The paradox of constitutional reforms in The Gambia: implications for democratic transition

Abstract

This study examines the persistent failure of constitutional reforms in The Gambia following the 2017 political transition, despite widespread domestic support and international backing. The transition, which marked the end of Yahya Jammeh’s two-decade authoritarian rule, raised expectations for transition to democratic governance, including the adoption of a new constitution to replace the 1997 Constitution. Through a qualitative case study approach, the research employs Elster’s theory of constitution-making, along with theories of political settlement and elite bargaining, to analyse the motivations, constraints, and interests that shaped the constitution-making process. Drawing from policy documents, media publications, and academic literature, the study identifies elite fragmentation as a primary reason that undermines constitutional reforms in The Gambia. Other factors, such as a lack of political will, institutional weaknesses, and the continued influence of authoritarian-era elites, also emerge as contributing factors to undermining the constitutional-making process, according to the findings. The findings reveal that while the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) Draft Constitution represented a progressive and inclusive framework, its rejection by parliamentarians underscored the dominance of narrow political interests over national consensus. The study concludes that the failure of constitutional reform will continue to have a significant impact on Gambia’s future democratisation process. It then offers policy recommendations for inclusive, transparent, and elite-consensual constitution-making processes, contributing to the broader discourse on democratic transitions in Africa.