The erosion of the right to freedom of thought: how to safeguard mental autonomy in the digital age?

Abstract

This thesis examines whether the existing human rights framework adequately protects the right to freedom of thought in the face of emerging digital and neurotechnological threats. It argues that although this right is formally recognised under international law, it remains poorly defined, weakly enforced, and increasingly vulnerable to erosion through algorithmic manipulation, behavioural profiling, and immersive persuasive technologies. Drawing on interdisciplinary sources from law, philosophy and science, the study demonstrates that current protections are insufficient to address the subtle yet profound ways in which mental autonomy is being compromised. It makes the normative case for strengthening the right’s legal status, through doctrinal clarification, regulatory innovation, and integration into digital governance. The thesis proposes a multidimensional safeguarding strategy that includes legal reform, public policy, ethical design standards, public awareness, and critical education. Special attention is given to children as a uniquely vulnerable group, whose cognitive development is at risk without early interventions. Ultimately, the work calls for a shift from reactive legal protection to proactive societal cultivation of freedom of thought as a foundational condition for democracy, dignity, and self-determination in the digital age.