method of POC, without precedent in the history of the organisation, this research considered this testimony to be extremely important because it reveals how the implementation of the priorities mandated by the Security Council are improvised and the risks that this implies for humanitarian personnel who work and live on the UN bases. These bases, which are currently being used to house internally displaced people, are also subject to constant threats by soldiers who attempt to contact civilians inside the same. In this sense, and if these methods of POC continue to spread, it becomes necessary to consider to what extent this will have an impact on the vulnerability of humanitarian personnel.

Internally displaced people (IDP) in a UN base[62]

Conclusions

In June 2014, the Secretary-General of the United Nations highlighted before the Security Council in New York that an increasing number of peacekeeping operations are being deployed in regions where there is *little peace to keep*. He added that these operations are being authorised without clearly identifying the parties in conflict or in the absence of a viable political process. He also emphasised the complex contexts in which peacekeeping operations are conducted and defined the threats of these environments as asymmetric and unconventional. Finally, and although he welcomed the renewed commitment of the Security Council to approve mandates which match the changing nature of conflicts in which peacekeeping operations operate, the Secretary-General stated that further discussion is needed on how operations are adapted to these new demands. He placed great emphasis on the need to clarify the limits of the operations and whether or not these are the most appropriate tool. All these circumstances were taken into account when concluding that it is time, as was the case fifteen years ago with the Brahimi Report (2000), to undertake a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations. In this sense he instructed the Secretariat to initiate such a review in the areas involved.

There is no doubt that peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War are complex and dangerous. They are carried out in volatile scenarios as a result of the implementation of mandates that are more ambitious than those of the bipolar era and they situate those who implement them in a direct line with the threats in a hostile terrain. Consequently, humanitarian personnel are increasingly exposed to risks associated with participation in multidimensional operations. This coupled with the recent adoption by the Security Council of robust mandates and new methods for the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, which, although they manage to save the lives of many civilians, also increase the vulnerability of humanitarian personnel.

This has been the field of investigation of this master's thesis, which used a set of statements obtained from in-depth interviews and exchanges with the main actors of the missions. Not only did it address the set of challenges that the personnel face in relation to situations of violence inherent to conflict or post-conflict scenarios, but also questioned

many associated factors related to the protection of the staff. It refers to circumstances such as traffic accidents mainly resulting from a destroyed or nonexistent infrastructure; deployment in precarious conditions involving serious difficulties in accessing essential elements such as water and food; the risk for life that diseases and infections derived from the field conditions imply, coupled with the difficulty of accessing diagnosis and treatment in a timely manner from remote areas and the shortcomings of the management system of the organisation that have a direct and indirect impact on the physical integrity and welfare of the staff. On the other hand, the thesis analysed how indifference and the lack of observance by the staff concerning safety and security rules and recommendations of the Organisation is another factor that increases the vulnerability of personnel deployed in the field.

The changing nature of conflicts in which peacekeeping operations are carried out –and, therefore, the change in their role- requires the United Nations to respond to new challenges affecting the staff responsible for implementing mandates approved by the Security Council. The research conducted for this thesis shows that it is a priority for the staff recruited by the organisation to comply with the highest standards of ethics and professionalism, thus not only protecting the rest of the personnel, but also the reputation of peacekeeping operations and, ultimately, that of the Organisation.

As regards peacekeepers themselves, the focus point is not only the creation of new frameworks but also the need to comply with the codes of conduct and rules established by the organisation and to ensure that the appropriate measures against those who ignore these obligations are also taken. In this regard, further efforts must be made when recruiting personnel to be deployed in remote areas, since the dynamics of these stations make officers more vulnerable and therefore more interdependent. Taking into account the living conditions in these areas, the cohesion of work teams -crucial for both the welfare of the group and for the development of tasks- can only be ensured through the recruitment of highly flexible, responsible professionals, committed to the mission and the values of the organisation. In this sense, it is not only crucial to increase the preparation and training of the personnel deployed as regards the management and provision of essential tools to perform their duties, but also to put special emphasis on their awareness of the same so that they can benefit from the Organisation's efforts to reduce their vulnerability.

In line with the questions and issues raised, a window of opportunity will soon be opened, based on the results of a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations. This was recently requested by the Secretary-General and its implementation can, without doubt, have a significant impact on the conditions of staff recruited and deployed in operations.

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ACRONYMS

UNCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
GA	General Assembly
EC	European Commission
IC	International civilian
SC	United Nations Security Council
CSA	Chief security adviser
DFS	Department of field support
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants
DO	Designated official
DPKO	Department of peacekeeping operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
EMB	Electoral Management Body
MILOBS	Military observers
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation enRépublique démocratique du Congo
MOSS	Minimum Operational Security Standards
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PKO	Peacekeeping operations
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
UN	United Nations
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
POC	Protection of Civilians
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
SMT	Security Management Team
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
AU	African Union
EU	European Union
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNASMIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leona
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNV	United Nations Volunteer

APPENDIX I

Peacekeeping operations since the creation of the United Nations

LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
1948 - 2013

Acronym	Mission name	Start Date	End Date
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948	Present
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January 1949	Present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956	June 1967
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958	December 1958
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	October 1962	April 1963
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963	September 1964
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	Present
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965	October 1966
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965	March 1966
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973	July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	Present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988	February 1991
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989	January 1992
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991	October 2003
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991	present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991	April 1995
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991	March 1992
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	February 1992	March 1995
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992	September 1993
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	June 2009
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	December 1994	May 2000
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	May 1995	January 1996
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	March 1995	February 1999
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January 1996	January 1998
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	January 1996	December 2002
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997	May 1997
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000

LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
1948 - 2013

Acronym	Mission name	Start Date	End Date
UNCPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998	October 1998
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999	June 2010
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	July 2008
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	Present
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	Present
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004	Present
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	March 2005	July 2011
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	August 2006	December 2012
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007	Present
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	December 2010
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	July 2010	Present
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	June 2011	Present
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	July 2011	Present
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	April 2012	August 2012
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	April 2013	Present
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	April 2014	Present

APPENDIX II

Political and peacebuilding missions

ONGOING POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS

| UNOWA | UNSMIL | UNSCOL | UNSCO | UNRCCA |
| West Africa | Libya | Lebanon | Middle East | Central Asia |

| UNIOGBIS | UNOCA | BNUB | UNSOM | UNAMI | UNAMA* |
| Guinea-Bissau | Central Africa | Burundi | Somalia | Iraq | Afghanistan |

* Mission directed by the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Map No. 4147 Rev. 42(E)   UNITED NATIONS
April 2014

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi	established: 2011
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	established: 2002
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	established: 2003
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	established: 2010
UNOCA	United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	established: 2011
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa	established: 2001
UNRCCA	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	established: 2008
UNSCO	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	established: 1999
UNSCOL	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	established: 2007
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya	established: 2011
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	established: 2013

APPENDIX III

General information about peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations since 1948	**69**
Ongoing peacekeeping operations	16
Ongoing peacekeeping operations led by the Department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO)	17
Uniformed personnel	97,518
International civilian	5256
United Nations Volunteer (nationals and internationals)	2020
Mortal victims since 1948	3,215
Budgets approved July-2013-June-2014	7,83 billions

Source: Elaborated by the author[63]

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[63] Figures taken from the fact sheet prepared by the Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information, in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations — DPI/1634/Rev.155 — April 2014.

APPENDIX IV

Training and practice centres for the personnel providing humanitarian assistance

CENTRE	COUNTRY
Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)	Germany
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)	Austria
Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Center	Australia
Royal Institute for International Relations (Egmont)	Belgium
Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)	Denmark
Crisis Management Centre (CMC)	Finland
Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA)	France
International Training Centre (ITC)	Hungary
Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), Sweden	Sweden
Centre for European Perspective (CEP), Slovenia	Slovenia
Sant' Anna School of University Studies & Doctoral Research	Italy
George Mason University, Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP)	USA
International Peace Academy	USA
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (NIIB),	The Netherlands
International Alert (Alert), United Kingdom	United Kingdom

Source: Elaborated by the author

APPENDIX V

Map of the peacekeeping operations currently deployed

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations since 1948	69
Current peacekeeping operations	16
Current peace operations directed by by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)	17

PERSONNEL

Uniformed personnel (as of 31 March 2014) (83,571 troops, 12,094 police and 1,853 military observers)	97,518 *
Countries contributing uniformed personnel	122
International civilian personnel (as of 31 January 2014)	5,256 *
Local civilian personnel (as of 31 January 2014)	11,723 *
UN Volunteers (as of 31 March 2014)	2,020 *
Total number of personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations	116,517 *
Total number of personnel serving in 17 DPKO-led peace operations	118,111 **
Total number of fatalities in peace operations since 1948	3,215 ***

FINANCIAL ASPECTS (US$)

Approved budgets for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014	About 7.83 billion
Outstanding contributions to peacekeeping (as of 31 March 2014)	About 1.73 billion

MISSIONS DIRECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

MINUSMA Mali | MINURSO Western Sahara | MINUSCA Central African Republic | UNMIK Kosovo | UNFICYP Cyprus | UNTSO Middle East | UNIFIL Lebanon | UNDOF Syria | UNMOGIP India and Pakistan

MINUSTAH Haiti | UNMIL Liberia | UNOCI Côte d'Ivoire | MONUSCO Dem. Rep. of the Congo | UNAMID Darfur | UNMISS South Sudan | UNISFA Abyei | UNAMA* Afghanistan

* Numbers include 16 peacekeeping operations only. Statistics for UNAMA, a special political mission directed and supported by DPKO, can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/pphm.pdf

** This figure includes the total number of uniformed and civilian personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations and one DPKO-led special political mission—UNAMA

***Includes fatalities for all UN peace operations

APPENDIX VI

Statistics about PKO currently deployed

AFRICA

MINUSCA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

Date of deployment	April 2014
Civilian personnel	N/D
Uniformed personnel	11,820 (deployment planned 15/09/2014)
Mortal victims	N/D

MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

Date of deployment	April 2013
Civilian personnel	566
Uniformed personnel	7469
Mortal victims	8

UNMISS – UN Mission in South Sudan

Date of deployment	July 2011
Civilian personnel	2604
Uniformed personnel	8747
Mortal victims	25

UNISFA - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

Date of deployment	June 2011
Civilian personnel	187
Uniformed personnel	4,124
Mortal victims	13

MINUSCO - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Date of deployment	July 2010
Civilian personnel	4509
Uniformed personnel	21,189
Mortal victims	72

UNAMID - African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Date of deployment	July 2007
Civilian personnel	4412
Uniformed personnel	22,623
Mortal victims	192

UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Date of deployment	April 2004
Civilian personnel	1,303
Uniformed personnel	9,433
Mortal victims	118

UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia

Date of deployment	September 2003
Civilian personnel	1,492
Uniformed personnel	7,439
Mortal victims	182

MINURSO - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Date of deployment	April 1991
Civilian personnel	278
Uniformed personnel	231
Mortal victims	15

AMERICA

MINUSTAH - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Date of deployment	June 2004
Civilian personnel	1775
Uniformed personnel	7980
Mortal victims	171

ASIA AND PACIFIC

UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

Date of deployment	January 1949
Civilian personnel	70
Uniformed personnel	110
Mortal victims	11

EUROPE

UNMIK - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Date of deployment	June 1999
Civilian personnel	351
Uniformed personnel	368
Mortal victims	55

UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Date of deployment	March 1964
Civilian personnel	149
Uniformed personnel	996
Mortal victims	181

MIDDLE EAST

UNDOFS - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Date of deployment	June 1974
Civilian personnel	146
Uniformed personnel	1,406
Mortal victims	45

UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Date of deployment	March 1978
Civilian personnel	938
Uniformed personnel	10,224
Mortal victims	303

UNTSO - The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

Date of deployment	May 1948
Civilian personnel	219
Uniformed personnel	158
Mortal victims	11

Source: Elaborated by the author with information from the UN website in July 2014.