The donor ‘human rights’ schizophrenia : aid cuts for human rights violations or the high costs of having good intentions
MetadataShow full item record
This thesis is devoted to challenging the idea that human rights violations should be a reason to cut foreign aid. While the issue is regarded as a matter of individual donor policy, if any, some provisional theoretical orientation for reconsidering and reframing such a practice is discussed here, along with a call for a more thorough and observant approach to human rights both in policy formulation and associated decision-making. The aforementioned stance is formed in relation to two factors: donors’ general attitude towards human rights in their foreign aid policies, and general objections that can be made to use of conditionality in aid. A closer focus on human rights conditionality reveals inconsistencies related to recipient’s ownership in development, donor’s assumption of a judicial role, and the difficulties associated with its implementation which lead to it lowered effectiveness. Finally, the mere hypothesis of feasibility of conditionality leveraging human rights improvements is put to a test, as it seems to be unable to address the complexity of situation at stake.